To return to the main
Pacific Fleet entry, see the
Pacific Fleet file
Southern edge of the Krasheninnikova Peninsula, across
Krasheninnikova Bay from Vilyuchinsk, near Petropavlovsk
Nuclear-powered submarines have operated out of
Rybachiy base since the mid-1960s. By the late 1980s, Rybachiy had become
Russia's largest nuclear submarine facility, serving as the home port to
15 Soviet SSBNs. However, a decade later (as of March 1998), this
number had dropped to nine active-duty SSBNs (all Delta IIIs), after
the withdrawal from service of three Delta Is and three Yankee
Is between 1993 and 1997.[1, 2] By 1999, the number of active SSBNs had dropped
to four, with at least one decommissioned SSBN (likely a Yankee) remaining in
Kamchatka.[6] However, the July 2000 START MOU counts 9 Delta IIIs and 1 Delta I
at Rybachiy. For more information on START numbers, see the
START I Treaty SLBM and SSBN Tables section. If
the Pavlovsk Bay nuclear submarine base in Primorye closes in accordance with a
May 2000 Russian General Staff decree, one active-duty Shchuka-class
(NATO name 'Victor-III') SSN from Pavlovsk will likely be transferred to
Kamchatka. (For more information, see the 10/13/2000
entry under Pavlovsk Bay developments.)[7]
As of 1999, the following active-duty submarines were based at
Rybachiy: four Delta III SSBNs
(K-496, K-506, K-211, and K-180, commissioned 1979-1980), six Oscar
II SSGNs (including K-119 Tambov, commissioned in 1988; K-442, probably
named Tomsk; K-456 Vilyuchinsk (ex-Kasatka); K-186
Omsk
(may
have been renamed Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy); and K-512
Georgiy
Pobedonosets (ex-Tomsk)), five Akula
Is (K-263 Delfin, K-391 Kit, K-331 Narval, K-419
Kuguar,
and K-295
Samara
(ex-Drakon)), and one Akula II (K-267 Nerpa).[3,4,5]
A worsening problem at the base is the growing number
of decommissioned and out-of-service submarines docked there.
As of December 2000, there were reportedly 17 decommissioned submarines in
Krasheninnikova Bay, of which only three had been defueled.[8] The
lack of dismantlement equipment at the
facility remains a severe problem, as does the facility's dependence on
warm weather sea links to Primorskiy Kray naval facilities for needed supplies.
Radiation does not exceed ambient levels in most of
Krasheninnikova Bay. Tests indicate that the closed part of the bay near
the Rybachiy base has very slightly elevated radiation levels of 8 Bq/kg.[8]
4/28/2001: NAVY OFFICERS CHARGED WITH THEFT OF
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
On 17 April 2001, four servicemen were arrested on the
Kamchatka Peninsula on suspicions that they were stealing non-ferrous metals
from submarines. The group included both sailors and officers.[1] On
20 April 2001, two navy officers were arrested in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy
while trying to sell items containing radioactive materials. The items were
parts of a submarine's radio-navigational equipment. According to Yuriy Sazonov,
military prosecutor of the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy garrison, the stolen
items could have come from a nuclear submarine. He also said that this is the fifth case
involving attempts by military staff to sell military property this year. The
two officers have been released to the regiment in which they serve, until the
completion of examinations of the stolen goods by the Kamchatka Oblast Environmental Committee and
the Radiation Measurement Center of the Kamchatka Directorate for Civil Defense
and Emergency Situations.[2,3,4]
2/22/2001: PLATINUM CATALYSTS STOLEN FROM AT LEAST
SIX SUBMARINES
In February 2001, the Kamchatka military court started
criminal hearings against 11 sailors charged with stealing and selling platinum
catalysts from submarine oxygen-generating respirator canisters. The 22kg
platinum catalysts contain 114.4 grams of platinum; it is virtually impossible to
separate the platinum from the alloy. The criminal group was organized by
Warrant Officer Barkulayev and included Petty Officer Soskin, Lieutenant
Captain Melenov, several sailors, and one civilian. The criminals began operations on 8 September 1999,
when Soskin stole platinum catalysts worth 69,883 rubles (about $2,700 as of 8 September 1999). Initially Soskin kept the catalysts in a safe
aboard his submarine. Burkulayev arranged to sell 200kg of catalysts for a
price of $3.50/kg. His accomplices received different sums of money ranging
from 800 rubles (about $30 as of 8 September 1999) to $160. During the investigation, inventory checks found that platinum
catalysts had been stolen from most Rybachiy submarines.
