Fact Sheet

United Kingdom Overview

United Kingdom Overview

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Background

This page is part of United Kingdom’s Country Profile.

The United Kingdom became the world’s third nuclear power, after the Soviet Union and the United States, on 3 October 1952. It remains one of the five recognized nuclear weapons states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and has maintained a continuous deployment of nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines since April 1969. Though it once possessed biological and chemical warfare programs, the United Kingdom ended both programs in the mid to late 1950s. Its limited missile program is now composed entirely of sea-launched missiles.

Nuclear

The United Kingdom is a nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and a member of all of the major WMD nonproliferation treaties and international export control regimes. The United Kingdom ratified the NPT in November 1968 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in June 1998. The United Kingdom’s total nuclear stockpile consists of around 225 strategic warheads that can be deployed on four Vanguard-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). 1 Under the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy released in March 2021, UK increased the cap on its nuclear warheads stockpile to 260, reversing a 2010 pledge to reduce the nation’s stockpile below 180 by the mid-2020s. 2 The UK justified this reversal by citing the evolving contemporary threat environment, noting in particular the rise of increased global competition and the proliferation of novel and potentially disruptive technologies. The move marked the first increase in the size of the UK arsenal since the end of the Cold War and a shift from previous Defense Reviews. The July 1998 Strategic Defense Review precipitated major changes to the British nuclear weapons program, including the removal of air-delivered weapons from service and exclusive reliance on SSBNs for nuclear deterrence. 3 The Review also mandated that only one submarine be on patrol at a time, it reduced the number of warheads carried aboard to a maximum of forty-eight, and it required the missiles be de-targeted. 4 The 2010 Defense Review further reduced the maximum number of deployed warheads to forty per submarine as part of a plan to cut the UK’s operational nuclear weapons to 120, with the goal of reducing the total stockpile from 225 weapons to 180 by the mid-2020s. 5 In January 2015, Defense Secretary Michael Fallon announced that the British government had fulfilled its pledge, operational nuclear weapons limited to 120 with only 40 deployed on each submarine. 6 The 2015 Strategic Defense Review further limited the number of operational missiles deployed on each submarine to eight. Again citing a changing global security dynamic, the 2021 Integrated Review discarded the nation’s long-standing policy of providing public figures for its operational stockpile and deployed warhead or missile numbers, opting instead for a policy of deliberate ambiguity. 7 Both changes made in the 2021 Integrated Review have been met with criticism from civil society groups and foreign governments who note that the new stance directly contradicts Britain’s oft-repeated commitment to nuclear disarmament. 8 Concern has also been expressed that the policy of ambiguity may weaken the credibility of the UK’s condemnations of Chinese and Russian proliferation and lack of transparency as well as its ability to engage with Iran to prevent its development of nuclear weapons.

The United Kingdom is currently engaged in several modernization projects related to its Continuous at Sea Deterrent (CASD). Among these projects is the effort to replace the current fleet of Vanguard-class SSBNs upon which the country’s CASD depends with four new Dreadnought-class SSBNs. The new Dreadnought SSBN missile compartments will be equipped with 12 launch tubes, down from the 16 carried by their predecessors. The First of Class Dreadnoughts are expected to enter into service by the early 2030s. 9 As the first Vanguard class submarine was initially slated for retirement in 2024, the service lives of the ships has been extended through refitting and maintenance processes the late 2020s to early 2030s. In addition to SSBN modification and replacement efforts, the United Kingdom is currently engaged in a joint project with the United States to replace the nation’s existing warheads. 10

Nuclear power provides approximately 18% of the United Kingdom’s electricity. 11 Nuclear power remains a key component of the government strategy to meet greenhouse emission targets under the Paris Agreement, and the UK Net Zero target passed in 2019. 12 Efforts to increase UK nuclear production to meet these targets has resulted in the signing of deals to construct new power plants. In the face of the collapse of private sector support of UK nuclear power projects, the UK government has introduced a new model for reactor funding, and has provided government investment in the UK’s nuclear industry funding advanced materials manufacturing projects, including Advanced Modular Reactor Projects, to promote the development of the UK nuclear industry. 13

As a result of Brexit, the UK is no longer a member of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). From 1 January 2021 and the end of the transition period, cooperation between Euratom and the UK is governed by the EU-UK Agreement for cooperation on the safe and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 14 The agreement provides a framework to facilitate research and development in areas of common interest and trade in nuclear materials and technologies.

