Pakistan Chemical Overview

This page is part of the Pakistan Country Profile

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Pakistan is not known to have ever possessed a chemical weapons (CW) program. The country has signed and ratified the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and is a member in good standing of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). ¹

Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris characterize Pakistan as having, “the world’s fastest-growing nuclear stockpile.” ² According to the SIPRI 2018 Yearbook, Pakistan possesses between 150 and 160 nuclear weapons. ³ Pakistan has stockpiled approximately 3.4 ± 0.4 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and produces enough HEU for perhaps 10 to 15 warheads per year. Pakistan also has a stockpile of about 280 kg of weapons-grade plutonium . In addition, the Chashma reprocessing plant that began operations in 2015 is thought to have expanded Pakistan’s plutonium production capability by 50-100 kg per year. ⁴ Pakistan has completed work on all four reactors at the Khushab facility, where the Khan Research Laboratories greatly increased its HEU production capacity. Satellite imagery of the fourth and last reactor at Khushab from January 2015 verified the complete external construction, including the presence of steam that signified its operation. ⁵

Over the past thirty years, several countries and media outlets have periodically raised allegations of a possible Pakistani chemical weapons program. Absent clear and independently verifiable evidence, however, the veracity of these claims is unknown. Citing European intelligence documents, The Indian Express, an Indian newspaper, alleged in 1997 that Pakistan had a well-developed CW program dating to the late 1970s. ⁶ This assertion was based primarily on apparent evidence of Pakistani efforts to import large quantities of dual-use chemicals such as phosphorous compounds and arsenic, and the absence of their use in the civilian chemical industry – the report cites the intelligence document as stating that “there is no explanation for the accumulation of these chemicals.” ⁷

United States intelligence assessments from the early 1990s similarly noted that Pakistan “has procured dual-use chemical precursors from foreign sources and hopes to achieve self-sufficiency in producing precursors.” ⁸ However, it is unclear to what extent, if any, Pakistan developed chemical weapons based on this capability. In 1991, the United States Director of Naval Intelligence listed Pakistan as one of a number of states that “probably possess” an “offensive CW capability,” while in 1992 the Director of the CIA asserted that in addition to nuclear weapon programs, both India and Pakistan “have pursued chemical weapons.” ⁹ In the wake of Pakistan’s May 1998 nuclear tests, the U.S. Department of Commerce imposed sanctions on a large number of entities related to nuclear and missile proliferation, as well as a few chemical and biological facilities, including: the Karachi CBW Research Institute; the Karachi CW & BW Warfare R&D Laboratory; the Multan Chemical Fertilizer Plant; and the Wah Chemical Product Plant. ¹⁰ However, the United States lifted these sanctions in 2001, and there is no conclusive evidence that any of these companies has engaged in offensive chemical weapons research or development. ¹¹ By 2001, the Department of Defense noted that “Pakistan is working towards establishing a viable commercial chemical industry capable of producing a variety of chemicals, some of which could be used to make chemical agents.” ¹²

Islamabad has consistently denied allegations that it pursued an offensive chemical weapons program, and has spoken in favor of CW arms control. ¹³ Pakistani officials have consistently denied any offensive chemical weapons program, and have spoken in favor of CW arms control. Simultaneously, Pakistan has insisted that the trade of chemicals for peaceful uses should not be overly hindered by any treaty. ¹⁴ As a confidence-building measure, Pakistan and India signed a Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in 1992, undertaking not to develop, produce, acquire or use chemical weapons, and both countries signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993. However, upon ratification of the CWC in June 1997, India declared that it had conducted “testing and development of chemical weapons” for defensive purposes and that CWC-prohibited chemicals existed in certain military facilities. ¹⁵ Pakistan decried India’s declaration as a breach of the 1992 Joint Declaration, but Islamabad nonetheless ratified the treaty later that year and did not declare any chemical agent production facilities or stockpiles. ¹⁶

Pakistan has also been accused of supplying chemical weapons or chemical substances to non-state actors. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union alleged that Pakistan had armed insurgents battling Soviet forces in Afghanistan with cartridges and grenades containing toxic chemicals. ¹⁷ In the mid-1990s, the deposed Afghan government similarly accused Pakistan of supplying the Taliban militia with chemical weapons. ¹⁸ However, neither of these claims could be independently verified. In 1998, Indian police officials reportedly seized two kilograms of cyanide and the anesthetic fluothane from Sikh separatists in the state of Punjab. ¹⁹ Punjab police officials subsequently identified the Pakistani military’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate as the source of the chemicals, and alleged that the arrested militants intended to poison the water supply or to target a military or paramilitary base in the country. ²⁰ There is no independent evidence to support the Indian officials’ assertions.

Subsequent to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, evidence surfaced that senior Pakistani nuclear scientists Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudhry Abdul Majeed may have helped Al-Qaeda develop concepts for the aerial dispersion of chemical and biological warfare agents. ²¹ In 2002, Pakistani police also unearthed chemical laboratories belonging to the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a militant Islamic group with links to Al-Qaeda, in the port city of Karachi. Investigations revealed that the group was preparing to produce poisonous gases for a possible terrorist attack. ²² It appears that these groups and individuals were acting independently without the knowledge or support of the Pakistani government.

In 1999, the Pakistani government announced a mandate for all domestic chemical producers to “furnish details of the chemicals” imported or used in Pakistan. ²³ In October 2000, Islamabad promulgated the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance to prohibit the development, production, and use of CW in accordance with its obligations under the CWC. The law also criminalizes the unauthorized transport or transfer of chemical weapons or toxic dual-use chemicals and chemical agent precursors. ²⁴ The OPCW has conducted a number of inspections of industrial facilities in Pakistan engaged in the production of CWC-scheduled chemicals, and none of these have resulted in publicly known irregularities. ²⁵

Pakistan has continued to play an active role in the OPCW, supporting provisions to increase trade and assistance in the peaceful uses of the chemical industry as consistent with the positions of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). ²⁶ Although the country’s domestic chemical industry has continued to grow, Pakistan still relies on imports for many raw materials and intermediate chemicals. In 2010, Islamabad released the Chemical Weapons Convention (Implementation) Rules, which established requirements for all companies dealing with CWC-scheduled chemicals to make declarations, obtain permits, and receive inspections. ²⁷