START Process and Russian Strategic Force Modernization

Introduction

On April 1, 2009, during the G-20 meeting in London, U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev met to discuss the state of U.S.-Russian relations and the future of bilateral arms control agreements. Although significant differences over U.S. deployment of missile defense assets in Europe and the interpretation of the August 2008 events in Georgia remained, the leaders pledged "to move beyond Cold War mentalities and chart a fresh start in relations between our two countries." Obama and Medvedev committed to "achieving a nuclear free world." They also promised to "work out a new, comprehensive, legally binding agreement on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the START Treaty" and to "conclude this agreement before the Treaty expires in December." [1] This declaration meant that the United States and Russia had just seven months to negotiate the text of a new agreement that would be acceptable to domestic legislatures. This tight timeline prompted newly-appointed chief U.S. negotiator Rose Gottemoeller to state that although the two countries remain committed to the December 5, 2009, deadline, "if things are not going well, you can not rush to the finish just to get something done" and "if necessary, we will look for ways to find more time for the negotiators." [2]

U.S.-Soviet/Russian Arms Control: The Historical Context

During the Cold War, arms control negotiations provided an important venue for communication between the two superpowers and led to the adoption of treaties that were able to limit the arms race.

The first arms control negotiation, known as Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I), was concluded by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and U.S. President Richard Nixon in May 1972. SALT I involved discussion of both offensive and potential defensive systems, which were seen as intrinsically linked, and resulted in two separate agreements: the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. While the ABM Treaty limited the scope of national missile defense systems, the Interim Agreement froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing, albeit high, levels.

In 1979, follow-on negotiations resulted in the SALT II agreement—the first arms control treaty to involve reductions in strategic forces (from 2,500 to 2,250 in all categories of delivery vehicles on both sides). Although the Carter Administration withdrew the treaty from U.S. Senate consideration after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both states adhered to it until 1986, when the United States exceeded the limit on MIRVed ballistic missiles by not dismantling an old strategic submarine according to procedures specified in the treaty.

An entire category of weapons was eliminated by the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. All U.S. and Soviet nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with intermediate ranges (500-5,500 km, or 300-3,400 miles). By June 1, 1991, a total of 2,692 such weapons had been destroyed, 846 by the United States and 1,846 by the Soviet Union. The treaty contained complex and detailed verification procedures at both nations' military sites including, for the first time, on-site inspections and exchange of detailed data on weapons systems and associated facilities.

Almost 10 years of protracted strategic nuclear weapons negotiations culminated in the signing of the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in July 1991. The new treaty set a ceiling of 1,600 on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers for each side, capable of carrying no more than 6,000 "accountable" warheads. START I included an intrusive verification regime consisting of a detailed data exchange, extensive notifications, 12 types of on-site inspection, and continuous monitoring activities, designed to help verify that signatories are complying with their treaty obligations. Both Moscow and Washington met the December 5, 2001 deadline and continued further reductions. According to START I counting rules, as of July 1, 2008, Russia had 4,138 strategic warheads on 839 launchers, [3] while the United States retained, as of January 2009, approximately 5,200 nuclear warheads on 798 delivery vehicles. [4]

A follow-on treaty, START II, was completed but did not enter into force. Signed on January 3, 1993, START II envisioned lower ceilings for nuclear warheads (3,000-3,500) and included provisions for the elimination of heavy and MIRVed ICBMs. Although the Russian State Duma ratified START II in 2000, it did not enter into force because this ratification was contingent on the preservation of the ABM Treaty. After the Bush administration withdrew from the ABM Treaty on June 13, 2002, Moscow announced that it would no longer consider itself bound by START II provisions. Negotiation of START III, which envisioned a ceiling of 2,000-2,500 warheads, was not completed before the election of George W. Bush to the U.S. presidency, after which the negotiations were not continued.

Instead, Washington pushed for a new type of arms control agreement, arguing that the Cold War was over and the U.S.-Russian relationship had changed. The result was the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty, of May 24, 2002. [5] The treaty was a compromise between Washington's position in favor of non-binding political declarations about reductions and Moscow's insistence on a legally binding treaty. SORT codified a November 2001 pledge by U.S. President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin to reduce the size of operationally deployed strategic forces to 1,700-2,200 on each side, setting a deadline of 2012. SORT does not contain any verification procedures, relying instead on the verification mechanism of START I. The treaty does not provide for warhead dismantlement, thus running counter to the principle of irreversibility enshrined in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty context (see, for example, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference).

Under these circumstances and with the START I set to expire on December 5, 2009, the parties risk finding themselves in a legal vacuum which could severely impair predictability of strategic relations between the United States and Russia.

