Modernization of Strategic Nuclear Weapons In Russia: The Emerging New Posture

by Dr. Nikolai Sokov, CNS Senior Research Associate, May 1998

To return to the main Nuclear Weapons entry, see the Nuclear Weapons Overview file.

An earlier version of this paper was published as Working Paper No. 6 in the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security series. For more information on the author, the working paper series or the program, please contact:

Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS)
Davis Center for Russian Studies,
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CONTENTS
Why Study Strategic Modernization?
The Nuclear Debate
    The "Minimalists:" Back to the Classic Age of Deterrence
    The "Maximalists:" Back to a War-Fighting Capability
The Context: In Search of a Predictive Paradigm
The Views of the Military Leadership
Modernization of the Russian Nuclear Triad
    (I) Land-Based Strategic Missiles
    (II) Sea-based strategic weapons
    (III) Air-Delivered Strategic Weapons
Conclusion
Endnotes

Why Study Strategic Modernization?

But old problems do not go away quietly. The place and the role of nuclear weapons has changed, as has the nature of interest in them, but in some way they continue to be relevant. During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear war seemed so great that any progress in arms control was welcome; common interest in preventing war was like a locomotive, which could pull superpower relations out of crises. Today, this is no longer the case. Arms control plays a visible role in great power politics (and rightly so), but progress on new treaties is no longer a necessary condition for progress on other issues. To the contrary, the lack of progress or, even worse, a setback, can easily disrupt broader cooperation. Arms control and the politics of nuclear balance have become a disruptive force, to an extent, as exemplified by the deadlock over START II ratification in Russia.

There are two alternative ways the politics of nuclear balance could affect relations between Russia and the United States: one is negative. Some Russian modernization options could undermine the stability of the nuclear balance and stimulate a launch-on-warning posture; this could be perceived in the United States as a threat, in the same fashion as the Soviet arsenal was perceived as a threat in the 1970s and the 1980s. It should be noted that the Soviet Union never actually had a first-strike capability; the key here is the reaction of the United States and the modernization programs it adopted in response.

The same option could also result from the deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system by the United States. Russia will see it as destabilizing and is likely to respond by modernization and/or buildup of its offensive forces, which, in its turn, would cause negative reaction in the United States. Given the nature of the issue, the impact on the domestic political situation in both countries is likely to be highly disruptive.

The other alternative is positive. Russian strategic modernization could proceed in a stabilizing manner and facilitate an eventual transition toward a pure second-strike posture. The real significance of this development, however, will not be in its impact upon the nuclear balance: nuclear war is clearly not in the cards. Rather, a stable nuclear balance will enable the sides to "forget" about those weapons; the arsenals will become useless not only for combat, but also as a political instrument. Since complete nuclear disarmament is hardly possible in the foreseeable future, putting weapons "aside," relegating them to irrelevance is as close to their elimination as realistically possible. Thus, the purpose of studying strategic modernization is not to learn more about possible scenarios of a nuclear exchange, but rather to understand an important aspect of domestic politics in Russia and the United States and, through it, the dynamic of the future relationship between them.

The potentially disruptive impact of the politics of nuclear balance is demonstrated by the continuing saga of START II ratification in Russia. The shortcomings of START II have already provided fertile ground for conservative/nationalist opposition and helped mobilize voters around their platform. Whether these shortcomings are militarily significant or not seems irrelevant: what counts is how the potential imbalance is used in the political games. Although the government is likely to push START II through the parliament,(3) it might have to make concessions in other areas of the domestic political process.  (For more information on the START II ratification process see the Nuclear Treaties section of the NIS Profiles database.)

The materials presented in this paper suggest that the current modernization programs in Russia lean toward the second, positive alternative. Russia's future nuclear arsenal is likely to be small, conducive to strategic stability, and non-provocative. It might even be unnecessary for Russia to engage in a significant buildup effort in response to a US NMD system, if one is deployed.

The positive outcome depends on two conditions. One is the minimum level of funding. Without it, the Russian strategic triad could quickly disintegrate. This would be a potentially dangerous development, since it might provoke a massive buildup once the economic situation improves and/or might increase the likelihood of an authoritarian regime that would mobilize resources to support such a buildup. Second, the transition toward the new posture is politically difficult: its proponents will remain vulnerable for at least the next five-seven years, until the new posture finally takes shape and Russia's international situation stabilizes.

In this regard the US policy toward Russia will have a lasting influence on the ongoing transition. Since Russia lacks financial and political resources today, the full impact of current US policy will be delayed until the next decade: no matter what the United States does, Russia will have to ultimately accept it, but this acceptance could be short-lived, depending on what is at stake. This means that today's reaction of the Russian government to US policy is not necessarily a reliable indicator of long-term relations; the "shadow of the future" should never be absent from policy planning in either country.

This paper begins with an analysis of the ongoing debate over the strategic modernization in Russia, reviews the policy of the government and the military leadership, and then proceeds to the available data on actual modernization programs. The last part will draw conclusions regarding the possible evolution of these views under various scenarios.

The Nuclear Debate

Apparently, the benefits and losses resulting from the START II Treaty are not at the center of the debate, either. The impact of START II is rather easy to calculate, and a decision would have been made earlier. Nor is the matter of funding necessarily at stake: everyone knows that Russia cannot afford to reject START II, but this does not dissuade its opponents. Some suggest that START II simply should not be ratified in order to keep more options open for the future, when the economic situation improves; others prefer to ratify START II because it does not contradict what they consider the optimal future strategic posture. Rather, the debate is about the criteria by which the Russian nuclear arsenal should be judged. An agreement on the criteria will determine its eventual size, structure, missions, and capabilities.

This frame of reference has several important implications. The most important among them is that the approval or the rejection of START II will not end the debate: the decision of the Duma will affect the probabilities of various outcomes, but will not completely foreclose any of those. If the treaty is ratified, the option of MIRVing ICBMs will not be removed completely: Russia could still return to them, for example, if the United States deploys an NMD. On the other hand, the rejection of START II does not automatically mean that Russia will MIRV its ICBMs: it might still stick to that key provision. At this writing, the ratification resolution, which will be sent to the floor of the Duma, is likely to espouse the first option: START II would be subject to a review in the case the United States deploys an NMD to determine whether MIRVing is advisable. At the same time, the resolution will insist on even deeper reductions, a START III treaty.

Another characteristic of the debate could be detected in frank discussions with many Russian experts: the lines between various positions are not necessarily drawn according to political, ideological, or institutional boundaries. Rather, they often run within individuals: quite a few experts cannot decide on their own preferences. It would be a mistake to picture the situation in simple black and white colors, as a standoff between "liberals" and "conservatives" or between "hawks" and "doves." In this sense, the disagreements described below are relative: in some cases, they refer to whole groups, but in others they describe the uncertainty that exists in the minds of experts and politicians.

All sides in the debate share a number of positions, first and foremost that Russia needs nuclear weapons and that their role has increased since the end of the Cold War. At a minimum, they are supposed to prevent large-scale aggression and guarantee Russia's sovereignty and survival. A study of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (RISI) underscored that "humankind has not created a substitute to nuclear weapons in terms of their deterrent effect in situations of escalating large-scale armed conflicts. This means that in the foreseeable future nuclear weapons will remain an important element of global politics despite all the 'inconveniences' related to their maintenance and the continuing debate over the actual role of nuclear weapons in preventing world wars during the last fifty years.”(4) In other words, the special role of nuclear weapons is determined by their real or perceived "absolute" character.

From here, it follows that nuclear weapons can compensate for Russia's inferiority in conventional armed forces relative to NATO and China. The new military doctrine, which is expected to be adopted sometime in 1998, will provide for the use of nuclear weapons "in the case of an immediate threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia that has emerged as a result of an external aggression.”(5) This will be a reaffirmation of the provision of the 1993 doctrine, which, in its turn, repudiated the 1982 Soviet policy of no-first-use. The 1993 first-use plank was also confirmed in the 1997 national security concept.(6)

Having introduced the first-use plank, however, the 1993 doctrine retained certain restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states in line with the negative guarantees provided by the Soviet Union (as well as all other "legitimate" nuclear states) in connection with the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Only nuclear-weapons states and their allies can be threatened with nuclear weapons. The new, 1998 doctrine will keep these limitations together with the first-use provision: Anatoli Klimenko and Aleksandr Koltukov underlined that the 1993 document enjoyed the support of the Foreign Ministry (meaning, it did not contradict international obligations) and thus it was decided to keep it. They also noted that while the doctrine was still under development unnamed experts attempted to broaden the first-use plank.(7)

A broader, less official approach to the use of nuclear weapons includes, for example, deterrence against "a belt of unstable, and sometimes unfriendly, states and countries, which covertly seek weapons of mass destruction.”(8) This definition embraces the majority of states to the south of Russia; it is interesting to note, however, that the recent shifts in Russia's relations with Iran and Iraq have probably weakened the perceived necessity to rely on nuclear weapons. Still, some states could be viewed as "candidates" for deterrence by nuclear weapons, e.g. Pakistan, whose policy in Afghanistan and Central Asia is assessed in Russia as unfriendly.

