Fact Sheet

Nuclear Disarmament Pakistan

Part of Nuclear Disarmament Resource Collection

Nuclear Disarmament Pakistan

Arsenal and Missile Types

Arsenal Size

  • Estimated stockpile: 170 nuclear warheads. Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are not deployed on launchers but kept in central storage facilities1
  • Continues to produce HEU and plutonium for its nuclear weapons program.2

Key Delivery Systems

  • Operational Nuclear-capable aircrafts: Mirage III/V
  • Operational land-based ballistic missiles: the short-range Abdali (Hatf-2), Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), Shaheen-I/IA (Hatf-4), Nasr (Hatf-9) and the medium-range Ghauri (Hatf-5), Shaheen-II (Hatf-6)
  • Operational cruise missiles: ground-launched Babur-1A (Haft-7)
  • Under development: Shaheen-III (medium-range ballistic missile). Ababeel (medium-range ballistic missile capable of carrying mutiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles), Babur-2 (ground-launched cruise missile). Babur-3 (sea-launched cruise missile).3

Capabilities and Developments

Estimated Military Fissile Material Stockpiles

  • Estimated plutonium stockpile: 580 kilograms.
  • Estimated weapons-grade HEU: 5.3 ± 1.5 tons4
  • It is estimated that Pakistan is producing enough fissile materials to build 14-27 warheads per year.
  • Operates HEU enrichment facilities in Kahuta and Gadwal.
  • Operates heavy water plutonium production reactor complex at Khushab, and plutonium reprocessing plant at the New Laboratories facility of the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH).5

Commitments and Policies

Disarmament and Commitments to Reduce Arsenal Size

  • Pakistan has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.6

Future Commitments

  • Pakistan has blocked the start of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, insisting that the treaty must include the elimination of fissile materials produced in the past due to its concerns over India’s larger stockpile.7
  • Attended the three Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons—Oslo, March 2013; Nayarit, February 2014, and Vienna, December 2014.8
  • Pakistan did not participate in the 2017 Nuclear Ban Treaty negotiations at the UN General Assembly.9

Nuclear Weapons Policies

Nuclear Testing Policy

  • Pakistan has observed a nuclear testing moratorium since May 1998. Pakistan renewed its proposal for a bilateral moratorium on testing with India in August 2016.10
  • Party to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (banning atmospheric, outer space, and underwater testing)11
  • Pakistan has not signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)12

Use of Nuclear Weapons

  • Has not declared a No First-Use policy
  • Maintains the principle of the credible minimum deterrence posture, while employing full-spectrum deterrence13
  • Ratified the Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities between India and Pakistan in 1989
  • Agreed on the Lahore Declaration with Pakistan in February 1999 to reduce the risk of an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons 14

