|
|||||
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
|
 |
|
|||||||||||||||||||
 |
Russia: Strategic Early Warning, Command and Control, and Missile Defense Overview
When the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991, the Russian Federation inherited considerable strategic early warning assets, along with the world's only operational anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system and an elaborate nuclear command and control system. In their entirety, these systems were comparable in scope and capabilities only to those possessed by the United States, and ensured that in the event of a nuclear crisis the Russian leadership would be provided with ample information about the unfolding situation and a variety of options regarding the use of nuclear weapons. However, this comprehensive network of mutually complementary systems rapidly began to deteriorate. Factors contributing to their deterioration include the loss of several of its components (most notably several of the Soviet Union's ground-based missile attack early warning radars) and of its support and manufacturing infrastructure, which were left on the territory of other former Soviet republics, and the protracted economic crisis of the 1990s. The resulting loss of capabilities means that in any future crisis, the Russian government would be forced to make decisions on the basis of incomplete and perhaps inaccurate information, and has raised concerns over the danger of accidental or unauthorized nuclear launches. Organization Until 1997, the ballistic missile early warning, space objects monitoring, ABM and anti-satellite (ASAT) systems were the responsibility of the Space-Missile Defense Troops (Voyska PRO i RKO), which were created as part of the Air Defense Forces in 1967 by amalgamating already existing units tasked with carrying out these missions.[1] In 1997, shortly after General Igor Sergeyev, who up to that point occupied the position of SRF's Commander in Chief, replaced General Igor Rodionov as the Minister of Defense, President Boris Yeltsin ordered the Space-Missile Defense Troops integrated with the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). The merger also included the Military Space Troops which were hitherto an independent branch of forces subordinated directly to the Ministry of Defense. In addition to simplifying the command structure, this merger was reportedly motivated by considerations of economy (the resulting merger was described as reducing the three services' share of Russia's defense budget from 19.3% to 15.5%), although there were complaints that the merger represented an attempt to redirect the merged services' budgets to fund priority SRF projects. [2] In addition to acquiring Russia's early warning systems, SRF also obtained considerably space-launch capabilities, as one of the missions of the Military Space Forces has been launching into orbit military satellites. After their transfer to the SRF, all strategic early warning and missile defense assets were grouped into the SRF's 3rd Separate Missile Defense and Missile Attack Warning Army.[3] The 1997 decision was reversed in 2000, however, by a special session of the Russian Federation Security Council in August 2000 which decided to create a separate branch of forces including the Space-Missile Defense Troops and the Military Space Forces. This process was completed by 1 June 2001. Chief of the General Staff General Anatoliy Kvashnin, the main proponent of such reform, motivated the decision by his desire to use early warning capabilities of these services in the interests of Russia's conventional forces, and not limit them solely to supporting the SRF.[4,5,6] The Soviet Missile Attack Warning System (Sistema preduprezhdeniya o raketnom napadenii, SPRN) was created over the course of several decades to provide 360-degree coverage of Soviet territory against missile launches. By 1991, SPRN was a well-developed system and included a land-based early warning radar network and a constellation of early warning satellites in high elliptical and geostationary orbits monitoring US missile fields. The two components provided complementary and comprehensive early warning capabilities, including a near-complete coverage of Soviet borders and continuous monitoring of US missile basing areas. At its peak state of development, SPRN was a comprehensive early warning system capable of providing timely and accurate early warning information in support of Soviet nuclear doctrine. In 1991, the ground-based SPRN component consisted of nine early warning stations with 19 long-range early warning radars (including radars under construction) of various age, representing several generations of development. Five of the radars were the aging Dnestr and Dnestr-M [NATO name 'Hen House'] radars that have been developed in the 1950s and 1960s, and the first examples of which were accepted into service in 1970 at Olenegorsk (Murmansk Oblast) and Skrunda (near Riga, Latvia) and in 1973 at Mishelevka (Irkutsk Oblast) and Balkhash (Kazakhstan), creating an embryonic early warning network that covered the northwestern and southeastern approaches to the USSR. In 1968 work started on developing additional early warning stations, this time using Dnepr [NATO name 'Hen House'] early warning radars, which were based on the earlier Dnestrs.[7] The actual construction of Dnepr radars was started in early 1970s, and the first station of this type was accepted into service in 1974 at Balkhash. A total of six Dnepr radars, located at Skrunda, Mukachevo (Zakarpatskaya Oblast, Ukraine), Nikolayev (Nikolayev Oblast, Ukraine), Mishelevka, and Balkhash, entered entered service by 1991.[8] These radars provided nearly complete missile warning coverage of Soviet borders.