The disagreements within the Russian elite regarding nuclear weapons rather closely mirror the debates in the United States in the end of 1960s--early 1970s and in the 1980s between the proponents of mutual assured destruction (MAD), war-fighting, and war-winning approaches(9) with just one important exception: almost no one in Russia advocates a transition to defense programs similar to SDI. A comparison of the current debate in Russia to the 30-year old debate in the United States sheds additional light on its substance and the views expressed by different sides. It could also provide a better grasp on how various doctrines emerge. Some are likely to relate to the nature of nuclear weapons, others to the conventional balance, still others to specific weapons systems that provide new capabilities.

To a large extent, the perceptions and the prescriptions regarding nuclear weapons appear to be determined by two related variables. One is the relationship with the United States and NATO, another is the prospect that the United States might deploy an NMD system and yield the Russian deterrent potential useless. These variables are related to the extent that the latter could be viewed as part of a "devious plan" to dominate and subjugate Russia. They differ to the extent that the NMD could be conceptualized as an independent phenomenon: the United States does not harbor hostile plans toward Russia, but, regardless of intentions, the deployment of an NMD could undermine the hedge against future threats that might unexpectedly emerge, for example, as a result of elections ten or twenty years from now.
 

The "Minimalists:" Back to the Classic Age of Deterrence

On the question of relations with the West, very few members of the Russian political establishment continue to adhere to the 1992-style positive view of these relations. But the end of the "honeymoon" conceals two rather distinct interpretations of the events, past and future. Most "minimalists" say that there are no fundamental differences between Russia and the United States, but cooperation is difficult and sometimes impossible because the United States simply does not want it. In their view, the United States often conflates cooperation with complete acceptance of its position by Russia and tends to label any disagreement as a return to the Soviet imperial policy. Examples abound, from the early disagreements on Bosnia to the continuing conflicts around NATO enlargement and Iraq.

More specifically, there is growing dissatisfaction with the failure of the United States to accommodate Russian complaints about START I implementation.(10) According to the Russian view, these problems could be solved, but the United States does not wish to; a narrower focus is on the US Navy, which, some say, refuses to budge even where it is possible and necessary. A more traditional area of concern is the ABM Treaty: the American arguments in favor of a national missile defense are simply not taken seriously by Russian experts. The agreements on demarcation of tactical and strategic defenses signed in New York in the fall of 1997 were met with wide-spread dissatisfaction as well: they are viewed as insufficient since the United States can still interpret them to allow development of TMD systems, which, in Russian eyes, have strategic potential.(11) Some Russian experts believe that a more restrictive agreement was possible, but the United States refused to accept it (of course, many US experts will not agree, but it is significant that this perception is widely spread in Russia). (For more information on Russian concerns regarding the ABM Treaty please see the Nuclear Treaties section of the NIS Nuclear Profiles Database.)

Still, the situation is far from critical, and patience and diplomacy are seen as the main policy tools. This line has been evident in the acceptance of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council "in exchange" for NATO enlargement and in the maneuvers around Iraq in the fall of 1997 and in the early 1998. Within this paradigm, nuclear weapons are important, but are expected to back up policy rather than play an independent role. In addition to a fundamental role as a security guarantee, they also guard against uncertainties in the future: a real large-scale conflict with NATO and/or deployment of a national missile defense by the United States.

These views produce the perception of a rather limited role for nuclear weapons. In many respects, it is close to what Bernard Brodie wrote in 1946: “The first and most vital step in any American security program for the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind.”(12) The "minimalist" view of nuclear weapons is also in line with the views postulated in the first Soviet official recognition of possession of nuclear weapons, in 1951 a TASS statement declared that the purpose of Soviet nuclear weapons was deterrence of nuclear war.(13) The core of this view is the ability to retaliate in case of an attack--a nuclear attack in the "classic" formulation or a large-scale conventional attack under a more recent policy.

A more liberal version of the "minimalist" view was expressed by Sergei Kortunov: "The optimal version of Russia's nuclear strategy today is a variant of non-aggressive, non-offensive and non-provocative (one could even say 'friendly'), but also credible deterrence, which should be aimed not only at the USA, but 'at all azimuths'--a Russian version of the classic French, de Gaulle's doctrine of 'dissuasion' as opposed to the American doctrine of 'deterrence' through the threat of annihilation.”(14) Although this view enjoys some popularity, it is yet hardly feasible politically or even bureaucratically: the military and politicians would still search for "objective" criteria to determine "how much is enough," and these criteria will inescapably be relative to the US nuclear arsenal, which is the largest in the world. Still, this might represent the future of Russian thinking on nuclear weapons if external and domestic conditions are right.

The dominant view of "minimalists" today does not boil down to simple existential deterrence, in which the very presence of nuclear weapons deters the other side. Rather, the core principle is that of assured second-strike capability, in line with McNamara's doctrinal innovations of the 1960s.(15) Following McNamara, Russian experts and military planners attach considerable value to the ability to "ride out" the first strike and still retain a second-strike capability. In this, they are closer to the views expounded by Paul Nitze who said that even in the early days of the nuclear era he and his associates believed that “the quality of deterrence depends upon one's ability to deal with the potential failure of deterrence. The vital factor is that one's ability to deal with the contingency of deterrence failing be understood by the other side.”(16)

The requirements outlined by Nitze are considerable. First, the number and/or the survivability of nuclear weapons must be sufficient to ride out a first strike by the other side. Second, the number and the quality of nuclear weapons that survive the first strike of the other side must be sufficient for it to believe that second-strike capability exists. Third, the surviving weapons must match reasonably liberal estimates of unacceptable damage. This calls for a rather large arsenal of deployed nuclear weapons, which, in turn, presents the risk of a classic security dilemma: in pursuit of second-strike capability "my" nuclear arsenal becomes so large that the other side begins to worry about its second-strike capability.

Nitze, like many others, solved this dilemma by simply assuming that the United States would never attack, so the Soviet Union did not have to worry about the survivability of its deterrent force, it was only the US headache. But, of course, the security dilemma would still emerge, and an arms race would (and did) follow. Another solution is launch-on-warning, whereby weapons do not have to ride out the first strike of the other side because they are launched before the incoming warheads reach targets.

A way to avoid the security dilemma was proposed by the Scowcroft commission in 1983: reduction of vulnerability of weapons, specifically through the deployment of single-warhead mobile ICBMs--the route which the Soviet Union was already taking and the United States planned to take. In this way one can, theoretically, retain a second-strike capability without inadvertently creating a first-strike capability. Apparently, this is the favorite option of the Russian "minimalists."

Yet another solution is an NMD, but Russian experts and politicians almost uniformly reject it on the grounds that a response in offensive weapons would be cheaper and easier; thus mutual deterrence would be reproduced at a higher level of arsenals. There is not consensus among the "minimalists," however, on the proper response to a US NMD.

Even one of the experts of a conservative think tank, Spiritual Heritage Foundation, concluded that under the most unfavorable circumstances (US first strike with 70-80 percent of Russian warheads lost and 50 percent effectiveness of the US ABM system) between 350 and 500 warheads would still reach US territory. The author also claimed that a 50 percent effective system would not be available until 2010-2015.(17)

The official position stresses negotiations as the way to regulate and limit the impact of defense systems. Recently, indications appeared that the option of MIRVing of Topol-M with up to three warheads is kept open as well. Vladimir Yakovlev, the SRF commander-in-chief, has openly declared that Topol-M could be MIRVed if necessary as a hedge against a US NMD.(18) MIRVed ICBMs are considered the best means of overcoming defense because they can overwhelm it with warheads and decoys. A simultaneous launch of a handful of MIRVed ICBMs is obviously easier to coordinate than a simultaneous launch of several hundred single-warhead ICBMs.(19) Still, this is a far cry from the more conservative proposals discussed below.

The prescriptions of Russian "minimalists" do not necessarily match all postulates of the "classic" deterrence theory, in particular the NSC-68 requirement of a sizable conventional force to supplement nuclear deterrence, nor do they appear to fully account for the complex problems of misperception, credibility, etc.(20) A detailed discussion of these belongs elsewhere. It is sufficient to note that the threat of an East-West military conflict is seen as low, and this helps to decrease many concerns that otherwise could have emerged.

To summarize, the "minimalists" see nuclear weapons as an insurance against a possible future threat, which will not necessarily materialize; thus the insurance can be minimal. This insurance is not immediately usable, like any insurance, and the size should be a reasonable compromise between the need to guard against uncertainty and the risk of buying an excessively expensive policy.
 

The "Maximalists:" Back to a War-Fighting Capability

The "maximalists" tend to conceptualize US policy toward Russia in terms of Zbignew Brzezinski's writings.(21) His idea is essentially about dividing Russia into several parts, of which the Western third should be integrated into the "Atlanticist Europe," the Eastern third falls into China's sphere of influence, while the middle would remain a "political black hole." This proposal, predictably, infuriated the Russian political establishment, and some suspect that Brzezinski simply made public the real goals of the United States.(22) If one adds to this the perception of threats from other "azimuths" such as China, Islamic countries, etc.,(23) then the prescription would be obvious: Russia needs a large nuclear force capable of performing various missions, both strategic and theater-wide, to deter and if necessary defeat almost any country or group of countries. Nuclear weapons are supposed to have immediate value as a foreign policy tool and be useful in a wide variety of global and local conflicts (after all, within this world-view every local conflict is only part of a larger, global US strategy aimed at eliminating Russia).