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Glossary

Highly enriched uranium (HEU)
Highly enriched uranium (HEU): Refers to uranium with a concentration of more than 20% of the isotope U-235. Achieved via the process of enrichment. See entry for enriched uranium.
Plutonium (Pu)
Plutonium (Pu): A transuranic element with atomic number 94, produced when uranium is irradiated in a reactor. It is used primarily in nuclear weapons and, along with uranium, in mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. Plutonium-239, a fissile isotope, is the most suitable isotope for use in nuclear weapons.
Ballistic missile
A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.  The flight of a ballistic missile includes three phases: 1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; 2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and 3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target.  Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters - range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision.  Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets.
Cruise missile
An unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path. There are subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles currently deployed in conventional and nuclear arsenals, while conventional hypersonic cruise missiles are currently in development. These can be launched from the air, submarines, or the ground. Although they carry smaller payloads, travel at slower speeds, and cover lesser ranges than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be programmed to travel along customized flight paths and to evade missile defense systems.
Fissile material
Fissile material: A type of fissionable material capable of sustaining a chain reaction by undergoing fission upon the absorption of low-energy (or thermal) neutrons. Uranium-235, Plutonium-239, and Uranium-233 are the most prominently discussed fissile materials for peaceful and nuclear weapons purposes.
Plutonium (Pu)
Plutonium (Pu): A transuranic element with atomic number 94, produced when uranium is irradiated in a reactor. It is used primarily in nuclear weapons and, along with uranium, in mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. Plutonium-239, a fissile isotope, is the most suitable isotope for use in nuclear weapons.
Weapons-grade material
Weapons-grade material: Refers to the nuclear materials that are most suitable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, e.g., uranium (U) enriched to 90 percent U-235 or plutonium (Pu) that is primarily composed of Pu-239 and contains less than 7% Pu-240. Crude nuclear weapons (i.e., improvised nuclear devices), could be fabricated from lower-grade materials.
Enriched uranium
Enriched uranium: Uranium with an increased concentration of the isotope U-235, relative to natural uranium. Natural uranium contains 0.7 percent U-235, whereas nuclear weapons typically require uranium enriched to very high levels (see the definitions for “highly enriched uranium” and “weapons-grade”). Nuclear power plant fuel typically uses uranium enriched to 3 to 5 percent U-235, material that is not sufficiently enriched to be used for nuclear weapons.
Reprocessing
Reprocessing: The chemical treatment of spent nuclear fuel to separate the remaining usable plutonium and uranium for re-fabrication into fuel, or alternatively, to extract the plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.
United Nations General Assembly
The UN General Assembly is the largest body of the United Nations. It includes all member states, but its resolutions are not legally binding. It is responsible for much of the work of the United Nations, including controlling finances, passing resolutions, and electing non-permanent members of the Security Council. It has two subsidiary bodies dealing particularly with security and disarmament: the UN General Assembly Committee on Disarmament and International Security (First Committee); and the UN Disarmament Commission. For additional information, see the UNGA.
Bilateral
Bilateral: Negotiations, arrangements, agreements, or treaties that affect or are between two parties—and generally two countries.
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)
The PTBT: Also known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water prohibits nuclear weapons tests "or any other nuclear explosion" in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. While the treaty does not ban tests underground, it does prohibit nuclear explosions in this environment if they cause "radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control" the explosions were conducted. The treaty is of unlimited duration. For additional information, see the PTBT.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The CTBT: Opened for signature in 1996 at the UN General Assembly, the CTBT prohibits all nuclear testing if it enters into force. The treaty establishes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to ensure the implementation of its provisions and verify compliance through a global monitoring system upon entry into force. Pending the treaty’s entry into force, the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO is charged with establishing the International Monitoring System (IMS) and promoting treaty ratifications. CTBT entry into force is contingent on ratification by 44 Annex II states. For additional information, see the CTBT.
First-use
The introduction of nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction, into a conflict. In agreeing to a "no-first-use" policy, a country states that it will not use nuclear weapons first, but only under retaliatory circumstances. See entry for No-First-Use
Deterrence
The actions of a state or group of states to dissuade a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict through the credible threat of retaliation. To be effective, a deterrence strategy should demonstrate to an adversary that the costs of an attack would outweigh any potential gains. See entries for Extended deterrence and nuclear deterrence.
Ratification
Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.
Lahore Declaration
The Lahore Declaration is an agreement in which India and Pakistan pledged to “take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.” For additional information, see the NTI Inventory.