[7,8] The next generation of SPRN radars included four Daryal and Daryal-U [NATO name 'Pechora'] phased-array radars working in meter band wavelengths. Their development began in early 1970s. The first experimental Daryal station was deployed at Olenegorsk in 1974, followed by operational stations at Pechora (Komi-Permyatsk Autonomous Kray), Gabala (Azerbaijan) in 1984-85 and at Mishelevka in the early 1990s.[7,9] The final model of the Daryal radar was the Daryal-UM, which was to be deployed at Yeniseysk (Krasnoyarsk Kray), Skrunda, and Mukachevo; however, none of these stations ever became operational.[10] The never-finished Daryal-UM near Yeniseysk, in particular, became an object of contention between the United States and the Soviet Union. Since the radar was sited well in the interior of the Soviet Union it violated the 1972 ABM Treaty, which permits the construction of phased array radars only along the periphery of national territory. After failed attempts to classify the radar as a space object tracking station, in 1989 the Soviet government acknowledged that the radar violated the ABM Treaty and dismantled the station.[9,11] The most recent generation of Soviet strategic early warning radars was represented by the Volga radar working in decimeter band wavelengths, whose development began in late 1970s and which incorporated digital and solid-state processor technologies. Although initially the first Volga radar was to have been deployed at Biysk (Altay Kray), US deployment of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe resulted in moving the radar's location to Baranovichi (Belarus). Its construction was not completed before the break-up of the USSR, although it was planned for 1989. Although plans existed to create an overlapping network of Daryal and Volga radars, the fall of the Soviet Union meant they were never implemented. No construction work was done on additional planned Volga radars, which were to have been deployed at Sevastopol and Komsomolsk-na-Amure.[11] The SPRN officially became operational in 1976, when the initial network consisting of the SPRN command post and the Olenegorsk, Skrunda, Irkutsk, and Balkhash early warning stations with Dnepr radars was accepted into service.[7] In 1982 SPRN, whose ground-based radars were by then being gradually supplemented by a growing number of early warning satellites, was linked to the strategic command and control system, enhancing the Soviet leadership's ability to respond to nuclear crises and and improving its ability to implement the "launch on warning" option.[12] While the development and deployment of Dnestr, Dnepr, and Daryal-series radars progressed, the Space-Missile Defense Troops also sought to deploy over-the-horizon (OTH) radars, which would be capable of detecting US missiles immediately upon their launch, rather than only after they rose above the Soviet early warning stations' radar horizon. These efforts were not fully successful, however, and did not lead to large-scale deployment of such radars. A Duga OTH radar was test-installed at Nikolayev and performed successfully in tests against Soviet ICBMs launched from bases in the Far East and SLBMs launched from the Pacific Ocean at the Novaya Zemlya test site in the 1970s. However, after additional Duga radars were sited at Pripyat (Ukraine) and Komsomolsk-na-Amure, additional tests showed that in the conditions of near-constant disturbances in the ionosphere over the Arctic the radars would not be able to reliably detect the launches of US missiles. Although the Duga at Komsomolsk-na-Amure was accepted into service in 1982 after considerable modifications, it was eventually withdrawn from operation following a fire in 1990. The Pripyat radar was constructed in the immediate vicinity of the Chornobyl NPP and was closed down in 1986, shortly after the accident at the NPP.[7,13,14] Having reached near-complete coverage of Soviet borders by 1991, SPRN ground radar network suffered serious breaches in coverage following the fall of the Soviet Union which left many of the stations outside of Russia's national borders. The Russian government sought to rebuild the fragmented network. These efforts included the signing by CIS countries of the Agreement on Missile Warning and Space Monitoring Systems on 6 July 1992. However, only three out of nine SPRN stations remained on the territory of the Russian Federation. The early warning system's situation was further complicated by the CIS states' rejection of Russia's proposals to develop some sort of "dual-use" role for the stations and to use them in the interests of their host countries. Nearly all work on completing unfinished radars stopped.[7] The multilateral 1992 agreement was followed by bilateral negotiations between Russia and other CIS countries to further regulate the status of the early warning stations. These negotiations have had mixed results, and Russia's dependence on other CIS countries for operating ground-based early warning radars has introduced an additional element of uncertainty about the system's effectiveness. However, without the means to create a new network of radars based entirely on its own territory, Russia is left with no other option.[7,15] The results of Russia's efforts to preserve the early warning radar network varied from country to country. Although Russia and Latvia signed a lease agreement in 1994 on the Skrunda station, the agreement expired in August 1998 and the station's two Dnestr-M radars ceased operation at the end of the month and were dismantled by the end of October 1999. The unfinished Daryal-UM radar at Skrunda was dismantled even earlier, in 1995.[9,16,17] By contrast, very few problems were experienced with the government of Belarus, which agreed to lease the parcel of land containing the incomplete Volga radar near Baranovichi to Russia for 25 years. In spite of financial problems, the Russian government managed to fund the continued construction of the Volga radar, which it perceived as vitally necessary to cover the gap created by the loss of the Skrunda radars. Work on completing the Baranovichi radar progressed at a slow pace due to the need to negotiate new contracts for the delivery of some of the radar station's electronics from the Dnepropetrovsk Machine-Building Plant in Ukraine.