Graduate Research Assistant, The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Unlocking the Impasse: Who Holds the Key to the Conference on Disarmament
The Conference on Disarmament (CD), the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, started its 2004 session with mixed optimism about its ability to start negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). In addition, it considered proposals on other long aspired goals such as a treaty preventing an arms race in outer space (PAROS), the cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, and international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use of nuclear weapons (security assurances). In her opening statement to the CD's plenary on January 20, 2004, the chair, Ambassador Amina Chawahir Mohamed, stated that "a great deal of work had gone into the search for compromises that would allow the Conference to begin its work." She also noted that it would be the collective responsibility of the member states to agree on a program of work and it would be possible with the necessary political will at the Conference.
The CD has over the years negotiated significant multilateral arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements. An earlier predecessor, the Eighteen-Nation committee on Disarmament (ENDC), concluded the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Conference also successfully negotiated the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), including intrusive verification systems for these treaties.
Founded in its current format in 1979, the CD has evolved from the Geneva-based Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (TNDC) from 1960-1961, the ENDC from 1962-1968, and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) from 1969-1978. It currently has 66 permanent members states. While the Conference maintains a special relationship with the United Nations, it is a separate entity and adopts its own agenda, based on the agenda agreed to at the 1978 first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament which took into account recommendations by the UN General Assembly and the proposals presented by its members.
Since the conclusion of the negotiations of the CTBT in 1996, the CD has remained deadlocked. The primary reasons for the impasse have been due to difficulties in the current relations between key players, in particular China and the United States, on the prioritization of main issues on the CD's agenda, and their attempts to link progress in one area to parallel progress in other areas.
A cause for some optimism is the renewed emphasis on the potential for agreement on a program of work based on the "Five Ambassadors" proposal. Otherwise known as the A5 Initiative, this proposal was introduced in August of 2002 by the ambassadors from Algeria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, and Sweden.. This initiative built on the 2000 Amorim proposal, which was a result of consultations by Brazilian Ambassador Celso Amorim, the now Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Amorim proposal, submitted August 24, 2000, recommended the establishment of four ad hoc committees: "one each to 'deal with' nuclear disarmament and PAROS, one to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile materials, based on a specific mandate agreed in 1995, and one, with a broader mandate, to negotiate on negative security assurances."
The mandate on nuclear disarmament states that the ad hoc committee "shall exchange information and views on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to attain the objective of nuclear disarmament and in doing so, shall examine approaches towards potential future work of a multilateral character." With respect to the PAROS mandate, the ad hoc committee was designated to "identify specific topics or proposals, which could include confidence-building or transparency measures, general principles, treaty commitments and the elaboration of a regime capable of preventing an arms race in outer space." The ad hoc committee assigned to the issue of security assurances was established to "negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument." And finally, the ad hoc committee for the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty was allocated to negotiate an FMCT.
Lack of consensus on the 2000 Amorim proposal stemmed from a dispute between the United States and China over which lines of departure from the proposal both delegations would be willing to accept. The A5 proposal was considered significant, not only because it received cross-regional support (with two Western states and three from the Group of 21.), but because its evolving character was open to further amendments. Although the A5 proposal drew wide support from most CD delegations, China and the United State in particular could not reach agreement. China, with the strong support of the Russian Federation, tabled its own proposal insisting that a PAROS ad hoc committee should be established with a view to reaching agreement on a legally binding instrument (treaty). The United States rejected this proposal and indicated that it would only be able to consider issues related to an arms race in outer space if such discussions do not pre-judge the outcome (e.g. lead to negotiations of a treaty).
At the last meeting of its second session in June of 2003, Ambassador Jean Lint attempted to breathe new life into the A5 proposals by suggesting a few changes based on his consultations with China and Russia as well as other key states. To this end, he proposed that an ad hoc committee be established for the "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" in order to "identify and examine, without limitation, any specific topics or proposals, which could include confidence-building or transparency measures, general principles, treaty commitments and the elaboration of a regime capable of preventing an arms race in outer space, including the possibility of negotiating a relevant international legal instrument. This proposal was amended from its original version by omitting the phrases "without prejudice" and "with a view to" in an effort to gain support from key parties.