Negotiating a post-START Agreement: the Bush Administration

During the first six years of the Bush administration, no serious talks about a treaty to succeed START I were undertaken. As mentioned above, the early Bush administration appeared to dismiss legally binding and verifiable agreements as Cold War relics necessary when the two states were enemies, but not required in the post-Cold War world. [6] While Moscow voiced its concerns over U.S. plans to deploy missile defense elements at sites in Europe and pointed to their potentially destabilizing effect on U.S.-Russian strategic relations, U.S. officials insisted that these plans did not pose a threat to Russia and initially did not even recognize a need for confidence building measures to alleviate Moscow's concerns.

Russia proposed to negotiate a follow-on to START I as early as 2005. [7] Later in June 2006, speaking to Russian diplomats, Vladimir Putin reiterated that the United States and Russia should negotiate a replacement for START I. [8] The Bush administration initially did not want to negotiate a new treaty, but was willing to extend, informally, some of START's monitoring provisions. [9] Only in March 2007 did U.S. Ambassador to Russia William Burns indicate that the two countries had started a dialogue on international security issues, including a possible START I follow-on agreement. [10] Interestingly this statement came shortly after a critical speech by President Putin at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, in which he argued that U.S. policies, which he referred to as unilateral and "politically expedient," indicated a disdain for international law and were "stimulat[ing] an arms race." [11]

In late March 2007, Washington and Moscow held preliminary consultations regarding the maintenance of some form of verification and transparency measures after the expiration of START I. [12] In contrast to the Russian preference for a follow-on treaty to START I, the United States favored negotiation of a fundamentally new arms control agreement with Russia. Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter stated that while START "has been important and for the most part has done its job," the pact was cumbersome and its complicated reporting standards had outlived their usefulness. "We don't believe we're in a place where we need have to have the detailed lists (of weapons) and verification measures," added DeSutter. [13]

Moscow has agreed in principle that START I procedures were somewhat cumbersome and suggested negotiating a "lighter" treaty. [14] Russian officials, however, insist that a new treaty should include verification mechanisms and information exchange, and limit both warheads and means of delivery in addition to provisions on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territories. [15] The U.S. administration reportedly did not respond to these proposals at the time.

In March 2008, Russian President-elect Dmitriy Medvedev reaffirmed the Russian position on the need for a legally binding and verifiable treaty and noted that there had been some progress in this direction. [16] In the U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration agreed to by Presidents Putin and Bush, both countries confirmed their intent to "continue development of a legally binding post-START arrangement." [17] Commenting on the results of the U.S.-Russian bilateral consultation, a representative of the Russian Defense Ministry, however, noted that although his U.S. counterparts had agreed to negotiate a new legally binding agreement, they continued to insist that a new treaty "be based on SORT with its virtual and not real reduction of strategic arms when strategic launchers and nuclear warheads are not physically destroyed, but are stockpiled and create an 'upload capability'." [18] According to the same official, Washington also opposed strong verification procedures and wanted the new treaty to contain a provision that would allow either country to deny inspection requests. [19]

Despite the promise of U.S. Ambassador to Moscow William Burns to do as much as possible to reach an agreement on post-START arrangements in 2008, no substantial progress was achieved. [20] In the words of Russian presidential aide Sergey Prikhodko, "Russia continued to receive 'hollow' offers of transparency measures that excluded verification of strategic launchers and a range of other offensive arms components." [21] Another high-ranking official in the Ministry of Defense said that "the United States excluded ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers in conventional mode, their deployment sites, as well as space rocket-launchers and interceptors using the first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs. This creates possibilities for bypassing limit levels and for clandestine increases in offensive arms." [22]

Meanwhile, the U.S. government was seeking interagency consensus on new treaty language. [23] While some agencies mooted the idea of a treaty that was essentially an agreement to continue verification, and were open to new or different transparency measures, other agencies had different views about verification. Though achieving a new agreement was seen as important, the Bush administration was reportedly still striving to complete an agreed draft proposal in fall 2008.

Russia's frustration with the process was clear when a high-level official stated that Russia would no longer discuss these issues with the outgoing Bush administration and would continue the dialogue with the incoming Obama administration. [24] Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin expressed hope that the new U.S. administration would adopt a "more constructive, responsible and far-sighted" approach. [25]

Obama Administration: A New Start?