[3,18] Despite the delays, the station was sufficiently complete to permit initial testing in 1994, and the station completed its technical tests by late 2000. It has yet to undergo state acceptance tests.[11,19] Although the SRF originally hoped to be able to put the radar site into operation in 2000, the actual date has been postponed due to inadequate funding. Some enterprises involved in the construction have not been paid for their work by the Russian government, and the radar site has already incurred a debt to local Belarusian organizations, on which it is dependent for electricity, food, and water. Officers assigned to the unit have also complained of inadequate support of their social needs.[20,21] Efforts to preserve the Nikolayev and Mukachevo stations located in Ukraine, each with a single Dnepr radar, have also been successful. The incomplete Daryal-UM radar at Mukachevo was never finished, however, and Ukraine refused to grant the stations the status of Russian military bases (this status was sought for SPRN stations in other CIS states). The stations have continued their operation and have been transferring data for the Russian early warning system; however, they are operated by Ukrainian, rather than Russian, military personnel, and Ukraine has formally refused to participate in the joint CIS air defense system.[3] In January 1995 the Russian and Ukrainian defense ministers agreed to a joint financing plan for early warning systems located in Ukraine.[22] In 1997 Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement on leasing the Mukachevo and Nikolayev early warning stations to Russia in return for supplying spare parts for the Ukrainian Air Force. The cost of the agreement was reported by Ukrainian military sources as $4 million per year. Ukraine also requested that Russia cover all the operating costs of the stations.[23] The agreement, which was signed on 28 February 1997, was ratified by the Duma on 23 December 1998 and by the Federation Council on 27 January 1999. Under the agreement, Russia is obligated to compensate Ukraine for maintaining the early warning stations, whereas Ukraine retains the responsibility for personnel-related expenses.[24,25] Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada ratified this agreement on 12 January 2001. The agreement also specifies that Russia will provide Ukraine with information from its early warning and space monitoring systems.[26,27] The status of the Gabala station with a single Daryal radar in Azerbaijan remains unresolved. In 1996 Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev declared the station to be the property of Azerbaijan, and Russia has incurred considerable debt for the energy required to operate the station. The station's radar usually operates in stand-by mode or is switched off for maintenance, and is only rarely switched on, usually to verify the location of a space object. No other station in SPRN network has been able to cover Gabala's sector, which includes the Indian Ocean.[3] In the course of negotiations, Azerbaijani authorities have maintained that the station is the property of Azerbaijan and have refused to award the station the status of a Russian military base. However, the Russian Defense Ministry has maintained that it retains control over the station's operation.[28,29] The most recent talks on Gabala's status, which took place in January 2001, also failed to bring the issue to resolution. The main point of disagreement appears to be the duration of the Gabala station's lease, with Russia reportedly wanting a 20-year lease, while the Azerbaijani government favors a lease of only five years. Proposed Russian concessions also included providing classified information to Azerbaijan on aircraft movements and assistance in repairing Azerbaijani military equipment.[30] The future of the Balkhash station with two Dnepr, one Dnestr, and one incomplete Daryal-U radar in Kazakhstan is also unclear. Although Kazakhstan has joined the common air defense system with Russia and Belarus, disagreements exist between Russia and Kazakhstan on the station's status and operation. In particular, Kazakhstan has not granted the station the status of a Russian military base.[3] Problems caused by the SPRN network's virtual dismemberment have been compounded by inadequate funds allocated for the radars' maintenance and modernization, and by their aging. Even though the SPRN network was expanding at a rapid rate in the late 1980s, with several Daryal and Volga radars brought into service or under construction, the rate of financing of the network began to fall off in the mid-1980s. The Space-Missile Defense Troops' financial situation only became worse following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the planned SPRN modernization and expansion was never implemented. The period between 1996 and 1998 was considered particularly damaging for SPRN, when Russian financing of SPRN projects was practically non-existent, and other CIS countries' willingness or ability to allocate funds for such projects was even lower than Russia's.[7] Even if sufficient funds were available, the fall of the Soviet Union left significant portions of the scientific and industrial network engaged in early warning system design and manufacture outside of Russia's borders, impairing its ability to maintain the existing radars, or to finish work on incomplete radar stations. For example, some key electronic components for the advanced Volga radar were produced only at a factory in Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, and while new components could be created within Russia, such an initiative would require considerable additional investments. Greatly diminished financing also led to a "brain drain" of scientists and engineers previously engaged in the design and construction of early warning systems, with few new qualified personnel to take their place. The average age of early warning system scientists and engineers has increased, and the aging of scientists and engineers may eventually lead to a loss of skills needed to preserve the existence of the early warning systems.