Russia: General Nuclear Weapons Developments

To return to the main Nuclear Weapons entry, see the Nuclear Weapons Overview file.

This file includes information on developments that affect all three of the Russian strategic forces.  For information on specific developments in the ICBM/SRF, SSBN, and bomber forces please see the respective sections of the NIS Nuclear and Missile Database.  For coverage of debates concerning arms control treaties please see the Nuclear Disarmament Treaties and Agreements section.

09/18/2008 SUCCESS OF BULAVA SLBM TEST LAUNCH UNCLEAR
On 18 September, a launch of the Bulava SLBM was conducted from the Dmitriy Donskoy SSBN. Soon after the test, the Russian Defense Ministry reportedly announced that the launch "proceeded according to plan."[1] However, anonymous Ministry of Defense sources have since questioned the success of the test. According to these sources, cited in Kommersant, though all of the missile's stages performed well, a problem arose at the end of the test, when the missile bus failed to separate the warheads.[2,3] Other commentators have praised the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, Bulava's developer, for successfully resolving the technical issues that had plagued the missile during previous tests.[4]
Sources:
[1] "Bulava strategic missile successfully test-launched in Russia – defense ministry," Interfax, 18 September 2008.
[2] Aleksandra Gritskova, "Bulava ne raskalyvayetsya", Kommersant, 22 September 2008.
[3] Pavel Podvig, "Bulava test was not quite successful," Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 22 September 2008.
[4] Ilya Kedrov, "Bulava dlya Yuriya Dolgorukogo," Voenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 24 September 2008 {Entered 10/14/08 AL}

08/01/2008 SLBM TESTED FROM RYAZAN NUCLEAR SUB IN BARENTS SEA
The Russian Navy announced that a successful test launch of an SLBM was conducted on 1 August. "The missile warhead has successsfully reached the target at the Kura testing site in Kamchatka," Interfax quoted a Russian Navy official as saying. A Navy source reportedly told Interfax that the SLBM launched was neither Bulava nor Sineva.[1] Experts note that the missile, launched from the Ryazan nuclear submarine, was likely the R-29R [NATO designation 'SS-N-18'].[2]
Sources:
[1] "Ryazan nuclear submarine test fires ICBM in Barents sea-Russian navy," Interfax, 1 August 2008.
[2] Pavel Podvig, "Test launch from Ryazan submarine," Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1 August 2008.
{Entered 10/14/08 AL}

07/13/2008 SOLOVTSOV COMMENTS ON TOPOL-M REARMAMENT PLANS
The missile formation located near Vypolzovo, in Russia's Tver region, will be rearmed with the Topol-M ICBM, Commander of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces Nikolay Solovtsov stated on 13 July.[1] A total of 18 Topol [NATO designation SS-25] missile systems are currently based at Vypolzovo.[2]
Sources:
[1]"Bologoyevskoye soyedineniye RVSN perevoruzhat na novyye raketnyye kompleksy, RIA Novosti, 13 July 2008, http://rian.ru/society/20080713/113863189.html.
[2] Pavel Podvig, Strategic Rocket Forces, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 3 April 2008, http://russianforces.org/missiles.{Entered 10/14/08 AL}

05/30/2008 DEPLOYMENT OF BULAVA SLBM WILL NOT BE RUSHED
The Bulava SLBM tests will continue in 2009 and the system "will come into service after we have polished it," commander of the Russian Navy Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky was quoted as saying on 30 May 2008. "We will not put into service weapons that are not ready," noted Vysotsky.
["Bulava tests to continue in 2009," Interfax, 30 May 2008.]{Entered 10/14/08 AL}

05/15/2008 MEDVEDEV VISITS TEYKOVO STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES FORMATION
On 15 May 2008, Russia’s newly elected president Dmitriy Medvedev visited the 54th division of the Strategic Rocket Forces, located in the town of Teykovo, Ivanovo region, to inspect deployment of the Topol-M ICBM.[1] Deployment of the missile system was ongoing at the Teykovo-based missile division, which was the first Strategic Rocket Forces formation to be equipped with the Topol-M missile in December 2006.[2] In an address to the missileers, Medvedev reportedly promised to assign 25 billion rubles for permanent alert units, including the Rocket Forces.[3]
Sources:
[1] Poyezdka v Ivanovskuiu, Kostromskuiu i Yaroslavskuiu oblasti, President of Russia website, 15 May 2008.
[2] "Medvedev arrives in Teikovo where Topol-M deployment is underway," Itar-Tass, 15 May 2008.
[3] "25 billion rubles to be assigned for permanent alert units – Medvedev," Interfax, 15 May 2008.{Entered 10/14/08 AL}

05/05/2008 STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES TO CONDUCT NINE TEST LAUNCHES IN 2009
Russia plans to conduct nine test launches of ballistic missiles during 2008, Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces Nikolay Solovtsov was quoted as saying. "One of the main tasks for us in 2008 is to test new [ballistic] missile systems and to extend the service life of the existing complexes," Solovstov noted.
["Russia plans to launch 9 ballistic missiles in 2008," RIA Novosti, 5 May 2008.]{Entered 10/14/08 AL}

