The Next 50 Years: Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention – Explained

Biological weapons pose a significant threat to international security, health, and the global economy. To address this, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) entered into force 50 years ago today, becoming the first multilateral disarmament treaty to ban the production of an entire category of weapons. As the world marks this anniversary, we reflect on the BWC’s importance and outline a path forward to strengthen its effectiveness.

What is the BWC

The primary international treaty prohibiting biological and toxin weapons.

• Opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entering into force on 26 March 1975, the BWC prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling, and use of biological and toxin weapons.
• As of February 2025, the Convention has 188 States Parties and four signatory States, demonstrating a near-universal commitment to preventing the weaponization of biological agents and toxins.

Why It Matters

The BWC establishes a legal framework to prevent biological weapons while promoting policies and practices that protect against the deliberate misuse of biology to cause harm.

• Since its ratification, the BWC has driven the dismantling of more than 20 offensive bioweapons programs.
• The convention reflects a shared global responsibility for safeguarding biological sciences from misuse, embodies the norm against biological warfare, and creates a platform for multilateral security cooperation.

Understand the Details

Despite its successes, there are significant gaps in the implementation of the BWC.

• Lack of verification or other adequate transparency measures: Unlike other nonproliferation treaties, the BWC lacks sufficient mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance or verify adherence. Verification is challenging because bioscience and biotechnology are broadly embedded within the economy, and they are more deeply dual-use (have the potential for both beneficial and harmful uses) than technologies in comparable arms control agreements. However, while more significant transparency mechanisms are feasible, they are missing from the BWC.
• Evolving biosecurity challenges: Rapid bioscience and biotechnology advances in synthetic biology, gene editing, and their convergence with artificial intelligence pose growing challenges for managing dual-use research. At the same time, geopolitical instability has heightened the risk of biological weapons development while slowing efforts to adapt the BWC.
• Limited institutional support: The BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) operates with just four staff members and an annual budget of ~$2.1 million, critically limiting its ability to manage compliance with and oversight of the BWC.  In contrast, for oversight of implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons’ 2025 budget is roughly $94 million.

What’s Next

The 50th anniversary presents an opportunity for renewed commitments from states to modernize the treaty and reinforce its effectiveness.

• Develop measures to enhance transparency: Member states should financially and politically support and explore new measures that can enhance transparency and build confidence regarding compliance with the BWC. These could include onsite and/or offsite monitoring approaches that take advantage of recent scientific and technological advances and a more robust approach to confidence building measures. Once effective transparency measures have been established and validated, strong incentives and legally binding mechanisms should be established and adopted.
• Leverage new technologies for transparency: To create a 21st century approach to transparency, integrate emerging technologies to support onsite and offsite BWC monitoring efforts. This could include using artificial intelligence to analyze data for open-source intelligence and other monitoring systems to improve detection of potential violations.
• Enhance science diplomacy and engagement: Strengthening international cooperation between governments, scientists, and industry leaders is crucial for ensuring the responsible development of biotechnology. States should engage in regular dialogue, pursue information-sharing mechanisms such as lab exchanges, and promote ethical guidelines to prevent the misuse of life sciences.
• Increase funding for BWC implementation: Member states should commit to expanding resources for the ISU, enabling it to conduct more robust outreach, coordination, analysis, and technical assistance to member states to support full compliance.
• Bolster national implementation and preparedness: Governments must strengthen domestic biosecurity policies and implement stricter biosafety regulations. Capacity-building efforts, including training programs and tabletop exercises, can help states prepare for and reduce potential biological threats.

Learn More

• Stay informed about BWC developments: UN Office for Disarmament Affairs
• Learn more about the history and the future of the BWC: The Biological Weapons Convention at Fifty – UNODA
• Read NTI’s recent analysis of the BWC: BWC at 50: Taking Bold Steps to Secure the Future