As with the "minimalists," the recommendations of this group largely mirror relevant American theories. Consider, for example, the warning Richard Perle gave after the collapse of the Berlin Wall but before the collapse of the Soviet Union: it would be dangerous, he wrote, to "disarm the West after the Cold War [and] ... run the risk that we might yet again make Europe safe for the exertion of Soviet military power."(24) One only needs to replace the Soviet Union with the United States in that quote and adjust for the geostrategic situation to arrive at a statement by Sergei Glaziev, a prominent nationalist politician: “[We need to] rethink our foreign policy and defense doctrine, as well as the national security doctrine. The thesis about the absence of enemies to Russia is obviously wrong. ...[We need to] create necessary conditions for preservation and development of strategic nuclear forces as a necessary and the most important element of national security. ...[W]e should abstain from ratification, implementation, and signing of treaties, which could reduce the effectiveness of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, and particularly those [treaties] that provide for unilateral concessions.”(25)

Much as some US theorists during the Cold War expected a first disarming Soviet nuclear strike,(26) these experts believe that the United States could strike first, or at least achieve a position where a successful first strike would be possible. This concern is similar to that of the American proponents of the infamous "bomber gap" and the "missile gap" in the late 1950s(27) --that the United States would use its theoretical ability to defeat Russia in a nuclear war to chip away at its interests and geopolitical positions. Nuclear inferiority would weaken Russia's ability to resist because it would not be able to up the ante in an (inevitable?) brinkmanship game. To avoid this gloomy scenario, they insist that Russia's nuclear arsenal should be rather large (probably the same as, or larger than, the START II limit of 3,500 warheads, and include a significant number of MIRVed ICBMs).

MIRVed ICBMs are supposed to perform two functions. One is making a US NMD incapable of defending against a Russian response--this mission generally follows the logic of deterrence with the exceptions noted below. The second function is to return to the situation of the 1980s, which made possible greater versatility of scenarios of employment of nuclear weapons beyond the straightforward second-strike option. This is essentially about the ability to fight a nuclear war rather than simply threaten to "punish" the aggressor. Or, as Brodie wrote in 1959 in a departure from his 1946 views, “if deterrence fails we shall want enough forces to fight a total war effectively.”(28)

The key difference between the "minimalists" and the "maximalists" regarding the value of MIRVed ICBMs boils down to the following. The former propose MIRVing only in response to a US NMD (and not all of them think it necessary), the proposed scale of MIRVing is limited. The latter consider MIRVing essential irrespective of the NMD, and when (rather than if) it is deployed, the number of MIRVed ICBMs should be increased even further. The scale of MIRVing is massive with or without NMD and "heavy"--up to ten warheads per missile rather than up to three for the "minimalists."

Two of the leading opponents of START II, a deputy head of the International Affairs Committee of the Duma Alexei Podberezkin and his advisor Anton Surikov, asserted: "Specialists think that in the case of ratification of START II and especially if in five-six years Washington would decide to annul the 1972 ABM Treaty, then in ten years Russia would lose the ability to inflict guaranteed unacceptable damage to the United States in a response strike.”(29) They argue that Russia should transfer to its territory the production of heavy SS-18 ICBMs (R-36M2 in Soviet designation) and deploy 154 of those in the existing silos; in the case the United States deploys an NMD, Russia should deploy an additional 180 heavy ICBMs.(30) In an earlier publication Anton Surikov suggested that deploying up to seven warheads on Topol-M was possible and advisable.(31)

A crucial element in this system of views are tactical nuclear weapons, which are expected to compensate for NATO's superiority in conventional armed forces--superiority that will increase after the enlargement of NATO. Tactical weapons should enable Russia to feel more self-assured in local/regional conflicts and either help prevent or terminate them at favorable conditions.(32) During his tenure as a minister of defense, Igor Rodionov declared that in the view of NATO enlargement Russia "might objectively face the task of increasing tactical nuclear weapons at [its] borders.”(33) One of the most vocal proponents of greater reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, General Vladimir Belous (Ret.) proclaimed that "in contrast to strategic weapons, whose central mission is 'deterrence' and, in the case it did not succeed, 'punishment,' tactical weapons, even as they perform the function of deterrence, could fulfill the mission of 'repulsing' aggression.”(34) In line with NATO's Cold War-period rationalization, the "maximalists" suggest that without tactical nuclear weapons Russia might have to choose between defeat and an all-out war. The ability to prevail at the tactical level is supposed to take care of this grim choice.

Overall, the perception of an imminent threat has created a host of (still rather poorly developed) theories analogous to American doctrines of limited nuclear strike, flexible response, limited war, escalation dominance, etc.(35) The purpose is to enable nuclear weapons to achieve a broad variety of missions when less than survival of the country is at stake. To support these missions the strategic force should be capable of a limited exchange, or a "demonstration" strike (similar to what Alexander Haig proposed in the 1980s), or of deadlocking the strategic situation in order to improve the chances of success at the substrategic level. Broad missions also require a substantial tactical nuclear potential capable of deterring NATO's conventional forces and dealing with other contingencies (such as conflicts to the south of Russia).

The advocates of a more limited approach to nuclear weapons, the "minimalists," display a rather ambiguous attitude toward tactical nuclear weapons. They seem to avoid public statements on this subject and rarely offer ideas on how exactly these weapons could be used. A mainstream think tank, the Institute of Geopolitical and Military Forecasts (part of IMEMO) cautiously suggested that "Russia needs a certain tactical nuclear weapons potential as one of [the] guarantees of national security in the case of possible radical changes in the European or Asian strategic scenes. Tactical nuclear weapons could also be [a] somewhat useful(36) addition in the case the balance in conventional armed forces is disrupted; they could be used primarily as a political tool to prevent war."(37) But they also said that the existing tactical nuclear weapons arsenals were excessive and could be significantly reduced. Caution is easy to explain by the domestic political situation in Russia, as well as its uncertain international situation: the enlargement of NATO has significantly increased the value of tactical nuclear weapons.

In a recent publication, Alexei Arbatov pointed at a fundamental contradiction related to tactical nuclear weapons. On one hand, there is widespread consensus that Russia needs them to balance NATO's conventional superiority; on the other, the United States could destroy up to 70 percent of Russian strategic weapons using only its tactical nuclear and conventional weapons. A first strike using a combination of strategic and tactical weapons, he said, would be 1.5-2 times more effective than the one with only strategic weapons. Thus, Russia would do best if only it had tactical nuclear weapons, but this is hardly possible.(38)

The brief description of the views espoused by the two groups, the "minimalists" and the "maximalists," reveals that differences between them relate to fundamental concepts of nuclear weapons and their role in the international system. Regardless, there are certain trends common to both. They are situation-specific and are caused by shared concerns over possible unfavorable developments in the international environment: doubts still linger about US policy, particularly the prospect of deployment of an NMD. Of course, the proposed responses radically differ, but it seems significant that at least some concerns are shared and the groups are apparently moving closer. It is not inconceivable that the above-mentioned ambiguity in the minds of some experts and politicians stems from this--for example, when the "minimalist" view of nuclear weapons contradicts the "maximalist" assessment of the international situation. The perceived weakness of the current administration and the influence of Congressional Republicans who advocate an NMD increase the propensity to seek a hedge against unpleasant surprises.(39) Unless the United States takes these concerns and uncertainties seriously, the still slow drift of the Russian political establishment toward negative expectations could become widespread.

In terms of START II, it is worth repeating that the treaty itself is of relatively marginal concern and few actually like it. For the "minimalists," START II is consistent with their image of the future Russian nuclear arsenal and, in addition, it helps somewhat constrain the US arsenal. Though critical of many provisions of START II, they are willing to go along with it. The "maximalists" oppose START II not simply because they are concerned about its deficiencies, but primarily because it is inconsistent with their preference for the future Russian arsenal. Regardless, the "minimalists" might still abandon START II if they come to the conclusion that a future US NMD system would deprive Russia of its retaliatory capability.
 

The Context: In Search of a Predictive Paradigm

Two variables stand out in the previous section: the perceived utility of nuclear weapons and the perceived level of threat. The first refers to the extent that nuclear weapons are expected to achieve "positive" goals: if nuclear weapons can only threaten "punishment" (i.e. a reactive mission), their utility is assumed to be low, but if they can help solve local conflicts or dissuade the United States from interfering in the Caspian Sea basin, utility is coded as high. The level of threat is more self-explanatory and its coding generally follows the lines in the previous sections (from the West as a friend and ally to the West as an implacable foe bent on eliminating Russia). Graphically, the current debate could be represented as a function of these two variables in the following way:
 

Of course, this diagram is only an approximation intended to convey the general idea and the author's estimate of the situation; an accurate diagram would require a survey (or, rather, a series of surveys) of the Russian political establishment. Still, it does provide an idea of how the views are distributed across the spectrum. The location of the views represented by the 1993 military doctrine (and, as is now clear, the 1998 doctrine) serves as a point of reference for the rest of the field. The area in the lower-left corner represents the "minimalists," while the upper-right corner is the "maximalists." Of course, the blank spaces are not necessarily empty: there are just too few people whose positions fall there. There are areas of overlap, where positions of individuals and institutions are difficult to distinguish in terms of the two proposed variables, but prescriptions could still differ as a result of affiliation, sources of funding, personal predispositions, etc.

