Flag for Iran Iran

Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP)

  • Location
    Khondab, near Arak
  • Type
    Nuclear-Heavy Water Production
  • Facility Status
    Probably Operating

Want to dive deeper?

Visit the Education Center

About

The Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) will provide heavy water for the IR-40 reactor currently under construction at Arak. The HWPP began operation in November 2004 and can produce up to 16 metric tons of heavy water per year. 1 Under an IAEA Additional Protocol agreement, heavy water plants are subject to declarations and complementary inspector access. 2 Because Iran has not ratified the Additional Protocol and does not implement it, the facility is currently not under IAEA safeguards. 3 However, the IAEA continues to monitor the status of the facility via satellite imagery. 4 Agency analysis of satellite photos indicates that the plant has been operating intermittently, including a cessation of activity since the IAEA’s 5 June 2009 report. 5

Tehran decided to begin a heavy water research and development program in the early 1980s. 6 Sometime in the 1990s, following laboratory-scale experiments to produce heavy water at the Isfahan (Esfahan) Nuclear Center, Iran decided to construct the HWPP at Khondab. 7 The facility remained secret until 14 August 2002, when the National Council of Resistance of Iran revealed the construction of at least two secret sites related to Iran’s nuclear weapons program. 8 The allegations prompted the IAEA Director General, Mohammed El-Baradei, to question Iranian authorities about the existence of a heavy water program. 9 During El-Baradei’s visit to Iran in February 2003, Iran officially declared that it was constructing the HWPP. 10

To justify the need for such a plant, Iranian officials said in 2003 that they did not know whether their uranium enrichment program would succeed or succumb to Western pressure. Therefore, they planned to hedge their bet by constructing a natural uranium-fueled nuclear power plant, using heavy water as the moderator and coolant. 11 According to Iranian statements, the amount of heavy water initially needed for the IR-40 reactor is 80 to 90 tons, with an estimated annual need of less than one ton. 12 Assuming a maximum annual production capacity of 16 tons per year and intermittent operation for approximately five years, it seems unlikely that the HWPP has yet produced enough heavy water to moderate the IR-40 reactor. 13 However, in the early 1990s, China reportedly supplied Iran with an unspecified significant quantity of heavy water. 14 The total combined supply of HWPP-produced and Chinese supplied heavy water may therefore be sufficient for Iran’s heavy water research reactor. The cessation of activity at the HWPP supported this theory, as did 30 tonnes of heavy water found by IAEA inspectors at the Isfahan (Esfahan) Uranium Conversion Facility in 2009. 15 However, using satellite imagery to monitor the HWPP, the IAEA reported that as of November 2012, “the plant appears to continue to be in operation.” 16 After visiting the HWPP in August 2011, the IAEA requested additional access in October 2011 and January 2012, but Iran has not responded to these requests.

In a letter dated 27 January 2012, the IAEA also requested that Iran provide an updated Design Information Questionnaire for the IR-40 Reactor. 17 In November 2012, the Agency conducted a Design Information Verification (DIV) at the site and reported that, “the installation of cooling and moderator circuit piping was continuing.” 18 Iranian media quoted the head of the AEOI that Iran plans to test the reactor in 2013 using dummy fuel, and to launch it the following year. 19 The May 2013 IAEA safeguards report indicated that Iran plans to begin operation of the IR-40 “in the third quarter of 2014.” 20

Glossary

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
IAEA: Founded in 1957 and based in Vienna, Austria, the IAEA is an autonomous international organization in the United Nations system. The Agency’s mandate is the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, technical assistance in this area, and verification that nuclear materials and technology stay in peaceful use. Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to accept safeguards administered by the IAEA. The IAEA consists of three principal organs: the General Conference (of member states); the Board of Governors; and the Secretariat. For additional information, see the IAEA.
Additional Protocol
The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements. The principal aim is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites, as well as additional authority to use the most advanced technologies during the verification process. See entry for Information Circular 540.
Ratification
Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.
Safeguards
Safeguards: A system of accounting, containment, surveillance, and inspections aimed at verifying that states are in compliance with their treaty obligations concerning the supply, manufacture, and use of civil nuclear materials. The term frequently refers to the safeguards systems maintained by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in all nuclear facilities in non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT. IAEA safeguards aim to detect the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material in a timely manner. However, the term can also refer to, for example, a bilateral agreement between a supplier state and an importer state on the use of a certain nuclear technology.