Soon after the elections, president-elect Barack Obama confirmed his intention to work with Russia on a new arms control agreement. [26] This promise was given further emphasis after the inauguration when the newly anointed Vice President, Joseph Biden, said at the Munich Conference in February 2009 that that the White House wanted to "press the reset button" on its relations with Russia. [27] Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, noted that as part of their effort to rebuild bilateral relations they would try to reach an agreement on a new strategic arms reduction treaty by the end of 2009. [28]

During an April 1, 2009 meeting in London, Presidents Obama and Medvedev outlined their vision of a new agreement:

• "The subject of the new agreement will be the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms;
• In the future agreement the Parties will seek to record levels of reductions in strategic offensive arms that will be lower than those in the 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which is currently in effect;
• The new agreement will mutually enhance the security of the Parties and predictability and stability in strategic offensive forces, and will include effective verification measures drawn from the experience of the Parties in implementing the START Treaty." [29]

They also instructed negotiators to report by July 2009 on progress achieved in working out the new agreement. The U.S. and Russian negotiating teams, headed by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller and Ambassador Anatoly Antonov, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Security and Disarmament Department, had their first official meeting in Rome on April 24, 2009. They stated that their consultations were "very productive" and "got off to a fast start," and agreed to meet in Moscow for the first round of full-fledged negotiations in May, with the second round to be held in early June in Geneva. [30]

While the discussion are now under way, both Moscow and Washington maintain that it is too premature to describe any concrete details of a new treaty because "difficult and intensive negotiations [lie] ahead" and "it is not logical to forecast their results in advance." [31] Nevertheless, the main outlines of the agreement and some of the obstacles the two sides face are already known. Less than a month before her trip to Rome, Gottemoeller discussed the upcoming negotiations with Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey Kislyak at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference. [32] Kislyak reiterated Russia's position that the new treaty should have the same structure as START I, with limits on delivery vehicles and warheads. Gottemoeller confirmed that "the subject of the new agreement will be strategic offensive arms, and that includes ICBMs, strategic submarine launch ballistic missiles, bombers and the warheads that are associated with them." [33] Thus, the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, including U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed on the territories of its NATO allies, appears to have been excluded from the scope of the new treaty. In the words of Kislyak, "We have enough work to do now to focus on things that are doable because when you go to substrategic, there will be a lot of other things that need to be entered into the play." [34] Gottemoeller later said, however, that "The United States will be delighted to talk about tactical nuclear weapons." [35]

Linkage to Missile Defense

Russian policymakers continue to note their concern about U.S. missile defense plans, but appear to have agreed with the U.S. desire to pursue this discussion on a track separate from the START negotiations. [36] The link to disarmament and arms control, however, remains clear. For example, in April 2009, President Medvedev stated that "unilateral deployment of antimissile systems […] damages the current system of checks and balances […] and very much complicates the prospects for nuclear disarmament." [37] The following month, Prime Minister Putin reiterated that "Russia, of course, will link the issues of ballistic missile defense and all related things with strategic offensive arms." [38] While the media interpreted this statement as meaning that Russia would link U.S. ballistic missile defense plans with the START I follow-on agreement, [39] this does not in fact appear to be the case. Ambassador Kislyak agreed that although missile defense is "an important issue that needs to be certainly factored in all the debates with the United States on strategic stability," [40] it would not be "a showstopper for the follow-on to START." Although important, it seems that Russia will not allow missile defense to block a START follow-on agreement, though the issue will definitely remain high on the Russian agenda and it is likely that Russia will try to use it as a bargaining chip in the negotiations with the United States.

Verification

The Obama administration has reportedly reversed the position of the previous administration and agreed with the Russian approach to base a follow-on agreement on START I while getting rid of some of that treaty's antiquated verification procedures. A senior U.S. official noted on April 17, 2009 that there are "some areas where perhaps we'll have to be layering on some additional verification measures, going beyond START, but I think also some areas where we might be able to streamline." [41] Later, Gottemoeller noted that "the START follow-on treaty will be much more specific in character, for example, in the way it will include verification measures from START. As the president said, it should incorporate START-I verification measures, but also grow on the experience of implementing START, and make some improvements for those measures. It will definitely include more detail than the Moscow treaty." [42]

Warhead Ceilings and Counting Rules

Two inextricably linked issues that will have to be addressed in the future treaty are the numbers of nuclear warheads and counting rules. START I permits a total of up to 6,000 warheads deployed on 1,600 delivery vehicles, while SORT limits the number of operationally deployed warheads to 2,200. In May 2009, Gottemoeller clarified that the U.S. position is to limit delivery vehicles in an initial agreement, and discuss limitations of warhead numbers in the future, noting that the Clinton administration had advanced a proposal for a warhead protocol in the late 1990s, but that the United States and Russia were not able to come to an agreement on verification measures. She said, further, that "it's a new phase and a very different approach to the strategic arms reductions we have ever had in the past. I think we have to consider it as something for the future." [43] Thus, while Moscow would like to count warheads in storage, the U.S. position is that the first post-START agreement continue to count only delivery systems. [44]

An additional question raised by Russia has been the possibility that Washington may want to count only those delivery vehicles that have nuclear warheads, and could "convert" some long-range delivery systems to conventional warheads—something Russia is against. The U.S. concept of Prompt Global Strike—which would employ high-precision strategic ICBMs with conventional warheads to strike military targets within a very short period of time—has invoked much criticism from Russia. [45] One of the concerns is that such a capability would give Washington an advantage in attacking Russia's nuclear strategic forces (making possible a first non-nuclear strike). In combination with a missile defense system, this might negate Russian retaliatory capabilities.