[7,15] The SPRN stations' gradual obsolescence has also begun to threaten the system's effectiveness. This issue is especially relevant to the remaining older types of radars, such as the Dnepr and Dnestr-M stations.[11] Dnepr radars, in particular, exhausted their service lives in the mid-1990s, and aging has led to decreasing operational readiness and even occasional false signals.[3] By 1998, 48% of SPRN's ground systems had exhausted their nominal service lives.[39,40] Modernization of the aging radars, with the goal of extending their service life, has progressed slowly due to the low level of financing.[15] In spite of the mounting difficulties, the Space-Missile Defense Troops have dedicated considerable efforts to alleviating their worst effects. For example, the gap in coverage created by the loss of the Skrunda station was partially closed by using the radars of the Pechora early warning station and the Don-2N battle management radar of the A-135 ABM system located near Moscow, although the Don's location in Russia's interior and lower power reduce the range at which it can detect incoming missiles, and hence the warning time.[3] Measures implemented to cover the gap opened by Skrunda's closure also included adjusting orbits of SPRN early warning satellites.[31] The Russian government has also been attempting to re-create the fragmented early warning system design and production infrastructure. In 1995, the place of the now-defunct Vympel Scientific Production Association, which encompassed organizations on the territory of several Soviet republics, was taken by Vympel International Joint Stock Company which re-established ties between Russian and Belarusian enterprises.[7] SPRN's problems notwithstanding, the Russian government is already making plans for the network's future. The Russian Federation's Reconnaissance and Airspace Control System Improvement Program for 2001-2010 includes upgrades to the SPRN command network (including the introduction of microprocessor-based computers), development of new radar technologies, and modernization of existing radars. Plans for the more distant future include the construction of more compact, mobile missile attack warning radars. According to Air Force Radiotechnical Troops Chief Lieutenant General Aleksandr Shramchenko, Russia also seeks to create a dual-purpose integrated automated radar system that would serve as the first step toward creating a global air and space surveillance system.[7,11,34] At the same time, the high cost of operating ground-based early warning radars, in addition to the uncertainty over the system's future given its age and Russia's dependence on other CIS countries for keeping the radars in service, have led some to question the utility of preserving the ground system, and to argue for greater reliance on early warning satellites.[32,33] Early Warning Satellite Network Supplementing SPRN's ground-based radar network is the early warning satellite network, whose importance is heightened by the fact that, in light of Soviet Union's failure to deploy effective ground-based OTH radars, they are Russia's only early warning assets capable of detecting ballistic missiles immediately upon their launch. Non-OTH ground-based radars can detect missiles only a considerable time after their launch, reducing available reaction time. The satellite network consists of two tiers of satellites in high elliptical and geostationary orbits, which in ideal circumstances ought to provide continuous coverage by multiple satellites of US ICBM missile fields as well as likely SLBM launch areas. The effectiveness of the system relies to great extent on the number of satellites in orbit. If the high elliptical orbit satellite tier is maintained at near the full strength of nine satellites, the early warning system is able not only to spot launches but determine the missiles' trajectories and identify their intended targets as well. With only four satellites, the system can only determine that a launch has occurred but can provide no additional information, and a smaller number of satellites in orbit means gaps in coverage.[35] The same is true for the geostationary tier. The USSR reserved seven geostationary satellite slots (designated Prognoz 1-7) for use by its early warning satellites, which would have provided coverage of most US ballistic missile launch areas. Reduction of the number of satellites invariably leads to gaps in coverage.[3,36] Like the ground-based radar network, the SPRN satellite network was also deployed in stages. The Soviet Union began to develop its early warning satellites in the late 1960s, following the US deployment of a satellite early warning system. In 1973 the CPSU Central Committee and Council of Ministers adopted resolutions approving the deployment of an early warning satellite network.[7,37] The system became operational in 1978, while still short of the planned full complement of satellites. Following additional satellite launches, the system acquired full operational capability by 1982, the same year the early warning network was linked with the nuclear command and control system, significantly reducing the reaction time in the event of nuclear attack and enabling the "launch on warning" option.[37,38] In 1985 work began to expand the satellite network to provide global missile launch coverage.