As a further result of departing Euratom, on 1 January 2021, the Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) assumed the role previously fulfilled by Euratom, delivering a State System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Material, ensuring that the UK meets its international safeguards obligations and maintains a domestic safeguards system analogous to that of Euratom. 15

The United Kingdom participates in efforts to control the export of nuclear technology through its membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee (ZAC).

Biological

Beginning in 1934, the United Kingdom weaponized anthrax and conducted research on botulinum toxin and the pathogens that cause plague and typhoid fever. 16 By the late 1950s, the United Kingdom no longer had an offensive biological weapons program, although its defensive biological program remains strong today. 17 London ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in March 1975, and is a member of the Australia Group (AG), an export control mechanism for chemical and biological weapons. On 28 March 2005, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia issued a joint statement affirming their support for the BTWC and called on all remaining countries not party to the BTWC to implement and comply with the convention. 18

Missile

The United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent currently resides on four Vanguard-class submarines, each outfitted to carry 8 U.S.-supplied Trident II (D-5) sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and up to 40 warheads as of November 2020. 19 The UK shares a pool of missiles with the United States at the Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, Kings Bay Submarine Base, Georgia. The Royal Navy retrieves missiles from the U.S. storage area and equips them with warheads at the Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport in Scotland. Although the United Kingdom has title to 58 SLBMs, it technically does not own them, and the United States handles missile servicing. 20

The United Kingdom has a highly developed missile program with maritime, air, and land capabilities. The UK has been undertaking efforts to update its missile defense systems. In 2018, the Sea Ceptor Missile system, a sea-based missile defense system employing the Common Anti-air Modular Missile (CAMM) produced by MBSA entered into service, replacing the former VL Seawolf system. Sea Ceptor has been fitted to the Royal Navy’s type 23 frigates and will be fit to the navy’s new-generation Type 26 frigates, currently under construction. 21 The new Sky Sabre ground-based air defense program was designed to replace the existing Rapier Short Ranger Air Defense and is expected to achieve initial operating capability in November 2020. Sky Sabre employs a ship-based version of the CAMM, produced by MBDA and known as Sea Ceptor, has replaced the Royal Navy’s VL Seawolf defense system and has been fitted to the Navy’s Type 23 frigates. The land-based version of CAMM, referred to as Land Ceptor, completed its first successful firing trials in 2018. 22 Additionally, under the Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon Programme, the UK is working with France on a new supersonic cruise missile to replace the Harpoon anti-ship missile and the Storm Shadow air launched cruise missile by 2030. 23

The United Kingdom is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an informal mechanism that aims to restrict the proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and subscribes to the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), designed to supplement and bolster the MTCR.

Chemical

The United Kingdom’s World War II stockpile of weaponized chemical agents included phosgene, mustard gas, and lewisite. 24 However, the country renounced its chemical weapons (CW) program in 1957 and subsequently destroyed its chemical stockpiles. 25 London ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in May 1996 and participates in the Australia Group (AG).

