Syria Missile Overview

This page is part of the Syria Country Profile.

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Syria has one of the largest missile arsenals in the Middle East, and is actively engaged in missile proliferation. Syria’s missile build-up began as a deterrent to its primary adversary, Israel. Unable to match Israel’s conventional military capabilities, Syria began seeking an unconventional deterrent that resulted in a robust chemical weapons program and ballistic missile delivery systems. Syria’s arsenal is limited to short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM). Given the close proximity of potential regional adversaries, Syria’s limited manufacturing and scientific capabilities, and the intensity of the ongoing civil war, it is unlikely that the country will pursue long-range missiles in the near future.

Syria produces many of its missiles; however, it is dependent upon foreign assistance for advanced components and technologies. Consequently, Syria’s production capacity is limited by foreign imports, and Syria is not capable of significantly improving on designs or producing more advanced missiles without assistance. All of Syria’s ballistic missiles are capable of carrying chemical warheads. ¹

Increased proliferation concerns have arisen in recent years given Syria’s warm relations with Hezbollah and Hamas. Syria is known to have transferred artillery rockets to both groups, and Israeli and U.S. officials have alleged that Syria has also supplied one or both groups with short-range ballistic missiles. ² As of September 2013, civil war is ongoing in Syria.

Table 1 shows the basic design characteristics of Syria’s ballistic and cruise missile arsenals. The foundation of Syria’s arsenal is the Scud, of which Syria possesses three variations. Syria first received the Scud-B (Russia: R-17 “Elbrus”/NATO: SS-1-C) from North Korea in the late 1980s, and the Scud-C (Russia: R-17M “Elbrus-M”/NATO: SS-1-D) shortly thereafter. ³ With assistance from North Korea and Iran, Syria established its own production line, and now assembles, maintains, and repairs its Scud B and C missiles. Before the civil war’s escalation, analysts estimated that the Syrian government was capable of producing approximately 30 Scud-B/Cs per year, while continuing its dependence on foreign assistance for advanced missile components and technologies. ⁴ Syria was believed to possess several hundred Scud-Bs and Scud-Cs, with fewer than 50 launchers for each system. ⁵ Current capabilities are difficult to assess, due to the lack of reliable estimates and the Syrian government’s need to relocate its weapons and weapons parts to decrease the likelihood of their acquisition by opposition forces. ⁶

The exact nature and status of Syria’s Scud-D (Russia: R-17VTO/NATO: SS-1-E/DPRK: Hwasong 7) is unknown. Reports indicate that Syria’s Scud-D is a modified Scud-C with a longer range and advanced guidance system. ⁷ Israeli intelligence confirmed the existence of the Scud-D in 2005, when a test launch failed and fragments of the missile landed in southern Turkey. ⁸ It is likely that Syria did not produce the guidance system indigenously, but rather imported it from a foreign supplier. Syrian modifications to increase the Scud-C’s range were basic in nature, and should not be considered a major advancement in the country’s missile production capabilities. Should Syria’s Scud-D have a 700km range, as reported, this would enable Syria to field the missile deep within its own territory, reducing its vulnerability and susceptibility to an adversary’s preemptive strike.

Syria produces a variant of the Iranian Fateh-110-A (China: DF-11-A/NATO: CSS-8), domestically called the M-600. ⁹ The M-600 is a solid propellant, road mobile SRBM. In contrast to liquid propellant, solid propellant may be stored in the missile, eliminating the need to fuel the missile prior to launch. Since fueling a missile takes several days, by eliminating this step Syria reduces the likelihood that a planned missile launch could be detected by its adversaries in advance. In this regard, the proliferation of solid-fueled missile technology in the Middle East is profoundly destabilizing.

Syria reportedly possesses two Chinese-made road-mobile SRBM’s, the Dongfeng-15 (DF-15/Export name: M-9/NATO: CSS-6) and the Dongfeng-11 (DF-11/Export name: M-11/NATO: CSS-7); however, these reports are unconfirmed. ¹⁰ If Syria possesses these missiles, the DF-15 would likely be Syria’s longest range missile, possessing a range of 600 to 800 km, while the DF-15 and DF-11 would likely be Syria’s most reliable missiles. In addition, each missile utilizes a solid propellant motor, which reduces the needed preparation time for launch, and therefore decreases the time available for detection. This, in conjunction with its range and ability to be fielded deep in Syrian territory, would make the DF-15 Syria’s most strategically important ballistic missile.