2000: TWO RYBACHIY SUBMARINES SINK AT PIER
On 18 May 2001, Anatoli Diakov, director of the Moscow Institute of Physics
and Technology's Center for Arms
Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, said that in 2000 two decommissioned submarines
in Kamchatka that were awaiting dismantlement sank at their pier.
10/18/2000 REGIONAL SPONSORSHIP OF SUBS TO CONTINUE FOR 55
YEARS
For more information on Rybachiy nuclear submarine
sponsorship, see the 10/18/2000 entry in
the General Naval Developments section.
6/14/2000: CRIMINALS ORGANIZE METALS THEFTS FROM RYBACHIY SUBMARINES
In a 14 June 2000 interview with CNS, a former submarine commander who
continues to work in Vilyuchinsk stated that criminal organizations in Kamchatka provide Rybachiy
recruits with a card listing prices and diagrams of what metals to steal from
submarines. According to the
commander, the lists indicate a great deal of knowledge about the submarines.
He believes there are quite a few successful thefts, as submarines are
often found to be missing equipment.
5/11/2000: SAMARA OBLAST
SPONSORS RYBACHIY AKULA
On 11 May 2000 Nezavisimaya gazeta announced
that Samara Oblast had committed to sponsoring an Akula-class submarine
based at Rybachiy. The attack submarine, K-295, formerly named Drakon,
was
rechristened the Samara. In a visit to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatksiy,
Samara Oblast Governor Konstantin Titov declared that the oblast will be
responsible for the submarine's financial and material well-being, and
has already provided it with office supplies. In addition, there
is a line in the Samara Oblast budget for the support of the 73 submariners
aboard Samara. For more information about regional sponsorship
of submarines, see 3/18/2000 entry
under General Naval Developments.
5/12/99: NUCLEAR SUBMARINES CONTINUE TO
SUPPLY POWER TO KAMCHATKA PENINSULA
During the early 1999 energy crisis in Kamchatka,
the reactors of several nuclear submarines were used to supply power at
the Rybachiy Nuclear Submarine Base. There were difficulties, however,
because a 5,400A current had to be sent through power lines designed for
only 1,200A. Some of the engines and equipment overheated, presenting
a constant threat of malfunction. Although submarines supplied power
to another Kamchatka town in late 1998 (see 11/11/98
entry in the Civilian Reactor Developments file) and the navy succeeded
in supplying itself with power in this case, the use of nuclear submarine
reactors is not a permanent solution. Nuclear submarine equipment
requires repair or possibly replacement after 2,000 to 3,000 hours of continuous
use. The nuclear-powered communications ship, the Ural, could
also be used to provide power to the Kamchatka Peninsula. The ship
is capable of delivering 18-20MW of electricity to shore and will be able
to supply power for approximately four more years.
5/30/97: SUB SINKS IN KAMCHATKA HARBOR
A decommissioned Charlie-class nuclear submarine sank in a harbor
on the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Russian Far East.[1] Some Russian
news agencies have speculated that the sub sank after colliding with another
submarine while en route to another pier, but local officials deny the
claim.[2] One official said that the submarine sank because corrosion
had allowed water to leak in.[1] A local emergency chief said that
the reactor core had been removed and that the compartment was sealed,
thereby preventing contamination of the water. He also said that
regular sampling of the water did not indicate any radiation leak.[2]
Page last
updated 28 August 2001
Comments or questions? Contact Cristina Chuen at MIIS
CNS:
Cristina.Chuen@miis.edu
This material is produced independently for NTI
by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has
not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers,
employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.
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