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During the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed the largest nuclear-powered submarine force in the world with approximately two-thirds of the fleet based out of the Northern Fleet. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the Northern Fleet has faced a number of problems related to its aging vessels, the naval nuclear fuel cycle, decommissioning and dismantlement demands, radioactive waste and contamination, and the Russian military's severe economic problems. Improvements in the Russian economy in recent years, largely brought about by revenues generated from the high prices of oil and gas, have led to the development of plans for military modernization. A number of these plans focus on the navy, with the building of new weapons systems and the streamlining of personnel. The world economic crisis of 2008-09 has, however, brought a number of these plans into question, a further indication that a positive future for the Northern Fleet continues to be closely linked to the political, social, and economic development of Russia itself.[1,2] HISTORY Construction of the Murmansk port, located on the Kola Peninsula, began in 1895 and was completed in 1899 for use by the Russian merchant fleet. The beginnings of a navy based on the Kola Peninsula were established in 1917 after the completion of the railway linking Murmansk to the rest of Russia. Because the Murmansk port is ice free year-round, it has great strategic importance, especially when coupled with its geographic proximity to the Atlantic Ocean.[1] (View a map of the region). In 1933, Stalin formally established the Soviet Fleet of the Northern Seas, which was subsequently renamed the Northern Fleet in 1937. During World War II, the fleet proved important in escorting supply ships from the allied countries to the Soviet Union. After World War II, the fleet began to increase in size and in the number of submarines, particularly the number of nuclear-powered submarines, which have strategic superiority over conventional diesel-powered submarines. About two-thirds of all Soviet nuclear-powered submarines have been based in the Northern Fleet. From 1950-1970, the Northern Fleet, once the smallest fleet, surpassed the other four Soviet fleets in terms of size and importance. It will most likely remain the largest fleet in the future,[1] as Russian policy has ordered downsizing of the Pacific Fleet. (Please see the Pacific Fleet section for more information). In addition to Murmansk, the Northern Fleet also includes the cities of Arkhangelsk and Severodvinsk. Arkhangelsk, located on the White Sea at the mouth of the Northern Dvina, was founded by Ivan the Terrible and established as Russia's first seaport by Peter the Great. Although it is icebound much of the year, icebreakers make the port usable. Arkhangelsk is a shipbuilding center, and the construction of nuclear submarines has been concentrated at nearby Severodvinsk. A construction shipyard with dismantlement capabilities (Sevmash) and a repair and refueling shipyard with dismantlement capabilities (Zvezdochka) are located in Severodvinsk, a city founded in 1936 by Stalin.[3] THE STATE OF THE NORTHERN FLEET The Northern Fleet's primary function is to defend Russia from the northwestern zone. In the past, the Northern Fleet participated in test launches of nuclear missiles, intelligence gathering missions, active anti-submarine warfare exercises, and wide-area patrols, and it played a greater offensive strategic role.[2] During the 1990's there had been a marked decrease in the number of operational vessels in the Northern Fleet and the rate of its patrolling in the Atlantic Ocean fell significantly. However, although the number of operational vessels has continued to fall, the Russian Navy as a whole has begun to deploy more widely in recent years. In one of the longest naval deployments since the end of the Cold War, a Northern Fleet battle group, led by the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, began a two-month deployment in February 2008 during which it spent a period in the Mediterranean. [33] Although some reports vary, by 2009 it is believed that the nucleus of the Northern Fleet comprised of six Project 667BDRM Delfin (Delta IV Class) submarines. One of these vessels, the Delta IV SSBN "Karelia", is currently being fitted out dockside and will return to service soon. [37] The fleet also comprises two Delta III and two Project 941 Akula (Typhoon Class) SSBNs. An additional Typhoon submarine remains in service as a platform for test firing the new RSM-56 Bulava missile. [32, 33, 38] Although currently undergoing sea trials, the Northern Fleet will also receive the Yuri Dolgoruky, the first of the new Borey-class of SSBNs (see modernization below), which is estimated to enter service some time during 2010-11. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS Reactors and Facilities A large number of naval nuclear reactors are concentrated in the Northern Fleet. The consequences of the operation and storage of this quantity of nuclear reactors results in a multitude of problems associated with the nuclear fuel cycle.[2] Each year approximately 11,000 cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste and 3,000 to 3,500 cubic meters of solid radioactive waste are generated by the Northern Fleet.[13] Approximately 25,000 spent fuel assemblies are located at Northern Fleet facilities, mostly at the Andreyeva Bay and Gremikha facilities.