North Korea Chemical Overview

This page is part of the North Korea Country Profile.

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North Korea claims that it does not possess chemical weapons (CW). While assessing CW stockpiles and capabilities are difficult, the DPRK is thought to be among the world’s largest possessors of chemical weapons, ranking third after the United States and Russia. ¹ In 2012, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) estimated that the DPRK possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of chemical weapons. ²

According to the South Korean MND, over 70% of North Korea’s ground forces, supported by thousands of artillery systems, are deployed within 90 miles of the DMZ. ³ The U.S. Department of Defense has described this as an “offensively oriented posture.” ⁴ South Korean daily Chosun Ilbo, reported in 2002 that chemical weapons were suspected to be among those deployed near the DMZ in forward units. ⁵ Chemical weapons could potentially be used in the early stages of an attack to debilitate key metropolitan areas in South Korea. ⁶

North Korea remains one of the few countries not to have signed or acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). North Korea has signed the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of CW in warfare, but does not prevent a state from producing or possessing them. ⁷ The DPRK refused to acknowledge having chemical weapons as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which was passed in October 2006 following North Korea’s underground nuclear test.

North Korea may possess between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of CW agents. ⁸ The South Korean government assesses that North Korea is able to produce most types of chemical weapons indigenously, although it must import some precursors to produce nerve agents, which it has done in the past. ⁹ At maximum capacity, North Korea is estimated to be capable of producing up to 12,000 tons of CW. Nerve agents such as Sarin and VX are thought be to be the focus of North Korean production. ¹⁰

According to the government-sponsored Korea Research Institute of Chemical Technology [한국화학연구원] in South Korea, North Korea has four military bases equipped with chemical weapons, 11 facilities where chemical weapons are produced and stored, and 13 dedicated research and development facilities. ¹¹ Two facilities near the cities of Kanggye and Sakchu are reportedly equipped to prepare and fill artillery shells with CW agents. These two locations also allegedly test agents, possibly in large underground facilities. ¹² However, there has been no open source evidence of new storage facilities. ¹³

North Korea’s weak economy has resulted in severe shortages of both energy and raw materials, making estimating the country’s CW production levels even more difficult. ¹⁴ It is possible that Pyongyang is allowing its existing CW cache to age due to these economic circumstances, which could make them unreliable on the battlefield — if usable at all. This may be particularly true of what is thought to be the majority of the DPRK’s cache: unitary munitions which hold a single canister of lethal chemicals, rather than the more stable binary system, holding two or more stable chemicals which are combined at deployment. ¹⁵

Nevertheless, North Korea has a considerable and capable, albeit aging, chemical industry able to produce dual-use chemicals such as phosphate, ammonium, fluoride, chloride, and sulfur. ¹⁶ In recent years, the DPRK has continued to acquire dual-use chemicals that could potentially be used in its CW program from abroad (China, Thailand, Malaysia). ¹⁷

North Korea is believed to be capable of deploying its stockpile of chemical agents through a variety of means, including field artillery, multiple rocket launchers, FROG rockets, Scud and Nodong missiles, aircraft and unconventional means. ¹⁸ Additionally, U.S. military authorities believe there is long-range artillery deployed in the DMZ, along with ballistic missiles capable of delivering chemical warfare agents. ¹⁹

In the aftermath of the Korean War and in light of the perceived nuclear threat from the United States, North Korea sought a less costly alternative to nuclear weapons. ²⁰ An indigenous chemical industry and chemical weapons production in North Korea have their roots in the ‘Three Year Economic Plan’ that spanned the years from 1954 to 1956, the period immediately following the Korean War, and the first ‘Five Year Plan’ from 1957 to 1961. However, significant progress was not made until the first ‘Seven Year Plan’ (1961-67). ²¹ At that time, Kim Il Sung issued a “Declaration for Chemicalization” whose aim was to further develop an independent chemical industry capable of supporting various sectors of its economy, as well as support chemical weapons production. ²² The DPRK established the basic organization of the current Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau at this time. ²³

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the DPRK received assistance from both the Soviet Union and China in developing its nascent chemical industry. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated in May 1979 that the DPRK had only a defensive CW capability. ²⁴ Estimates vary as to when North Korea is believed to have acquired the capability for independent CW production. Some sources suspect it was not until the early 1980s, and others speculate it was as early as the 1970s. ²⁵ By the late 1980s, the DPRK was capable of producing substantial amounts of CW agents and deployed a large number of chemical weapons munitions. ²⁶ In January 1987, the South Korean MND reported that the DPRK possessed up to 250 metric tons of chemical weapons, including Mustard (blister agent), and some nerve agents. ²⁷ By 2010, the MND’s estimate had climbed to 2,500 to 5,000 metric tons of chemical agents, including nerve agents. ²⁸