Arrows show the trends of change in the distribution of views over the last seven-ten years. An analysis of publications and interviews suggests that in the late 1980s--early 1990s the distribution was even less even than today. There were three poles located approximately on one line from the lower-left to the upper-right corner. One proceeded from very low utility of nuclear weapons and very low external threat; this position boiled down to existential deterrence, the assumption that even a few nuclear weapons could prevent an all-out war. The other pole united what could be termed “unreformed Cold War warriors,” who stressed unilateralism and reliance on almost unrestricted nuclear arms buildup. The third, in the middle, were the "classic" Soviet moderate proponents of arms control, who were behind the INF and START I Treaties. They preferred reductions as a way to optimize the nuclear arsenal, regulate arms modernization and deployment, but still remained on the side of rather large stockpiles of weapons.

Since then, the number of proponents of absolutely minimal, existential deterrence has significantly dwindled. Apparently, the biggest change was caused not by a greater belief in the utility of nuclear weapons but rather by disenchantment with the United States, which is often expressed by a popular phrase, "the end of the honeymoon." Probably, the perceived utility of nuclear weapons has increased as well, at least among some erstwhile liberals, primarily as a result of a perceived need for a more credible and robust second strike capability.

The differences between the early 1990s "idealists" and today's "minimalists" boil down to the following: (a) larger estimated minimally sufficient arsenal, (b) lower propensity to make concessions at arms control negotiations, and (c) greater propensity to hedge against possible unpleasant surprises. The first two points simply represent formal attributes of nuclear balance, first and foremost the maintenance of a credible second-strike capability: the current views demand high probability of delivering a significant number of warheads in response to an attack, more or less along McNamara's criteria. The third component is primarily political: even rather liberal experts and politicians are no longer optimistic about relations with the United States.

The evolution of the Cold War warriors depicted in the diagram is not intended to suggest that they have necessarily moderated their views, although some might have. Rather, over time their views have become more diverse and now occupy a larger area. One only has to compare the intense, focused criticism of START II in 1992-93 with the proposals advanced today. The limited moderation was a consequence of a clearer understanding of the economic constraints on Russia's ability to modernize and build up its nuclear weapons, and a recognition that the dissolution of the Soviet Union is permanent.

The evolution of the former centrists, which have now become largely extinct, is particularly interesting. It is well known but rarely recognized that a very large part of the Soviet political-military establishment in the mid-1980s favored reduction of nuclear weapons. For a variety of reasons (personal convictions, institutional interests, political expediency) their positions were far from radical. The actual process of arms reductions split this group apart. Some continued the evolution and joined the ranks of a more liberal "minimalist" group. The growing disenchantment of others in the arms reduction process in the late 1980s led them to more hard-line positions.

To a large extent, the evolution of the centrists was caused by the loss of conventional superiority or at least parity with NATO. It was easy to consider deep reduction of nuclear weapons while the Soviet Union possessed sufficient conventional armed forces to support a broad variety of missions. Today, the choice of military instruments is so limited that some centrists no longer consider nuclear arms reduction feasible. Subsequent evolution of the debate is likely to depend on the changing perception of threat. It is formed by many different developments, not necessarily limited to military power. Almost anything can affect the perception of threat: economic sanctions, further enlargement of NATO, Caspian oil pipelines, a new crisis around Iraq, etc. Such events are also subject to interpretation: some will treat them as evidence of growing threat, while others will tend to discount their significance.

In the meantime, the perception of the utility of nuclear weapons is likely to change more slowly since there are fewer reasons to reevaluate the currently held views. After all, people will be dealing with the same amount of information and the same tools for interpreting it. As a result, in the near future polarization is likely to stay and perhaps even increase. The existing groups will consolidate around two different assessments of the level of threat; each group will stretch vertically.
 

From this line of reasoning it follows that for some time a rather contradictory combination of views might become possible: either perception of immediate threat coupled with perception of low utility of nuclear weapons or, alternatively, perception of low threat coupled with high utility of nuclear weapons. Without doubt, such mixed views will be internally contradictory and will not remain stable for long, making further evolution likely.

By definition, long-term evolution is difficult to predict. Several options seem possible. First, the Russian elite might develop some sort of consensus on their perception of US policy. Recent trends indicate that a mainstream, "hard-headed" position is already emerging, approximately around the views espoused by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. In addition, the growing marginalization of military and political aspects of US-Russian relations could stimulate the emergence of a centrist position as well: the increasingly influential business groups tend to judge these relations by the degree to which they are conducive to business, not by geopolitical schemes. If business is reasonably successful, then geopolitics and ideology will be more or less suppressed. In both cases the groups depicted in the diagram will tend to concentrate around one pole.

Second, if military reform is successful, Russia will come to rely somewhat less on nuclear weapons; accordingly their perceived utility will decrease. This will be a necessarily lengthy process since it involves restructuring, reductions, replacement and education of personnel, modernization of weapons, etc. All of this has to be done under severe financial constraints. Furthermore, in all likelihood the military reform, regardless of its success, will not affect policyrnaking until there is some sort of a "small successful war" (like the US operation in Grenada) to visibly demonstrate that conventional forces could be relied upon for a certain category of contingencies. The second option will help consolidate the elite. If the perception of threat remains constant, there will be two poles gravitating toward the lower left and the upper right corners. If consensus on US-Russian relations emerges, then one pole will emerge. Under any scenario, successful military reform is likely to benefit the "minimalists" more.

Yet another option is continued uncertainty: the distribution of views could remain frozen for a long time and experience only slow consolidation. The most likely result is still the emergence of two opposite poles in the lower left and upper right comers.

Much in the evolution of the debate will depend on economic and political stabilization in Russia. If optimistic forecasts come true, Russia will become more self-confident and its global positions will improve, in particular in such sensitive areas as relations with other new independent states of the former Soviet Union and with Europe. After all, many problems are caused by inadequate competitiveness in international markets, the inability to offer credits (as a rule, export of high-tech products often depends on the ability of the exporting country to offer cheap credits to finance purchases), and the low attraction of Russia's domestic market. An improvement in these three parameters will reduce the sense of dependency and help reduce the perceived external threat.

The United States could do much to shape the development of the debate on nuclear weapons in Russia, even without sacrificing any major policy goals. For example, the US Government could make it clear that the views of Zbignew Brzezinski do not represent official policy. More active pursuit of integration within the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council could also yield significant results. A more cautious US policy in the Caspian Sea region would help as well, especially if it is "packaged" in terms friendly to Russia and sensitive to Russian concerns (e.g., it would be advisable to avoid proclaiming the region an area of vital US interests, since such declarations are invariably interpreted as hostile). These are only illustrations, of course, since a detailed analysis of possible steps is beyond the scope of this paper.

The Views of the Military Leadership

The second characteristic is that the uniformed military is actually playing the "doves:" they support START II and oppose plans for large-scale MIRVing of ICBMs. Only rarely does one see sudden outbursts of emotion, such as General Vladimir Dvorkin's recent response to an article by Podberezkin and Surikov.(41) The military have not turned into proponents of total and complete nuclear disarmament, but they certainly do not seem to support extreme proposals for a nuclear arms race.

The result is rather unusual. While the political elite appears to move to the right and increasingly embrace the idea of a large, MIRVed nuclear arsenal (funding, of course, is not available, but the attitudes are almost ripe for that), the military's ambitions are more modest. They are more or less comfortable with START II and are very serious about START III, which is certain to confirm a ban on MIRVed ICBMs and will further reduce the Russian force.

Since the government's policy on nuclear weapons is relatively independent from the broader political context, it requires a separate, independent inquiry. This section will attempt to reconstruct the rationales for this policy; a review of the actual modernization programs in the next section will serve as an additional test for the hypotheses about the "real" Russian nuclear doctrine. The detachment, however, is clearly temporary and cannot hold forever. The big question is whether the military would eventually embrace the increasingly popular conservative views or whether the political elite will reconcile itself with the more moderate views of the military. But at the moment the public debate and the official views have to be analyzed separately, even while both are important ingredients of a study that attempts to predict the evolution of the Russian strategic arsenal and doctrine.

It would be easy to explain away the military's moderate position as simply an honest recognition of economic constraints. After ten years of ever-deepening economic crisis, Russia can ill afford the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the Soviet Union. Indeed, one of the key arguments in favor of the START II Treaty is that deep reductions are the only way to keep the imbalance with the United States within tolerable limits. With or without START II it will have to reduce its nuclear arsenal to 2,000 warheads at best (START II counting rules). If START II is ratified, then the US will be at the 3,500 level, if not--at 7,000-8,000.(42)

For that reason, Russia kept insisting that the United States agree to negotiate and preferably sign START III even before START II is ratified, so that the Russian parliament could consider both treaties simultaneously or at least had a clearer picture of the future balance. In the spring of 1997, at the Helsinki summit, the United States made a partial concession by agreeing to establish the overall limit of warheads for START III at the level preferred by Russia. Consultations on the new treaty have begun, and since September 1997 have been very active, but are unlikely to result in a treaty or even assume formal character until START II is ratified.

It remains uncertain, however, whether the United States will actually pursue START III if START II is ratified, or if it will just mark time and put Russia into an awkward position by codifying its inferiority. Theoretically, the talks could continue forever, keeping the United States at the START II level of 3,500, while Russia stays at a much lower level (below 2,000 warheads) in anticipation of a new treaty. To some extent, this uncertainly clouds the START II ratification process.