[7] Initially, Soviet early warning satellites were placed only in high elliptical orbits. However, starting in 1984 SPRN began to be augmented by geostationary orbit satellites. Early warning capabilities received a further boost in 1991, when the geostationary tier of SPRN satellite network started to receive so-called "second generation" satellites, 81G6 "Oko" surveillance satellites produced at the Lavochkin Scientific Production Association located in Khimki, near Moscow, which could spot missile launches against the Earth's background, in contrast to the first generation satellites which could detect missiles only against the sky background.[3,36,37,41] While the satellite network did not suffer the same problem of fragmentation that reduced the effectiveness of the ground-based radar systems, it has not been immune to problems. Like other components of the Russian military, the SPRN network has suffered from progressive aging and its numbers have declined due to Russia's inability to place new satellites into orbit. By November 1997, 68% of SPRN satellites and 48% of ground systems had exhausted their nominal service lives, and the number of satellites dropped considerably. By early 1998, only four to five satellites were still functioning instead of the optimum nine, barely enough to provide continuous coverage.[39,40] The SPRN satellite network was particularly hard hit in 1996, when not a single early warning satellite was launched. Some Russian sources have alleged that gaps in coverage sometimes last six hours at a time, rendering the satellite network nearly useless.[32] The drop in the number of geostationary satellites in orbit meant that coverage had to be limited only to North America, and there was a brief period in late 1998 when there was not a single satellite in geostationary orbit, following the premature failure of the Kosmos-2350 after only three months in orbit.[41] Although the situation has improved somewhat in the late 1990s, the satellite early warning network was still well short of its full potential. In the first half of 1999, SPRN's satellite fleet consisted of only three early warning satellites in high elliptical orbits (out of nine planned) and of only two satellites in geostationary orbit.[3] The economic crisis of the 1990s had a negative impact not only on the quantity of Russian early warning satellites, but on their quality as well. Although early warning satellites have a design service life of five years, in reality they often fail to reach this goal.[38] Five out of eight satellites produced by the Lavochkin Scientific Production Association in 1997-1998 have malfunctioned within less than two years of their launch, including the already mentioned Kosmos-2350 which malfunctioned a mere three months after it was launched into orbit in April 1998.[41] Inadequate funding in the 1990s may also have long-term consequences for the future of Russian early warning network. Research and development funding dropped sharply during the 1990s, both in absolute terms and as a share of the budget. This made it more difficult for enterprises engaged in satellite design and manufacture to retain and recruit qualified specialists.[38] These problems notwithstanding, the SRF leadership feels that the system will retain its effectiveness until at least 2003, when it hopes its financial situation will improve.[40] In spite of the network's deterioration, the SRF leadership claims that the early warning network is reliable and that the risk of false alarm is exceedingly low. There have been cases of false alarms in the past, including a July 1983 incident in which SPRN satellites issued a false alarm of a mass US ICBM launch. However, the alarm was quickly verified as false and later determined to have been caused by a software problem which caused the satellite to issue a false warning when it abruptly moved from the sun's illumination into the Earth's shadow.[37] Nevertheless, in spite of reduced funding, work on preserving and modernizing the SPRN space network is continuing at a slow pace. Future priorities include the development of a new generation of satellites, with miniaturized components, extended service lives, and lower launch costs. Plans also include the creation of a satellite network to detect submarine missile launches.[7] In addition to the SPRN network, Russia also possesses the Space Monitoring System (Sistema kontrolya kosmicheskogo prostranstva, SKKP) which is used to track and control Russian satellites, and to identify and monitor foreign space objects. Its missions include preserving the viability of the SRF's mobile ICBM force by providing information on surveillance satellites, and providing targeting inputs to Space-Missile Defense Troops' anti-satellite weapons.[15] The SKKP network was originally under the control of Military Space Troops until July 1997, when they were merged with the Strategic Rocket Forces.[40] According to recent Security Council decisions, the system will be transferred to the Air Force by 2002. SKKP, whose main command points are located near Moscow, includes a network of land-based tracking stations supplemented by a small fleet of vessels equipped with space object tracking radars. SKKP also receives space object tracking information from SPRN ground-based radars, ABM system radars, and a variety of optical-electronic and laser sensors. These include the Krona systems and the Okno optical-electronic sensor located near Nurek, Tajikistan.[40] Okno, which was placed into trial service in 1999, is used to track objects on orbits ranging from 120km to 40,000km, and its sensors are reportedly capable of tracking objects 10cm or greater at low orbits or 50cm or greater in intermediate orbits.[40] Nuclear Command and Control System Like the United States, the Soviet Union developed an elaborate command and control system which, while enabling the country's leadership to respond in a timely fashion to crisis situations, also sought to minimize the risk of accidental or unauthorized launches by centralizing command and control functions and making the system dependent on inputs from Soviet early warning systems. In a nuclear crisis situation, the nuclear command and control system would usually be activated upon the General Staff central command post's receipt of a missile attack warning message sent from the early warning system's central command post. This information, which would include data on the type and scale of attack, as well as predicted trajectories and targets of the attack, would be displayed on the Krokus system terminals used by the country's highest leadership.