This file
contains
major developments related to U.S. and international cooperative threat
reduction in Russia beginning in January 2005. All other development files
related to foreign assistance have been discontinued. Archives of these
files can be found by following the links at the bottom of this page.
4/11/2007: U.S.-Russian agreement to Sustain Security Upgrades On 11 April 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced that U.S. and Russian officials
had agreed to a plan to help sustain and maintain security upgrades at Russian
nuclear material sites. Security enhancements that the United States installed
over the last 14 years at Russian nuclear sites, largely through the
Material
Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program, will be preserved by
Russia under the new plan.
The plan by DOE and the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom)
outlines specific details for how the upgrades will be sustained so that they can be transitioned to sole Russian support for the future, as mandated by U.S. law.
While this agreement covers sustainability at nuclear material sites, separate discussions are under
way regarding sustainability at sites with nuclear weapons.
Since 1993, DOE programs have spent approximately $1.6 billion in Russia to enhance security for several hundreds of nuclear warheads and hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material at approximately 75 percent of Russia's nuclear material storage and warhead sites of concern. This includes all 50 of
the naval nuclear sites, 11 of Russia's
Strategic Rocket Forces sites, and over 175
buildings within the Russian nuclear complex. Work is underway at the balance of
sites and will be completed by 2008. ["U.S. & Russia Agree to Sustain Security Upgrades at Nuclear Material Facilities,"
NNSA press release, 11 April 2007,
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/
newsreleases/2007/PR_2007-04-11_NA-07-11.htm.]
{Entered 4/25/2007 CC}
7/12/2006: JOINT REPORT ISSUED BY US SECRETARY OF ENERGY AND ROSATOM HEAD On 12 July 2006, US
Department of Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman and Russian Federal Atomic Energy
Agency Director Sergey Kiriyenko submitted to Presidents Bush and Putin the
third report of the Senior Interagency Working Group on implementation of the
measures agreed upon at the
February 2005 meeting in Bratislava. In an effort to secure nuclear weapons
and fissile material and keep them out of the hands of terrorists, Presidents
Bush and Putin agreed in Bratislava to establish a bilateral Senior Interagency
Working Group to address issues of cooperation on nuclear security; the group is
responsible for reporting the status of the cooperation to the Presidents.
The third report highlights progress over the past six months, including a joint field
exercise in Russia in late 2006 that focused on a search for radioactive
materials and the elimination of consequences resulting from a nuclear or
radiological emergency; shipments of spent
highly enriched uranium
fuel of Russian and US origin to Russia and the United States; and other
activities.
The report also highlights "best practices" for maintaining the security of
sensitive nuclear facilities, and commits both agencies to developing principles
and evaluation criteria by the end of 2006. According to Bodman, the bilateral Joint Action Plans prioritize repatriation of fresh and spent highly
enriched uranium (HEU) fuel and conversion of research reactors in third-world
countries as well as improving the level of physical protection, control and
accountability of nuclear weapons and materials stored at Russian Ministry of
Defense and Rosatom facilities.
The Senior Interagency Working Group will submit its next report in December
2006. ["Joint Report
Issued by the US Secretary of Energy and the Director of the Russian
Federation's Federal Atomic Energy (Rosatom)," US Department of Energy, 12 July
2006.] {Entered 2/14/2006 SG}
6/26/2006: NEW ZEALAND TO CONTRIBUTE TO SHUTTING DOWN PLUTONIUM
REACTOR IN ZHELEZNOGORSK
New Zealand is offering a contribution of NZ$500,000 (about $304,000 as of
26 June 2006) to a U.S.-led
project to shut down a plutonium-producing nuclear reactor at
Zheleznogorsk.
According to U.S. Ambassador William McCormick, both New Zealand and the United States
recognize that Russia's three remaining plutonium production
reactors constitute a proliferation threat. A fossil fuel plant, which
is being built in Zheleznogorsk, will replace the reactor and New Zealand’s
contribution is to be used to ensure that the facility meets the
highest environmental standards.