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Glossary

Nuclear-weapon states (NWS)
NWS: As defined by Article IX, paragraph 3 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the five states that detonated a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967 (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Coincidentally, these five states are also permanent members of the UN Security Council. States that acquired and/or tested nuclear weapons subsequently are not internationally recognized as nuclear-weapon states.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The NPT: Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should assist one another in its development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. For additional information, see the NPT.
Deployment
The positioning of military forces – conventional and/or nuclear – in conjunction with military planning.
Ballistic missile
A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.  The flight of a ballistic missile includes three phases: 1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; 2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and 3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target.  Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters - range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision.  Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets.
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM)
Refers to cruise missiles with conventional or nuclear payloads that are launched from submarines.
WMD (weapons of mass destruction)
WMD: Typically refers to nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, though there is some debate as to whether chemical weapons qualify as weapons of “mass destruction.”
Nonproliferation
Nonproliferation: Measures to prevent the spread of biological, chemical, and/or nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. See entry for Proliferation.
Export control
National laws or international arrangements established to restrict the sale of certain goods to certain countries, or to ensure that safeguards or end-use guarantees are applied to the export and sale of sensitive and dual-use technologies and materials. See entry for Dual-use
Ratification
Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The NPT: Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should assist one another in its development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. For additional information, see the NPT.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The CTBT: Opened for signature in 1996 at the UN General Assembly, the CTBT prohibits all nuclear testing if it enters into force. The treaty establishes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to ensure the implementation of its provisions and verify compliance through a global monitoring system upon entry into force. Pending the treaty’s entry into force, the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO is charged with establishing the International Monitoring System (IMS) and promoting treaty ratifications. CTBT entry into force is contingent on ratification by 44 Annex II states. For additional information, see the CTBT.
Strategic nuclear warhead
Strategic nuclear warhead: A high-yield nuclear warhead placed on a long-range delivery system, such as a land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs), a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBMs), or a strategic bomber.
SSBN
Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear: A hull classification for a submarine capable of launching a ballistic missile. The "N", or nuclear, refers to the ship's propulsion system. SSBN's are generally reserved for strategic vessels, as most submarine launched ballistic missiles carry nuclear payloads. A non-strategic vessel carries the designation SSN, or attack submarine.
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)
Euratom: Launched in 1958 to facilitate the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes within the European Community. For additional information, see EURATOM.
Safeguards
Safeguards: A system of accounting, containment, surveillance, and inspections aimed at verifying that states are in compliance with their treaty obligations concerning the supply, manufacture, and use of civil nuclear materials. The term frequently refers to the safeguards systems maintained by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in all nuclear facilities in non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT. IAEA safeguards aim to detect the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material in a timely manner. However, the term can also refer to, for example, a bilateral agreement between a supplier state and an importer state on the use of a certain nuclear technology.