Scarcity Requires External Sources

During the 1990s, DPRK was forced to turn to foreign sources for precursors required in manufacturing nerve agents. In 1996, an employee of a Kobe, a Japan-based trading company, was caught trying to export 50 kg of sodium fluoride and 50 kg of hydrofluoric acid to North Korea via North Korean cargo vessels. Japanese authorities arrested the individual and charged him with illegally trading chemicals for weapons production, specifically, Sarin. ²⁹

It came to light in the fall of 2004 that China and Malaysia had exported to North Korea in the previous year without government approval, a considerable amount — more than 100 tons in one case – of sodium cyanide, a dual-use chemical that could be used to manufacture both hydrogen cyanide (blood agent) and Tabun (nerve agent). In the case of China, South Korea had originally exported the chemicals, which China then re-exported to North Korea. Another such attempt via Thailand was reportedly thwarted. ³⁰

North Korea and the Chemical Weapons Convention

Since 1997, the ROK government has been unsuccessful in convincing the DPRK to join the CWC. ³¹ The DPRK has also rebuffed similar efforts on the part of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Japanese government. ³² In theory, North Korea’s accession to the CWC could convey long-term economic advantages for the DPRK through treaty-controlled chemical and technology trade. In the short term, however, North Korea is not likely to join the CWC regime. ³³

Allegations of Human Testing

Activists, North Korean defectors, and the South Korean government have reported charges of chemical weapons experimentation on humans. However, no publicly available evidence has substantiated the allegations. ³⁴ In 1994, the South Korean National Unification Board reported to the National Assembly that Pyongyang was testing CW on its political prisoners. ³⁵ In 2004, a BBC-produced documentary titled “Access to Evil” alleged that the DPRK had tested CW on its political prisoners. However, numerous discrepancies in the film questioned its veracity. ³⁶ In response to the documentary, South Korea seemed to demur on its previous assertions. A spokeswoman for South Korea’s Unification Ministry said, “We have no official comment on whether humans were used for tests…there are areas [of the documentary] that are not completely free of doubt.” ³⁷ Activists have asserted that the South was being diplomatic in order to avoid confrontation with the North. In 2013, Human Rights in North Korea, citing defector testimony, alleged that the DPRK was testing CW on political prisoners and disabled children at Detention Camp 22 (Hoeryong Concentration Camp) and an island off South Hamgyong Province. ³⁸ In February 2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council reported accounts of CW use on disabled persons; however it could not independently verify the accuracy. ³⁹

While there is no evidence that North Korea’s CW program is growing, South Korea continues to take the threat seriously. A month after North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing civilians with conventional munitions, the South Korean National Emergency Management Agency distributed 1,300 gas masks to residents of islands along the disputed western border, as well as an additional 610,000 to boost numbers amongst the 3.93 million civil defense corps members. The Agency also said it would renovate existing emergency shelters located at subway stations and underground parking lots to protect against chemical weapons. ⁴⁰ These efforts seem to assuage fear more than anything else, as gas masks cannot protect against blister agents that affect the skin such as Mustard, Lewisite, and Phosgene oxime, which North Korea is believed to possess. In October 2013, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to build a joint surveillance system to detect biochemical agents along the demilitarized zone. This agreement will also enable information sharing on vaccines and diseases. ⁴¹

North Korea may have contributed to Syria’s chemical weapons program. In 2009, Greece seized 14,000 chemical suits from a North Korean ship believed to have been bound for Syria. In April 2013, Turkish authorities seized small arms, ammunition, and gas masks from a ship flying under the Libyan flag. According to the captain of the ship, the cargo came from North Korea and was to be transported from Turkey to Syria over land. ⁴² In February 2018, a leaked report from the UN Panel of Experts found that North Korea had supplied the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad with equipment which can be used in the production of chemical weapons, including acid-resistant tiles, valves and thermometers. ⁴³

On 13 February 2017, Kim Jong-nam, the half-brother of DPRK leader Kim Jong-un, was attacked from behind by two women at the Kuala Lumpur airport, who wiped his face with cloths. He died on the way to the hospital, after complaining of pain in his face and having a seizure ⁴⁴. Following an investigation, Malaysian authorities announced that Jong-nam had been killed using the chemical nerve agent VX. ⁴⁵ Police hypothesize that each woman had a different compound of VX on their cloths, harmless individually but deadly when combined. ⁴⁶ On 10 October 2017, a Malaysian government chemist testified that the concentration of VX found on Kim Jong-nam’s skin was 1.4 times greater than the median lethal dose. ⁴⁷

North Korea rejected claims that it was behind the assassination, instead citing the attack as a conspiracy between Malaysia and South Korea. ⁴⁸ On 6 March, 2018, the United States imposed additional sanctions on North Korea under the Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Control Act of 1991, having come to the determination that the North Korean government was responsible for Kim Jong-nam’s assassination using VX. ⁴⁹