Iran
Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
About
The Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) is an underground uranium centrifuge enrichment plant, and the primary facility in Iran’s centrifuge program. Construction started in the early 2000s, and the plant has been partially operating since February 2007. The exile group the National Council of Resistance of Iran revealed the existence of the facility to the public in 2002, and the IAEA first visited the complex in 2003. 1 According to the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), the facility “consists of three large underground buildings, two of which are designed to be cascade halls to hold 50,000 centrifuges.” 2
According to some estimates, when fully operational the plant would be able to produce 500kg of weapons grade uranium annually. 3 However, Iran has not concluded the construction and installation of centrifuges in both of the production halls.
The installation of additional centrifuges is ongoing. As of August 2013, Iran had fully installed 89 IR-1 cascades, feeding 53 IR-1 cascades with natural UF6. Iran has partially installed one additional IR-1 cascade and completed preparatory installation work for another 46 cascades, for a total of 15,416 IR-1 centrifuges. 4 In its August 2012 report the IAEA noted that, “not all of the centrifuges in the cascades being fed with UF6 may have been working” at the time of reporting. 5 This qualification was not included in the Agency’s November 2012 and subsequent reports. Since enrichment began at the FEP in 2007, Iran has produced approximately 9,704kg of LEU with a maximum enrichment level of 5%. 6 According to the August 2013 IAEA report, 6 IR-2m centrifuge cascades had been fully installed and preparatory installation work on 12 IR-2 cascades had been completed. 7
Between February 2010 and May 2013, Iran fed an estimated 1,353.7 kg of UF6 enriched to 5% at the FEP into cascades in the production area of the above-ground Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), also located at the Natanz complex, for further enrichment up to 20% U-235. 8 Iran produced approximately 335.7 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5% at the PFEP between 16 September 2012 and 16 August 2013. 9 Due to the potential military applications of uranium enrichment, the IAEA closely monitors activities at the facility.
Since April 2021, Iran has enriched uranium up to 60% at FEP.10
The IAEA released a report in October 2022 which found that Iran had added six new IR-2m centrifuge cascades and one new IR-4 centrifuge cascade to FEP, and that Iran announced its intention to add 3 more IR-2m cascades to the FEP.11
Glossary
- Uranium
- Uranium is a metal with the atomic number 92. See entries for enriched uranium, low enriched uranium, and highly enriched uranium.
- Enriched uranium
- Enriched uranium: Uranium with an increased concentration of the isotope U-235, relative to natural uranium. Natural uranium contains 0.7 percent U-235, whereas nuclear weapons typically require uranium enriched to very high levels (see the definitions for “highly enriched uranium” and “weapons-grade”). Nuclear power plant fuel typically uses uranium enriched to 3 to 5 percent U-235, material that is not sufficiently enriched to be used for nuclear weapons.
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- IAEA: Founded in 1957 and based in Vienna, Austria, the IAEA is an autonomous international organization in the United Nations system. The Agency’s mandate is the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, technical assistance in this area, and verification that nuclear materials and technology stay in peaceful use. Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to accept safeguards administered by the IAEA. The IAEA consists of three principal organs: the General Conference (of member states); the Board of Governors; and the Secretariat. For additional information, see the IAEA.
- Weapons-grade material
- Weapons-grade material: Refers to the nuclear materials that are most suitable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, e.g., uranium (U) enriched to 90 percent U-235 or plutonium (Pu) that is primarily composed of Pu-239 and contains less than 7% Pu-240. Crude nuclear weapons (i.e., improvised nuclear devices), could be fabricated from lower-grade materials.
- Low enriched uranium (LEU)
- Low enriched uranium (LEU): Refers to uranium with a concentration of the isotope U-235 that is higher than that found in natural uranium but lower than 20% LEU (usually 3 to 5%). LEU is used as fuel for many nuclear reactor designs.
- Centrifuge
- Centrifuge: A machine used to enrich uranium by rapidly spinning a cylinder (known as a rotor and containing uranium hexafluoride gas) inside another cylinder (called the casing).
Sources
- Yonah Alexander and Milton M. Hoenig, The New Iranian Leadership (London: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. 119.
- “Nuclear Sites, Facilities, Natanz,” Institute for Science and International Security, www.isisnucleariran.org.
- Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Arms Race (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), p. 217.
- International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, August 2013, www.iaea.org.
- “International Atomic Energy Agency,” “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, August 2013, www.iaea.org.
- International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, August 2013, www.iaea.org.
- International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, August 2013, www.iaea.org.
- International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, 22 May 2013, www.iaea.org.
- International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, 19 August 2013, www.iaea.org.
- Kelsey Davenport, “Iran’s nuclear program is advancing. So too should negotiations.” Atlantic Council, 2 March 2023, www.atlanticcouncil.org.
- David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Spencer Faragasso, “Iran’s Vastly Increased Advanced Centrifuge Deployment at Natanz Underground Facility,” Institute for Science and International Security, 25 October 2022, www.isis-online.org.