Fact Sheet

Pakistan Missile Overview

Pakistan Missile Overview

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Background

This page is part of the Pakistan Country Profile

Pakistan’s missile program is rapidly evolving, achieving greater accuracy, payload capacity, and range. Both their ballistic and cruise missile programs have benefited from foreign assistance. Moreover, Pakistan is becoming a seller of missiles and missile technology while remaining outside the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Pakistan sees its ballistic and cruise missile programs as key to its strategy to deliver nuclear weapons. It continues to balance against India‘s conventional superiority and follows a high-frequency testing schedule. Pakistan considers its nuclear weapons to be national “crown jewels” and likely holds missile delivery systems in a similar regard. Barring substantial changes in South Asian geopolitics, a change in attitude seems unlikely. Pakistan is still reliant on foreign partners to acquire and develop missile technology. Pakistan also remains a non-signatory to the MTCR, but the United States waived the last U.S. missile sanction laws against Pakistani entities in 2003. 1

Capabilities

Ballistic Missiles

Pakistan has a variety of deployed ballistic missiles ranging from tactical battlefield weapons to medium-range ballistic systems with the ability to hit any target in India. Pakistan currently deploys three tiers of ballistic missiles: battlefield short range ballistic missiles (BSRBMs), short range ballistic missiles (SRBM), and medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs).

The Army’s primary BSRBM is the Hatf-1 (1, 1A and 1B models) with a range of 70 to 100 km depending on the variation. Although listed as a ballistic missile capable of carrying an unconventional warhead, the Hatf-1 is not a guided missile, and more closely resembles battlefield artillery. In November 2013, the Army successfully test fired the Nasr (Hatf-9) BSRBM. 2 The Nasr is a 60-120 km range missile, launched from a multi-tube launcher capable of launching four missiles before reloading. 3 The Nasr reportedly is designed to counter India’s Cold Start and limited war strategy. 4 The system is a quick reactionary “shoot-and-scoot” missile that can be launched on minimal notice and quickly moved to another location for a second launch. The development of the Nasr raises serious proliferation concerns, as it provides a quick-launch battlefield nuclear deterrent weapon that could easily lead to force escalation or an arms race of similar weapons and deterrent systems in the region. In February 2013, Islamabad conducted a test launch of the Abdali (Hatf-2) BSRBM. 5 The Abdali is a more traditional launch system with a single vertical launch capability. Whereas the Nasr fulfills the role of a tactical, battlefield deterrent, the Abdali, with a range of 200km, will serve as a more traditional short-range strategic deterrent. 6

Pakistan deploys two SRBMs: the Hatf-3 and Hatf-4 series. The Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) has a range of 300 km and the Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4) 750 km. The Shaheen-1 is based on the Chinese M-11 (China: Dongfeng-11; CSS-7). Pakistan is also thought to have deployed a variant of Shaheen-1, called Shaheen-1A (Hatf-4) with the range of 900 km.

Islamabad’s most advanced missiles, and the cornerstones of Pakistan’s deterrent arsenal, are the Ghauri and Shaheen MRBMs. The Ghauri (Hatf-5) is based on the North Korean NoDong missile and has a range of 1250 km. The Hatf-6 series (Shaheen-2 and 3) is two-stage road mobile missile with a range of 1,500-2,750 km and capable of carrying a 1000 kg payload. 7

Cruise Missiles

Pakistan currently has three cruise missiles in development with land, air, and sea launch capabilities. The Babur (Hatf-7) is a mobile land-based missile with a range of 350 km. 8 The Hatf-7 is designed to fly at low altitudes to avoid radar detection and can carry nuclear warheads. 9 An improved version of Babur, The Babur-2/1(B) is being developed with a range of 700 km. Pakistan most recently tested an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), named Ra’ad (Hatf-8) is armed with conventional warheads and capable of hitting targets at a range of 350 km. 10 Pakistan has indicated that it is working on a sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), knows as Babur-3 and it is most likely based on the American Harpoon missile, but experts are uncertain about the reliability or sophistication of these capabilities. 11 12

History

1960 to 1990: Space Research and a Nascent Missile Program

Pakistan began to develop rocketry expertise in the early 1960s at the Space Sciences Research Wing of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). In September 1961, the PAEC Space Sciences program began sending lead engineers and scientists to the United States for rocket launch training with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 13 In June 1962, Pakistan successfully launched a two-stage rocket. 14 By the account of at least one U.S. missile proliferation official, Pakistan’s sounding rocket program directly enabled its future missile programs. 15

Functioning de facto as an independent agency since 1964, President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq formally established the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) as Pakistan’s national space agency in 1981. 16 In 1989, a year after India’s Prithvi test, Pakistan launched the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 missiles. 17 Both American and Indian observers denoted the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 as SUPARCO-modified French research rockets. 18 Analysts also concluded that SUPARCO benefited from substantial technical assistance from China. 19

The Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 suffered from limited range and accuracy. The lack of mass production efforts suggests that Pakistan intended the missiles be used primarily as training tools. 20 Thus, despite the successful test-flights of SUPARCO’s Hatf-1 and Hatf-2, U.S. assessments into the 1990’s continued to name American F-16 combat aircraft sold to Pakistan in the 1980’s as Pakistan’s most likely nuclear delivery option. 21

1990 to 2001: Arms Race with India, Interagency Competition, and Foreign Assistance

Unlike India’s more regional outlook, Pakistan’s security concerns remained focused on the threat from India. However, Indian-Chinese relations indirectly motivated Pakistani missile proliferation. India’s disastrous military campaigns against China, and the emergence of a nuclear China in the early 1960s, motivated both an Indian arms build-up as well as India’s refusal to participate in missile control agreements absent Chinese participation. 22 The difficult relationship between India and China thus increased the perceived security threat in Pakistan and created an irresolvable logistical hurdle to any India-Pakistan missile control regime. 23

In 1990, the Bush administration imposed Pressler Amendment sanctions on Pakistan, banning military assistance to Pakistan while it maintained a nuclear weapons program. 24 In the decade that followed, intense clandestine missile projects culminated with the successful launch of several intermediate-range missiles. In so doing, Pakistan demonstrated the effectiveness of an organizational structure characterized by contentious interagency competition between the Chinese-assisted solid-fuel PAEC program under Dr. Samar Mubarakmand and the North Korea-assisted liquid-fueled program at Khan Research Lab (KRL) under Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. 25

China, motivated in part by competition with Soviet-armed India, agreed to sell M-11 missiles, launchers, and support equipment to Pakistan in 1988. 26 SUPARCO subsequently surfaced as the destination for numerous illicit materials transfers. In 1996, Taiwan and Hong Kong seized numerous shipments of several tons of Ammonium perchlorate (AP), a solid-propellant component, bound for SUPARCO from North Korea and routed through China. 27 28

In June 1991, H.W. Bush administration imposed sanctions against SUPARCO and two Chinese firms for M-11 missile technology transfers. 29 In August 1993, the Clinton administration imposed new sanctions after discovering additional M-11 exports to Pakistan. 30 These sanctions weakened Chinese support and Pakistan responded by turning to other sources. 31 In 1993, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who would come to regard herself as the “mother of the missile program,” travelled to Pyongyang and secured the transfer of Nodong missile technology on behalf of Dr. A.Q. Khan and his solid-fueled missile development program at Khan Research Lab (KRL). 32 Fearing obsolescence, and unsuccessful through much of the 1980’s, A.Q. Khan leveraged North Korean assistance to quickly transform KRL into a vibrant rival for PAEC. 33 Some report that A.Q. Khan struck additional technology transfer deals with North Korea outside the purview of Pakistan’s state negotiations. 34 Circumstantial evidence points to an agreement by either the Pakistani government or A.Q. Khan to exchange nuclear secrets for missile technology. 35

By the end of the decade, both programs would demonstrate intermediate-range missile launch capabilities. On 3 July 1997, SUPARCO successfully launched the Hatf-3/Ghaznavi missile. One year later, KRL test fired the liquid-fueled Hatf-5 (Ghauri) missile. Winning the race for an intermediate-range missile, KRL’s Ghauri brought New Delhi within range. 36 Analysts immediately noted design similarities with the North Korean Nodong missile. 37 A year later, KRL launched the Hatf-5A (Ghauri-2), with increased range capable of striking most of India. A day later, PAEC successfully fired the Hatf-4 (Shaheen-1), introducing solid-fueled intermediate-range capabilities to the Pakistani arsenal. The successful launches of the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles occurred nearly concurrently with the debut of India’s Prithvi and Agni-2 missiles. The chronology of Pakistani missile tests is consistent with arms competition not only with India, but also between KRL and PAEC.

In October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf seized power and overhauled Pakistan’s nuclear command-and-control structure. 38 While the official justification for the reforms was to “establish harmony between Pakistan’s poorly coordinated and competitive” agencies, some speculate that Musharraf also sought to “knock out the one person in Pakistan most likely to eclipse him: The Father of the Bomb.” 39 Under the new organizational scheme, weaponization and delivery activities were transferred from PAEC and KRL to the National Development Complex (NDC). 40 While uncertainty exists about whether KRL retained the Ghauri program, NDC nevertheless now stands as Pakistan’s primary missile development agency. 41

2001 to 2010: Interagency Harmonization and Technological Maturity

The period between 2002 and 2006 marked a flurry of missile test-flights in a “tit-for-tat” pattern with India, with the two countries generally scheduling flight tests within days of each other and often concurrent with politically sensitive events such as elections. 42 In total, three Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi) tests, six Hatf-6 (Shaheen-1) tests, five Hatf-5 (Ghauri-1) tests, and five Hatf-6 (Shaheen-2) tests occurred. 43 By the conclusion of this period, Pakistan would claim solid-fueled capabilities of 2,000-2,500km range with 1,000kg payload, and liquid-fueled capabilities of 1,300km with a 1,000kg payload, bringing almost all of India within nuclear strike range.