However, to date, U.S. negotiators have given no indication that they intend to alter START counting rules, which count delivery vehicles regardless of whether they are equipped with nuclear or conventional warheads. [46] Indeed, in a May 2009 interview with Interfax, Gottemoeller noted that "in the presidents' instructions after London it was quite clear that the focus of negotiations will be strategic offensive armaments and that it includes delivery vehicles and warheads." [47] Most Western analysts have taken this statement as confirmation that Washington will continue to count nuclear and conventionally armed missiles together, as is currently the case.

In terms of numbers of nuclear warheads, current expert estimates indicate that limits of 1,000-1,500 are likely. In a January 2009 op-ed in the Boston Globe, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations John Kerry promised to "urge the Obama administration to embrace the goal of reducing our strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,000 deployed warheads and work to persuade the Russians to do the same." [48] The following month, the Times of London reported that "President Obama will convene the most ambitious arms reduction talks with Russia for a generation, aiming to slash each country's stockpile of nuclear weapons by 80 per cent. The radical treaty would cut the number of nuclear warheads to 1,000 each." [49] However, in an interview with the German journal Spiegel, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov pointed out that despite reports in the media, Russia had not received any proposals from the United States that would suggest such cuts—"neither officially nor behind the scenes." [50]

Some experts note that although a 1,500-warhead level is relatively easy to achieve, it would be too close to the 1,700-2,200-warhead limit established by the 2002 Moscow treaty. [51] Thus they expect levels of 1,000-1,200 operationally deployed warheads on both sides. [52] Other reports suggest, however, that the United States and Russia have privately indicated an intention to aim at a 1,500-warhead limit, [53] as going to lower ceilings might require tough choices and would result in significant shifts in the strategic postures of the two countries. In this regard Gottemoeller stated, "It's very important to complete [the Nuclear Posture] Review before the United States will start deep reductions… there will be some additional reductions below the Moscow Treaty numbers, that is, below 1,700. But deeper reductions have to wait until the completion of the Nuclear Posture Review." [54]

If in Washington Defense Department officials have already concluded that they can not make any significant reductions to the nuclear arsenal unless President Obama decides to scale back the strategic targeting plan, [55] Russia's long-term projections for strategic nuclear force modernization runs counter to even the 1,500-warhead limit. [56]

Setting Negotiating Positions: The U.S. and Russian Nuclear Postures

Significant changes to the negotiating positions of Moscow and Washington require alterations to national strategic postures, which set how nuclear weapons fit into national security concepts. Indeed, the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act notes that the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, due to Congress in December 2009, is to be used as "a basis for establishing future U.S. arms control objectives and negotiating positions." [57] Similarly, Russia's nuclear posture sets the framework for that country's position at arms control talks. This section examines Russian strategic force modernization. [For more information about the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, please see "Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap" [58] and "The bureaucracy of deterrence." [59]

According to recent estimates, as of January 2009, START-countable Russian strategic forces consisted of 634 strategic delivery platforms capable of carrying up to 2,825 nuclear warheads, including 385 operational missile systems with up to 1,357 warheads, 13 strategic missile submarines with up to 612 nuclear warheads, and 77 bombers with up to 856 long-range cruise missiles. [60] [For the most recent statistics on Russian declarations of START-accountable launchers, see Russia: Deployment and Stockpile Estimates," www.nti.org]

On March 17, 2009, Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev announced a comprehensive rearmament of the Russian military, a process that will include strategic force modernization. According to Medvedev, Russia has already begun to reequip its army; further, this effort will not be affected by falling prices for oil and gas and will accelerate through 2011. [61] The new procurement budget for 2009 is set at 1.5 trillion rubles (about $45 billion). While this announcement came amid concerns in Moscow over the performance of its conventional forces during last year's conflict with Georgia, 25 percent of the funding (almost $12 billion) will be directed to the strategic nuclear forces. [62]

Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov, head of the Russian strategic missile forces, has stated that "plans for the development of the Russian strategic rocket forces through 2016 foresee a decrease in quantity and a transformation in quality at the same time [….] Rocket systems with an extended shelf life will account for roughly 20 percent [and] new rocket systems for at least 80 percent of the forces." [63] According to Vice Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov, "by 2020 Russian strategic nuclear forces will be reequipped." [64]

This modernization will include gradual retirement of the old Soviet-built ICBMs (R-36MUTTH and R-36M2 [NATO Name SS-18], UR-100NUTTH [SS-19], Topol [SS-25]) in 2014-2022 and their replacement with a modified version of Topol-M [SS-24] — the MIRVed RS-24, which Russia plans to start deploying after the expiration of START I. The sea-based leg of the nuclear triad will consist of six Project 667BDRM Delfin (Delta IV) submarines with R-29RM Sineva missiles, which will gradually be replaced by up to eight Project 955 Borey submarines with Bulava missiles (each carrying 16 missiles with six warheads). [65] Modernization plans also envision procurement of Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bombers. [66]

Based on these estimates, Stanford-based Russian nuclear forces expert Pavel Podvig has concluded that "Russia is planning to have about 1,400-1,600 nuclear warheads in its strategic force for some time" and "if all of Russia's currently scheduled defense programs materialize, Moscow will find itself in a situation where its strategic nuclear arsenal will start growing." [67]

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains, however, that "modernization of Russian armed forces will not undermine, but rather strengthen international security and strategic stability." According to the MFA spokesman, Russia "does not [reject] its disarmament obligations and actively participates in nuclear weapons reductions." [68]

At the same time, this modernization is occurring against the backdrop of a renewed push for a nuclear weapons-free world. The April 5, 2009 Prague speech by U.S. President Barack Obama outlined his vision of a nuclear weapons free world and the steps that have to be undertaken to reach this objective. On the disarmament side, the immediate steps include reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategies, a new arms control agreement with Russia by the end of 2009, and U.S. ratification of the CTBT. [69] While endorsing the overall vision of nuclear disarmament, President Medvedev listed a number of "additional conditions that are necessary for reaching such an agreement and achieving a new level of security." [70] They include:

• prevention of the militarization of outer space,
• making it impossible to compensate for a cut in nuclear arms by building up conventional forces,
• making sure that nuclear weapons are destroyed and not just stockpiled.

These conditions reflect Moscow's concerns over the deep gap between Russian and U.S./NATO conventional capabilities. Under these circumstances, nuclear weapons serve as an important deterrent to what is viewed in Moscow as aggressive U.S. policies. Nuclear weapons also serve as a crucial symbol of U.S.-Russian parity. From this perspective, U.S. plans to deploy ballistic missile defense and to use strategic means of delivery in conventional mode are seen as actions aimed at devaluing the Russian nuclear arsenal. Russia's National Security Concept of 2000 states that nuclear forces will continue to provide for national security until conventional forces can be sufficiently modernized; however, current rearmament plans call for this rearming to be achieved by 2020, and even this deadline may prove hard to meet.

While the 2009 National Security Strategy acknowledges the benefit of gradually moving to a nuclear weapons free world, it also asserts that Russia will undertake all necessary measures to maintain strategic parity with the United States. [71] Thus, the nuclear arsenal is likely to continue to be seen as necessary to balance U.S. and NATO forces for some time to come, placing limitations on the reductions possible under a START follow-up agreement. [For more details on Russian nuclear posture, please see "The Evolving Role of Nuclear Weapons in Russia's Security Policy." [72]]

Conclusion

Russia supports further nuclear reductions, but views U.S. conventional superiority with concern. In the eyes of Moscow, deep reductions are possible only with progress along other tracks (missile defenses, overall military expenditures, etc.), so that Russia's "undiminished security" can be guaranteed. As nuclear weapon numbers decrease, Russia has emphasized that the other permanent members of the UN Security Council will have to join nuclear disarmament talks. [73] Officials from the Russian General Staff have already argued that a START I follow-on agreement should take into account the nuclear arsenals of France and the United Kingdom. [74] However, the Russian Foreign Ministry does not appear likely to insist on counting non-U.S. NATO weapons in the short term (unless and until deep reductions are at issue).

Although Presidents Obama and Medvedev clearly tasked their negotiators with concluding a new treaty before START I expires on December 5, 2009, it is not clear that the deadline will be met. Another important date to keep in mind is the next NPT Review Conference, to be held May 3-28, 2010, at which the Nuclear Weapon States will have to report on their fulfillment of Article VI (disarmament) obligations.

