The main objectives of the Department of Energy's
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program are to identify and
develop nonmilitary applications for defense technologies and to create
long-term jobs for NIS weapons scientists and engineers in the
high-technology commercial marketplace.[1]
The Inter-Laboratory Board (ILAB), comprising
personnel from 10 US Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories, makes contact
with NIS institutes and performs initial evaluations of capabilities and
technologies. The United
States Industry Coalition (USIC), comprising participating US companies,
evaluates the commercial viability of proposed projects and promotes the
potentially successful candidates to private companies.[2]
As of June 2000, the program had approved 511 projects, engaging over 8,000 NIS scientists,
engineers, and other staff at more than 170 institutes.[3] Seventy percent
of the projects have been in the nuclear sector and 30% in the chemical and
biological sectors.[1]
IPP projects are categorized in three phases: Thrust
1, Thrust 2, and Thrust 3. Thrust 1 projects are funded by DOE and focus
on the identification of commercially feasible technologies. In Thrust 2,
a US industry partner agrees to share in the costs of developing potential technologies. In the final phase, or Thrust 3, projects are expected to become self-sustaining
business ventures.
A US Government Accounting Office report released in
February 1999 criticized IPP for excessive overhead costs at US
national laboratories, expressed concern about inadequate program oversight, and
argued that the program was not achieving its long-term nonproliferation goal of
commercializing NIS weapons technologies.[4] Partly in response to these
comments, IPP has adopted new guidelines requiring that at least 50% of
project funds be spent in the NIS. In the past two years, it has placed
increasing emphasis on Thrust 2 and Thrust 3 projects. As of June 2000,
eight IPP projects had reached the point of commercialization, and DOE officials
expect another nine projects to do so by the end of 2001.[3] In FY 2000,
plans called for all program funds to be spent on Thrust 2 and Thrust 3 projects.[1]
In its
FY 2002 appropriations bill, the House of Representatives recommended transferring the IPP and Nuclear Cities
Initiative (NCI) programs into a new program entitled Russian Transition
Assistance. The House bill recommended that IPP and NCI remain
separate programs, but expected the DOE to provide a
single program manager for both. The bill also recommended that NCI adopt
the same standards, applications, and approval procedures used by IPP and that
NCI projects be guided by the commercialization principles inherent in the IPP
program. No more than 25% of IPP and NCI funds allowed to be spent at DOE
laboratories and USIC was to assume
responsibility for all business-related activities. The FY 2002 House bill
provided $30 million to IPP, a 20% increase over FY 2001 allocations of $24.1
million.[5]
The US
Congress passed the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act
for FY 2002 signed by President Bush on 12 November 2001, which combined NCI and IPP
funding under the Russian Transition Initiatives budget item and provided $42
million for the programs. The US Department of Energy integrated the management of both programs. The Act also gave DOE the flexibility to
allocate funding between the two programs.[6]The Russian
Transition Initiatives received additional $15 million in the post-September 11
FY2002 emergency supplemental appropriation package.[7] Combined FY2002
allocations for the IPP totaled $36 million. In the FY 2003 request,
the DOE has asked for $39.334 million for the Russian Transition Initiatives,
including $22.586 million
for the IPP.[8] In FY2004, IPP received $23.2 million in
funding.[9]
For more information on
IPP funding, see Table I below. For more
information about the program, see the IPP web site at http://ipp.lanl.gov/
and the 1999 GAO report, Nuclear
Nonproliferation: Concerns with the DOE's Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed
by Russia's Unemployed Weapons Scientists, February 1999.