Following further consultations by the Five Ambassadors, it became apparent that with the omission of the statements "without prejudice" and "with a view to," China and Russia would be able to support the A5 proposal. Almost immediately following submission of Ambassador Lint's amended A5 Programme of Work, China and the Russian Federation signaled their acceptance of the proposal and urged the Conference to "start substantive work on PAROS issues at an early date so as to enable full-fledged discussion and negotiations on this matter." China and the Russian Federation, once blamed for blocking consensus on the CD's program of work, stated their willingness to compromise and join consensus on the proposal in order to make progress on both a fissile material treaty as well as PAROS.
While significant progress was made, the United States and France have yet to express their position on the issue. The primary reason for these two countries' silence is their opposition to any negotiations on a PAROS treaty. Some analysts, however, believe that the United States in particular no longer share the original objectives of a FM(C)T. In the meantime, the proposal will for the foreseeable future remain a significant focus of the CD debate.
When China and the Russian Federation announced their full support for the "Five Ambassadors" proposal and their willingness to be "flexible" on the linkages between negotiations on a FM(C)T and PAROS, it brought forth one of the first signs of movement at the CD in over a year and increased pressure on the United States to take a clear position on the issue. The new sense of optimism generated by this declaration has shifted focus at the CD onto the United States and its view on PAROS and the A5 initiative. The President of the Conference in July 2003, Ambassador Carlo Trezza of Italy, noted that the Five Ambassadors proposal remained the most "updated and advanced proposal for a programme of work" and demonstrated an important move toward progressive negotiation. The general purpose of the initiative has been to create a program of work that will assist the CD in moving beyond its current impasse and to start working on all four major issues on its agenda concurrently.
In December 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution recommending the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. On January 25, 1994, the CD decided to appoint a Special Coordinator to seek the views of members on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate the type of fissile material cut-off treaty requested by the UN General Assembly.
In March 1995, the Conference on Disarmament established an Ad Hoc Committee to pursue these negotiations under what is now referred to as the "Shannon Report" (CD/1299). This report calls for a CD Ad Hoc Committee "to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." The negotiating mandate was based on the 1993 UN resolution, but the report did not preclude any delegation from raising the issue of scope and verification within the Ad Hoc Committee to accommodate fundamentally different views among the members. These views included those that believed that a "cut-off" treaty should be both a nonproliferation as well as disarmament tool.
Subsequently, all the NPT Parties endorsed the immediate commencement and early conclusion of such negotiations at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference at which they adopted the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament." These objectives recognized a ban on fissile material as an important measure for "the full realization and effective implementation of article VI." It called for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of FMCT negotiations in the CD as part of a three-phased program of action on nuclear disarmament. The 13 steps for nuclear disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference also urged the CD to commence negotiations on a treaty in accordance with the Shannon Report and the mandate contained therein, with a view to their conclusion within five years. It is important to note that the states parties agreed that a treaty should take into consideration "both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives," which defined the scope of a treaty more clearly than the Shannon Report. Actual negotiations on this issue have not begun. Since this time, an FMCT Ad Hoc Committee was re-established only once—late during the 1998 CD session. Given the current impasse over the CD's Program of Work, the Ad Hoc Committee was not reestablished in 1999 or in 2000.
The issue of FMCT arose several times in different United Nations nonproliferation and disarmament bodies throughout 2002. At the First Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 NPT Review Conference in April 2002, several states mentioned the importance of an FMCT to become an enhancing component of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the UN General Assembly's First Committee, Canada again sponsored a resolution calling for an ad hoc committee to negotiate such a treaty. Several states spoke in the plenary in support of an FMCT as a way to move the Conference forward.