["NZ cash to shut Russian reactor," New Zealand Herald, 26
June 2006.] {Entered 8/29/2006 SG}
8/22/2005: JAPAN PLEDGES FUNDING FOR ON-SHORE REACTOR STORAGE FACILITY IN THE
RUSSIAN FAR EAST In July 2005, government sources cited by Kyodo News indicated that
Japan will fund the construction of an on-shore reactor storage facility in
Vladivostok.[1,2] Costs are estimated at $70-71 million, or approximately eight
billion yen.[1,2] The facility will be roughly six hectares (approx. 15 acres)
in size, and will have the capacity to store reactor compartments from 100
nuclear-powered submarines.[1,2] Japan will fund the project out of its $200
million pledge for Russian nonproliferation assistance.[2] Additionally, Japan
has agreed to install radiation detectors around the facility. Negotiations
regarding the project are to begin as early as September; construction may begin
early next year for completion in 2009.[2] Sources:
[1] "Japan to Help Russia Build Nuclear Components Storage Facility," RIA
Novosti, 18 July 2005.
[2] "Japan to Aid Russia in Building Storage for Dismantled Nuke Subs," Kyodo
News, 18 July 2005. {Entered 9/15/05 JB}
8/10/2005: INVESTIGATIONS FOLLOW FIRE AT ZVEZDOCHKA SHIPYARD Russian and Canadian investigations were launched following the deaths of
two workers on 1 August 2005. The deaths were the result of a fire in the
third compartment of K-298, a Victor III-class submarine undergoing
dismantlement at Zvezdochka
Shipyard in Severodvinsk.[1] Zvezdochka Head Engineer Viktor Frolov
indicated that diesel fuel had ignited, causing the fire.[2] On 10 August 2005,
a Canadian delegation arrived at Zvezdochka to inspect the dismantlement
facility, along with fire and occupational safety policies.[1] Thirteen
individuals currently face administrative penalties for work safety violations
at the shipyard.[3] Sources:
[1] "Canadians Inspecting Russian Shipyard, Where Two Killed When Scrapping
Sub," Interfax-Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 10 August 2005.
[2] "No Nuclear Reactor on Severodvinsk Submarine," RIA Novosti, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20050801/41070228.html.
[3] Semen Tyukachev, "Plamya v tretem otseke," Severnyy rabochiy, 6
August 2005; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru. {Entered 9/15/05 JB}
7/22/2005: RELAXATION OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROLS ON NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAM The Senate approved an amendment to the Nunn-Lugar program which eliminates
restrictions that have delayed the implementation of numerous
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
programs.[1]
The legislation, in section 211(b) of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of
1991 and repeated in section 1203(d) of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of
1993, had required the president to certify annually that recipient countries
met six conditions. These conditions, which the Senate agreed to repeal,
were that the recipient country is:
(1) making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or
destroying such weapons;
(2) forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense
requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed WMD;
(3) forgoing any use of fissionable and other components of destroyed nuclear
weapons in new nuclear weapons;
(4) facilitating United States verification of weapons destruction carried out
under section 212;
(5) complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and
(6) observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection
of minorities.[2]
Additionally, presidential certification was required for assistance in the
elimination of chemical weapons. The Senate also agreed to repeal the
following restrictions, in section 1305 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for FY 2000 on Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities, which
required:
(1) full and accurate Russian declaration on the size of its chemical weapons
stockpile;
(2) allocation by Russia of at least $25 million to chemical weapons
elimination;
(3) development by Russia of a practical plan for destroying its stockpile of
nerve agents;
(4) enactment of a law by Russia that provides for the elimination of all nerve
agents at a single site;
(5) an agreement by Russia to destroy or convert its chemical weapons production
facilities at Volgograd and Novocheboksark; and (6) a demonstrated commitment
from the international community to fund and build infrastructure needed to
support and operate the facility.[4]
According to Senator Lugar, the new legislation is designed to streamline
bureaucratic requirements by eliminating duplicate reports and to create more
time for agencies to focus on emerging proliferation threats. To provide proper
accountability and verification, the Secretary of State will submit an annual
report on each country with CTR programs. The report will contain information
similar to that in reports previously submitted for Nunn-Lugar programs. To
further simplify program implementation, presidential approval is not longer
required; instead, the Secretary of Defense will provide the required
authorization. [1] Sources:
[1] Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2005, 109th Congress, S. 313.
[2] Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991-Section 211(b), (title II of
Public Law 102-228; 22 U.S.C. 2551 note).
[3] Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993-Section 1203(d), (title XII of
Public Law 103-160; 22 U.S.C. 5952(d)).
