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Prepared by Jill Tatko, CNS Graduate Research Assistant
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed the largest nuclear-powered submarine force in the world with approximately two-thirds of the fleet based out of the Northern Fleet. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the Northern Fleet faces a number of problems related to its aging fleet, the naval nuclear fuel cycle, decommissioning and dismantlement demands, radioactive waste and contamination, and the Russian military's severe economic problems. As a result, the solutions and a positive future for the Northern Fleet are closely linked to the political, social, and economic development of Russia.[1,2] HISTORY Construction of the Murmansk port, located on the Kola Peninsula, began in 1895 and was completed in 1899 for use by the Russian merchant fleet. The beginnings of a navy based on the Kola Peninsula were established in 1917 after the completion of the railway linking Murmansk to the rest of Russia. Because the Murmansk port is ice free year-round, it has great strategic importance, especially when coupled with its geographic proximity to the Atlantic Ocean.[1] (Click here for a map of the region). In 1933, Stalin formally established the Soviet Fleet of the Northern Seas, which was subsequently renamed the Northern Fleet in 1937. During World War II, the fleet proved important in escorting supply ships from the allied countries to Soviet Union. After World War II, the fleet began to increase in size and in the number of submarines, particularly the number of nuclear-powered submarines, which have strategic superiority over conventional diesel-powered submarines. About two-thirds of all Soviet nuclear-powered submarines have been based in the Northern Fleet. From 1950-1970, the Northern Fleet, once the smallest fleet, surpassed the other four Soviet fleets in terms of size and importance. It will most likely remain the largest fleet in the future,[1] as Russian policy has ordered downsizing of the Pacific Fleet. (Please see the Pacific Fleet section for more information). In addition to Murmansk, the Northern Fleet also includes the cities of Arkhangelsk and Severodvinsk. Arkhangelsk, located on the White Sea at the mouth of the Northern Dvina, was founded by Ivan the Terrible and established as Russia's first seaport by Peter the Great. Although it is icebound much of the year, icebreakers make the port usable. Arkhangelsk is a shipbuilding center, and the construction of nuclear submarines has been concentrated at nearby Severodvinsk. A construction shipyard with dismantlement capabilities (Sevmash) and a repair and refueling shipyard with dismantlement capabilities (Zvezdochka) are located in Severodvinsk, a city founded in 1936 by Stalin.[3] THE STATE OF THE NORTHERN FLEET The Northern Fleet's primary function is to defend Russia from the northwestern zone. In the past, the Northern Fleet participated in test launches of nuclear missiles, intelligence gathering missions, active anti-submarine warfare exercises, and wide-area patrols, and it played a greater offensive strategic role.[2] However, since 1989, there has been a 40% decrease in the number of operational vessels in the Northern Fleet and a 20% decrease in Atlantic Ocean patrolling.[1] Although reports vary, as of May 2000 the Northern Fleet had approximately 28 operational nuclear-powered submarines[14, 17] and two nuclear-powered cruisers. A total of 117 Northern Fleet nuclear-powered submarines had been withdrawn from active service by May 2001. Of this total, 43 submarines have not been defueled.[14,17] Fourteen submarines had been dismantled as of December 2000.[17,18] In the future, some or all of the nuclear submarine fleet in the Pacific may be transferred to the Northern Fleet. However, even this consolidated fleet would still make up a smaller Northern Fleet than in Soviet times. As a consequence, bases in the Northern Fleet would continue to close.[2] (Please see the Pacific Fleet Overview for more information.) According to Admiral Oleg Yerofeyev, commander-in-chief of the Northern Fleet, the decrease in the submarine forces, achieved by the removal of old and obsolete submarines, has led to an increase in the overall effectiveness of the fleet. Furthermore, according to Yerofeyev, in order to achieve the fleet's mission of strategic deterrence, it will need to organize two SSBN task forces consisting of 13 to 16 operational SSBNs. Two to three subsequent task forces, comprised of both nuclear and diesel submarines, will protect SSBNs and counter attacks from opposing SSNs. A final task force would counter aircraft carriers and attacks from land-based groups.[2] From a different standpoint, some experts think that although the Northern Fleet will decrease in size and also maintain a smaller supporting infrastructure, it will not necessarily achieve greater efficiency and strength. Problems will most likely persist in terms of manufacturing, repair, and modernization efforts.[2] TECHNICAL PROBLEMS Reactors and Facilities