Economic constraints are hardly the only variable to affect the position of the military. There is a widespread certainty that the United States will significantly reduce its strategic weapons regardless of whether START II is ratified; if this logic is correct, then Russia could MIRV its ICBMs, but the imbalance might still remain within tolerable limits. After all, if there is no START III, then Russia will have 1,500 to 2,000 warheads compared to 3,500 on the US side; if there is no START II, then Russia can have 3,000 to 3,500 warheads (calculation is approximate) to something like 3,500 to 4,500 warheads on the US side. But in the latter case Russia would have MIRVed ICBMs, which are considered a better response to an NMD system.

This means that support of START II is a conscious decision of the military and their policy reflects long-term planning and certain doctrinal innovations. Apparently, this policy is connected first and foremost with the former Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Igor Sergeyev (Sergeev), who was appointed the minister of defense in 1997.

Since his appointment as the SRF commander-in-chief in 1992, Sergeev has become a veritable "nuclear czar," who determines not only the policies of the SRF, but to a large extent the relevant aspects of the policies of the Navy and the Air Force. His close ally is the director of the 4th Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense (the SRF institute) Vladimir Dvorkin.

In what was a unique experience for Russia, Sergeyev became the SRF commander as a result of genuine competition, after a special commission interviewed several candidates for the position. Reportedly, the commission was swayed by his response to the question about the impact of a US strategic defense system. Other candidates proposed large-scale MIRVing of ICBMs and abandonment of START II and even START I (in 1992, to some this still seemed feasible), but Sergeyev advocated a "qualitative" response, in particular based on enhanced ability of single-warhead ICBMs to penetrate the defense. Sergeyev also advocated a faster transition toward a pure second-strike posture to replace the "vstrechno-otvetnyi udar" (launch under attack) strategy.

Subsequent modernization and reduction activities followed Sergeyev's initial statement without deviation. It is significant that he has not even once proposed a different course of action (e.g., reject START III, consider MIRVing, etc.), which leads one to conclude that fiscal constraints are not the only motivation behind his behavior. Only recently, as mentioned above, the new SRF commander-in-chief suggested that MIRVing Topol-M was possible, but even then he did not declare it a top priority option.

From the point of view of the military, nuclear weapons will remain the core element in Russia's security. There exists an obvious relationship between the role of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and Russia's economic potential and its (insufficient) involvement in international security regimes, on the other. Economic weakness means, among other things, weak conventional forces and fewer instruments of influencing international politics. Underdeveloped security regimes mean that Russia lacks effective means of presenting and defending its interests through international institutions, economic and political vulnerability, and reliance on raw power to a greater extent than would have been otherwise necessary.

For the government, nuclear weapons are apparently even more valuable, in a sense. Their impact on Russian domestic and foreign policy has been counterintuitive. They have played a positive role and are likely to continue playing it in the foreseeable future. Their presence has helped to alleviate concerns about the security environment during the difficult transition period. Nuclear weapons probably played a critical role in the (so far) successful transition toward democracy and a market economy: without them, the (perceived) reduction of security could have provoked an arms buildup, requiring concentration of resources and political power, i.e. restoration of an authoritarian regime. But proponents of reforms could always invoke nuclear weapons and claim that security was assured, that armed forces could be reduced and the defense budget cut down--even below the reasonable level. In a sense, the ongoing modernization of nuclear weapons is an inevitable "price" for reforms. Apparently, one can hardly exist without the other.

Taken together, Russian strategic weapons modernization programs fall rather neatly into a certain well-structured and logical framework. The force will be smaller, but will consist of relatively invulnerable weapons systems. The posture is likely to be oriented toward a second-strike strategy meaning that it will be able to "ride out" the first strike of any nuclear power, including the United States, and still be able to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation.

A particularly advantageous feature of the Russian arsenal will be congruence between the low overall level and low concentration of warheads on delivery vehicles, which will help to increase survivability. As a result, the arsenal will be almost perfect for low levels of nuclear weapons and will fit any probable arms control scheme, whether bilateral with the United States or multilateral, with participation of other nuclear-weapons states.

Funding is the only element missing today from the overall picture. After economic growth resumes (and a period of protracted economic growth might begin as early as this year), the current modernization effort will reacquire common sense: the economically developing Russia will ultimately cease to be the Upper Volta with nuclear weapons, to quote Margaret Thatcher, and then nuclear weapons will look "natural."

Modernization also fits the strategy developed by the former First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrei Kokoshin (who has been promoted since to the secretary of the Security Council). According to Kokoshin, the period of scarcity should be devoted to research and development, with acquisition postponed until approximately 2005. The number of types of weapons (including nuclear) should be reduced. Until 2005, weapons producing plants should be allocated the absolute minimum of contracts, just enough to enable them to survive; plants that are no longer needed to support the reduced armed forces and the relatively fewer types of equipment should be closed or converted.(43)

In hindsight, it is an ultimate irony that economic and political hardships have probably rendered Russian strategic weapons a service, after all. Russia skipped one or two stages in the modernization plans originally projected by the Soviet Union and, under reasonably favorable economic conditions, by the year 2010 it will have a rather small, fully optimized arsenal, which will consist almost exclusively of the most modern weapons (the word modern applies to delivery vehicles only; the CTBT will limit modernization of warheads).

Modernization programs display a decisive turn toward putting the quality of delivery vehicles above quantity and survivable second-strike potential above war-fighting capability. The new weapons will have the following characteristics:

• low concentration of warheads on delivery vehicles: ICBMs are single-warhead and new submarines are likely to carry only 48 warheads each (more on that in the next section);
• mobility or other means to ensure survivability: a significant share of ICBMs will be mobile, the rest will be based in hardened silos; submarines on patrol are highly invulnerable by definition;
• improved accuracy, which includes air-launched cruise missiles; and
• increased ability to penetrate defense systems.

Close attention to qualitative characteristics suggests that the military leadership is not content with simple “existential deterrence," which could be achieved by relatively low quantities of any weapons systems and would have required maintenance of the existing types instead of creation of new ones. The goal is, rather, to maintain a robust reliable second-strike arsenal capable of delivering a rather large number of warheads under the worst (or realistically bad) circumstances. The realistically bad circumstances probably include a first US strike and the ability to "ride it out." In any event, this interpretation comfortably explains the absolute majority of data on modernization programs.

In one of the very few public statements on the subject, First Deputy Minister of Defense Nikolai Mikhailov (he replaced Kokoshin after the latter moved to the Defense and then the Security Council) stated that deterrence should be ensured not by the quantity of warheads but by guaranteed delivery of warheads to the territory of the aggressor: “At the forefront here are the qualitative factors, rather than quantitative ones.” The goal of the defense ministry, according to Mikhailov, is to retain a reliable deterrent while simultaneously reducing the number of both delivery vehicles and warheads. This would require, among other things, a new technological level of delivery vehicles and warheads, as well as of information, command and control systems.(45) Dvorkin, in the above-mentioned letter, confirmed that the military leadership(46) did not consider it wise to retain old-type MIRVed ICBMs (as Podberezkin and Surikov proposed) simply because their 1970s technology was hopelessly outdated.

The attention to the qualitative parameters has a number of positive implications for the strategic balance and arms control. First of all, the requirements of numerical parity could be further relaxed. Exact parity has never been achievable, nor vital. It was, to a large extent, a political requirement, while in strictly military terms it was, as one analyst put it, “the roughest indicator of the strategic balance.”(47) The stability of the balance always depended on qualitative characteristics of weapons systems. The purposeful creation of a reliable second-strike capability, which stresses survivability, makes parity even less relevant. Russia will be truly able to abandon it (of course, if the domestic political scene permits it) and feel reasonably comfortable under a quite significant disparity. Of course, numbers will continue to matter--no one suggests they will not--but less than ever before.

Second, a combination of survivability and penetrability eases the impact of national missile defense. Survivability means that more delivery vehicles will survive the first strike to be used in retaliation, and penetrability means that more of those will be able to deliver warheads. As a result, the pressure to counter NMD deployment with additional deployment of offensive weapons and MIRVing would decrease. As in the previous case, the NMD problem will not disappear completely: at a certain level of offensive arms and certain effectiveness of defense it will reemerge, but the elasticity of the balance will increase, and the ABM Treaty, including the issue of ABM demarcation, will not be as serious an impediment to nuclear arms reduction as in the past.

Still, major uncertainties and unsolved problems will exist even when the transition to the new posture has been completed. First, it is unclear if the second strike capability will continue to exist under the combined impact of numerical imbalance and an NMD system. The positive implications described above treated the two separately; taken together, they might substantially affect the calculations. It is likely that this uncertainty was behind the statement of the current SRF Commander-in-Chief Yakovlev about the possibility of MIRVing Topol-M.

Second, even a very reliable second-strike capability might not be enough to ensure security. At least, under the NSC-68 criteria further elaborated in the subsequent decades (and still to a large extent guiding the thinking on nuclear weapons), reliable nuclear deterrence requires the maintenance of strong conventional deterrence in parallel. Thus, the current approach of the Russian military, i.e. reliance on nuclear weapons as the main provider of security, is a rather big gamble. After all, nuclear weapons are a means of last resort, and if confronted with a choice between a relatively limited concession and the use of nuclear weapons, Russia might choose the first.