On May 23, 2002, South Africa presented a working paper to the Conference on Disarmament which goes beyond the principles of FMCT banning only future production of weapons-grade fissile material. This working paper, entitled "The Possible Scope and Requirements of the Fissile Material Treaty (FMT)" (CD/1671) explores the controversial issues of existing stocks of nuclear material, and to provide a practical and politically feasible solution to this problem. In addition, on June 7, 2002, the Netherlands sponsored an open-ended, informal meeting on an FMCT. This initiative, conducted outside of the CD, contributed to the development of ideas regarding the scope and verification of a fissile material treaty. In addition, the Netherlands has sponsored a series of open-ended, informal meetings on an FMCT, the latest of which concluded on April 2, 2004. These meetings, conducted outside of the CD, have contributed to the development of ideas regarding the scope and verification of an FMCT by analyzing the possible contents of such a treaty and by exploring opportunities and obstacles when drafting an FMCT. Both the South African working paper and the Dutch informal meetings were considered important to the progress of the Conference.
At the conclusion of the 2003 session of the CD, it was noted that "significant contributions were made to promote substantive discussion on issues within the agenda in the plenary meeting," particularly with respect to FMCT. The work of the Netherlands played an important role at the annual meeting in addition to Japan, which submitted a significant Working Paper on FMCT and took a very strong position on a fissile material ban. Japan's view on such a ban is somewhat different from that of the Netherlands. Though it remains flexible on the issue of stocks, Japan emphasizes that substantial technical deliberations should be focused on future production to avoid prolonged negotiations. Since Japan is also a nation with a large nuclear industry, it is opposed to the idea that a fissile material ban should include fissile material for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. With respect to the contributions made to promote substantive discussion on fissile material, the positions of the Netherlands and Japan, as well as other delegations at the CD, have played important roles in the potential for future negotiations on FMCT.
PAROS is one of the seven components of the "Five Ambassadors" proposal that has been earmarked as a momentum creating tool. Since all other CD members have, in principle, signaled their support for the A5 proposal, the onus now lies primarily with the United States, and a few other nations standing behind it, to indicate whether it would accept this compromise and "unlock" the CD from its current impasse.
Although there exists within the United Nations and the CD, general agreement that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is a critical issue, no international legal mechanism currently exists. Unlike in the case of a FM(C)T, a clear mandate does not exist to negotiate such treaty.
The initiative to negotiate a treaty preventing an arms race in outer space, often referred to as PAROS, was first introduced to the agenda at the CD in 1982. In 1985, "an ad hoc committee was established to deal with this issue." From 1985 to 1994, PAROS was a vigorously debated subject at the CD and it was faced with a number of major challenges such as the conflicting points of view between theUnited States, China, and Russia on the potential for negotiating a treaty. These challenges have blocked many of the attempts made by the CD to negotiate new measures on the PAROS issue. In fact, in 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that the United States should "vigorously pursue the capabilities of National Missile Defense, called for in the National Space Policy, to ensure that the president will have the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats to, and if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests." Nonetheless, various key parties at the Conference have remained committed to working multilaterally on the A5 proposal, including PAROS, signaling an intense dedication to making progress on these issues. Such steps have been considered important contributions to the progress of the Conference.
The fact that two members of the Security Council—China and Russia—took a clear position on PAROS has stimulated a whirlwind of discussion about the implications for these countries, for the United States and, most importantly, for the future of the CD itself. This case has become particularly captivating because, in the past, China maintained reservations about the Five Ambassadors proposal as it lacked the ability to "negotiate an international legal instrument to prevent the deployment of weapons in outer space." Though the amended version still fell short of China's position on the need for such an instrument, the country still came forth declaring its support for the proposal. In early August of 2003, Ambassador Hu Xiaodi of China stated that his country was willing to demonstrate flexibility at the Conference by accepting the A5 proposal on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). In addition, Russian Ambassador Leonid Skotnikov also noted his support for the proposal stating that the Russian Federation would be ready to join in a consensus on the Five Ambassadors proposal claiming that "the necessary balance had been found and it hoped that this proposal would be supported generally in the near future."