In addition to its ballistic missile arsenal, Syria has a small arsenal of Russian anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Syria’s cruise missiles are designed for coastal defense; however, such missiles may be used against cities as well. Syria’s cruise missiles are capable of being equipped with chemical warheads. ¹¹

Early Attempts to Achieve a Strategic Deterrent: 1970-1989

Syria’s missile program began in November 1970, when President Hafez al-Assad assumed power and immediately sought closer military ties with the Soviet Union. ¹² This resulted in Syrian purchase of the R-70, a rudimentary battlefield short-range ballistic missiles (BSRBM), which was first delivered in early 1973. ¹³ Syria immediately used the missile in the 1973 Yom Kippur War against Israel, but the missile’s limited range and poor accuracy rendered it ineffective. ¹⁴ Syria therefore requested the more advanced Scud-B from the Soviet Union, receiving its first delivery in 1974. Although outdated by modern standards, the Scud-B represented a significant upgrade from the R-70.

Syria learned from both the Six-Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War that its conventional forces were dramatically inferior to Israel’s. President Hafez al-Assad therefore adopted a doctrine of “Strategic Parity,” to eliminate the gap, which included an asymmetric deterrent strategy based on chemical weapons and their delivery systems. ¹⁵ Syria may have equipped the Scud-B with chemical warheads as early as 1979. ¹⁶

Syria continued to bolster its missile arsenal, receiving a North Korean Scud-C, possibly via Iran, in the early 1980s, and a Scud-C from the Soviet Union in 1980. ¹⁷ By seeking the same missile from multiple suppliers, Syria demonstrated its commitment to building a ballistic missile arsenal.

The 1982 Lebanon War once again demonstrated the superiority of Israeli conventional forces. Therefore, in early 1983 Syria attempted to acquire a more advanced BSRBM with improved accuracy and payload. Damascus negotiated with the Soviet Union for the OTR-21, and by late 1983 received its first shipment. ¹⁸ The OTR-21 replaced the highly inaccurate R-70, and was intended to serve as a battlefield weapon in any future conflict with Israel. Syria attempted to acquire the OTR-23 “Oka” (NATO: SS-23 “Spider”) from the Soviet Union in 1987. ¹⁹ However, Syria’s attempts to acquire the missile failed due to the USSR’s signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, which required the destruction of its ground-launched missiles possessing ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. ²⁰

New Partners and Improved Capabilities: 1990-2007

The Soviet Union’s collapse forced Syria to seek new missile suppliers. By the early 1990s, Syria began looking to China, North Korea and Iran for assistance, none of whom are members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). ²¹

According to the CIA, Syria signed an agreement with China as early as 1989 for the M-9. ²² Whether China ever delivered M-9 missiles to Syria remains unconfirmed, and some experts believe U.S. pressure on China successfully halted the deal. ²³ Conflicting reports, however, claim China may have circumvented U.S. pressure by providing Syria with the technologies and materials necessary for producing the missile. ²⁴ Reports that Syria attempted to acquire M-11 missiles from China, which could be deployed on converted Scud B launchers and used to deliver chemical weapons, are similarly unconfirmed. ²⁵

In 1992, with assistance from North Korea and China, Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) constructed two missile complexes at Aleppo and Hama. ²⁶ The facilities included missile assembly plants, liquid and solid fuel production plants, and hardened concrete storage bunkers for missiles and launchers. ²⁷ The Aleppo facility is also reportedly used for chemical warhead fitting. ²⁸ In 2007, Syria allegedly attempted to weaponize a Scud-C with mustard gas, resulting in an explosion and 15 fatalities. ²⁹

After the 1991 Gulf War, Saudi Arabia and other members of the coalition that opposed Iraq rewarded Syria with several billion dollars for its involvement. ³⁰ Syria used a portion of this money to purchase Scud-Cs and missile production equipment from North Korea. ³¹ In July 1992, Syria tested the Scud-C with North Korean assistance, conducting a similar test again in 1997. ³² It is widely believed that North Korea continued to ship Scud-Cs to Syria throughout the 1990s. While the total number of missiles involved is unknown, it is reportedly several hundred. ³³

North Korea is also believed to have assisted Syria with its Scud-D program. In 2000, Syria allegedly received Scud-D and related technology directly from North Korea. ³⁴ Other reports contend that along with North Korea, China and Iran have been actively assisting Syria to produce the Scud-D. ³⁵

By the late 1990s Syria began to once again look to Russia for missiles and related technologies. Reports suggest that in 1999 Russia helped Syria to establish a solid fuel development capacity. ³⁶ In 2008 President Bashar al-Assad visited Russia to negotiate a deal to acquire the solid-propelled BSRBM, the Iskander-E (GRAU: 9K720; NATO: SS-26 ‘Stone’). ³⁷ The Iskander-E’s capacity to fly at a variable trajectory could aid Syria in evading Israeli air defenses, and the missile could also be equipped with unconventional warheads. ³⁸ However, the negotiations collapsed under U.S. and Israeli pressure, marking the second round of failed negotiations since 2005. ³⁹ Determined to acquire a solid fueled BSRBM, Syria turned to Iran, who in 2008 helped to establish a Syrian domestic production capacity for the Iranian Fateh-110A, known in Syria as the M-600. ⁴⁰ Israel claims that Syria has since exported the missile to Hezbollah and Hamas. ⁴¹

Although Syria’s indigenous capabilities have improved over time, the country continues to rely on foreign assistance from Chinese, North Korean, Iranian and possibly Russian entities for advanced components and technologies.