A large number of naval nuclear reactors are concentrated in the Northern Fleet. The consequences of the operation and storage of this quantity of nuclear reactors results in a multitude of problems associated with the nuclear fuel cycle.[2] Each year approximately 11,000 cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste and 3,000 to 3,500 cubic meters of solid radioactive waste are generated by the Northern Fleet.[15] Approximately 25,000 spent fuel assemblies are located at Northern Fleet facilities, mostly at the Andreyeva Bay and Gremikha facilities.[2] These facilities, which were both built in the 1960s, have been filled beyond capacity since 1985. The Northern Fleet does not operate any facilities for reprocessing solid radioactive waste. A considerable amount of the existing radioactive waste in the Northern Fleet comes from repair and refueling activities, which, when coupled with modernization and dismantlement, generate four to five times more radioactive waste than routine nuclear submarine operations.[1] Moreover, the naval bases on the Kola Peninsula were built by unspecialized military personnel, who were more concerned with timely completion than with quality, safety, and durability. The construction projects themselves were not designed with consideration of public health or environmental safety. In addition, the Navy has had to adjust its submarine training regimes to make up for the loss of the training facilities at Paldiski, Estonia and Sevastopol, Ukraine.[1, 3] After a long period during which several projects to handle radioactive waste languished, construction of a liquid radioactive waste processing facility finally resumed in the late 1990s with foreign assistance. On 20 June 2001, the facility, located at Atomflot, began test operations.[22] A solid radioactive waste treatment plant may be built at Polyarnyy with foreign assistance. Transportation of Naval Fuel
Spent fuel assemblies are removed from the submarines by specially-equipped service vessels and are transported to the naval bases at Zapadnaya Litsa, Gremikha, and Severodvinsk for temporary storage. After three years, the spent fuel is shipped to Sevmorput and loaded into rail containers for processing at Mayak, because the Northern Fleet does not operate facilities for reprocessing solid waste.[5] However, a number of problems disrupt this procedure, including the lack of proper rail containers (TUK-18 containers). Until 2000, the Northern Fleet shared just 18 such containers with the Murmansk Shipping Company, which equals only four trainloads per year. As of 25 August 2000, Izhorskiye Zavody had built 12 additional containers and planned to construct 36 more under a project funded by the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) project.[19] More trains are also needed. In June 2000, the Tver Railcar Building Plant completed construction, with funding from Norway, of four railroad cars designed to transport containers with spent submarine fuel from the Northern Fleet to the Mayak Chemical Combine.[20] Increasing the ability to transport spent fuel to Mayak for reprocessing should reduce the amount of waste accumulating in the Northern Fleet. As of 2001, however, storage capacities at various facilities continued to be pushed to their limits, increasing the danger of an environmental disaster.[4] Material Protection, Control, and Accounting of Naval Fuel
The DOE MPC&A program also concentrates on the storage of fresh fuel for the nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet operated by the Murmansk Shipping Company.[7] (Please see the Icebreakers section for more information.) While the DOE MPC&A Program has not dealt with spent fuel in the Northern Fleet, it may examine the problem in the future. (See the section on Site 32, in the Pacific Fleet, for information on spent fuel MPC&A upgrades at that location.) Norway and Sweden have a partnership with Russia which addresses this issue, as well as the question of protecting against sabotage, for both the naval vessels and the civilian icebreakers.[7] (For more information please see the Foreign Assistance section.) DECOMMISSIONING AND DISMANTLEMENT DEMANDS As a result of the Soviet, over-militarized past, there are now a large number of nuclear submarines waiting to be decommissioned but with few plans, little funding, and only aging facilities available to tackle the problem. Among the numerous naval facilities based in the Northern Fleet, three facilities are directly involved in the dismantlement of nuclear submarines: the Nerpa Shipyard, Sevmash, and Zvezdochka.[6] In order to comply with the provisions of START I, decommissioned submarines are cut in half to remove their missiles. Then, the submarine halves are welded back together, and the precarious vessels float in the bay awaiting further dismantlement.[10] In the Northern Fleet, only 14 nuclear submarines have been dismantled.[17,18] Rusting hulls of nuclear submarines, which are laid up at docks, can leak radionuclides into the water. This radioactive waste has the potential to enter the food chain and result in potentially hazardous consequences for both aquatic and human populations.[11] The cost of safely maintaining one decommissioned vessel runs up to about four million rubles (approximately $641,720) per year, according to Murmansk Governor Yuriy Yevdokimov.[16] In June 1997, data suggested that no more than four nuclear submarines can be dismantled per year at a cost of some $6-10 million per vessel, depending on the type of submarine.