In the amended version of the PAROS initiative, the CD would "identify and examine, without limitation, any specific topics or proposals, which could include confidence-building measures, general principles, treaty commitments and the elaboration of a regime capable of preventing an arms race in outer space, including the possibility of negotiating a relevant international legal instrument." China and Russia were able to agree on the language put forth in this version and were therefore ready to "join a consensus" on the A5 proposal.
Though China and the Russian Federation have announced their unified flexibility on PAROS and the Five Ambassadors proposal, the United States has declined to take a position on the issue. In early 2002, the United States announced at the Conference that it "saw no need for new outer space arms control agreements," a statement that has shifted attention toward the role that the United States has played in negotiations on preventing the weaponization of outer space as well as an FMCT and nuclear disarmament. The United States has taken the position that there is no need for new agreements governing activities in space and that the current Outer Space Treaty regulating the use of space meets all U.S. purposes. This has generated intense debate with China, the Russian Federation, and the G-21, which have argued that PAROS should assume greater urgency "because of legitimate concerns that existing legal instruments are inadequate to deter imminent attempts for further militarization of outer space." Rather than addressing this issue, the United States has instead been favoring other topics before the Conference such as curbs on the production of fissile nuclear material.
The issue of nuclear disarmament has been central to the CD debate since it was established in 1979. In the last two and a half decades, the subject has remained an important focal point of the Conference. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, it was made clear that the CD needed to focus on both FMCT and nuclear disarmament in order to achieve any sort of progress. During the Conference, it was agreed by all of the NPT member states that movement toward nuclear disarmament was essential and that there were certain steps that should be taken in order to achieve this goal.
The agreement on the "13 Practical Steps" came as a result of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC)—Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden—and the five nuclear weapon states (NWS). Included among the "13 Steps" was an 'unequivocal undertaking' by the NWS to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. A reference to the "13 Practical Steps" was included in the A5 proposal as it "called on governments of each of the nuclear-weapon states, and the three nuclear-weapon-capable states, to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon capability and to agree to start work on the "practical steps" and negotiations required for its achievement". In addition to the reference to the FMCT, the fourth step of the "13 Practical Steps" specifically called on the CD to establish a subsidiary body "with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament."
As indicated in the A5 proposal, the Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament would be established by the Conference under agenda item 1 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament." The committee would "exchange information and views on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to attain this objective, and in doing so, it would examine approaches towards potential future work of a multilateral character." Within the CD, however, there has been resistance from the United States and France as well as other nuclear weapons states under the NPT against the establishment of such a body. This poses a complex dilemma for the CD, particularly given the legal obligations of the NWS embodied in Article VI of the NPT which states that all parties to the NPT must pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of a nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
One of the major challenges that the CD has faced with respect to nuclear disarmament has been whether or not the international community is capable of achieving such an objective in a world where "the continued production, transportation, export, and use of weapons usable nuclear material is allowed, condoned, and even promoted." Within the CD and the A5 proposal, nuclear disarmament has been one of the most difficult issues to negotiate as many countries favor certain aspects such as PAROS and FMCT over others. As a consequence, the prospect of progressive discussion on the issue is likely to yield a non-consensual result on the issue of nuclear disarmament.
Since the inception of the NPT in 1968, the issue of security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has played a central role in influencing states not to pursue nuclear weapons options. These so-called "negative security assurances" encompass unilateral pledges by NPT NWS not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against NPT NNWS. These pledges were reaffirmed by the Security Council in 1995 prior to the NPT Review and Extension Conference (RevCon). The confirmation of security assurances by the Security Council in 1995 "formed a key basis for the important decision by all states parties to extend the NPT indefinitely." And while both the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences emphasized the importance of security assurances for NNWS, little progress has been made to "effectively assure NNWS in this regard."