See entries for Full-scope safeguards, information-driven safeguards, Information Circular 66, and Information Circular 153.
Nuclear weapon
Nuclear weapon: A device that releases nuclear energy in an explosive manner as the result of nuclear chain reactions involving fission, or fission and fusion, of atomic nuclei. Such weapons are also sometimes referred to as atomic bombs (a fission-based weapon); or boosted fission weapons (a fission-based weapon deriving a slightly higher yield from a small fusion reaction); or hydrogen bombs/thermonuclear weapons (a weapon deriving a significant portion of its energy from fusion reactions).
Uranium
Uranium is a metal with the atomic number 92. See entries for enriched uranium, low enriched uranium, and highly enriched uranium.
Enriched uranium
Enriched uranium: Uranium with an increased concentration of the isotope U-235, relative to natural uranium. Natural uranium contains 0.7 percent U-235, whereas nuclear weapons typically require uranium enriched to very high levels (see the definitions for “highly enriched uranium” and “weapons-grade”). Nuclear power plant fuel typically uses uranium enriched to 3 to 5 percent U-235, material that is not sufficiently enriched to be used for nuclear weapons.
Nuclear power plant
Nuclear power plant: A facility that generates electricity using a nuclear reactor as its heat source to provide steam to a turbine generator.
Research reactor
Research reactor: Small fission reactors designed to produce neutrons for a variety of purposes, including scientific research, training, and medical isotope production. Unlike commercial power reactors, they are not designed to generate power.

Sources

  1. Jane’s Information Group, “Iran’s Heavy Water Plant is Nearly Ready,” Jane’s Foreign Report, 4 November 2004, www.janes.org; “Iran Inaugurates New Atomic Project,” The Associated Press, 26 August 2006.
  2. Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), “Nuclear Sites: Arak Heavy Water Production Plant at Khondab,” ISIS Nuclear Iran, www.isisnucleariran.org; International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, 28 August 2009, www.iaea.org.
  3. Judith Perera, “West Turns on Iran,” Nuclear Engineering International, 9 January 2008; Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), “Nuclear Sites: Arak Heavy Water Production Plant at Khondab,” ISIS Nuclear Iran, www.isisnucleariran.org.
  4. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, 28 August 2009, www.iaea.org.
  5. “Iran Inaugurates New Atomic Project,” The Associated Press, 26 August 2006; International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, 5 June 2009, www.iaea.org.
  6. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, 10 November 2003, www.iaea.org.
  7. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, 26 August 2003, www.iaea.org.
  8. Anthony Cordesman, “Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Programs: Work in Progress?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6 November 2008, www.csis.org.
  9. “Iran N-Plant Claim,” The Daily Telegraph, 16 August 2002.
  10. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, 6 June 2003, www.iaea.org.
  11. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, 10 November 2003, www.iaea.org.
  12. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, 10 November 2003, www.iaea.org.
  13. By simple calculation, the maximum amount of heavy water produced at the HWPP is 80 tons (16 tons/year * 5 years). If the HWPP is indeed operating intermittently and currently shut down, the actual amount of heavy water produced should be significantly less than 80 tons.
  14. China transported the heavy water in batches of less than twenty tons because individual transactions of more than twenty tons would have required a report to the IAEA. See: John W. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2006), pp. 151-152.
  15. David Albright and Christina Walrond, “Update on the Arak Reactor,” Institute for Science and International Security, 15 July 2013, www.isis-online.org.
  16. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, 16 November 2012, www.iaea.org.
  17. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions,” Report by the Director General, 24 February 2012, www.iaea.org.
  18. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, 16 November 2012, www.iaea.org.
  19. “Iran says Arak reactor to be launched in 2 years,” Iranian Students News Agency, 18 February 2012.
  20. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, 22 May 2013, www.iaea.org.

Close

My Resources