By 1987, an estimated 132 metric tons (t) of plutonium for weapons
had been produced by 13 reactors at three sites: PO
Mayak (in Ozersk, also known as Chelyabinsk-65), GKhK
(the Mining and Chemical Combine in Zheleznogorsk, also known as Krasnoyarsk-26),
and SKhK (the Siberian Chemical Combine
in Seversk, also known as Tomsk-7).[1] The five Mayak reactors produced
an estimated 55.9t of weapons-grade plutonium between 1948 and 1990, the
five SKhK reactors produced 69.1t between 1955 and 1994, and the three GKhK reactors produced 44.2t between 1958 and 1994. Ten of these reactors
were shut down between 1987 and 1992.[7]
On 12 March 2003, an addendum agreement to the
1997
US-Russian Intergovernmental Agreement Concerning Cooperation
Regarding Plutonium Production Reactors
was signed. [10] Under the addendum,
the
ADE-4 and ADE-5 reactors in Seversk and the
ADE-2 reactor in Zheleznogorsk
will stop producing plutonium by 31
December 2005 and 31 December 2006, respectively.[11] The reactors will continue
to operate as heat and power sources
until the
existing fossil
fuel plant in Seversk is refurbished and a new plant is constructed in
Zheleznogorsk.[12] According to DOE estimates, the two reactors in Seversk
will be shut down in 2008 and the reactor in Zheleznogorsk in 2011.[13]
Military Plutonium Stocks
In June 1999, the US Department of Energy estimated that there were 140-162t of weapons-grade plutonium in the Russian military
stockpile.[8] Albright et. al estimated that there were 117-172t in 1996.[4] As
of 1995, Russia was producing approximately 1.5t of weapons-grade plutonium
per year from the reactors in GKhK and SKhK.[3] As of 1994, these three
production reactors were discharging approximately 1200t of spent fuel
annually.[2]
Civilian Plutonium Stocks
Russian civilian plutonium stockpiles
consist of plutonium separated from spent nuclear fuel and plutonium still
contained in spent fuel. According to the 2002 declaration of
the Russian Federation to the IAEA Board of Governors, Russia had 34t of unirradiated
separated plutonium stored at civilian reprocessing and fuel-fabrication
facilities as of 31 December 2001. In addition, there are 200kg of plutonium
in unirradiated MOX fuel or other forms at reactor sites, and 1t at
other locations. The total amount of separated plutonium is 35.2t.[6]
Plutonium contained in spent fuel at
civilian reactor sites is estimated at 34t. Three metric tons of plutonium is
contained in spent fuel at reprocessing plants. An additional 24t of plutonium
is contained in spent fuel held at other sites. This brings the total for
plutonium contained in spent fuel to 61t as of 31 December 2001.[6] Sources: [1] Robert Norris, "The Soviet Nuclear
Archipelago," Arms Control Today, Vol. 22, No. 1, January-February
1992, pp. 24-31. [2] Anatoliy S. Diakov, "The Cessation
of Production of Weapons-Grade Plutonium in Russia," Science & Global
Security, Vol. 5, 1994, pp. 33-35. [3] Oleg Bukharin, "Nuclear Safeguards
And Security In The Former Soviet Union," Survival, Vol. 36, No.
4, Winter 1994-1995, p. 55. 4/3/97 LBN} [4] David Albright, Frans Berkhout,
William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories,
Capabilities and Policies (New York: Oxford University Press Inc.,
1997), p. 58. [5] 1994 Agreement Between The Government
Of The United States Of America And The Government Of The Russian Federation
Concerning The Shutdown Of Plutonium Production Reactors And The Cessation
Of Use Of Newly Produced Plutonium For Nuclear Weapons, http://www.eia.doe.gov/gorec/gcc8.html.{Revised 11/2/99 LWB} [6] "Communication Received From
the Russian Federation Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of
Plutonium," IAEA Information Circular, INFCIRC/549/Add.9/4, 11 September 2002. [7] Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris,
Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 277-284. [8] "World Plutonium Inventories,"
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 5, September-October
1999, p. 71. [9] Nuclear Successor States of
the Soviet Union: Status Report on Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and
Export Controls, The Monterey Institute of International Studies and
The Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, No. 5, March 1998, pp. 29-30,
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/statrep.htm.
{Revised 11/2/99 LWB}
[10] "Finansovoye uchastiye SShA v ostanovke rossiyskikh reaktorov-narabotchikov
plutoniya sostavit sotni millionov dollarov," Nuclear.ru Web Site,
http://www.nuclear.ru/, 14 March 2003.
[11] "Podpisano soglasheniye ob ostanovke trekh rossiyskikh reaktorov,
proizvodyashchikh plutoniy," RosBiznesKonsalting, 12 March 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.com/. [12]
"U.S. and Russia Agree to Plan to Shutdown Three Remaining Russian Plutonium
Production Reactors," DOE Press Release,
http://www.energy.gov/, 12
March 2003.
[13] Platts Nuclear News Flashes,
http://www.platts.com/, 12
March 2003. {Updated
4/18/2005 ES}
US Funding for Elimination of Russian
Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production
As of April 2005, the US-Russian cooperative program for
the elimination of Russian weapons-grade plutonium production in Russia was
managed by the US Department of Energy (DOE). Until 2001, the United States
allocated funds for
the cooperative program
under the Reactor Core Conversion budget item of
the Department of Defense (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. Until
2000,
modification of the cores of the three
plutonium-production reactors in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk for civilian use was the focus of the
program.
The DOD served as the executive agent
relying on the DOE for technical advice and contracting
support. In 2001, construction of fossil-fueled power
plants to replace the reactors
as heat and power sources was introduced as an alternative to reactor
core conversion, and the
budget item
was
renamed Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production. In
December 2001, management and
funding for the program were transferred from DOD to DOE, in part due to Congressional
restrictions on the use of CTR funds for fossil-fuelled power
plants.[1,3]. The following tables
provide historical data on US funding for the elimination of Russian
weapons-grade plutonium production. For the current level of US funding, please
refer to the updates provided in "Controlling Nuclear Warheads and
Materials," on the NTI web site.