It is likely that the current negotiations on strategic arms reductions will result in a new nuclear arms control treaty that combines some of the START I verification procedures with reductions that go a bit beyond the SORT level, ensuring the predictability of the strategic relation between the two countries. It is less clear that the December 2009 deadline will be met, though some sort of preliminary agreement is likely. After the initial agreement is achieved, as noted by Gottemoeller, the two countries could "start deeper negotiations after 2009-2010 … because the Nuclear Posture Review will take a very careful view of all aspects of nuclear doctrine and strategy." [75] The degree of possible reductions remains unclear, however; the U.S. negotiating position will indeed depend in large part upon the result of the 2009 posture review. While the recent Congressional Strategic Posture Commission Report [76] advocates an incremental approach to nuclear weapons reductions, it is not clear that the Obama administration or the Defense Department's posture review will come to similar conclusions. As of May 2009, however, it remained clear that both Washington and Moscow are committed to concluding a START I follow-on agreement that includes some sort of verification provisions and additional reductions. The degree of reductions, however, remain a question mark, as does the likelihood of additional, follow-on agreements codifying deeper reductions, which will have to deal with issues such as missile defense and long-range conventional weaponry. Both U.S.-Russian relations and the nuclear nonproliferation regime depend on the success of these negotiations.

The author would like to express his gratitude to Cristina Hansell, Dr. Nikolai Sokov and Anna Loukianova for their invaluable comments and editing in the preparation of this issue brief.

Resources

Official Statements and Speeches

• Joint Statement by Dmitriy A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, and Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Regarding Negotiations on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arm, Office of the Press Secretary, White House, April 1, 2009, www.whitehouse.gov.
• Obama Prague Speech on Nuclear Weapons, Huffington Post, April 5, 2009, www.huffingtonpost.com.
• Dmitriy Medvedev, Speech at Helsinki University and Answers to Questions from Audience, Helsinki, April 20, 2009, kremlin.ru.

Articles and Reports

• Amy Woolf, "Strategic Arms Control After START: Issues and Options," Congressional Research Service, April 3, 2009, https://fpc.state.gov.
• Final Report, The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, https://media.usip.org.
• Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament (edited by Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter), James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper No. 15, April 2009, www.nonproliferation.org.
• Andrew Grotto and Joe Cirincione, "Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap," November 2008, www.americanprogress.org.
• Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: U.S. nuclear forces, 2009," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 65, No. 2 (March/April 2009), pp. 59-60.
• Official Documents and Reports, U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), www.state.gov.
• U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), www.state.gov.
• U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II), www.state.gov.

Websites

• Arms Control Association, Treaties, www.armscontrol.org
• Federation of American Scientists, Arms Control Agreements, www.fas.org.