Sources

  1. Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “6. World Nuclear Forces,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2025: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 56th ed., SIPRI Yearbook Series (Oxford University Press, 2025), www.sipri.org.
  2. “Countries: Pakistan,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, May 22, 2025, https://fissilematerials.org/countries/pakistan.html.
  3. Kristensen and Korda, “6. World Nuclear Forces.”
  4. International Panel of Fissile Materials, “Countries: Pakistan.”
  5. Hans M. Kristensen et al., “Pakistan Nuclear Weapons, 2023,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79, no. 5 (2023): 329–45, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2245260.
  7. “Fact Sheet: Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT),” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, May 19, 2023, https://armscontrolcenter.org.
  8. Faiqa Mahmood, “India, Pakistan, and the Nuclear Humanitarian Initiative: Let’s Be Real,” Stimson Center, April 26, 2015, www.stimson.or.
  9. “Pakistan,” International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, accessed August 8, 2025, https://www.icanw.org/pakistan.
  10. Sitara Noor, “Pakistan’s Evolving Nuclear Doctrine,” Arms Control Association, October 2023, www.armscontrol.org.
  11. “Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT),” United Nations Treaty Collection, accessed August 6, 2025, https://treaties.un.org.
  12. “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT),” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, accessed August 8, 2025, https://disarmament.unoda.org.
  13. Noor, “Pakistan’s Evolving Nuclear Doctrine.”
  14. Lahore Agreement, Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
  1. Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” Congressional Research Service, 1 August 2016, www.fas.org.
  2. Zia Mian, “Pakistan,” Assuring Destruction Forever, Reaching Critical Will, March 2012, pp. 51-58, www.reachingcriticalwill.org; “Design Characteristics of Pakistan’s Ballistic and Cruise Missiles,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 2014, www.nti.org.
  3. “Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Pakistan,” Arms Control Association, July 2018, www.armscontrol.org.
  4. Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policy Makers,” Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, November 2009, p. 20, www.icnnd.org.
  5. See statement of Mr. Elahi, A/C. 1/59/PV.19 General Assembly Fifty-Ninth session First Committee 19th Meeting Thursday, 28 October 2004, accessed through Pakistan Security Research Unit, University of Bradford, https://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/display/conf/Home.
  6. Marvin Miller and Lawrence Scheinman, “Israel, India, and Pakistan: Engaging the Non-NPT States in the Nonproliferation Regime,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 33, December 2003, www.armscontrol.org.
  7. General Statement by Pakistan Delegation, “Informal Consultative Meeting by the Chairperson of the High-level FMCT Expert Preparatory Group,” 15-16 February 2018, www.un.org.
  8. Ambassador Zamir Akram, Statement on Nuclear Disarmament at the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, 24 February 2015, www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
  9. “Pakistan Joins US-Led Boycott Against UN Meeting to Ban Nuclear Weapons,” The Express Tribune (Pakistan), 28 March 2017, www.tribune.com.pk.
  10. “Pakistan Offers India Moratorium on Nuclear Tests,” The Express Tribune, 17 August 2016, www.tribune.com.pk.
  11. Statement by Pakistan at the Eighth CTBT Ministerial Meeting, 21 September 2016, www.ctbto.org.
  12. Qazi M. Khalilullah, General Assembly Sixty-first Session First Committee 21st Meeting Thursday, 26 October 2006, A/C.1/61/PV.21, accessed through Pakistan Security Research Unit, University of Bradford, spaces.ac.uk:8080/display/ssispsru.
  13. “World nuclear forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2021, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, www.sipri.org.
  14. “F-16 fighters sold by US to Pakistan,” DNA, November 19, 2016, www.dnaindia.com.
  15. U.S. Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee, “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” 2017, www.nasic.af.mil.
  16. “Pakistan conducted successful flight test of Shaheen-II surface to surface ballistic missile,” ISPR, April 9, 2022, www.ispr.gov.pk.
  17. “Ababeel,” CSIS Missile Defense Project, updated July 31, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org.
  18. Masao Dahlgren, “Pakistan Test-Fires Ghaznavi Missile,” CSIS Missile Defense Project, August 15, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org.
  19. “Missiles of Pakistan,” CSIS Missile Defense Project, updated June 30, 2022, https://missilethreat.csis.org.
  20. “Countries: Pakistan,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, April 29, 2023, https://fissilematerials.org.
  21. Tamara Patton, “Combining Satellite Imagery and 3D Drawing Tools for Nonproliferation Analysis: A Case Study of Pakistan’s Khushab Plutonium Production Reactors,” Science & Global Security, Vol. 20, No. 2-3 (2012), pp. 117-140, https://scienceandglobalsecurity.org.
  22. Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, and Eliana Johns, “Pakistan nuclear weapons, 2023,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 79:5 (2023), pp. 329-345.

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