Atomic Pulse

BWC at 50: Taking Bold Steps to Secure the Future

Twenty twenty-five marks 50 years of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and a pivotal moment to assess its impact and where we go from here.

The BWC established a legal framework which prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons. The upcoming Fifth Session of the Working Group on Strengthening the Convention taking place December 2-13 offers a political opening to strengthen the convention, address gaps and challenges with the treaty, and reinforce the BWC’s role in global security.

A Legacy of Successes and Shortcomings

The convention has fostered a shared global responsibility to safeguard biological sciences from misuse, strengthened the norm against biological warfare, and created a platform for cooperation on security obligations.

  • Since its ratification as the first multilateral disarmament treaty to ban an entire class of weapons, the BWC has driven the dismantling of more than 20 offensive bioweapons programs.
  • It now boasts 187 States Parties and 4 signatory states, demonstrating a near-universal commitment to preventing the weaponization of biological agents.
  • And the BWC encourages the peaceful exchange of biological materials, equipment, and scientific knowledge, supporting legitimate scientific advancement.

Despite these successes, the BWC faces significant challenges and there is an urgent need to modernize the BWC, ensuring it keeps pace with scientific developments and reinforces global biosecurity.

  • States vary widely in how they implement its provisions, and the convention lacks mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance or verify adherence.
  • Rapid advances in biotechnology further complicate matters, as the BWC struggles to address the risks tied to dual-use research and emerging technologies.

The Fifth Session on Strengthening the BWC

Building on the agreed upon consensus at the Ninth Review Conference in 2022, the current intersessional program features a Working Group tasked with identifying, examining, and developing targeted measures to enhance the convention – calling specifically for recommendations on “the establishment of mechanisms on international cooperation and assistance and on review of developments in science and technology” by the end of 2025 preferably. The Working Group will meet in Geneva next month to further develop their recommendations.

A successful outcome in December would involve States Parties committing to advance the convention by voting to convene a Special Conference in 2025, focused on formally establishing two key mechanisms:

  1. International cooperation and assistance
  2. Scientific and technological review

At the recent Fourth Session of the Working Group in August, many States Parties showed strong interest in this taking place. With precedent from a Special Conference in 1994, convening a similar meeting in 2025 would demonstrate that States Parties are ready to make significant investments in modernizing the convention.

This step would not only reinforce the BWC’s ability to tackle emerging threats but also showcase a renewed dedication to collaborative and proactive biosecurity measures especially during this time of geopolitical conflict.

Civil Society as a Vital Partner

While the BWC is an agreement between States Parties, civil society organizations (CSOs) have historically played a critical role in supporting and strengthening the convention. As non-governmental entities, CSOs bring technical expertise, public awareness, and accountability, helping to bridge the gap between policy and practice.

NTI | bio, a program dedicated to reducing biological threats imperiling humanity, has been a consistent advocate for stronger measures to prevent the misuse of bioscience and biotechnology, actively contributing to the BWC’s mission. During the December session, NTI will convene two side events to highlight initiatives that tackle measures related to BWC confidence-building, transparency, compliance, and verification:

  • Disincentivizing Bioweapons: NTI | bio commissioned an essay collection focused on disincentives for bioweapons proliferation. This event will highlight the need for and importance of fostering a rigorous academic discourse around preventing bioweapon proliferation—a field where policy development lags more established areas, such as nuclear deterrence.
  • Enhancing Transparency for Bioscience Research and Development: As advancements in bioscience accelerate, ensuring transparency becomes essential. This event will discuss innovative solutions for monitoring bioscience R&D, which can reduce misperceptions and help maintain confidence among States Parties. This effort directly supports the Working Group’s mandates on transparency, verification, and confidence building.

As we look ahead to the future of the BWC, the role of civil society will become increasingly critical. Organizations like NTI provide a bridge between governments, scientists, and the public, ensuring that biosecurity remains a global priority. By advocating for stronger international norms and pushing for innovative solutions to new challenges, NTI can help make the BWC an effective tool in the fight against the development and use of biological weapons.

Stay Informed

Sign up for our newsletter to get the latest on nuclear and biological threats.

Sign Up

Russian Biological Facility Build-up Underscores Need for Enhanced Transparency

Atomic Pulse

Russian Biological Facility Build-up Underscores Need for Enhanced Transparency

The Washington Post’s chilling report on major activity at a former bioweapons research site where the Soviets once weaponized biological agents — including ones that cause Smallpox, Ebola, and other hemorrhagic fevers — is another dangerous development potentially related to Russia’s war on Ukraine.




See All

Close

My Resources