Sources:
[1] Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America, White House Website, April 1, 2009, www.whitehouse.gov.
[2] See comments by Rose Gottemoeller, transcript of panel "Whither U.S.-Russia Relations?" at Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, April 6, 2009, www.carnegieendowment.org.
[3] "Russia: Deployment and Stockpile Estimates," NTI website, www.nti.org.
[4] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: U.S. nuclear forces, 2009," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 65, No. 2 (March/April 2009), pp. 59-60.
[5] Michael Jasinski, "Bush-Putin Summit, November 2001," NTI Issue Brief, www.nti.org.
[6] Dmitriy Kirsanov, "SShA gotovy zaklyuchit s RF novoye soglasheniye o sokrashchenii strategicheskikh arsenalov, no nastaivayut na otkaze ot prezhnikh mekhanizmov proverki," ITAR-TASS, May 23, 2007.
[7] Address by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Conference on Disarmament Plenary Meeting, Geneva, March 7, 2009, www.acronym.org.uk.
[8] Amy Woolf, "Strategic Arms Control After START: Issues and Options," Congressional Research Service, March 3, 2009, https://opencrs.com.
[9] Amy Woolf, "Strategic Arms Control After START: Issues and Options," Congressional Research Service, March 3, 2009, https://opencrs.com.
[10] "Rossiya i SShA nachali dialog s tselyu poiska zameny dorovoru SNV-1," RIA Novosti, March 1, 2007.
[11] Vladimir Putin, "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy," Munich, February 10, 2007, Russian presidential website, https://president.kremlin.ru.
[12] Arkadiy Orlov, "Rossiysko-amerikanskie peregovori po yadernomu oruzhiyu demonstriruyut horoshie strategicheskiye otnosheniya mezhdu dvumya stranami," RIA Novosti, March 29, 2007.
[13] "U.S. to let START nuclear treaty expire," Reuters, May 22, 2007, www.reuters.com.
[14] Russian view as articulated by Lieutenant General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy, head of the Russian Defense Ministry's International Treaty Directorate. "Rossiya predlagayet SShA razrabotat oblegchyenniy variant dogovora SNV," RIA Novosti, July 18, 2007.
[15] Russian view as articulated by Lieutenant General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy, head of the Russian Defense Ministry's International Treaty Directorate. "Rossiya predlagayet SShA razrabotat oblegchyenniy variant dogovora SNV," RIA Novosti, July 18, 2007.
[16] "Rossiya prodolzhit peregovori s SShA po PRO I po novomu dogovoru o SNV, " RIA Novosti, March 25, 2008.
[17] "U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration," Sochi, April 6, 2008, U.S. Embassy (Russian), https://moscow.usembassy.gov.
[18] "Rossiya ne mozhet prinyat ideyu SShA rarabotat novoye soglasheniye po SNV na osnove Moskovskogo dogovora ob SNP ot 2002 goda," ITAR-TASS, March 31, 2008.
[19] "Rossiya ne mozhet prinyat ideyu SShA rarabotat novoye soglasheniye po SNV na osnove Moskovskogo dogovora ob SNP ot 2002 goda," ITAR-TASS, March 31, 2008.
[20] "SShA sdelayut vsye vozmozhnoye, chtoby noviy Dogovor o SNV byl podpisan v 2008 godu," RIA Novosti, May 6, 2008.
[21] "Kreml rasschityvaet do kontsa goda viyti na resheniye problemy zameny dogovora o SNV," RIA Novosti, July 6, 2008.
[22] "Predlozheniya SShA po SNV pozvolyayut skytno narasshchivat yaderniy potentsial," RIA Novosti, December 9, 2008.
[23] This paragraph is based on CNS interviews with U.S. government officials, August-September 2008.
[24] "Rossiya otklonila predlozheniya SShA po sotrudnichestvu v sfere PRO i budet razgovarivat po etomu voprosu s novoy administratsiyey," ITAR-TASS, November 12, 2008.
[25] Natalia Slavina, "Rossiya nadeyetsya, chto novaya administratsiya SShA 'bolee kostruktivno' podoydyet k voprosu o novom dogovore ob SNV," ITAR-TASS, November 24, 2008.
[26] Arkadiy Orlov, "Obama nameren rabotat s RF nad sokrashcheniyem yadernykh vooruzheniy," RIA Novosti, November 7, 2008.
[27] Remarks by Vice President Biden at 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy, Office of the Vice President, February 7, 2009, www.whitehouse.gov.
[28] Russian FM Lavrov, U.S. State Secretary Clinton content with talks — 2, March 7, 2009, RIA Novosti, https://en.rian.ru.
[29] Joint Statement by Dmitriy A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, and Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Regarding Negotiations on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arm, Office of the Press Secretary, White House, April 1, 2009, www.whitehouse.gov.
[30] Phil Stewart, "Arms Talks 'Off to a Fast Start,'" Moscow News, 27 April 2009, www.themoscowtimes.com.
[31] "Govorit o konkretnikh parametrakh dogovora Rossii i SShA po SNV prezhdevremenno," ITAR-TASS, April 2, 2009.
[32] For a transcript and video of the discussion, see: "Whither U.S.-Russia Relations?" Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, April 7, 2009, www.carnegieendowment.org.
[33] "Whither U.S.-Russia Relations?" Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, April 6, 2009, Transcript by Federal News Service, Washington, D.C., www.carnegieendowment.org.
[34] "Whither U.S.-Russia Relations?," Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, April 6, 2009, Transcript by Federal News Service, Washington, D.C., www.carnegieendowment.org.
[35] "U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller outlines the U.S. position on a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia," Interfax, May 4, 2009, www.interfax.com.
[36] Gottemoeller stated in April at Carnegie that missile defense issues would be a part of a "broad-ranging discussion on strategic issues that will proceed on a separate track" from START negotiations.
[37] Dmitriy Medvedev, Speech at Helsinki University and Answers to Questions from Audience, Helsinki, April 20, 2009, kremlin.ru.
