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Overview Last updated: March, 2012

Iran has been a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since 1970, and has possessed a nuclear program for more than fifty years, ostensibly for peaceful purposes. The nuclear program has advanced significantly in the past decade with Iran's decision to enrich its own uranium. Tehran's refusal to halt uranium enrichment and its insistence on developing all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle has invited intensified international pressure and led many states to worry that Iran's true intention is to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and is actively working to acquire, develop, and deploy a broad range of ballistic missiles and space launch capabilities. The scope and status of Iran's chemical and biological weapons programs are unknown. While Iran joined the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1973 and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997, Western intelligence agencies believe that Iran developed chemical and biological weapons during the Iran-Iraq war and has likely retained these capabilities.

Nuclear

With assistance from the U.S. Atoms for Peace Program, the Shah initiated Iran's nuclear program during the 1950's. Establishing the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in 1974, the Shah had ambitious plans to construct 20 nuclear power reactors, a uranium enrichment facility, and a reprocessing plant for spent fuel. [1] However, the 1979 Iranian Revolution deposed the Shah; Ayatollah Khomeini deemed the nuclear program "un-Islamic," and ordered it terminated. In 1984, Khomeini reversed course on the issue of nuclear power and sought international partners to continue building the Bushehr reactors. [2] Currently, Iran has a robust nuclear infrastructure, including uranium mining, milling, conversion, and enrichment capabilities. [3] As of February 2012, Iran had produced a total of 5,451kg of LEU, with an average enrichment level of up to 5% U-235, at the Fuel Enrichment Plant. [4] In February 2010, Iran also began feeding UF6 into cascades at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant for the enrichment of UF6 to up to 20% U-235. According to the IAEA, as of February 2012 Iran had produced an estimated 95.4kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235. [5] In December 2011, Iran also began feeding 5%-enriched UF6 into the cascades at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), and by February 2012 had produced an estimated total of 13.8kg UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 at the FFEP. [6]

The UN Security Council has passed multiple resolutions demanding that Iran halt its uranium enrichment program. In 2009, concerns over Tehran's nuclear program increased when Iran revealed to the IAEA that it was constructing a second enrichment facility close to the city of Qom. [7] In November 2011, tensions escalated further when the IAEA released a report with a 14-page annex outlining the "possible military dimensions" of Iran's nuclear program, though most activities described dated to the pre-2003 period. [8] While Iran questioned the evidence in the report and the IAEA's legal authority to investigate non-nuclear activities, the report provoked a series of new sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union.

Negotiations to resolve the nuclear issue between the United States, Russia, France, the UK, China, Germany (P5+1), and Iran have so far failed to produce tangible results. As of early March 2012, the talks have not resumed, although both Iranian leadership and EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton, speaking on behalf of the P5+1, indicated a willingness to restart negotiations. [9] Tehran maintains that it has no interest in nuclear weapons, but that as a member of the NPT it has an inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology. Critical parts of Iran's nuclear infrastructure include a VVER-1000 MWe light water reactor at Bushehr, a uranium conversion facility at Esfahan, enrichment facilities at Natanz and Qom, a heavy water production plant, and a heavy water research reactor under construction at Arak.

Biological

There is very little publicly available information to determine whether Iran is pursuing a biological weapons program. Although Iran acceded to the Geneva Protocol in 1929 and ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1973, the U.S. government in the past has accused Iran of pursuing a biological weapons program; however, more recent intelligence estimates do not suggest that such a program currently exists. The report to Congress by the Director of National Intelligence for the year 2010 assessed that Iran "probably has the capability to produce some biological warfare (BW) agents for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so." [10] This qualified assessment indicates that U.S intelligence probably does not have conclusive evidence of a current Iranian BW program. Historically, Iran has denied the acquisition or production of biological weapons.

Chemical

Iran suffered severe losses from Iraq's use of chemical weapons between 1982 and 1988 during the Iran-Iraq War. Consequently, Iran has significant experience with the effects of chemical warfare (CW). Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in November 1997 and has been an active participant in the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Iran has publicly acknowledged the existence of a chemical weapons program developed during the latter stages of the 1980 to 1988 war with Iraq. On ratifying the CWC, Iran opened its facilities to international inspection and claimed that all its offensive CW activities had been terminated and the facilities destroyed prior to the treaty's entry into force.

