Strengthening Trust in Bioscience Research & Development

Over the past decade, governments, private industry, and academic institutions have increased their investments in bioscience research and development, yielding global benefits. However, these advancements have also increased the risk of deliberate misuse of biology to cause harm which global experts highlighted in a recent public statement on biosecurity risks at the convergence of AI and the life sciences.

Geopolitical tensions are further complicating the risks, leading to misunderstandings and accusations around state-sponsored biological research activities and alleged bioweapons (BW) programs. For instance, in 2022, the Russian Federation alleged that the United States backed the development of bioweapons in Ukraine — which the United States and Ukraine firmly deny. Then, in 2024, satellite imagery revealed major expansion of Sergiev Posad-6, a Russian biological laboratory with historic links to bioweapon development, sparking international concern. This type of behavior could lead to a biological arms race, an unacceptable outcome.

To help mitigate these risks and strengthen the norm against biological weapons development and use, NTI | bio has outlined approaches for enhanced transparency in bioscience research and development.

What Is Enhanced Transparency?

Enhanced transparency refers to tools, structures, and mechanisms designed to address these risks. They work to reduce misperceptions around bioscience research, discouraging arms racing behavior and increase the likelihood of detecting actual non-compliance, making it more difficult to conceal bioweapons programs. This includes activities that fall between the current, self-reported confidence building measures (CBMs) within the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and a traditional verification regime, like that found within the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. While many agree that current CBMs are necessary but insufficient to provide confidence that governments are complying with the BWC prohibition on development or use of biological weapons, there is no consensus within the biosecurity community that traditional verification approaches are practical or feasible.

Why now?

We’re at a moment of unprecedented scientific advancement and a unique political opening within the BWC. The Ninth Review Conference in 2022 provided a new opportunity to advance long-stalled discussions on confidence-building, transparency, compliance, and verification, through the establishment of the Working Group on Strengthening of the Convention.

• Between 2022 and 2025, there have been six meetings of the Working Group, demonstrating continued political attention and time to find measures to strengthen the BWC.

• During the sixth meeting of the Working Group, Chairperson H.W. Mr. Frederico S. Duque Estrada Meyer (Brazil) presented a draft rolling text supporting the need for specific and effective measures, including confidence-building and transparency.

• Governments are considering establishing an Open-Ended Working Group, mandated to develop concrete compliance and verification measures for adoption within the BWC.

What actions should we take?

Leveraging this political opening, NTI | bio released Enhancing Transparency for Bioscience Research and Development at the Sixth Session of the BWC Working Group on August 18, 2025, providing BWC States Parties a consolidated range of options for consideration now and in the future to strengthen the norm against BW development and use.

1. Define a clear threat model to inform BWC enhanced transparency measures. Design a model that evolves with scientific and technological advances and defines the scope of threat scenarios associated with BW development programs.
2. Explore open-source data collection and AI analysis. Evaluate the potential of publicly available information collection and AI analysis to detect meaningful signals of high-risk or illicit activities related to BW development.
3. Conduct a pilot project to explore integration of sample and data collection during site visits. Experiment with site visit procedures that incorporate standardized sample and data collection while balancing intellectual property protection with transparency.
4. Strengthen BWC confidence-building measures. Strengthen and modernize the confidence-building measures process to make it a more effective transparency tool.
5. Develop a joint assessment process to assess BWC compliance. Enable States Parties to demonstrate and assess compliance through a structured, standardized, and internationally recognized process.
6. Strengthen the BWC Implementation Support Unit to lay the groundwork for establishing a Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Organization. States Parties should take a series of intermediate steps to strengthen the BWC Implementation Support Unit and other BWC-linked structures.

What’s Next?

These approaches provide a starting point to further strengthen the norm against BW development and use. NTI | bio encourages governments, private industry, and NGOs to work together to implement the recommendations. Doing so may prove instrumental in reducing the risks of misperceptions around the intent behind biological research efforts, increasing opportunities of detecting biological weapons development activities, and rebuilding trust among States Parties at a time of geopolitical uncertainty.