In response to Syria’s proactive steps to improve its arsenal, the United States and Israel are actively seeking to disrupt Damascus’s acquisition of missile technologies. Syria’s SSRC and the Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology (HIAST) are under U.S. sanctions. ⁴² In 2005, the United States extended the Iran Nonproliferation Act to Syria and North Korea with the intention of preventing these countries from obtaining technology related to weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and conventional weapons. ⁴³ Israeli officials claim that Syria has missiles aimed at almost every part of Israel and the disputed Golan Heights. Israel has responded to the perceived Syrian missile threat by improving its Arrow Missile Defense system, training its troops to respond to missile and rocket attacks, and working diplomatically to prevent Syrian acquisition of missile technologies from foreign suppliers, such as Russia. ⁴⁴

Israel remains one of Syria’s main motivations for acquiring more advanced missile systems; however, Syria is also concerned about other potential regional threats, and the U.S./NATO presence in the Middle East. ⁴⁵ Syrian missile procurement could also be driven by the decades-long geopolitical rivalry between Iraq and Syria. ⁴⁶ Although it is unclear whether Syria will pursue long-range ballistic missile systems, Damascus continues to see increasingly advanced ballistic missile systems as vital to its security.

The conflict in Syria raises substantial proliferation and security concerns with regards to the security of Syria’s weapons stockpiles.

On 12 December 2012 the Obama Administration noted that the Assad regime had escalated the violence by firing at least six Scud-based ballistic missiles over the preceding week. ⁴⁷ A few weeks later, on 21 December, NATO’s Secretary General confirmed the launch of additional Scud-type missiles inside of Syria. ⁴⁸ According to Human Rights Watch, from the initial launches in December 2012 to July 2013 the Syrian government launched at least 131 missiles; however, the exact number cannot be confirmed. ⁴⁹ While it is difficult to specify the exact missile types launched, local reports and videos confirm that Scud missiles, the OTR-21 (SS-21-B Scarab-B), and most likely the R-300 (SS-1-C Scud B) have been fired. ⁵⁰ The Scud-B is highly inaccurate, making it impossible to use as a battlefield weapon that targets military personnel or infrastructure while avoiding collateral damage. The number of civilian casualties caused by missile launches is unknown.

Beginning in April 2013 the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and Germany have each stated that their respective intelligence services confirmed the use of chemical weapons in Syria. ⁵¹ On 31 August 2013, the United Nations released videos of ongoing inspections investigating the alleged use of chemical weapons. ⁵² The videos show that artillery shells delivered the chemical weapons. ⁵³ To date, there have been no reports of chemical weapons being delivered by ballistic missiles.

From May 2013 through early 2014, Israel struck transports suspected of carrying Yakhont missiles and Scud-D missiles from Syria to Lebanon for Hezbollah. ⁵⁴ Israeli analysts allege Iran and Syria were supplying Hezbollah with the Scud-Ds. ⁵⁵ There were five reports of strikes on delivery targets in 2013 and two additional strikes in early 2014. ⁵⁶ Apart from the Assad regime’s capabilities, Syrian opposition groups continue to acquire and receive new weapons. In July 2012, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) received approximately two dozen SAMs from Turkey. ⁵⁷ Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expressed a desire to provide opposition groups with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). ⁵⁸ However, suspected transfers of MANPADS to opposition groups from Saudi Arabia and Qatar through Turkey cannot be confirmed. ⁵⁹ Additionally, reports show that Syrian rebels received U.S. anti-tank missiles in April 2014, though the origin, possibly Turkey or Saudi Arabia, is unknown. ⁶⁰ In the same month, the United States provided 50 TOW anti-tank missiles to the opposition group Harakat Hazm as part of the U.S. covert effort to train and supply the Syrian opposition in Jordan. ⁶¹

Opposition forces have also improved their missile-related capabilities by capturing territory and weapons once under the control of the Syrian regime. When the Free Syrian Army (FSA) captured Syria’s Dair Alzour facility in February 2013 with the help of members from the Ja’far al-Tayyar brigade and the Al Nusra Front, it may have acquired a Scud C missile. ⁶² Images in a video source uploaded by the FSA suggest that the Dair Alzour site had been used by the Syrian regime as a stationary launch site for short-range Scud ballistic missiles. ⁶³ The militant group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), displayed a Scud missile alongside other captured weapons in a parade through the city of Raqqa in July 2014, and sources infer that the missile and a static launcher also featured in the parade are most likely the same weapons taken from Dair Alzour. ⁶⁴

While the civil war remains ongoing, monitoring foreign missile technology assistance to the Syrian regime and opposition forces remains problematic, and the alleged use of missiles by either party will be difficult to substantiate.