[2] These facilities, which were both built in the 1960s, have been filled beyond capacity since 1985. The Northern Fleet does not operate any facilities for reprocessing solid radioactive waste. A considerable amount of the existing radioactive waste in the Northern Fleet comes from repair and refueling activities, which, when coupled with modernization and dismantlement, generate four to five times more radioactive waste than routine nuclear submarine operations.[1] Moreover, the naval bases on the Kola Peninsula were built by unspecialized military personnel, who were more concerned with timely completion than with quality, safety, and durability. The construction projects themselves were not designed with consideration of public health or environmental safety. In addition, the Navy has had to adjust its submarine training regimes to make up for the loss of the training facilities at Paldiski, Estonia and Sevastopol, Ukraine.[1, 3] After a long period during which several projects to handle radioactive waste languished, construction of a liquid radioactive waste processing facility finally resumed in the late 1990s with foreign assistance. On 20 June 2001, the facility, located at Atomflot, began test operations.[20] A solid radioactive waste treatment plant has also been established at Polyarnyy, under the auspices of the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) project which provided financial support for the project. The facility is able to treat both civilian and military waste. [22] Transportation of Naval Fuel Fresh naval reactor fuel, enriched to between 20 to 45 percent, is shipped by rail to the Northern Fleet from the Machine Building Plant at Elektrostal. Fresh fuel is stored in five main storage facilities scattered across the Northern Fleet territory, as well as aboard support ships of the Malina class. The Imandra service ship also stores fresh fuel. The Navy uses these ships, also referred to as floating technical bases, to refuel nuclear-powered submarines. Spent fuel assemblies are removed from the submarines by specially-equipped service vessels and are transported to the naval bases at Zapadnaya Litsa, Gremikha, and Severodvinsk for temporary storage. After three years, the spent fuel is shipped to Sevmorput and loaded into rail containers for processing at Mayak, because the Northern Fleet does not operate facilities for reprocessing solid waste.[5] However, a number of problems disrupt this procedure, including the lack of proper rail containers (TUK-18 containers). Until 2000, the Northern Fleet shared just 18 such containers with the Murmansk Shipping Company, which equals only four trainloads per year. As of 25 August 2000, Izhorskiye Zavody had built 12 additional containers and planned to construct 36 more under a project funded by the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) project.[17] More trains are also needed. In June 2000, the Tver Railcar Building Plant completed construction, with funding from Norway, of four railroad cars designed to transport containers with spent submarine fuel from the Northern Fleet to the Mayak Chemical Combine.[18] Increasing the ability to transport spent fuel to Mayak for reprocessing should reduce the amount of waste accumulating in the Northern Fleet. In addition to the lack of proper rail containers, the temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at Gremikha and Andreyeva Bay is also an issue of concern. Although both Gremikha and Andreyeva previously operated pool storage facilities, these were taken out of operation in the 1980's. As a result, SNF has been held in dry storage or left in the reactors of the retired ships. The use of open-air storage, in particular, poses a grave radiation threat. Radiation levels at Gremikha are said to have fallen in recent years due to the work of SevRAO, but decontamination efforts have not been performed without sacrifice. In July 2003 twelve SevRAO employees are said to have received high radiation doses while cleaning up a storage site full of solid radioactive waste. [21] At the beginning of 2009, following a two year assessment by SevRAO into whether it was safe for transportation, Russian authorities began the process of transferring approximately 800 spent fuel assemblies and six reactor cores from the Gremikha naval base to the Atomflot facility in Murmansk. The spent fuel, which was being stored in rusty containers, had been removed from the Soviet Union's first generation of nuclear submarines. [21] After being shipped to Murmansk, the containers would await onward transportation by railway to Mayak for reprocessing. In March and June 2009 a number of spent nuclear fuel containers were shipped from Gremikha to Murmansk on board a vessel named Serebryanka, which had been specially redesigned for the purpose. [23] Material Protection, Control, and Accounting of Naval Fuel While there have previously been significant problems with the security and accounting of the Northern Fleet's nuclear material, including the theft of HEU naval fuel, the situation has been greatly improved by the United States Department of Energy's (DOE) Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Program. Under the program, Northern Fleet fresh fuel was consolidated at one facility. The DOE MPC&A Program has transferred equipment, such as fences, reinforced building materials and doors, along with access-control and intrusion-detection devices, to assist in upgrading fresh fuel security in the Northern Fleet.