Tactical nuclear weapons are supposed to compensate for that problem, but they are still nuclear weapons and carry with them all the associated limitations. The self-imposed restrictions on who could be targeted with nuclear weapons (the negative guarantees, which were confirmed in the military doctrine) exacerbate the problem further: since Russia cannot threaten certain categories of states with nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence works only weakly against the rest.

Let us consider, as an example, the so-called Southern Flank, the states to the south of Russia. Only Turkey in that region falls under the first use provision, since it is formally allied with a nuclear power, the United States. All others are formally non-nuclear, and the use of nuclear weapons cannot be convincingly invoked. Even Pakistan, which is widely assumed to have nuclear weapons and is viewed as generally unfriendly to Russia (primarily because of its role in Afghanistan and the support of the Taliban movement) presents problems because threatening the use of nuclear weapons against Pakistan would amount to recognition of its nuclear status. Without doubt, the specter of the use of nuclear weapons is still present regardless of anything, but its credibility and thus the utility of threat should be judged as low.

The same problems apply to Europe, the region that seems to have become the focal point of worries for Russian strategic planners. Armed conflicts there seem infeasible today, but if they emerge (e.g., as a result of an attempt to challenge the existing borders), Russia would still face a choice between the use of nuclear weapons over a relatively small issue and surrendering its position. Again, the credibility of the threat should be judged as low.

Of course, it is possible that vagueness is intentional and should help to contain any, no matter how limited, military clash or provocation. After all, if there exists even a miniscule chance of escalation to the nuclear level, no NATO country would think about challenging Russia; at least this follows from a Schelling-like analysis, which is popular in Russia. Still, these calculations are rather shaky, and the probability of benefits and harm appears equal.(48)

These problems point at an important conclusion: the current degree of reliance on nuclear weapons is temporary. They cannot fully substitute for modernization of conventional armed forces. This area lies outside the purview of this paper, and it is sufficient to note that the same logic is likely to be applied to strategic weapons. This means putting quality above quantity: the troops will be better suited for the types of conflicts that are anticipated as most likely, conventional weapons will be "smarter," etc. In other words, a return to the Soviet-type army is hardly possible.(49)

Comprehensive military reform will take a long time. So far, one can guess only the broad contours. The outline of the future strategic posture is, in contrast, more or less clear. The modernization programs, taken together with the reduction of weapons and the position at arms control negotiations, suggest that the goal is close to what in the 1980s was often called "defensive defense"--a posture defined by a fine balance between the ability to defend and inability to attack. At the same time, the likely direction of further development is hardly toward "existential deterrence:" the current plans stress reliable second-strike capability measured in probably two or three hundred warheads. Still, even that arsenal will not be suitable for a first strike, and in this sense will conform to "defensive defense." It will also provide significant (but not unlimited) flexibility in terms of numerical imbalance and resistance to the impact of a large-scale defense system.

Whether these plans will be implemented remains to be seen. As noted above, there are major uncertainties directly related to the planned posture and the level of credibility of nuclear retaliation. There are also significant domestic constraints, which might affect the preferences of the military. Finally, there is a larger international context to keep in mind, in particular the perception of external threat, which could emerge from economic and political conflicts rather than from the more traditional military challenges.

In spite of major conceptual uncertainties, Russia is definitely bent on keeping its nuclear weapons and even modernizing them. This is natural: historically, nuclear weapons appeared first and only then the conceptual basis for them was invented to suit the already existing systems.(50) The practical impact of these conceptual uncertainties is that in the absence of a clearly defined role, the benchmark for nuclear planning remains the US-Russian nuclear balance. The fact that these two countries have the largest arsenals appears to be only a superfluous reason, a convenient habitual way to rationalize certain established methods of planning. Deep under it hides what is probably the real rationale--the absence of a widely accepted hypothesis about the missions of nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War world.
 

Modernization of the Russian Nuclear Triad(51)

Secondly, modernization is limited by Soviet standards. Only one new type of ICBM is being developed (in the 1980s alone the Soviet Union deployed two new types, SS-24 and SS-25, and was considering modernization of three existing types and addition to one new type). Only one type of SSBN is planned for deployment (in the 1980s--two types of SSBNs, Typhoon and Delta IV), one existing type of SLBMs (in the 1980s, the Soviet Union fielded two types of SLBMs, SS-N-20 and SS-N-23). One new type of heavy bombers is under development (in the 1980s-also only one new type, Tu-160).

Modernization is also proceeding more slowly than usual. Although the SS-27 (Topol-M) was adopted for deployment rather quickly, it was done at the expense of drastically cutting down on the number of flight tests. The new-generation SSBN is at least partially funded from the Moscow city budget (sic!), but the Severomorsk shipyard continues to suffer from insufficient allocations.

Additionally, modernization does not affect all three legs of the triad simultaneously, in contrast to Soviet practices. Instead, modernization of ICBMs is now in full swing, modernization of the sea-based leg is only beginning, and heavy bombers are clearly left for the future. This is quite unusual, as most of the existing types of weapons will have to be discarded between the years 2005-2010. This only serves to reinforce the hypothesis above that the properties of the US-Russian nuclear balance are not viewed as "real," but rather as a benchmark for planning: otherwise, a crash program could have followed, with associated changes in the resource mobilization mechanism.

Even more interesting is that the stages of modernization do not seem to be directly related to the state of technology of the existing weapons. Had it been the case, heavy bombers would have been probably the first in line since the bulk of that leg consists of Tu-95MS, which were produced in the 1980s, but are based on 1950s technology. The ICBM force, in contrast, is by all standards rather modern, but was nonetheless accorded the highest priority.

Instead, service life appears to be the criterion behind the choice of one or another leg of the triad for modernization. The service life of SS-25 Topols is the shortest (10-15 years) and will expire in 2005-20 10; the service life of SSBNs is up to 25-30 years, although this would require periodic medium-level maintenance, which is not being performed on time and on all submarines, with the effect of shortening the service life for some of those (the service life of heavy bombers is up to 30 years and they are expected to remain operational longer than any other existing class of delivery vehicles).(52) Economic woes are common knowledge. Still, there is little doubt that the Russian government would have found the money for strategic modernization programs had the situation been assessed as dangerous. Evidently, this is not the case: the government considers external conditions sufficiently stable for years ahead to tolerate a fairly slow pace of modernization.

Modernization programs comply with START II. No MIRVed ICBMs are under development, which is consistent with the prohibition on these missiles. Under no conceivable circumstances can Russia exceed the START II limit of 3,500 warheads; to the contrary, it is likely to stay well below that limit. Furthermore, a significant increase in the concentration of warheads on delivery vehicles (in case Russia decides to develop and deploy MIRVed ICBMs and 10-warhead SLBMs) would make the force less stabilizing, which would run counter to the dominant views of the military. It should not be forgotten that the military began the shift toward putting the premium on survivability of the triad well before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and while still under conditions of practically unlimited funding. The deployment of mobile ICBMs in the 1980s was the first step in that direction. The reduction of the number of warheads on existing SLBMs (for example, from seven to four on SS-N-18) reflected the same trend, same as the fact that SS-N-23, the most modern of the existing SLBMs, has only four warheads. The 1990 Joint Statement on Future Negotiations proclaimed the intention to reduce concentration of warheads on delivery vehicles, which was more than a concession to the United States: the projected ICBM and SLBM programs featured no more than five warheads per missile.(53)

This means that survivability achieved through mobility and low concentration of warheads on delivery vehicles is not a Russian innovation, but rather a continuation of an earlier trend. In a sense, START II represents what the Soviet military would have expected in the form of START IV or V. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic crisis only helped to accelerate that evolution.

Since the "jump" over stages has already been made, Russia is likely to continue its adherence to the current trends in modernization and will refrain from MIRVing ICBMs. This line could be altered if the United States deploys a national missile defense (NMD) system. In this case domestic pressure to deploy MIRVed ICBMs as the means of penetrating the defense might tip the existing balance within the Russian government and elite and strengthen the position of the (still numerous) proponents of MIRVing. But such a change in the modernization plans is by no means assured: even some conservatives recognize that an effective second-strike capability could be retained without MIRVing.

But prospective systems are expected to have robust defense penetration capabilities, and this is one more common feature of modernization. The new ICBM is reportedly able to carry a very large load of decoys and defense penetration aids; the new SSBN will be able to carry SLCMs, and, finally, the development of heavy bombers is dictated, to a large extent, by the perceived need in ALCMs.

(I) Land-Based Strategic Missiles

The breakup of the Soviet Union has had a strong impact as well: two of three modem types of ICBMs (SS-18, a.k.a. R-36 and its modifications, and SS-24, a.k.a. RT-23) were produced in Ukraine; parts of the production base for the single-warhead SS-25 (a.k.a. Topol, a.k.a. RT-2PM) also remained outside Russia. As a result, Russia found it difficult and expensive to maintain even the existing weapons, much less transfer production from Ukraine. The almost desperate need for US support in the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from former republics to Russia, especially from Ukraine, coupled with rather unfriendly relations with the latter, led Russia to agree to complete elimination of MIRVed ICBMs.