[4] "Senate Approves Nunn-Lugar Amendment," http://lugar.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=241261,
21 July 2005. {Entered 9/15/05 JB} 4/26/2005:
Canada Signs Second Submarine Dismantlement Deal with
Russia On 26 April 2005, Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Pierre
Pettigrew announced an additional $32 million in Canadian dollars (almost US $26
million as of 26 April 2005) in submarine dismantlement assistance to Russia.[1]
Under the new agreement, eight Victor-class submarines, each with two reactors,
will be towed to the Zvezdochka
shipyard for defueling. Of the eight vessels to be towed, three are located
in Ura Bay, two in
Zapadnaya Litsa, and the
remaining three in Vidyayevo.[3]
Four of these boats will be defueled (it is unclear whether or not the remaining
four boats have fuel onboard) and three of them will be dismantled under the
contract.[4] The dismantlement of the five remaining vessels will be funded by
the Canadians through future contracts.[1]
In August 2004, Canada concluded a Canadian $24.4 million (about US $18 million
as of 1 August 2004) agreement to defuel and dismantle three Victor class
submarines. Canada's goal is to dismantle 12 nuclear submarines, expending
approximately $116 million by 2008.[1] For more information on Canadian
assistance, please see the Russia: International
Assistance Programs: Canada file. Sources:
[1] "Canada Signs Second Agreement to Help Russia Dismantle Nuclear Submarines,"
Canadian Foreign Ministry Press Release, http://w01.international.
gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?Language=E&publication_id=382478.
[2] Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 28 April 2005; in "Canada Signs Second Russian
Nuclear Submarine Disposal Deal," FBIS Document CEP20050428013004.
[3] "Eight retired submarines to be transported to Severodvinsk this summer,"
Bellona Foundation Web Site, http://www.bellona.no/en/international/
russia/navy/co-operation/38436.html.
[4] "Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement Progress, Canada’s Global Partnership
Program," Canadian Foreign ministry Web Site,
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/global_partnership/
nuclearsubs_progress-en.asp.
{Entered 9/15/05 JB}
4/18/2005: U.S., RUSSIA SEEK
FUNDING TO SHUT DOWN
PLUTONIUM REACTORS
As Arms Control Today reported on 18 April 2005, The U.S. Department of Energy is seeking
contributions from the international community to fund the shutdown of Russia's three
remaining nuclear reactors which produce weapons-grade plutonium. These
reactors are located in the cities of
Seversk and Zheleznogorsk.
In 2002, the Department of Energy estimated the cost of the project, known as the
Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production program, at no more than $470 million.
A revised estimate, taking into account Russian inflation, rising labor costs,
and contractor fees totals nearly $1 billion. In 2001, U.S. and
Russian officials determined that eliminating the production of weapons-grade
plutonium in the three reactors would be best achieved by replacing them with
fossil-fuel plants that can provide heat and electricity to near by communities.
The United States expects the two reactors in Seversk to be shut down by December 2008. The refurbishing
of a fossil
fuel plant in Seversk is scheduled to be more than 60 percent
complete by the end of fiscal year 2006. The Energy Department requested
$132 million for the program in fiscal year 2006, which is a 200 percent increase
over the 2005 allocation. Shutting down the third plutonium-producing
reactor at Zheleznogorsk will require building an entirely new fossil fuel
plant. That project will require $100 million in international donations
if it is to meet its 2011 target completion date. So far the United
Kingdom has pledged $20 million and Canada has offered $7 million towards
construction of the replacement power sources.[1] In
mid-February 2005, a two-day conference was held in Switzerland to solicit
international funding for projects outside of the existing U.S.-Russia
construction agreement to protect and remediate the environment around the
reactor sites and create new business enterprises and jobs for the workforce of
highly skilled scientists and technicians that will be displaced when the
reactors shut down.
The conference was attended by 11 countries, the European Commission, and the
International Atomic Energy Agency.[2] Sources:
[1] Claire Applegarth, "U.S., Russia Seek Help on Plutonium,"
Arms Control Today,
http://www.armscontrol.org. {Entered
4/18/05 WDP}
[2] National Nuclear Security Administration,
Press Release, 14 February 2005, "Nations Gather to Help Nuclear Cities Shut
Down Plutonium Production Reactors." {Entered 8/10/05 CC}
3/30/2005: U.S., CANADA SIGN
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON FUNDING RUSSIAN PLUTONIUM REACTOR SHUT-DOWN Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew and U.S. Secretary of
Energy Samuel Bodman announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
to assist with the shut-down of one of the final operating weapons-grade
plutonium producing reactors in Russia. According to the MOU, Canada will
contribute $9 million Canadian (about US$7 million as of 30 March 2005) to the U.S.