The 2005 inaugural test-flight of the Hatf-7 (Babur) cruise missile stunned many observers for its technological complexity and because its development had gone undetected. 44 The extent of foreign assistance remains unclear; analysts identified design similarities with Chinese cruise missiles as well as American Tomahawk missiles, which previously crash-landed over Pakistan. 45 In 2007, Pakistan test-fired the Hatf-8 (Ra’ad) cruise missile, adding air-launch missile capabilities to the Pakistan Air Force. 46 While Pakistan officially claimed that NDC indigenously developed the Hatf-8, some believe that the modest range of the missile suggests foreign assistance by a country unwilling to contravene MTCR range and payload restrictions. 47

In 2005, India and Pakistan signed an agreement requiring both parties to provide advance notice of any ballistic missile tests. 48 Since 2007, testing activity of the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles has slowed, and the majority of new developments have appeared in cruise, rather than ballistic missile systems. 49 Potential causes for this include India’s investment in a ballistic missile defense system, the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles acquiring sufficient range and payload to target strategic locations in India, international pressure against intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile tests, and a shift in focus toward developing a tactical nuclear capability. 50

2011 to Present: Improvements in Ballistic Missile Capabilities

In 2012, the Pakistan’s government announced that the Naval Strategic Forces Command had been created with the responsibility of maintaining and controlling Pakistan’s second-strike capabilities. 51 The government also hinted that it had developed sea-based launch systems, but since then Pakistan has kept the state of these systems publicly ambiguous. 52

Pakistan also tested the short-range ballistic missile Hatf-2 (Abdali) in February 2013. 53 Pakistan tested its nuclear-capable Hatf-9 (Nasr) SRBM and Hatf-6 (Shaheen-2) MRBM in September and November of 2014. 54 In December 2015, Pakistan test launched the Shaheen-3 ballistic missile with a range of up to 1,700 miles, placing all of India within striking range, 55 and in January 2016, it tested the Ra’ad air-launched cruise missile. 56 Pakistan tested the Ghauri in April 2015, a nuclear capable medium range ballistic missile developed by Khan Research Laboratories. 57 Pakistan also tested its medium-range ballistic missile, the Shaheen-1A nuclear-capable missile, in December 2015. 58

Recent Developments and Current Status


In January 2017, Pakistan army announced that it has conducted its first successful flight test of a SSBM, called Ababeel, which has a maximum range of 2200 kilometers. The missile is said to be capable of delivering multiple warheads, using Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology, making Pakistan the first country in South Asia to demonstrate MIRV capability. 59

In April 2018, Pakistan announced that it has successfully test-fired an enhanced-range version of its indigenously developed Babur cruise missile, known as Babur-1B, with range of 700 km. 60

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Glossary

Ballistic missile
A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.  The flight of a ballistic missile includes three phases: 1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; 2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and 3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target.  Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters - range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision.  Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets.
Cruise missile
An unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path. There are subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles currently deployed in conventional and nuclear arsenals, while conventional hypersonic cruise missiles are currently in development. These can be launched from the air, submarines, or the ground. Although they carry smaller payloads, travel at slower speeds, and cover lesser ranges than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be programmed to travel along customized flight paths and to evade missile defense systems.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
The MTCR: An informal arrangement established in April 1987 by an association of supplier states concerned about the proliferation of missile equipment and technology relevant to missiles that are capable of carrying a payload over 500 kilograms over a 300-kilometer range. Though originally intended to restrict the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles, the regime has been expanded to restrict the spread of unmanned aerial vehicles. For additional information, see the MTCR.
Nuclear weapon
Nuclear weapon: A device that releases nuclear energy in an explosive manner as the result of nuclear chain reactions involving fission, or fission and fusion, of atomic nuclei. Such weapons are also sometimes referred to as atomic bombs (a fission-based weapon); or boosted fission weapons (a fission-based weapon deriving a slightly higher yield from a small fusion reaction); or hydrogen bombs/thermonuclear weapons (a weapon deriving a significant portion of its energy from fusion reactions).
Sanctions
Punitive measures, for example economic in nature, implemented in response to a state's violation of its international obligations.
Deployment
The positioning of military forces – conventional and/or nuclear – in conjunction with military planning.
Tactical nuclear weapons
Short-range nuclear weapons, such as artillery shells, bombs, and short-range missiles, deployed for use in battlefield operations.
Deployment
The positioning of military forces – conventional and/or nuclear – in conjunction with military planning.
Deterrence
The actions of a state or group of states to dissuade a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict through the credible threat of retaliation. To be effective, a deterrence strategy should demonstrate to an adversary that the costs of an attack would outweigh any potential gains. See entries for Extended deterrence and nuclear deterrence.
Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM)
A missile designed to be launched from an aircraft and jet-engine powered throughout its flight. As with all cruise missiles, its range is a function of payload, propulsion, and fuel volume, and can thus vary greatly. Under the START I Treaty, the term "long-range ALCM" means an air-launched cruise missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

Sources

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