Yet another reason to give priority to ICBMs could be understood if one pictures the situation in 1992-93. Ratification of START II seemed imminent; it had to be implemented by 2003 or, if the United States would have provided necessary assistance, by the year 2000. This meant that by 2000 Russia would have been left practically without silo-based ICBMs, except for 105 very old SS-19s (UR-100UTTKh) downloaded to one warhead. Development of a new silo-based ICBM seemed urgent; even road-mobile Topol-Ms could wait.

It is truly amazing, though, how much START II, which the Russian parliament refuses to ratify, has already benefited Russia. Despite its many shortcomings, it helped to limit modernization of ICBMs to just one type of single-warhead ICBMs. Without START II, political pressure in favor of research and development on a new MIRVed ICBM completely made in Russia might have been too strong. The lack of resources might have strengthened the hand of those who advocated a return to an authoritarian system. As things stand now, the defense of MIRVing remains the prerogative of a minority (except for in the scenario of US deployment of an NMD).

The future mainstay ICBM is Topol-M.(54) The testing phase is over, and the first regiment was deployed in late December 1997. On December 27, 1997 Boris Yeltsin officially congratulated Igor Sergeev with the introduction of the first Topol-Ms into combat duty.(55) However, because of insufficient funding the regiment consists of only two deployed missiles instead of the usual ten; the deployment itself is classified as "evaluative," rather than a full-scale combat one.(56)

Topol-M was designed at the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), a firm that specializes in solid-fuel missiles. From the very beginning (in the late 1960s) it was assigned the task of designing a solid-fuel mobile ICBM. The first prototype, called Temp-2S, was dropped (some say, because it was too heavy to be practical).(57) The next, successful ICBM, the SS-25 Topol, appeared only by the 1980s, after a successful intermediate-range missile Pioneer (SS-20). Some say, however, that the adoption of Topol for deployment was partially due to the fact that Dmitri Ustinov, who prior to becoming the minister of defense held top positions in the defense industry, had a "soft spot" for both the MITT and the Ministry of Defense Industry, which supervised it. (Previously, strategic missiles had been designed only within the confines of the Ministry of General Machine-Building). As a result, the military adopted a missile that, some say, was not ready for deployment. Today, one might say it was sheer luck that through bureaucratic competition the MITT was given the assignment: as a result, Russia inherited an active design bureau after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (other design bureaus on Russian territory had switched to civilian space launch vehicles years earlier).

Research on Topol-M began in the late 1980s and by the early 1990s the missile was ready for testing. The final decision to begin work on Topol-M was made by Boris Yeltsin in February 1993: this decision confirmed and probably amended earlier Soviet decisions on this missile (the amendments were necessary, obviously, to account for the need to transfer production of some components to Russia).(58) From the very beginning, Topol-M was intended as a dual-based ICBM, to be deployed in silos and on road-mobile launchers. Only the silo-based version exists today; the road-mobile version has yet to be tested. This will involve primarily modification of the first stage, and the process will be relatively simple.

Compared to Topol, the new missile is slightly shorter--the length of the assembled missile without front section is 17.9 meters (Topol, 18.5 meters) and wider--the diameter is 1.86 meters (Topol, 1.8 meters). Its front section is slightly longer: 3.3 meters (Topol, 2.3 meters).(59) This solid-fuel missile is deployed and maintained in launch canister, as are the absolute majority of Soviet missiles (only the SS-13 was deployed and maintained by stages), continuing the traditional difference between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia in terms of approaches to missile-building.

The pace of Topol-M's development was high: the first test was conducted in December 1994 and the last one prior to initial deployment in July 1997. Compared to Topol, however, this should not seem excessive: the first test of the latter was conducted in February 1983 and in 1985 the missile was adopted for deployment.(60) The unusual aspect was that only four tests of Topol-M took place in three years, whereas in the Soviet Union the usual number of tests for a new type was 15-20.(61)

Thus, testing of Topol-M seems more than a little bit hasty. The START I Treaty permits up to 20 tests before the side has to either completely abandon the new missile or accept it for deployment; the first official information on a new missile (its throw-weight) has to be provided only after seven tests.(62) This means that in the late 1980s the prospect of such a short test series did not occur to anyone in the Soviet Union or the United States. In fact, a well-known conservative general and member of the Communist Party faction in the Duma, Albert Makashov, claimed that Topol-M had not undergone the required number of tests and was not ready for deployment at all.(63)

The unusually small number of tests could partially be explained by the fact that the missile was a derivative of the existing Topol and thus used some existing technology, but also by the possibility that tests were more thoroughly prepared than used to be the case in the Soviet Union.(64) There are reports that the ground checks were considerably more thorough and that they were performed at the test range rather than at the plant as had been the case during the Soviet period.(65)

Insufficient funding evidently played an important role as well. In fact, originally a series of six tests was scheduled, and after the first test some reports indicated that more might be necessary. Even after the third test the situation remained uncertain, since the missile reportedly had flaws in the cooling system. Evidently, the fourth test went smoothly, and the missile was adopted for deployment. Still, only one successful test is hardly sufficient, and the military might be not completely satisfied with the quality of the new missile.(66)

Topol-Ms service life without major maintenance is up to 15-20 years, longer than that of Topol.(67) Most of the Topols that exist today will have to be replaced rather soon, which means that quite a large quantity of new missiles will have to be produced. Reportedly, the production capacity of the Votkinsk plant is up to 80 missiles per year; production is cost-effective at 30 missiles per year, and the absolute minimum necessary to sustain the supplier network of about 200 plants is 12-15.(68) The deployment rate was at 20 missiles per year in 1996, enough to sustain production cooperation, but insufficient to make it cost-effective.(69)

The planned rate of production for Topol-M is 30-40 annually with the goal of deploying 400-500 Topol-Ms by 2010, although the level of funding is only 55 percent of the required, which means that if the financial situation does not improve, only about 300 missiles will be deployed by 2010.(70) However, if economic conditions improve rapidly it would not be impossible to return to the Soviet-era deployment rate of 48 per year.(71)

Topol-M follows the Soviet tradition of large throw-weight: reportedly, 1.2 tons (for comparison, Topol is 1 ton and a three-warhead Minuteman III is 1.15 tons). This is the source of consistent speculation that Russia might MIRV Topol-M, especially since the predecessor of both, the intermediate-range missile Pioneer (SS-20) carried three warheads. Recently, SRF Commander-in-Chief Yakovlev did mention this possibility. But throwweight in itself is not necessarily a reliable indicator. Topol-M is consistent in this respect with other Soviet missiles: the six-warhead SS-19 is 4.35 tons and the modern 10-warhead SS-24 is 4.05 tons; a comparison to Minuteman III is not necessarily an indication of anything. In any event, MIRVing Topol-M would require extensive redesigning and retesting of the missile, so no breakout from START II limits would be possible, at least compared to the breakout potential of Minuteman III and D-5 (Trident II). The conditions under which MIRVing Topol-M could become feasible were noted in preceding sections.

Large throw-weight could be attributed to greater weight of the warhead, guidance and other systems, and defense penetration aids. Topol-M is considered fairly well equipped for penetration of defense systems. According to some estimates, this single-warhead ICBM carries more decoys and penetration aids than a 10-warhead Peacekeeper (MX).(72) Reportedly, only a direct hit by an anti-missile could stop its warhead on the descending trajectory.(73) US sources suggest that Topol-M has a maneuvering warhead, which has not been tested yet;(74) Russian sources are silent on that matter. If these reports are correct, then Topol-M, indeed, has an impressive defense penetration capability.

The first stage of Topol-M is reported to be more powerful than that of Topol, which gives it an added capability to avoid a space-based defense system of the type that was widely touted in the United States in the 1980s under the "Star Wars" nickname. According to the commander-in-chief of the SRF Vladimir Yakovlev, the greater power of Topol-M's booster was used to reduce the duration and the altitude of the active (boost) phase of the trajectory. This was done specifically for the purpose of avoiding the impact of "various types" of anti-missile defense systems, such as ultra-high-frequency emissions, lasers, etc., a clear reference to the "exotic" space-based systems foreseen under the "Star Wars" program.(75) Dvorkin disclosed that the altitude of Topol-M's boost phase is 4.5 times lower than that of older MIRVed ICBMs, and only the new ICBM makes any sense under the conditions of a prospective US NMD.(76)

The distinguishing feature of the new ICBM is the premium put on survivability. The silo-based version is reported to have enhanced resistance to a nuclear explosion: some say that it can withstand a direct hit by a nuclear warhead. The missile itself is completely resistant to an electromagnetic pulse.(77)

The road mobile version possesses vastly more effective navigational equipment. According to Yakovlev, it could be launched from any level spot within the division deployment area, whereas Topol could be launched only from a limited number of predetermined spots.(78) Topol-M is projected to have significantly enhanced concealment capabilities, being able to avoid all types of space and airborne intelligence systems.(79) Solomonov argues that the missile launchers might remain unconcealed during normal combat duty, but will "disappear" if combat alert is introduced.(80) This might prove to be especially valuable in terms of the ability to avoid B-1B and B-2 heavy bombers, which are commonly conceptualized in Russia as "hunters" after mobile ICBMs.