Department of Energy's Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP)
program. The contribution is part of Canada's $1 billion pledge under the
G8 Global Partnership. The goal of
the EWGPP program is to permanently shut down three Russian plutonium-producing
reactors, which provide heat and electricity to nearby communities, and replace
them with fossil fuel plants. For more information on the plutonium
producing reactors please see the
Zheleznogorsk and
Seversk files. ["Canada and the United States Cooperate to Shut Down One of the Last
Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Reactors in Russia," Canadia Foreign
Affairs Web Site,
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/global_partnership/ shutdown_plutonium-en.asp.]
{Entered 4/20/05 WDP}
3/11/2005: RUSSIA RATIFIED CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE On 11 March 2005, the Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian
legislature) voted overwhelmingly
to ratify the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. Russia
originally signed the Convention in May 1996, but only recently put it up for
parliamentary ratification. Russia hopes the ratification will improve global
participation in its nuclear industry. The Convention establishes the
international legal foundation of civil liability for nuclear damage but does
not address compensation from nuclear related terrorism. [Russia Ratifies Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage," RIA
Novosti, 11 March 2005.] {Entered 8/19/05 JB}
12/22/2004: SOVIET-ORIGIN HEU REPATRIATED FROM CZECH REPUBLIC Six kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel were
successfully returned to Russia from the Czech Republic in a mission completed
on 22 December 2004. The operation was carried out by the United States, the
Czech Republic, the Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) within the framework of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative
aiming at identifying, securing, recovering and/or facilitating disposition of
vulnerable nuclear materials around the globe.[1] The HEU fuel was originally
delivered by the Soviet Union to the Soviet-designed research reactor located in Rez, north of Prague, in the 1960-1970s.[2] Because the HEU fuel has not been
irradiated, it could have been particularly attractive to terrorists seeking to
make a crude nuclear device.[3] The packaging and removal operation was
monitored by IAEA safeguards inspectors and technical experts from the U.S.
Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration.[1] The HEU fuel
was repatriated to the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Atomic
Reactors (NIIAR) in Dimitrovgrad, in the form of fuel
assemblies and powder.[2,4] NIIAR Director for Technical Issues Vladimir Kalygin
stated that the repatriated HEU will be first used for scientific purposes, and
then it will be either reprocessed or used as nuclear reactor fuel.[2,4] This is
the sixth operation involving HEU repatriation to Russia in the past two years.
The first involved the repatriation of 48 kg of Soviet-origin HEU fuel returned
from Serbia to Russia in August 2002, an operation mainly funded by the Nuclear
Threat Initiative that also received funding from the U.S. Departments of Energy
(DOE) and State.[1] In addition, DOE has funded four other HEU shipments,
accounting for 58 kg of HEU returned to Russia: from Romania (September 2003, 14
kg), Bulgaria (December 2003, 17 kg), Libya (March 2004, 17 kg), and Uzbekistan
(September 2004, 10 kg).[5, 6] Sources:
[1]
"Highly Enriched Uranium Repatriated from the Czech Republic," U.S. National
Nuclear Security Administration press release, 22 December 2004, NNSA Web Site,
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov.
[2] "Na NIIAR iz Chekhii privezli partiyu urana," Glavnyye novosti Ulyanovska,
24 December 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Mike Nartker, "HEU returned to Russia," Global Security Newswire, 23 December
2004, Nuclear Threat Initiative Web Site, http://www.nti.org.
[4] "Yadernyy podarok dlya Dimitrovgrada," Ulyanovskiy
meridian, 29 December 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[5] "Global Threat Reduction Initiative," IAEA Fact Sheet, IAEA Web Site,
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/ PDFplus/2004/cn139fact.pdf.
[6] "TC and
the Global Threat Reduction Initiative," 7 January 2005, IAEA Web Site,
http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/regionalsites/europe/news/ newsstory/default.asp?newsid=56.
{Entered 2/2/05 CC}
This file
contains
major developments related to U.S. and international cooperative threat
reduction in Russia beginning in January 2005. All other development files
related to foreign assistance have been discontinued. Archives of these
files can be found by following the links at the bottom of this page.