See entries for Full-scope safeguards, information-driven safeguards, Information Circular 66, and Information Circular 153.
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The NSG was established in 1975, and its members commit themselves to exporting sensitive nuclear technologies only to countries that adhere to strict non-proliferation standards. For additional information, see the NSG.
Zangger Committee (ZC)
A group of 35 nuclear exporting states established in 1971 under the chairmanship of Claude Zangger of Switzerland. The purpose of the committee is to maintain a "trigger list" of: (1) source or special fissionable materials, and (2) equipment or materials especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable materials. Additionally, the committee has identified certain dual-use technologies as requiring safeguarding when they are supplied to non-nuclear weapon states. These include explosives, centrifuge components, and special materials. The Zangger Committee is an informal arrangement, and its decisions are not legally binding upon its members. For more information see the Zangger Committee. 
Anthrax
The common name of the bacterium Bacillus anthracis, as well as the name of the disease it produces.  A predominantly animal disease, anthrax can also infect humans and cause death within days.  B. anthracis bacteria can form hardy spores, making them relatively easy to disseminate.  Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR/Russia have all investigated anthrax as a biological weapon, as did the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo.  Anthrax-laced letters were also used to attack the U.S. Senate and numerous news agencies in September 2001.  There is no vaccine available to the general public, and treatment requires aggressive administration of antibiotics.
Botulinum Toxin
Botulism is caused by exposure to botulinum toxin (a neurotoxin).  Most often caused by eating contaminated foods, botulinum poisoning prevents the human nervous system from transmitting signals, resulting in paralysis, and eventually death by suffocation.  Botulinum toxin is the most toxic known substance. 15,000 times more toxic than VX nerve gas, mere nanograms of botulinum toxin will kill an adult human.  A significant bioweapons concern, botulinum toxin has been investigated as a weapon by Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States, Iraq and unsuccessfully by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo. 
Pathogen
Pathogen: A microorganism capable of causing disease.
Plague
Plague: The disease caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis. There are three forms of plague: bubonic plague, pneumonic plague, and septicemic plague. Bubonic plague refers to infection of the lymph nodes by Y. pestis, causing black sores or “buboes,” pneumonic plague refers to infection of the lungs, and septicemic plague refers to infection of the bloodstream. Although no longer a serious public health hazard in the developed world, the bacterium can spread from person-to-person in aerosolized form, and has been investigated as a biological weapon by Japan and the Soviet Union.
Typhoid fever
Typhoid fever: A disease spread through contaminated food, typhoid fever causes diarrhea and rash. While typhoid fever is now only a public health concern in developing countries, typhoid fever outbreaks during wartime have occurred numerous times. Caused by the bacterium Salmonella typhi, Japan investigated and allegedly used typhoid-based biological weapons during sabotage operations in World War II.
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
The BTWC: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Countries must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery within nine months after the entry into force of the convention. The BTWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. In 1994, the BTWC member states created the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding BTWC Protocol that would help deter violations of the BTWC. The draft protocol outlines a monitoring regime that would require declarations of dual-use activities and facilities, routine visits to declared facilities, and short-notice challenge investigations. For additional information, see the BTWC.
Australia Group (AG)
Australia Group (AG): Established in 1985 to limit the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) through export controls on chemical precursors, equipment, agents, and organisms. For additional information, see the Australia Group.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
The MTCR: An informal arrangement established in April 1987 by an association of supplier states concerned about the proliferation of missile equipment and technology relevant to missiles that are capable of carrying a payload over 500 kilograms over a 300-kilometer range. Though originally intended to restrict the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles, the regime has been expanded to restrict the spread of unmanned aerial vehicles. For additional information, see the MTCR.
HCOC
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), formerly known as The International Code of Conduct (ICOC), was adopted in 2002. The HCOC was established to bolster efforts to curb ballistic missile proliferation worldwide and to further delegitimize such proliferation by fostering consensus among states on how they should conduct their trade in missiles and dual-use items.
Phosgene (CG)
Phosgene (CG): A choking agent, phosgene gas causes damage to the respiratory system leading to fluid build-up in the lungs. Phosgene also causes coughing, throat and eye irritation, tearing, and blurred vision. A gas at room temperature, phosgene can be delivered as a pressurized liquid that quickly converts to gas. Germany and France used phosgene during World War I; the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia also produced military phosgene. Phosgene caused over 80% of the deaths from chemical gas during World War I.
Mustard (HD)
Mustard is a blister agent, or vesicant. The term mustard gas typically refers to sulfur mustard (HD), despite HD being neither a mustard nor a gas. Sulfur mustard gained notoriety during World War I for causing more casualties than all of the other chemical agents combined. Victims develop painful blisters on their skin, as well as lung and eye irritation leading to potential pulmonary edema and blindness. However, mustard exposure is usually not fatal. A liquid at room temperature, sulfur mustard has been delivered using artillery shells and aerial bombs. HD is closely related to the nitrogen mustards (HN-1, HN-2, HN—3).
Lewisite (L)
Lewisite is a blister agent that like mustard causes eye, skin, and airway irritation, but unlike mustard, acts immediately rather than with a delay. With significant exposure, lewisite can cause blindness. A colorless liquid, lewisite can be dispersed as a gas or a liquid.  Lewisite (L) has no known medical or other non-military uses.  Several countries, including Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union, have produced and stockpiled lewisite.  Lewisite may have been used by Japan during World War II.
Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requires each state party to declare and destroy all the chemical weapons (CW) and CW production facilities it possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any CW it abandoned on the territory of another state. The CWC was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, and entered into force on 29 April 1997. For additional information, see the CWC.
Australia Group (AG)
Australia Group (AG): Established in 1985 to limit the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) through export controls on chemical precursors, equipment, agents, and organisms. For additional information, see the Australia Group.