[8] In December 2008 the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration completed all nuclear security upgrades within the scope of the 2005 US-Russian Nuclear Security Initiative. This included security upgrades to 39 Russian Navy nuclear sites including those that act as storage facilities for nuclear warheads. [39, 40] The MPC&A program is also helping to upgrade security for some stores of irradiated HEU fuel. (For more information on US CTR funding see the Russia Naval Reactors Foreign Assistance section and the overview of CTR projects in the Russia Foreign Assistance section.) The DOE MPC&A program also concentrates on the storage of fresh fuel for the nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet operated by the Murmansk Shipping Company.[7] (Please see the Icebreakers section for more information.) While the DOE MPC&A Program has not dealt with spent fuel in the Northern Fleet, it may examine the problem in the future. (See the section on Site 32, in the Pacific Fleet, for information on spent fuel MPC&A upgrades at that location.) Norway and Sweden have a partnership with Russia which addresses this issue, as well as the question of protecting against sabotage, for both the naval vessels and the civilian icebreakers.[7] (For more information please see the Foreign Assistance section.) DECOMMISSIONING AND DISMANTLEMENT DEMANDS As a result of the Soviet Union's high levels of militarization,, Russia was faced with a large number of nuclear submarines waiting to be decommissioned but with few plans, little funding, and only aging facilities available to tackle the problem. Among the numerous naval facilities based in the Northern Fleet, three facilities are directly involved in the dismantlement of nuclear submarines: the Nerpa Shipyard, Sevmash, and Zvezdochka.[6] In order to comply with the provisions of START I, decommissioned submarines are cut in half to remove their missiles. Then, the submarine halves are welded back together, and the precarious vessels float in the bay awaiting further dismantlement.[9] In the Northern Fleet, only 14 nuclear submarines were dismantled in 2002.[15,16] By 2004 Russia still had 56 retired nuclear submarines in the Barents Sea awaiting dismantlement but this figure is said to have now dropped to 25, many of which still have their spent nuclear fuel on board. [21, 24, 30, 31] In contrast to the Pacific Fleet, the process of decommissioning the Northern Fleet's nuclear submarines is far more advanced. Nevertheless, there remains considerable work to be done in the decommissioning of nuclear service ships that were used to fuel and de-fuel submarines at sea.[21] In a move aimed at facilitating the dismantlement process, the German government provided financial assistance towards the successful construction of an on-shore storage platform in Saida Bay on the Kola Peninsula. The facility was commissioned in 2006 and is currently storing 33 reactor compartments. Floating just off-shore, in front of the facility, are several other reactor compartments from decommissioned submarines that are awaiting storage. The Saida Bay storage facility consists of a wharf for the berthing of floating docks, a repair building, as well as external infrastructure. [28] ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE Several accidents have occurred during the operation of nuclear-powered submarines in the Northern Fleet. Four Northern Fleet submarines have sunk.[2,19] Sunken submarines may spread radioactive waste, but no studies have observed significant danger. In 1996, specialists were able to stop the leakage of plutonium from the sunken Komsomolets in the Norwegian Sea, but these measures will only last for several years and have not solved the problem.[10] In August 2003 a K-159 submarine also sunk in the Barents Sea while being towed from Gremikha to the Polyarny Shipyard near Murmansk. As the submarine was loaded with spent nuclear fuel at the time of the incident there are serious concerns regarding possible radioactive contamination. [21] The history of nuclear testing and radioactive waste dumping in the area of the Northern Fleet also remains as a negative environmental legacy. Three "peaceful" underground nuclear explosions have occurred on the Kola Peninsula for mining purposes, while six have occurred in the Arkhangelsk and Komi regions.[10] Although the Navy stopped dumping liquid radioactive waste in the northern seas in 1986, large amounts of waste remain stored on vessels specially designed for dumping at sea.[4] A total of 31,534 cubic meters of solid radioactive waste with a radioactivity of 574 TBq (15,502 Ci) has been dumped in the Barents Sea and in the Kara Sea, primarily just off the eastern coast of Novaya Zemlya. This waste consisted of 6,508 containers, 17 ships, and 155 pieces of major equipment.[11] This amount equals approximately two-thirds of all the radioactive waste dumped into the oceans by the world as a whole. (Please see the Radioactive Waste section for more information.) High levels of radioactive waste are also prevalent at both of the storage areas for spent nuclear fuel in Gremikha and Andreyeva Bay. An abundance of equipment, used ion-exchange materials and storage containers are all said to have high levels of radioactive contamination. [21] Much of this is stored in open-air facilities that result in abnormal levels of atmospheric radiation. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has provided funding for the clean-up of these sites including a Euro 20 million package for the establishment of safe temporary storage for spent nuclear fuel at Andreyeva Bay until a long-term plan is developed. [41] ECONOMIC PROBLEMS Russia's Northern Fleet suffered considerably from the collapse of the Soviet Union, a predicament that reflected the economic problems of the nation as a whole. This situation has, however, improved after several years of economic growth up until 2009. Even in spite of a projected contraction in Russia's economy in 2009, a result of the world financial crisis, the annual state defense budget represented a 25% increase from the previous year. [33] A large proportion of the funds allocated to the navy will be directed towards the maintenance of strategic deterrence, which together with the defense of the sea lanes is the navy's highest priority. [42] In addition to the modernization of hardware, there are substantial plans for the reduction of naval personnel and improvements to their living conditions. A major concern in the past has been the prevalence of unpaid wages and the dangers that this creates with regards to the possible diversion of nuclear material. [33] Addressing these problems will help raise morale in what is a largely unmotivated and underpaid naval force, thereby improving the security of nuclear material. Despite the increased availability of funds in recent years, the northern fleet still has a considerable way to go in order to reverse the post-Soviet decline. The maintenance of operational vessels and the development of a new SSBN class will continue to compete against securing laid-up submarines and their nuclear materials.[12] Although a more compact, reliable and economically viable fleet of SSBNs is likely to be viewed as the most appropriate way of maintaining strategic deterrence, Russia also has grand plans for the development of carrier fleets. Projects of this nature could further drain the budget of what is already an underfunded northern fleet. MODERNIZATION In February 2007 it was announced by former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov that the Russian armed forces will embark upon a program of rearmament and modernization. It is believed that approximately one quarter of this budget will be allocated to the navy. [34] As part of the program, the Russian Navy will be provided with a new class of strategic nuclear submarines, the Project 955 or "Borey" class. The first of the new submarines, the Yuriy Dolgorukiy, is currently undergoing sea trials with the Northern Fleet and is likely to become operational in 2010-11. Two additional submarines, the Aleksandr Nevskiy and the Vladimir Monomakh, were laid down in 2006 and are due for launch in 2010. It is anticipated that they will both join the Pacific Fleet. A fourth boat is also under construction at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk and it is estimated that a total force of between six and eight vessels will be built. [27] The Borey-class SSBN displaces 19,400 tons and is designed to carry 16 Bulava-M SLBMs, a three stage solid propellant missile that has a range of approximately 9,600 km. [33] However, significant difficulties have been encountered in the testing of this new missile, with seven of twelve test firings resulting in failure. [25, 26] Financial pressure may now lead to the Bulava system being scrapped in favor of existing SLBMs should the test failures continue. [26] In addition to the new Borey Class, Sevmash shipyard is also currently building the second of a new generation of Yasen-class (Project 885) nuclear-powered attack submarines. The first of the new class, the Severodvinsk, is scheduled for launch in 2010 and commission in 2011. It is anticipated that the vessels will be equipped with eight Novator Alfa SS-N-27 surface-to-surface missiles, as well as a vertical launch system for anti-ship missiles. [29] Of particular note is the indication that the new Yasen-class could be fitted with a missile that carries low-yield nuclear weapons. [37] It is envisaged that at least six of the new vessels will be built. Ambitious plans have also been made for the introduction of several nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. [35] The only aircraft carrier that is currently serving in the Russian navy, the Admiral Kuznetsov (Orel Class), forms part of the Northern Fleet. Should the project go ahead then the initial indications are that construction will begin in 2012 and the carriers will be equipped with a fifth-generation fighter aircraft currently under development. However, budgetary constraints and the lack of a Russian shipyard believed to be capable of building the carriers may yet result in the project's cancellation. [36] It should be noted that the only shipyards in the Soviet Union that were capable of constructing aircraft carriers were located in Ukraine. CONCLUSION Russia's transition from an authoritarian government and centrally-planned economy to a democratic government and free market system has great implications for the nuclear vessels of the Northern Fleet. The growth of the Northern Fleet in the years leading to the end of the Cold War resulted in its operation of almost 200 nuclear-powered submarines. Technical problems associated with naval reactors and the naval fuel cycle, including inadequate storage facilities, MPC&A, and fuel transportation, had plagued the Northern Fleet, which lacked the funding to address these concerns. However, much needed foreign assistance and an improved Russian economy has aided the process of dismantlement and modernization. This will lead to a more compact and economically viable strategic fleet. Nevertheless, a great deal of remediation work still has to be done and the Northern Fleet will continue to be a cause for environmental and security concern. Sources:
Updated February 2010 For more recent developments, see the Northern Fleet Developments file and development sections under individual fleet facility files in the Murmansk Oblast or Arkhangelsk Oblast sections. Comments or questions? Contact Thomas Young at MIIS CNS: Thomas.Young@miis.edu
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