The impact of concealment measures on verifiability--an obvious issue that is likely to be raised at arms control talks--is likely to be minimal. The number of deployed mobile ICBMs is checked through on-site inspections, when all mobile launchers have to return to their garrison. The risk that some deployed launchers might not return is hardly greater than with respect to Topols: the latter could theoretically remain hidden as well. Other verification instruments provided by START I were designed to remove that residual risk. The overall number of missiles for mobile launchers is checked through the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system installed at the production facility, which gives the most reliable figure on the number of produced missiles; the aggregate number of non-deployed (spare) missiles could be verified through on-site inspections; the difference between the two numbers (produced and non-deployed) gives the aggregate number of deployed missiles.

What future awaits Topol-M? Clearly, the missile will remain the mainstay of the SRF for a long time. The road-mobile version will gradually replace Topols, and ultimately the whole force will consists exclusively of Topol-Ms. But the system is apparently not perfect. In 1992, during the first stage of public debate over the yet-unsigned START II, a number of drawbacks were disclosed by none other than the Communist newspaper Pravda.(81) The missile was considered rather large and heavy, which limited its maneuverability and speed and constrained its ability to escape from a nuclear strike fast enough and would be too vulnerable to the blast wave of an explosion. The critics declared that Topols were acceptable only as part of a much larger ICBM force, but not as the only type. Judging by the size of the missile, Topol-M probably inherited the same drawbacks, according to some experts.(82)

Of course, these problems are mitigated by the presence of silo-based ICBMs and the projected overall size of the force (eventually about 700-800 missiles). Apparently, Topol-M even in its mobile mode is more survivable than Topol. Still, as arsenals are reduced, a new, lighter and smaller missile might be required to increase survivability not just of the force as a whole, but also of each missile. There are no indications of such plans so far, for understandable reasons. Russia can barely support the work on Topol-M, that is, without affecting the overall economic and social policy, and is unlikely to embark upon a new program until the economic situation seriously improves. In the future a new ICBM seems likely, if current trends in global nuclear relationships continue. There is an isolated and not very reliable mention, however, of a modification of Topol-M, a Topol-M2, but its characteristics remain unknown.(83)

Topol-M was not the only single-warhead ICBM under development in the Soviet Union, however. In a 5 October 1991 statement, President Mikhail Gorbachev mentioned that the Soviet Union was terminating the program of creating a small mobile ICBM.(84) The word "small" meant that this missile was smaller than Topol-M. According to Solomonov, the missile's designation was Courier, and it was an analogue to the US “small ICBM” Midgetman. It featured new materials, new fuel, new guidance systems, and other elements, and the R&D program had reached the stage of flight-tests by mid-1991. But, he complained, the United States learned about the new missile (probably from the tests of its components) and “did not permit [the Soviet Union] to conduct flight tests.”(85) A more feasible explanation, however, is that facing the choice between two programs, one of which had become excessive for financial reasons and because of arms reductions, the Soviet Union chose the one that was closer to the existing type. This permitted savings on R&D, testing, and deployment: unlike Topol-M, Courier would have required a completely new launcher, infrastructure, etc. It is also possible that the other missile was not intended for dual basing.

Russia might conceivably return to this idea in the sense that the next missile will be smaller than Topol-M, more mobile and hardened. At least, this would fall into the broad trend toward greater survivability of the retaliatory forces.

A different option was disclosed by Russian First Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Mikhailov. According to him, Russia has started R&D on a single missile for land and sea basing.(86) This will permit, of course, major savings through the maximum possible reduction in the number of types. Whether the project will be technologically optimal and how the legal aspects will be taken care of (ICBMs will have to be single-warhead, while SLBMs are more cost-effective if they carry several warheads) remains to be seen.

(II) Sea-based strategic weapons

Submarines and SLBMs are the second priority after ICBMs. Their modernization could be postponed, but not for too long. The Navy requires a particularly long lead time for modernization since the construction of new submarines is such a lengthy process. The existing submarines are growing old,(88) and a new class had to be started in the mid-1990s. After 2003, the SSBN force was expected to consist of 24 of the most modern SSBNs (Project 667 BDR, Delta III; Project 667 BDRM, Delta IV; and Project 941, Typhoon), but after 2006 – of only 17 submarines: even relatively new submarines will begin to die out.(89)

Construction of the first submarine of the new, fourth generation(90) officially began on November 2, 1996.(91) Its name was selected with a special purpose in mind: Yuriy Dolgorukiy, after a 12th-century great prince who founded Moscow. The mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, was present at the ceremony and committed funds from the city budget to support its construction. This was not the first time Luzhkov helped the Navy out: earlier he committed Moscow city money to complete construction of the heavy missile cruiser Petr Velikiy. The new class is called Project 955, or Borey. The new submarine is being built at the Severodvinsk shipyard after an almost 10-year pause in SSBN construction. Construction was expected to last for four years,(92) although the shortage of funding is expected to delay it.(93) Masluykov suggested that as a result of chronic underfunding the Navy would be likely to have just one, or a maximum of two Borey submarines by 2010.(94) The program was put on hold because the SLBM intended for that submarine had failed three flight tests in a row and was canceled; now Yuri Dolgoruki has to be redesigned for a new SLBM, whose type is still unknown.

There are serious differences between American estimates and the data contained in Russian sources with respect to this new submarine. According to U.S. official estimates, the new Borey class SSBN will be equipped with solid-fuel SS-NX-28 SLBMs(95) (a.k.a. R-39UTTKh,(96) a.k.a. D-31). The new missile is reportedly more accurate and has a longer range.(97) Based on the missile type, Project 955 is assumed to be a continuation of Project 941 (a.k.a. Typhoon, a.k.a. Akula), the largest SSBN in the world. Still, no source explicitly establishes the connection.(98) Project 941, of which six submarines are now in service, is equipped with R-39 SLBMs (a.k.a. SS-N-20, a.k.a. D-19, a.k.a. RSM-52),(99) each carrying ten warheads.

This logical picture hides numerous inconsistencies, however. Project 955 is not necessarily a continuation of Project 941. Steven Zaloga, an authority on Soviet and Russian strategic weapons, hypothesized that it was a derivative from the fourth-generation attack submarine (SSN), Project 885 (a.k.a. Severodvinsk). Construction of the first submarine of this class, Tomsk, began in the summer of 1996.(100)

Russian experts, however, define the Borey as Delta V, establishing a direct link between the existing Project 667 modifications (667A, 667B, 667BD, 667BDR, and 667BDRM), which are considered the “workhorse” of the Soviet/Russian SSBN fleet, and the new SSBN.(101) Project 955 is smaller than Project 941 (170x10x? meters compared to 172x11x23.3 meters for Project 941 and 167x8.8x11.7 meters for Project 667BDRM).(102) Its silhouette is similar to Project 667BDRM, in particular missile tubes are located behind the sail (Project 941 has unique configuration: its missile tubes are in front of the sail). Borey will carry 12 SLBMs (Project 667BDRM – 16, Project 941 – 20). Project 955’s surfaced displacement is reportedly 17,100 tons,(103) which is between Project 667BDRM (11,740 tons) and Project 941 (23,200 tons);(104) U.S. sources estimate it as between 18,000 and 20,000 tons.(105) Its full load submerged displacement is also between Projects 941 and 667BDRM and is estimated at 33,800 tons (667BDRM – 18,200 tons, 941 – 48,000 tons).(106) In other words, available information puts it squarely in the middle between Projects 667 BDRM and 941 making easy identification impossible. Still, at least based on configuration it is closer to the former, and probably Russian military sources know what they are talking about, when they call it Delta V.

But if the new SSBN does not represent the next stage of Project 941, then one would have good grounds to ask why it should be equipped with the R-39UTTKh SLBM. Indeed, the available evidence about that missile is contradictory.

According to Steven Zaloga, development of R-39UTTKh(107) began in 1985 and in 1989 the missile was reportedly adopted for deployment,(108) when no new class of SSBN was yet in existence. Russian experts concur and report that the R-39UTTKh (D-19UTTKh) was intended as a replacement for the R-39 (D-19) as part of the modernization of Typhoon submarines.(109) In 1991 or 1992 the first Project 941 SSBN was put in dock for modernization, and, Zaloga suggested, was supposed to be refitted with the R-39UTTKh SLBMs in the place of R-39s. He notes, however, with his usual caution, that under the strained economic conditions the project to replace all R-39s with the modernized version might never be completed. In fact, he says, R-39UTTKh has never been produced in quantity, since its first stage was developed and probably produced in Pavlograd, Ukraine, and the breakup of the Soviet Union created a dilemma: whether all production should be moved to Russia or a new arrangement with Ukraine has to be found.(110) The Russian military has never felt comfortable with importing components of strategic weapons.(111) A different version, however, suggests that the first stage of the R-39 was produced in Perm and then shipped to Pavlograd.(112)

There is also different evidence with respect to the SLBM for Project 955. According to Boris Makeev (Makeyev), in the 1990s the Miass design bureau was working on what he called SS-NX-27 (a follow-up to the R-39), which was substantially different from the R-39. According to the catalogue issued by the Russian defense industry, the new SLBM (which it called a variant of the RSM-52, a.k.a. R-39) was a solid-fuel missile, rather heavy (87.6 tons compared to 90 tons for R-39) and had 10 warheads.(113) This program was under way until late 1997 and was abandoned after three test flights, all of which failed. This data does not fit with the story told by Zaloga. According to the catalogue, the