[9] (Please see the Decommissioning and Dismantlement section for more information.) ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE Several accidents have occurred during the operation of nuclear-powered submarines in the Northern Fleet. Four Northern Fleet submarines have sunk.[2,21] Sunken submarines may spread radioactive waste, but no studies have observed significant danger. In 1996, specialists were able to stop the leakage of plutonium from the sunken Komsomolets in the Norwegian Sea, but these measures will only last for several years and have not solved the problem.[11] The history of nuclear testing and radioactive waste dumping in the area of the Northern Fleet also remains as a negative environmental legacy. Three "peaceful" underground nuclear explosions have occurred on the Kola Peninsula for mining purposes, while six have occurred in the Arkhangelsk and Komi regions.[11] Although the Navy stopped dumping liquid radioactive waste in the northern seas in 1986, large amounts of waste remain stored on vessels specially designed for dumping at sea.[4] A total of 31,534 cubic meters of solid radioactive waste with a radioactivity of 574 TBq (15,502 Ci) has been dumped in the Barents Sea and in the Kara Sea, primarily just off the eastern coast of Novaya Zemlya. This waste consisted of 6,508 containers, 17 ships, and 155 pieces of major equipment.[12] This amount equals approximately two-thirds of all the radioactive waste dumped into the oceans by the world as a whole. (Please see the Radioactive Waste section for more information.) ECONOMIC PROBLEMS Finally, one of the greatest obstacles facing the Northern Fleet is its critical economic situation. Inadequate resources force the Navy to decide where to allocate the limited amount of funds it receives. As a result, the maintenance of currently operational vessels competes against securing laid-up submarines and their nuclear materials.[13] Funding problems most directly affect the fleet's ability to keep vessels operational and complete its mission. The purchase of new equipment, the construction of new submarines, and the modernization of facilities translate into major challenges for the Northern Fleet. As evidence, a lack of storage batteries has kept ten new Northern Fleet submarines non-operational since 1995.[2] The 1996 funding level for ship repairs decreased by 10% from the 1990 funding level, and maintenance and repairs are long overdue on a fleet that is already 10-12 years old.[2] New construction of nuclear submarines has stopped at three of the four Northern Fleet shipyards,[1] and the Northern Fleet cannot afford to transport spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste to reprocessing facilities. Furthermore, the financial strains on the Northern Fleet result in unpaid electric bills. The electric company has briefly turned off the power to the naval facilities two times causing potentially hazardous situations when the cooling systems, which maintain the safety of the submarine reactors, were shut down.[10] In 1994, the Northern Fleet only received 35% of the funds it was budgeted. The funds it does receive go to pay back wages and social services, or they are significantly devalued by inflation. Moreover, wage arrears promote unrest among facility staff, which, when coupled with lax MPC&A, has the potential to produce an environment conducive to nuclear material diversion. To improve the financial situation of the Northern Fleet, the following ideas have been considered:
Some of the economic problems facing the Russian Northern Fleet may be attributed to the lack of privatization and civilian activities at nuclear facilities. The Russian Navy has maintained a hold on military-related industries by preventing the privatization of certain industries, including those related to the dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines. Subsequently, these industries are plagued by the same problems that strike the Navy.[1, 3] CONCLUSION Russia's transition from an authoritarian government and centrally-planned
economy to a democratic government and free market system has great implications
for the nuclear vessels of the Northern Fleet. The growth of the
Northern Fleet in the years leading to the end of the Cold War resulted
in the operation of almost 200 nuclear-powered submarines in the Northern
Fleet. Technical problems associated with naval reactors and the
naval fuel cycle, including inadequate storage facilities, MPC&A, and
fuel transportation, plague the Northern Fleet,
which lacks the funding to address these concerns. In addition, the
end of the Cold War signals the complex problem of decommissioning and
dismantlement of submarines, required because of the fleet's age, START
I provisions, and the Northern Fleet's financial inability to maintain
so many submarines. While the Fleet's role in protecting Russia's
security has increased, without a comprehensive plan and continued international
assistance to address these issues, the Northern Fleet risks incurring
severe security consequences and environmental degradation.
Page last updated 15 March 2002 Comments or questions? Contact Cristina Chuen at MIIS
CNS: Cristina.Chuen@miis.edu
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selling salvaged scrap metals from dismantled submarines;