In the 1995 "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament" document, reference was made specifically to the issue of legally binding security assurances. Security Council Resolution 984, which called for further steps to be considered to assure NNWS party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, was considered a critical step in the advancement of security assurances by the Review and Extension Conference. While legally binding security assurances are also contained in the protocols to the four existing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ), several NWS maintain reservations on these obligations and in some cases, refuse to sign the protocols.
The role of the Conference on Disarmament with respect to security assurances has become increasingly more important, particularly since the 1995 RevCon at which several delegations agreed that the harmonized security assurances provided by NWS in Security Council Resolution 984 (1995) were useful, but not sufficient. There were hopes of establishing a legally binding instrument that would assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Negotiations on such a topic, however, were not measured as appropriate for the annual session and would therefore have to be considered in an ad hoc committee.
Following the conclusion of the 1996 annual session of the CD, there was general agreement to address the issue of a legally binding instrument in an ad hoc committee. This committee was not, however, able to establish itself as members of the Group of 21 (G-21) non-aligned countries, including India and Pakistan, argued that for non-discriminatory negotiations on the issue, negative security assurances should be dealt with in the CD. South Africa, however, distanced itself from this position arguing that negative security assurances only belong to NNWS parties to the NPT and that such a legally binding instrument can therefore not be negotiated in the CD. In 1998, the Conference re-established the ad hoc committee addressing the "nature and scope of negative security assurances, but failed to begin negotiations on a legally binding commitment." During the 1999 session, the CD was once again faced with a roadblock on the ad hoc committee issue partly as a result of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998.
Today, the primary issue of concern continues to be the lack of a legally binding agreement on security assurances at the CD. Though the Cold War is over, NATO countries and the Russian Federation still maintain first-use policies to use nuclear weapons to deter chemical and biological (United States and NATO) or conventional (Russia) threats. This fact, combined with nuclear testing by India and Pakistan in 1998, has been one of the major obstacles to progress made security assurances and a legally binding instrument.
On September 10, 2003, Ambassador Jean Lint, on behalf of the Five Ambassadors, officially submitted the amendment to their proposal, which was made on June 26, 2003 according to the language put forward by China. This amendment illustrates the evolving character of the Five Ambassadors proposal. It was not, however, an official acceptance of the Programme itself, which remains an issue to be negotiated at the CD. In her concluding statement, the President of the Conference, Ambassador Kuniko Inoguchi of Japan, said that many events taking place in today's world had taken the Conference backwards, away from its aim. She continued to say that the CD remained in the same position as it had one year ago and that the main challenge was finding a balance between different priorities in its Programme of Work. She noted that the Five Ambassadors proposal was a realistic option to strike such a delicate balance and move forward. Other delegates at the final session acknowledged the protracted lack of agreement on the Programme of Work and the inability of the CD to move beyond its current impasse. Some even argued that the standstill was a reflection of broader problems in multilateral diplomacy.
Faced with the significant challenges of the FMCT, PAROS, nuclear disarmament, and security assurances, the Conference has found itself, once again, in a deadlock situation. One of the most critical parties that will continue to have a major impact on the CD has been the position, or lack thereof, of the United States.
The United States has never really expressed its support of the A5 or other attempts by the CD, such as the 2000 Amorim proposal, to move beyond the impasse. In fact, during an informal meeting in February of 2003, the U.S. delegation noted that the CD should not be ambitious for a comprehensive program of work" and that it should negotiate on matters all agree are ripe for negotiation, while informally exploring other issues. In addition, while the former U.S. Ambassador to the CD Eric Javits claimed that the United States wanted the CD to adopt a comprehensive program of work along the lines proposed by Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil, it was reported that he was not authorized to accept the Amorim proposal as it stood.
The question remains: what will be the future of the Five Ambassadors proposal and the possibility of movement at the CD? That continues to be an issue that perhaps only the United States can address. If the past U.S. position on arms control in outer space is any indication, it seems unlikely that it would accept the amended version of the A5 initiative. It has frequently stressed that any proposal on PAROS would be acceptable only if it does not necessarily determine where the discussions may lead. For the time being, however, pressure is mounting on the U.S. delegation to take a stance on the A5 proposal and to facilitate the adoption of a Programme of Work that would allow the Conference to finally move forward.