[42] The missile attack warning signal also activates the Kazbek communications system used for establishing communications between the highest military leaders of the country and for issuing nuclear launch orders. The Kazbek system's terminals are at the disposal of the country's commander-in-chief, minister of defense, and the chief of General Staff. Following the activation of the Kazbek system, the commander-in-chief may issue a so-called "preliminary command" bringing strategic forces to full readiness and activating the communications channels used for transmitting the launch orders and codes to nuclear forces. Launch orders apparently cannot be issued prior to the preliminary command. If the commander-in-chief is not located at one of highest-echelon command posts during the attack, he may use a portable Kazbek system terminal to transmit his directives directly to the General Staff central command post, where the actual launch order is formulated and issued to strategic forces using multiple communication channels. The command and control system was therefore structured in a way that made authorizing a nuclear strike dependent on the receipt of the missile attack warning. At the same time, the system did not preclude launching a first strike. In the absence of the missile attack warning message from the SPRN command post, the commander-in-chief and the minister of defense could authorize a missile attack warning message to be formulated directly at the General Staff central command post, without any SPRN inputs. However, this act required the participation of both the commander-in-chief and the minister of defense, reducing the possibility of a first strike being authorized by a single individual. The missile attack warning message is formed at the SPRN command post after satellite launch warnings are confirmed by ground-based SPRN radars once they have tracked attacking missiles for a specified amount of time. Since the satellites do not provide global coverage, the missile warning may be formed using information from ground-based radars alone.[43] The command and control system also incorporates a certain amount of redundancy to reduce the risk of excessive centralization, and hence vulnerability to a "decapitating" strike aimed at disabling the system. In addition to having multiple and redundant communications channels, the command and control system also had reserve and mobile command posts. Although General Staff's central command post and reserve command posts near Moscow are protected against attack, in the mid-1970s the Soviet leadership began the construction of an "absolutely protected CP" buried deep inside a mountain as further insurance against the effects of a decapitating strike. There has also existed a great deal of speculation over the possible existence of a "dead hand" strategic C3I system that would ensure the launch orders were issued even in the event of a successful "decapitating" strike aimed at Russian command and control systems. An April 1996 New York Times article cited anonymous Russian sources claiming that such a system was nearing operation at that time. There has also been speculation that the "dead hand" system would by sited in a new underground facility being built in Yamantau mountain, although Russian sources have denied this.[43,44,45,46] The nuclear command system also provides for the possibility of launching nuclear strikes without authorization by the commander-in-chief, provided a number of conditions are satisfied. These include confirmed loss of contact with the commander-in-chief and verified reports of nuclear explosions on Russian territory using seismic and other types of sensors. Moreover, nuclear strikes can be authorized only if a directive was issued by the commander-in-chief pre-delegating his launch authority. If all three conditions are satisfied, the authorization to use nuclear weapons may be issued at the General Staff's central command posts or one of the reserve command posts. Some redundancy has also been built into the communication channels. In addition to mobile land and air-based relay stations, the nuclear C3 network also includes the Perimetr missile system which may be used to transmit launch commands to the nuclear forces. The Perimetr system uses missiles based on retired ballistic missile types (the most recent variant, the Perimetr-RTs, reportedly uses missiles based on the Topol ICBM, while earlier variants used missiles based on the Pioner IRBM and UR-100 ICBM) which would be launched upon the issue of nuclear attack orders and transmit these orders during their 20-50 minute flight over ICBM basing areas. Some consideration was given to enabling the Perimetr system to operate in an automated mode. Following a missile attack warning, Perimetr missiles could be set to launch automatically after a set period of time unless they received a second message stopping the countdown. Although this mode of operation would have provided further insurance against a decapitating strike, it was not adopted due to concerns over unauthorized nuclear launches in the event it proved impossible to stop the countdown.[43] Given the short missile attack warning time, effective implementation of a "launch on warning" doctrine requires a high degree of readiness from early warning and command control systems, as well as from the strategic forces themselves. Despite considerable efforts that have gone into ensuring the system's redundancy and survivability, it is nevertheless vulnerable to degradation by enemy nuclear or precision-guided munition strikes.