Sources

  1. Shannon N. Kile, and Hans M. Kristensen, “British Nuclear Forces,” in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 346-49, www.sipri.org.
  2. “Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” Her Majesty’s Government, March 2021, p. 76, www.gov.uk; “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review,” Her Majesty’s Government, October 2010, p. 38-39, www.gov.uk.
  3. House of Commons, “Strategic Defense Review White Paper,” 15 October 1998.
  4. House of Commons, “Strategic Defense Review White Paper,” 15 October 1998.
  5. Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, “Report submitted by the UK under actions 5, 20, and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 28 April – 9 May 2014, www.un.org.
  6. Jefferson Morley, “UK Downsizes Its Nuclear Arsenal,” Arms Control Association, March 2015, www.armscontrol.org.
  7. “Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” Her Majesty’s Government, March 2021, www.gov.uk, p 77.
  8. Hans Kristensen, “British Defense Review Ends Nuclear Reductions Era,” Federation of American Scientists, 17 March 2021, https://fas.org; Tom Plant and Matthew Harries, “Going Ballistic: The UK's Proposed Nuclear Buildup,” Royal United Services Institute, 16 March 2021, https://rusi.org;  “UK decision to build up nuclear arsenal defies disarmament logic: Russian Foreign Ministry,” TASS Russian News Agency, 18 March 2021, https://tass.com; Jon Shelton, “Exclusive: Germany's Heiko Maas criticizes UK plans to expand nuclear arsenal,” Deutsche Welle, 19 March 2021, www.dw.com.
  9. Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 19 February 2021, p. 41, https://crsreports.congress.gov.
  10. Ministry of Defence, Defence Nuclear Organisation and Ben Wallace, “Defence Secretary Announces programme to replace the UK’s nuclear warhead,” Her Majesty’s Government, 25 February 2020, www.gov.uk; Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Statement of Charles A. Richard Commander United States Strategic Command Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services,” 13 February 2020, p. 13, United States Senate, www.stratcom.mil.
  11. Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, “Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics 2020,” United Kingdom Statistics Authority, 30 July 2020, p. 14, www.gov.uk; Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, “Energy Trends: March 2019, special Feature Article-Nuclear electricity in the UK,” United Kingdom Statistics Authority, 28 March 2019, p 64, www.gov.uk.
  12. Parliament of the United Kingdom, “Climate Change Act 2008 (2050 Target Amendment) Order 2019,” Her Majesty’s Government, 26 June 2019, www.legislation.gov.uk; Committee on Climate Change, “Reducing UK emissions: 2019 Progress Report to Parliament,” Committee on Climate Change, July 2019, www.theccc.org.uk.
  13. Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, “£40 million to kick start next-gen nuclear technology,” Her Majesty’s Government,10 July 2020, www.gov.uk; Department for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy, “Funding for Nuclear Innovation,” Her Majesty’s Government, Accessed 25 March 2020, www.gov.uk.
  14. European Atomic Energy Community and the United Kingdom, “Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the European Atomic Energy Community for Cooperation on the Safe and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” Official Journal of the European Union, 31 December 2020,  https://eur-lex.europa.eu.
  15. “Nuclear Safeguards: ONR’s role from 1 January 2021,” Office for Nuclear Regulation, Accessed 5 March 2021, www.onr.org.uk; Parliament of the United Kingdom, “Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018,” Her Majesty’s Government, 26 June 2018, www.legislation.gov.uk.
  16. Milton Leitenberg, “Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and Analysis,” 7th International Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare, Stockholm, Sweden, June 2001, www.fas.org; Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed., p. 198, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).
  17. Milton Leitenberg, “Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and Analysis,” 7th International Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare, Stockholm, Sweden, June 2001, www.fas.org; Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed., p. 198, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).
  18. U.S. Department of State, “U.S., U.K., Russia Reaffirm Support for Biological Weapons Pact,” U.S. Department of State International Information Programs, 28 March 2005, www.iwar.org.uk.
  19. Shannon N. Kile, and Hans M. Kristensen. “British Nuclear Forces.” In Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 346–49, www.sipri.org; Jefferson Morley, “UK Downsizes Its Nuclear Arsenal,” Arms Control Association, March 2015, www.armscontrol.org.
  20. Shannon N. Kile, and Hans M. Kristensen. “British Nuclear Forces,” in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 346–49, www.sipri.org.
  21. “The Defence Equipment Plan 2019, Version 2_0,” UK Ministry of Defence, 28 October 2020, www.gov.uk.
  22. “Land Ceptor – the British Army’s new air defence missile – blasts airborne target by Baltic Sea,” UK Ministry of Defence, 28 May 2018, www.des.mod.uk.
  23. “Anglo-French FC/ASW Missile Programme Successfully Passes Its Key Review,” MBDA, 19 March 2019, www.mbda-systems.com; Alex Love, “UK-French future ship-based missile: standing the Brexit test,” Global Defence Technology, 18 January 2021, https://defence.nridigital.com; Thomas Harding, “New British Missile Three Times as Fast as Current Weapons,” The Telegraph, 21 June 2011, www.telegraph.co.uk.
  24. Julian Perry Robinson, Carl-Göran Hedén and Hans von Schreeb,“The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare,” CB Weapons Today 2, p. 127; Edward M. Spiers, Chemical and Biological Weapons: A Study of Proliferation, pp. 11, 162, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
  25. Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed., (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 97.

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