[38] "Rossiya v otnosheniyah s SShA budet uvyazyvat voprosy PRO i SNV," RIA Novosti, May 10, 2009.
[39] See for example, "Cracks appear in Russo-U.S. arms reduction plans," Jane's, May 11, 2009, www.janes.com; "Russia to link missile shield, arms talks," United Press International, May 11, 2009, www.upi.com.
[40] "Whither U.S.-Russia Relations?," Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, April 6, 2009, Transcript by Federal News Service, Washington, D.C., www.carnegieendowment.org.
[41] Elaine M. Grossman, Obama Team Eyes Changes in U.S.-Russian START Verification Practices, April 17, 2009, Global Security Newswire, www.globalsecuritynewswire.org.
[42] "U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller outlines the U.S. position on a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia," Interfax, May 4, 2009. www.interfax.com.
[43] "U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller outlines the U.S. position on a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia," Interfax, May 4, 2009, www.interfax.com.
[44] Pavel Podvig, "Formulating the next U.S.-Russian arms control agreement," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 18 December 2008, www.thebulletin.org.
[45] Most recently see, for example, Russian National Security Concept till 2020 (in Russian), approved by Presidential decree on May 12, 2009. www.scrf.gov.ru.
[46] Amy Woolf, "Strategic Arms Control After START: Issues and Options," Congressional Research Service, March 3, 2009, opencrs.com.
[47] "U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller outlines the U.S. position on a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia," Interfax, May 4, 2009, www.interfax.com.
[48] John F. Kerry, "New directions for foreign relations," The Boston Globe, January 13, 2009.
[49] "President Obama seeks Russia deal to slash nuclear weapons," The Times, February 4, 2009, www.timesonline.co.uk.
[50] Interview with Russian Foreign Minister, "Moscow Optimistic About America's New Beginning," Spiegel, February 15, 2009, www.spiegel.de.
[51] Next Steps In U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Reductions: The Start Follow-On Negotiations And Beyond, Arms Control Association, April 27, 2009, Transcript by Federal News Service, Washington, D.C, www.armscontrol.org.
[52] Pavel Podvig, "Russia's new arms development," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 16 January 2009, www.thebulletin.org.
[53] Peter Baker and Helene Cooper, "U.S. and Russia to Consider Reductions of Nuclear Arsenals in Talks for New Treaty," New York Times, March 31, 2009, www.nytimes.com.
[54] "U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller outlines the U.S. position on a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia," Interfax, May 4, 2009. www.interfax.com.
[55] Elaine M. Grossman, "New U.S. Warhead Reductions Said to Depend on Nuclear Targeting Changes," Global Security Newswire, April 1, 2009, https://gsn.nti.org.
[56] Pavel Podvig, "Russia's new arms development," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 16 January 2009, www.thebulletin.org.
[57] "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008," Public Law 110-181, www.dod.mil.
[58] Andrew Grotto and Joe Cirincione, "Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review: A Roadmap," November 2008, www.americanprogress.org.
[59] Janne E. Nolan and James R. Holmes, "The bureaucracy of deterrence," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 1, p. 40-43, 55-58, thebulletin.metapress.com.
[60] For more details see Pavel Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, Current Status, April 3, 2009, russianforces.org.
[61] "Russia announces major arms buildup," CNN, March 17, 2009, www.cnn.com.
[62] "Minoborony forsiruyet raboty po pereosnashcheniyu sistemy boyevogo upravleniya Strategicheskimi yadernymi salami," ITAR-TASS, March 5, 2009.
[63] "Russia Plans Smaller, Younger Missile Arsenal," Global Security Newswire, April 13, 2009, www.globalsecuritynewswire.org.
[64] "Strategicheskiye yadernyye sily RF polostyu pereosnastyat k 2020 godu," RIA Novosti, February 26, 2009.
[65] Pavel Podvig, "Long-term force projections," Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, January 25. 2009, russianforces.org.
[66] "Na KAPO im. Gorbunova ispytali novyi seriyniy Tu-160,"Tatar-Inform, January 6, 2009, www.tatar-inform.ru.
[67] Pavel Podvig, "Russia's new arms development," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January 16, 2009, www.thebulletin.org.
[68] Modernizatsiya VS RF ne oznachaet, chto Moskva otkazhetsya ot obyazatelstv po razoruzheniyu," RIA Novosti, March 26, 2009.
[69] Obama Prague Speech on Nuclear Weapons, Huffington Post, April 5, 2009, www.huffingtonpost.com.
[70] Dmitriy Medvedev, Speech at Helsinki University and Answers to Questions from Audience, Helsinki, April 20, 2009, kremlin.ru.
[71] Russian National Security Concept through 2020 (in Russian), approved by presidential decree on May 12, 2009, www.scrf.gov.ru.
[72] Nikolai Sokov, "The Evolving Role of Nuclear Weapons in Russia's Security Policy," in Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter, Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper No. 15, April 2009, https://cns.miis.edu.
[73] "Rossiya predlagaet podklyuchit vseh chlenov SB OON k yadernomu razoruzheniyu," RIA Novosti, February 19, 2009
[74] "Noviy dogovor SNV dolzhen uchityvat potentsial NATO," RIA Novosti, March 28, 2009
[75]"U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller outlines the U.S. position on a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia," Interfax, May 4, 2009, www.interfax.com.
[76] Final Report, The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, https://media.usip.org.