Although the Russian Federation has not been involved in a nuclear crisis in the 1990s, its nuclear C3 system became the subject of international scrutiny on a number of occasions. The Russian command and control system, as well as the early warning network, were inadvertently tested on 23 January 1995 when the launch of a Black Brant XII geophysical research rocket from Norway was mistaken by the Russian early warning system for a Trident SLBM launch, in spite of the fact that proper advance notification of the rocket's launch was provided by the Norwegians. The launch was detected by the Skrunda, Olenegorsk, and Pechora stations, which alerted the Central Air and Missile Defense Command Post. Acting on that information, the General Staff raised the nuclear forces' alert level and activated the Kazbek system. However, according to Russian accounts, SPRN stations quickly ascertained that the rocket was headed toward Spitsbergen rather than Russia, and there was no risk of a nuclear attack. Foreign sources attributed the mishap to poor communication between Russia's Foreign Ministry, which received the original launch notification, and the Ministry of Defense. However, Russian sources claim that Black Brant XII uses the first stage from the retired Honest John tactical ballistic missile, giving it a considerably higher velocity than other geophysical rockets, which led the rocket's launch to being interpreted by the SPRN radars' software as a ballistic missile launch.[37] Other Russian sources ascribed the Russian military's apparent overreaction to the launch to the Air Defense Forces leadership's desire to raise the perceived importance of their branch of service on the eve of its merger with the Air Force, which was already under discussion at the time.[52] Another event that brought attention to Russia's nuclear C3 network was President Boris Yeltsin's cardiac surgery in 1996, during which the nuclear release authority was transferred to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin by presidential edict.[53] The Prime Minister would presumably also acquire this authority in the event of an unforeseen incapacitation of the President, when there would be no time to issue appropriate edicts beforehand. Russian experts generally agree that the role of early warning systems will only grow as nuclear arsenals shrink and precision-guided conventional weapons become ever more effective. Russian specialists appear to be concerned that as the Russian strategic arsenal decreases numerically, as a result of arms control treaty-mandated reductions and the aging of its missile force, it becomes more vulnerable to a counterforce strike by either nuclear or precision-guided conventional weapons. Therefore, if Russia is to retain a credible retaliatory capability, they argue, it must be able to execute a "launch-on-warning" doctrine, since a "launch-on-impact" doctrine risks exposing the Russian nuclear arsenal and its C3I assets to debilitating damage. In order to execute a "launch-on-warning" doctrine, however, the Russian leadership must have reliable and resilient command and control assets at its disposal, bolstered by a robust early warning system capable of rapid and accurate collection and dissemination of information to the decision makers. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the effectiveness of the Russian command and control system will be contingent, to a significant degree, on the effectiveness of Russia's early warning systems, which have suffered considerable deterioration over the 1990s. The fall of the Soviet Union, and the prolonged economic crisis, have created gaps in coverage and resulted in considerable aging of the entire network of early warning radars and satellites. Deterioration of the early warning system may make it very difficult for Russia to implement a "launch-on-warning" doctrine. Therefore, how Russia's early warning and command and control systems fare in the next decade will likely have an impact on Russia's strategic nuclear forces and their doctrine. Recent Russian writings, including an article in the November 2000 issue of Voyennaya mysl, provide an indication of the importance the Russian military is attaching to the preservation of robust command and control systems capable of retaining their effectiveness when subjected to widespread use of precision-guided munitions capable of destroying even hardened targets.[54] Some Russian specialists foresee a tactical role for the strategic early warning systems, which can be used to track the process of conventional air and space operations. However, in spite of their acknowledged importance, C3I system modernization programs may find themselves in competition for funds with other strategic force programs, and the doctrinal importance of survivable command and control systems may not necessarily translate into adequate funding. As of the end of 2000 the Russian Federation possessed one ABM system with 100 interceptor missiles and associated radars and command posts sited around Moscow, as permitted by the 1972 ABM Treaty. Designated A-135, this system replaced the earlier A-35M ABM system with 64 A-350 [NATO designation SH-01 'Galosh'] anti-ballistic missiles that was deployed in 1970s and withdrawn from service in 1990.[55,56] In contrast to the A-35 system, A-135 uses two types of missiles, the 53T6 [NATO designation SH-08 'Gazelle'] missile with a range of up to 80km which is optimized for endoatmpospheric intercepts, and the 51T6 [NATO designation SH-11 'Gorgon'] exoatmospheric interceptor missile with a range of up to 350km. Both missiles use nuclear warheads.[57] Altogether, the A-135 system consists of 64 exoatmospheric and 36 endoatmospheric missiles in silo launchers controlled by the Don-2N [NATO name 'Hen House'] phased-array battle management radar near Sofrino, 30km north-east of Moscow.