Chain of Custody, Tags, Seals & Tamper-Indicating Enclosures

This section explores issues associated with establishing and maintaining chain of custody for treaty-limited items, as well as different tags and seals that could be used to support monitoring and transparency activities. Chain of custody includes the process of establishing the authenticity or provenance of items, tracking their movements between facilities and confirming that they have not been altered in any way. A tag is any intrinsic characteristic or applied feature that identifies a particular item, such as a nuclear weapon or weapon canister. The simplest tag is a serial number or bar code. A seal is a tamper-indicating device that prevents undetected access. A seal need not prevent access; it need only record in some permanent and unambiguous manner that such access has occurred. 

 

Key Documents in Chain of Custody, Tags, Seals & Tamper-Indicating Enclosures:

Hauck, Danielle K. et al., The Role of Portal Monitors in Arms Control and Development Needs. LA-UR-12-22026. Los Alamos National Laboratory. 2012.

Keel, Frances et al., Preliminary Results from the 2010 INMM International Containment and Surveillance Workshop. Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting. 2010. This paper is reprinted with permission from the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. Copyright 2010. All rights reserved.

Bartberger, Jack et al., Reflective Particle Tag for Arms Control and Safeguards Authentication. Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting. 2009.This paper is reprinted with permission from the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. Copyright 2009. All rights reserved.

Johnston, Roger G. and Anthony R.E. Garcia, Analyzing Vulnerability Results for Tags and Tamper-Indicating Seals. LAUR-02-1889. Los Alamos National Laboratory. 2002.

 

The following additional resources are available:

Smartt, Heidi A. et al., First Prototype of Intrinsically Tamper Indicating Ceramic Seal (ITICS). SAND2012-5661C. Sandia National Laboratory. 2012.

Weeks, G.E. et al., Analog Video Authentication and Seal Verification Equipment Development. INL/CON-12-27396. Idaho National Laboratory Preprint. September 2012.

Smartt, Heidi A. and David T. Furgal, Non-Traditional Surveillance Systems and their Application to Safeguards. SAND2011-3261C. Sandia National Laboratory. 2011.

Merkle, Peter B. et al., Automated Reflective Particle Tag System for Physical Authentication. Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting. 2010. This paper is reprinted with permission from the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. Copyright 2010. All rights reserved.

Hinman-Sweeney, Elaine et al., Design and Manufacture of an Explosive Resistant Container. Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting. 2008. This paper is reprinted with permission from the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. Copyright 2008. All rights reserved.

Pickett, C.A. et al., Evaluation of a RF-Based Approach for Tracking UF6 Cylinders at a Uranium Enrichment Plant. Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting. 2008.This paper is reprinted with permission from the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. Copyright 2008. All rights reserved.

Bondar, Igor et al., F2F Storage Facility Monitoring System and Software Integration. Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting. 2007. This paper is reprinted with permission from the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. Copyright 2007. All rights reserved.

Pickett, C.A. et al, Technologies for Real-Time Monitoring and Surveillance of High-Valued Assets. Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting. 2007. This paper is reprinted with permission from the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. Copyright 2007. All rights reserved.

Samigulin, Rustem et al., Development of Next Generation Advanced Remote Monitoring System. Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting. 2007. This paper is reprinted with permission from the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. Copyright 2007. All rights reserved.

Hansen, R.R. et al., Implementation of the AES as a Hash Function for Confirming the Identity of Software on a Computer System. PNNL-14170. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. 2003.

Gerdes, Eric R. et al., A Proposed Approach for Monitoring Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement. LAUR-00-2222. Los Alamos National Laboratory. 2000.

Safe Handling and Storage of Plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency. IAEA, Safety Report Series No.9, Vienna, 1998.

Olinger, C.T. et al., Acoustic Resonance Spectroscopy Intrinsic Seals. LA-UR-94-2445. Los Alamos National Laboratory. 1994.

DeVolpi, A., Tags and Seals for Arms Control Verification. 1990.

 

Note: The content on this website and in this resource collection does not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the International Partnership.

September 16, 2015
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A collection of PDF documents provided to facilitate understanding of chain of custody, monitoring and transparency activities in verification.