As the CD concluded its first session in March of 2004, the 66-member body had still not decided on a program of work. There was, however, a certain sense of optimism as the proposed agenda from the five ambassadors (the A5 initiative) appeared to be accumulating more support with each revision made to it. While the United States and a few other key players had not yet stated their position, the delegations from Bangladesh, Canada, Ireland, and Sweden reiterated the need for support on the A5 initiative as a basis for an agreed Program of Work. It was an encouraging sign that some states were heeding the call of Ambassador Kuniko Inoguchi, the last CD president for the 2003 sessions. In her closing remarks, Ambassador Inoguchi called for more states to send foreign ministers or their high level equivalents, in order to not only raise the profile of the CD's important work, but also as a demonstration of states' commitment to the CD and the multilateral process that it embodies. As it currently stands, however, the Conference remains deadlocked and whoever holds the key to moving forward remains to be seen.
 Press Document, Conference on Disarmament Opens 2004 Session, www.unog.ch.
 Member States of the CD include: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Viet Nam, and Zimbabwe.
 "The Conference on Disarmament," Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 2003.
 CD/1624. Amorim Proposal, 24 August 2000.
 Conference on Disarmament. CD/1624. Proposal by the President on the Programme of Work for the 2000 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, 24 August 2000.
 The "Group of 21" consists of member states of both the CD and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). They include: Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil (observer), Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Peoples Republic of the Congo, Cuba, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tunisia, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe.
 Conference on Disarmament. Initiative of the Five Ambassadors Dembri, Lint, Reyes, Salander and Vega: Proposal of a Programme of Work, CD/1693, 23 January 2003.
 CD/1679 Working Paper. Compilation of Comments and Suggestions to the CD (Compiled by the Delegations of China and the Russian Federation 31 July 2003), Reaching Critical Will.
 UN Press Release DCF/428, China Accepts 'Five Ambassadors' Proposal on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space, As Amended, 7 August 2003.
 Conference on Disarmament, Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly of the United Nations, CD/1718, 10 September 2003.
 At the 2003 58th General Assembly of the United Nations, document A/58/461 on an outer Space Arms Race was adopted by a recorded vote of 174 in favour with none against and 4 abstentions. The abstaining countries were: the Federated States of Micronesia, Israel, the Marshall Islands, and the United States.
 Reaching Critical Will, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
 Hitchens, Theresa; Rushing to Weaponize the Final Frontier, Arms Control Today, www.armscontrol.org.
 CD/1693, Initiative of the Ambassadors Dembri, Lint, Reyes, Salander and Vega: Proposal of a Programme of Work. 23 January 2003.
 Agence France Press: International News, China accepts compromise on arms race in space at UN conference, 7 August 2003.
 Statement on behalf of the Group of 21 by Camilo Reyes Rodriguez, Amgassador of Colombia, to the CD. 31 January 2002.
 Rauf, Tariq; Towards NPT 2005: An Action Plan for the 13 Steps Toward Nuclear Disarmament Agreed at NPT 2000, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Prepared for the Middle Powers Initiative, Pg. 17.
 Statement on behalf of the Group of 21 by Camilo Reyes Rodriguez, Amgassador of Colombia, to the CD. 31 January 2002.
 du Preez, Jean; Scope and Requirements of a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT), August 2003, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program (IONP).
 Du Preez, Jean; Security Assurances Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons: Is Progress Possible at the NPT Prepcom? Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 24 April 2003.
 Background paper prepared by the United Nations Secretariat (NPT/CONF, 2000/6).
 M2 Presswire, Conference on Disarmament Concludes 2003 Session, 11 September 2003.
 CD, Informal meeting, 2/04/03 and 2/13/03.
 Javits, Eric M.; Ambassador of the United States to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva. 7 February 2002.
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