Table
I: Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Projects by Year (NIS)
| Fiscal
Year |
Project |
Amount
Obligated
(in millions) |
Projects
Approved |
FY 1995
(Funding
originated in FY 1994) |
Thrust 1: Technology
Identification |
$20[1] |
159[1] |
| Thrust 2: Cost-sharing
Partnerships |
$12[1] |
34[1] |
| Academic Support Element |
$3[1] |
|
| FY 1996 |
Thrust 1: Technology
Identification |
$6[1] |
40[1] |
| Thrust 2: Cost-sharing
Partnerships |
$12[1] |
24[1] |
| Additional Projects |
$2[1] |
|
| FY 1997 |
Thrust 1: Technology
Identification
Thrust 2: Cost-sharing
Partnerships |
$29.6[1] |
68[1] |
| 10[1] |
| FY 1998 |
Thrust 1: Technology
Identification
Thrust 2: Cost-sharing
Partnerships |
$29.6[2] |
60[1] |
| 40[1] |
| FY 1999 |
Thrust 1: Technology
Identification
Thrust 2: Cost-sharing
Partnerships |
$22.5[3] |
35[4] |
| 41[4] |
| FY 2000 |
100% of funding planned for Thrust 2 and Thrust 3 |
$22.5[3] |
120[2] |
| FY 2001 |
100% of funding planned for Thrust 2 and Thrust 3 |
$24.1[5] |
64[3] |
|
Fiscal
Year |
Funding |
| FY 2002 |
Initial: $42 million for the Russian Transition Initiatives (the NCI and the
IPP combined)[6] Supplemental: $15 million from the FY2002 Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations[7]
Total: $57 million for the Russian Transition Initiatives (the NCI and
the IPP combined)
- including $36 million for
IPP[8]
|
| FY 2003 |
$16.639 million for NCI $22.439 million for IPP[10] |
| FY 2004 |
$39.764 million for the Russian Transition
Initiatives (the NCI and the IPP combined)[10]
(including $23.2 million for the IPP program)[11] |
| FY 2005 Request |
$41 million[10] |
|
(For recent major
developments,
please see the
Russia: Foreign Assistance Programs file):
1/13/2003:
CENTER OPENS TO RETRAIN RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS SCIENTISTS
Under the IPP program, a new center offering
software programming training to former Russian nuclear weapons scientists
opened at Moscow's
Kurchatov Institute on 11 January 2003. According to the Moscow Times, the Kurchatov Institute,
Kurchatovsky Tekhnopark, and
CTG Software, Inc. are
among the organizations who recently founded Optima Program, a company that will
employ graduates of the center. The United States has allocated $22.6
million for the IPP program in 2003, which will support 176 current projects at
57 institutes in Russia, 14 projects in Kazakhstan, and 13 projects in Ukraine.
11/12/2001: NCI AND IPP COMBINED INTO ONE PROGRAM
On 12 November 2001 President Bush signed the
Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act for fiscal year 2002. The
act
combines the Nuclear Cities Initiative and the Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention into a new program entitled Russian Transition Assistance and
provides $42 million for its activities, which is $12 million more than was
requested by the administration. The law stipulates that the Department of Energy
shall
have a single manager responsible for both the NCI and IPP programs. DOE will have
the flexibility to allocate the funding between the two programs. The new
program manager is requested to ensure close coordination with other federal
agencies that provide funding for scientists from closed nuclear cities. The
law does not specify the amount or percentage of funds to go directly to
facilities in Russia but calls for increasing the level of funding provided to
Russia (thus reducing the funding that remains in the United States) and directs DOE
to apply the lowest possible laboratory overhead rates.
10/4/2001 LUXOFT AGREES TO RETRAIN RUSSIAN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS FOR WORK IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
LUXOFT became the first major Russian information technology company to
join the US DOE Initiatives for Proliferation Program (IPP). LUXOFT
and its US partner, CTG Inc., of Wayne, Pennsylvania, plan to train 500 nuclear
professionals at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow in a number of computer
technology applications. The project consists of four stages: trainee
selection, external basic training, targeted training at LUXOFT, and
provision of employment. LUXOFT plans to expand training at Kurchatov
before moving on to Russian nuclear weapons facilities.
2/19/99: GAO REPORTS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE IPP PROGRAM
The US Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported
that only $23.7 million dollars of the $63.5 million spent on the Initiatives
for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program went to scientific institutes
in the Newly Independent States. The other $39.8 million was spent in the
United States, largely on oversight and implementation programs of the
Department of Energy's national laboratories. The report also found that
it was impossible to determine what percentage of the money that made it
to the Newly Independent States reached scientists as the institutes used
some of that money to pay overhead charges, taxes, and other fees. With
regards to the overall objective of the IPP program, the GAO found that
"the program has been successful in employing weapons scientists through
research and development projects, but it has not achieved its broader
nonproliferation goal of long-term employment through the commercialization
of these projects." Additionally, the report states that the IPP program
officials do not always know if key scientists and institutes are being
targeted and do not know how many scientists are receiving IPP funding. Please see the full text of the GAO report Nuclear
Nonproliferation: Concerns with the DOE's Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed
by Russia's Unemployed Weapons Scientists, February 1999.
5/13/97: NEARLY HALF OF FUNDS FOR IPP NOT REACHING
RUSSIAN SCIENTIST
A DOE official reported that 46.5 percent of the
monies intended for Russian Scientists through the CTR's Initiative for
Proliferation Prevention program is being diverted to pay taxes and other
facility-specific costs. The Russians are taxing the foreign aid
going to the scientists and are using some of the rest of the money to
pay overhead costs at facilities that have been strapped for cash for a
long time. Thus, a large amount of the money intended to aid former
nuclear scientists is not accomplishing that goal. While both US officials
and their Russian counterparts have been working for some time to revise
the tax structure and combat corruption, both of which contribute to this
problem, thus far they have been relatively unsuccessful.
Page last updated 2 February 2005
The development section in this file is no longer being updated. For
major recent developments, see the
Russia: Foreign Assistance Programs file.
Comments or questions? Contact Elena
Sokova at MIIS CNS: esokovaATmiis.edu
This material is produced independently for NTI
by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has
not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers,
employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.
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