Nevertheless, throughout the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the United States continued to claim that Iran maintained an active program for the development and production of chemical weapons. This program was alleged to include stockpiles of blood, blister, choking, and possibly nerve agents. [11] Evidence could not be found to confirm these accusations. Reflecting this uncertainty, since 2003 the U.S. intelligence community has substantially downgraded its public assessments of Iranian chemical warfare capabilities. In its unclassified report to Congress covering the year 2010, the Director of National Intelligence asserted that Iran "maintains the capability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents and conducts research that may have offensive applications." [12] Iran denies producing or possessing chemical weapons in violation of its treaty obligations. [13]

Missile

Following the Iran-Iraq war, Iran committed itself to the development of one of the most sophisticated ballistic missile programs in the Middle East. Iran has pursued a dual track strategy, developing both liquid and solid-fueled systems. As a first step, Tehran acquired Scud-B and Scud-C missiles and production lines from North Korea (renamed Shahab-1 and Shahab-2). [13] Tehran commenced producing considerable quantities of the missiles shortly thereafter. [14] On 22 July 1998, Iran tested a single-stage liquid-fueled Shahab-3 with a range of 1,300km. [15] Tehran began serial producing the Shahab-3 in early 2001, based upon the model used during the second Shahab-3 test in 2000. [16] The Shahab-3, including its guidance system and engine design, is a derivative of North Korea's Nodong medium-range ballistic missile. [17] On 2 February 2009, Iran launched the small cube-shaped satellite "Omid" into orbit using a modified Shahab-3. [18] Some analysts fear that Iran's space launch vehicle, Safir, has established the technical basis for Tehran to develop long-range ballistic missiles. [19] In 2009, Iran tested a two-stage solid propellant missile with a range comparable to the Shahab-3. [20] Subsequently, in September 2011 Iran’s Space Organization unsuccessfully attempted to launch the Kavoshgar-5 space launch vehicle with a live monkey and a 250-kg payload. [21] There is an ongoing debate about Iran's technological capacity to develop ICBMs in the near future. [22]

Sources:
[1] Judith Perera, "Iran's Nuclear Industry," Middle East and North Africa, January 2006.
[2] "Iran's Nuclear Program: 1950s and 60s: Atoms for Peace," Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), www.isisnucleariran.org.
[3] "Iran's Nuclear Fuel Cycle," Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), www.isisnucleariran.org.
[4] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General, the International Atomic Energy Agency, 24 February 2012.
[5] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General, The International Atomic Energy Agency, 25 February 2011; Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General, The International Atomic Energy Agency, 24 February 2012.
[6] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General, the International Atomic Energy Agency, 24 February 2012
[7] David Sanger, Helen Cooper, "Iran is warned over nuclear 'deception'," The New York Times, 25 September 2009.
[8] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General, the International Atomic Energy Agency, (GOV/2011/65), 8 November 2011.
[9] Justyna Pawlak, "Big powers accept Iran offer of nuclear talks-EU's Ashton," Reuters, 6 March 2012.
[10] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 20010, Director of National Intelligence, www.dni.gov.
[11] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2002, Central Intelligence Agency, www.fas.org.
[12] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 2010, Director of National Intelligence, www.dni.gov.
[13] Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, "Iran," in Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 295.
[14] Uzi Rubin, "The Global Reach of Iran's Ballistic Missiles," The Institute for National Security Studies, November 2006.
[15] Steve Rodan and Arieh O'Sullivan, "Iran Test Fires Shahab-3 Missile," The Jerusalem Post, 24 July 1998.
[16] Andrew Koch and Steve Rodan, "Iran Begins Serial Production of Shahab 3," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 October 2001.
[17] Doug Richardson, "Iran Satellite Launch Suggests Advances in Indigenous Missile Technology," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 March 2009.
[18] Doug Richardson, "Iran Satellite Launch Suggests Advances in Indigenous Missile Technology," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 March 2009.
[19] Nazila Fathi and William J. Broad, "Iran Launches Satellite in a Challenge for Obama," The New York Times, 3 February 2009.
[20] "Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Experts," The East-West Center, May 2009, http://docs.ewi.info/JTA.pdf.
[21] "Iran's Space Monkey Launch Attempts Fails," Discovery News, 12 October 2011, http://news.discovery.com; "Russian paper says Iranian space programme raises concerns," BBC World Monitoring – Former Soviet Union," 24 July 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
[22] Uzi Rubin, "New Developments in Iran's Missile Capabilities: Implications Beyond the Middle East," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, August 2009, www.jcpa.org; "Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Experts," The East-West Center, May 2009, http://docs.ewi.info/JTA.pdf.

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright © 2011 by MIIS.

Get the Facts on Iran

  • Nuclear program condemned and sanctioned under multiple UN Security Council Resolutions
  • Possesses ballistic missiles with a range of at least 1,500 km
  • Produced 95.4 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% as of February 2012