Nuclear

With assistance from the U.S. Atoms for Peace Program, the Shah initiated Iran's nuclear program during the 1950's. Establishing the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in 1974, the Shah had ambitious plans to construct 20 nuclear power reactors, a uranium enrichment facility, and a reprocessing plant for spent fuel. [3] However, the 1979 Iranian Revolution deposed the Shah; Ayatollah Khomeini deemed the nuclear program "un-Islamic," and ordered it terminated. In 1984, Khomeini reversed course on the issue of nuclear power and sought international partners to continue building the Bushehr reactors. [4]

Currently, Iran has a robust nuclear infrastructure, including uranium mining, milling, conversion, and enrichment capabilities. [5] As of October 2010, Iran had fed 34,737kg of UF6 into its cascades and produced a total of 3,606kg of LEU, with an average enrichment level of 3.37% U-235, at the Fuel Enrichment Plant. [6] In February 2010, Iran also began feeding UF6 into cascades at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant for the enrichment of UF6 to up to 20% U-235. As of September 2010, Iran had fed 487.2kg of LEU into the cascades and produced 43.6kg of UF6 with an average enrichment level of 19.7% U-235. [7]

The UN Security Council has passed five resolutions demanding that Iran halt its uranium enrichment program. In 2009, tensions over Tehran's nuclear program increased substantially when Iran revealed to the IAEA that it was constructing a second enrichment facility close to the city of Qom. [8] Negotiations to resolve the nuclear issue between the United States, Russia, France, the UK, China, Germany (P5+1) and Iran have failed to produce tangible results. As of February 2011, negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran remain stalled due to Tehran's unwillingness to discuss a suspension of its uranium enrichment program. [9] Tehran maintains that it has no interest in nuclear weapons, but that as a member of the NPT it has an inalienable right to peaceful nuclear energy. Critical parts of Iran's nuclear infrastructure include a VVER-1000 MWe light water reactor at Bushehr, a uranium conversion facility at Esfahan, enrichment facilities at Natanz, an enrichment facility under construction at Qom, a heavy water production plant, and a heavy water research reactor under construction at Arak.

Biological

There is very little publicly available information to determine whether Iran is pursuing a biological weapons program. Although Iran acceded to the Geneva Protocol in 1929 and ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1973, the U.S. government in the past has accused Iran of pursuing a biological weapons program; however, more recent intelligence estimates do not suggest that such a program currently exists. The report to Congress by the Director of National Intelligence for the year 2010 assessed that Iran "probably has the capability to produce some biological warfare (BW) agents for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so." [10] This qualified assessment indicates that U.S intelligence probably does not have evidence of a current Iranian BW program. Historically, Iran has denied the acquisition or production of biological weapons.

Chemical

Iran suffered severe losses from Iraq's use of chemical weapons between 1982 and 1988 during the Iran-Iraq War. Consequently, Iran has significant experience with the effects of chemical warfare (CW). Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in November 1997 and has been an active participant in the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Iran has publicly acknowledged the existence of a chemical weapons program developed during the latter stages of the 1980 to 1988 war with Iraq. On ratifying the CWC, Iran opened its facilities to international inspection and claimed that all its offensive CW activities had been terminated and the facilities destroyed prior to the treaty's entry into force.

Nevertheless, throughout the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the United States continued to claim that Iran maintained an active program for the development and production of chemical weapons. This program was alleged to include stockpiles of blood, blister, choking, and possibly nerve agents. [11] Evidence could not be found to confirm these accusations. Reflecting this uncertainty, since 2003 the U.S. intelligence community has substantially downgraded its public assessments of Iranian chemical warfare capabilities. In its unclassified report to Congress covering the year 2010, the Director of National Intelligence asserted that Iran "maintains the capability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents and conducts research that may have offensive applications." [12] Iran denies producing or possessing chemical weapons in violation of its treaty obligations.

Missile

Following the Iran-Iraq war, Iran committed itself to the development of one of the most sophisticated ballistic missile programs in the Middle East. Iran has pursued a dual track strategy, developing both liquid and solid-fueled systems. As a first step, Tehran acquired Scud-B and Scud-C missiles and production lines from North Korea (renamed Shahab-1 and Shahab-2). [13] Tehran commenced producing considerable quantities of the missiles shortly thereafter. [14] On 22 July 1998, Iran tested a single-stage liquid-fueled Shahab-3 with a range of 1,300km. [15] Tehran began serial producing the Shahab-3 in early 2001, based upon the model used during the second Shahab-3 test in 2000. [16] The Shahab-3, including its guidance system and engine design, is a derivative of North Korea's Nodong medium-range ballistic missile. [17] On 2 February 2009, Iran launched the small cube-shaped satellite "Omid" into orbit using a modified Shahab-3. [18] Some analysts fear that Iran's space launch vehicle, Safir, has established the technical basis for Tehran to develop long-range ballistic missiles. [19] In 2009, Iran tested a two stage solid propellant missile with a range comparable to the Shahab-3. [20] The development of multi-staged missiles is considered to be critical for the potential development of longer range ballistic missiles. However, there is an ongoing debate about Iran's technological capacity to develop ICBMs in the near future. [21]

Sources:
[1] Judith Perera, "Iran's Nuclear Industry," Middle East and North Africa, January 2006.
[2] M. Ghannadi-Margheh, "Atomic Energy Organization of Iran," World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, London, 4-6 September 2002.
[3] Judith Perera, "Iran's Nuclear Industry," Middle East and North Africa, January 2006.
[4] "Iran's Nuclear Program: 1950s and 60s: Atoms for Peace," Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), www.isisnucleariran.org.
[5] "Iran's Nuclear Fuel Cycle," Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), www.isisnucleariran.org.
[6] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," The International Atomic Energy Agency, 23 November 2010.
[7] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," The International Atomic Energy Agency, 25 February 2011.
[8] David Sanger, Helen Cooper, "Iran is warned over nuclear 'deception'," The New York Times, 25 September 2009.
[9] Julia Damianova, "Nuclear Negotiations with Iran End in Failure; Iran, Meeting with Six World Powers, Says It Has the Right to Continue Its Work," Los Angeles Times, 23 January 2011.
[10] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 20010, Director of National Intelligence, www.dni.gov.
[11] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2002, Central Intelligence Agency, www.fas.org.
[12] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 20010, Director of National Intelligence, www.dni.gov.
[13] Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, "Iran," in Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 295.
[14] Uzi Rubin, "The Global Reach of Iran's Ballistic Missiles," The Institute for National Security Studies, November 2006.
[15] Steve Rodan and Arieh O'Sullivan, "Iran Test Fires Shahab-3 Missile," The Jerusalem Post, 24 July 1998.
[16] Andrew Koch and Steve Rodan, "Iran Begins Serial Production of Shahab 3," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 October 2001.
[17] Doug Richardson, "Iran Satellite Launch Suggests Advances in Indigenous Missile Technology," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 March 2009.
[18] Doug Richardson, "Iran Satellite Launch Suggests Advances in Indigenous Missile Technology," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 March 2009.
[19] Nazila Fathi and William J. Broad, "Iran Launches Satellite in a Challenge for Obama," The New York Times, 3 February 2009.
[20] "Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Experts," The East-West Center, May 2009, http://docs.ewi.info/JTA.pdf.
[21] Uzi Rubin, "New Developments in Iran's Missile Capabilities: Implications Beyond the Middle East," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, August 2009, www.jcpa.org; "Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Experts," The East-West Center, May 2009, http://docs.ewi.info/JTA.pdf.