[58] Although it represents an improvement over the earlier A-35 system, the upgraded A-135 system suffers from limited capabilities. Although it might be effective against single warheads, a multi-warhead strike would likely overwhelm the system, and there are also questions whether its sensors would not be blinded by the explosions of its own missiles' nuclear warheads. In addition, the extremely complex radar and command center electronics reportedly have a low combat readiness rate, and in the interests of safety the system's nuclear warheads were usually stored separately from the missiles. Bringing the missiles into operational readiness would require at least 12 hours, an operation that would likely be performed at early stages of a developing nuclear crisis. As a result of its low performance and extremely high operation and maintenance costs, the A-135 system has been controversial within Soviet, and later Russian, decisionmaking circles throughout its existence.[59] These factors eventually led to the deliberate lowering of the system's readiness in early 1990s. Responding to George Bush's 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiative, Soviet President Gorbachev introduced a number of reciprocal measures which included withdrawing air defense missile nuclear warheads to central storage facilities and eliminating a portion of them. These measures, which were confirmed and expanded by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1992, were also applied to the ABM system's nuclear warheads, although the missiles themselves remained in their launch silos. The Don-2N radar appears to be operational and is used for early warning and space tracking purposes, and its command and control system underwent limited upgrades in the mid-to late 1990s. These upgrades were implemented despite the severe underfinancing of the State Radio Instrument Production Scientific Research Institute, which developed the A-135 system's electronics. The A-135 system was also supplemented by S-300PMU2 [NATO designation SA-10 'Grumble'] and S-300V Favorit [NATO designation SA-12A/B 'Giant/Gladiator'] air defense systems which can be used to intercept tactical ballistic missiles.[60] In spite of these measures, the A-135 system still retains some latent capability. In November 1999 the SRF tested one of its short-range interceptor missiles in order to verify the missiles' reliability. Commenting on the test, SRF Commander General Vladimir Yakovlev stated that the SRF would extend the missiles' official service life to 12.5 years as a result of the successful test.[61] Apart from the system's missiles, its Don-2N radar possesses useful early warning and space tracking capabilities and may remain in service even if other components of the system are dismantled, which appears likely in light of the high maintenance costs and limited effectiveness in its primary role. Russian Anti-Satellite Weapons The Russian Federation may also still possess some anti-satellite (ASAT) capability which it inherited from the Soviet Union. In the late 1960s the Soviet Union developed an automated anti-satellite (ASAT) system consisting of a ground-based command center, a special launch site at the Baykonur Cosmodrome, and radar- and ground-launched infrared-guided interceptor satellites with high explosive-fragmentation warheads. The first successful test of the system took place in August 1970, and the system was officially accepted into service in 1973 under the designation IS-M. The last IS-M test took place in 1982, and in 1983 General Secretary Yuriy Andropov ordered further ASAT tests stopped.[15,38] In spite of the ASAT test moratorium, in April 1991 the Soviet government officially accepted into service the IS-MU ASAT system, an improved variant of the IS-M.[62] No additional tests of Russian ASAT system have been conducted since that time, and the status and readiness of the system are unknown. US-Russian Cooperative Efforts The deterioration of Russia's early warning systems has led to a number of US-led initiatives to alleviate the problem. These included proposals by members of the US Congress to help Russia launch its early warning satellites. However, these proposals were rejected in September 1999 by the Russian government.[63,64] The United States and Russia also cooperated on preventing the Year 2000 (Y2K) problem from interfering with Russian early warning systems.[65] The Russian-American Consultative Group on Defense issues discussed Y2K-related issues during its February 1999 conference. Russian specialists discounted the potential threat posed by Y2K to its nuclear command and control system, saying that the extent of Y2K-related damage would most likely be limited to temporary problems tracking the location and readiness status of Russian warheads.[66,67] In any event, the Y2K problem appears to have done no significant damage on Russia's early warning and command and control systems. So far the most ambitious initiative aimed at reducing risks inherent in the deterioration of the Russian early warning systems has been the US-Russian cooperation in the realm of sharing early warning system information. On 2 September 1998 Presidents Clinton and Putin signed an agreement that would enable the United States and Russia to share early warning system information, with the goal of reducing the possibility of misinterpreting a launch originating from a third-party country. The two sides also discussed the possibility of opening a joint US-Russian data exchange facility, and expanding the agreement to include other countries.[68,69] This initiative received a further boost on 4 June 2000 when Bill Clinton and Vladimir Putin signed a Memorandum of Understanding establishing a Joint Data Exchange Center. Based near Moscow, the center is to ensure "near real time" exchange of US and Russian early warning data, and will begin operations in June 2001. The center will be manned by a mixed crew of US and Russian officers and will exchange information on SLBM launches and third-country launches of ballistic missiles capable of posing a threat to either the United States or Russia.[70,71] Sources: Page last updated 24 May 2004 Comments or questions? E-mail Nikolai Sokov: nsokovATmiis.edu.
HOME | CONTACT US | SITE MAP |
|
|||||||||||||||||||