04/29/2008 NEW TU-160 ENTERS SERVICE
A newly assembled Tu-160 (Blackjack) strategic bomber joined the 121st long-range aviation regiment on 29 April 2008. The aircraft was manufactured at the Kazan-based KAPO imeni S.P. Gorbunova. Kommersant reported that the aircraft was one of the six bombers, which were located at the plant in different stages of assembly when Russia declared an end to serial production of the Tu-160 in 1992. The paper quoted the president of Russia’s United Aircraft Building Corporation (Obyedinyonnaya Aviastroitelnaya Korporatsiya) Aleksey Fedorov as stating that he expects KAPO’s civilian and military order to balance out at 50 percent each. Fedorov also noted that the enterprise would be involved in assembly of the new strategic bombers to fulfill Russia’s state defense order, though these aircraft are yet to be designed.
[Luiza Ignatieva, "KAPO izbavlyayetsya ot sovetskogo naslediya," Kommersant, 30 April 2008.]{Entered 10/14/08 AL}

04/28/2008 RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SUB PATROL RATES DECREASE NOTED
Russia's 11 nuclear boats conducted only three sorties in 2007, Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists wrote in a 28 April 2008 report. Kristensen argued that the decrease in the number of sorties, though its reasons are ultimately unclear, may indicate that Russia has "shifted to a new posture where it occasionally deploys an SSBN for training purposes."
[Hans M. Kristensen, "Russian nuclear missile submarine patrols decrease again," FAS Strategic Security Blog, 28 April 2008, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp.]{Entered 10/14/08 AL}

04/04/2008 FIRST BOREY CLASS SSBN TO ENTER SERVICE IN 2008
Commander of the Russian Navy Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky was quoted as saying that Russia’s first Borey class submarine, the Yuriy Dolgorukiy, will definitely be launched in 2008. The boat, currently under construction at the Sevmash shipyard, is likely to sail in July, Vysotsky stated. Commenting on the program's delays, he noted that if the launch did not take place in July, it would definitely occur in October or November.
["New Russian nuclear submarine to go to sea this year," RIA Novosti, 4 April 2008.] {Entered 10/14/08 AL}

02/27/2008 ELEVEN TOPOL-M SYSTEMS TO BE DEPLOYED IN 2008
Commander of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces Nikolai Solovtsov was quoted as saying that 11 new Topol-M ICBMs in both silo and mobile-launched versions would be deployed in the European part of Russia during 2008. The fifth missile regiment is expected to be fully rearmed with the silo-based version of the missile, while the rearmament of the sixth missile regiment is also expected to begin. Solovtsov indicated that approximately three mobile-launched Topol-M ICBMs and three or four silo-based systems are deployed annually. However, after 2009-2010, the deployment rate is likely to double, he stated.
["RVSN poluchat v 2008 godu 11 mbr 'Topol-M' mobilnogo i statsionarnogo bazirovaniya," Arms Tass, 28 February 2008.] {Entered 10/14/08 AL}

02/13/2008 SEVMASH ANNOUNCES FIRST BOREY CLASS SUB COMPLETION
The Severodvinsk-based Sevmash shipyard has announced completion of the long-anticipated Yuriy Dolgorukiy SSBN, Interfax reported on 13 February. The boat will undergo sea trials before being inducted into the Russian Navy.
["Russia launches latests nuclear submarine Yury Dolgoruky," Interfax, 13 February 2008.]{Entered 10/14/08 AL}

01/30/2008 NUCLEAR SUBMARINE SORTIES DECREASED IN 2007
In 2007, Russia's held six large-scale naval exercises, chief of the Russian Armed Force Central Department for Troops Combat Training Lt. Gen. Vladimir Shamanov was quoted as saying. However, the number of training sorties for Russia's nuclear submarines fell by 20 percent during the year due to "the technical condition" of the boats, Shamanov noted. He indicated that the age of the submarines, which in some cases exceeds 20 years, "does not allow to use the whole potential [of the boats] when it comes to combat-training exercises and combat duty."
["Submarine sorties were down 20% in 2007 due to technical reasons, general Shamanov," Interfax, 30 January 2008.]{Entered 10/14/08 AL}

12/31/2007 RUSSIA CONCLUDES YEAR WITH NEW SLBM AND ICBM TESTS, WILL NOT INCREASE TOPOL-M DEPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTION RATE IN 2008
In December 2007, the Russian military conducted two tests of the new Sineva SLBM from a Delta IV class submarine, as well as the second test of the new RS-24 land-based road-mobile strategic missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. In addition, at an early December 2007 meeting of the scientific and technical council of the Military-Industrial Commission, First Vice-Premier and former Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov rejected proposals to increase the rate of production and deployment of the Topol-M ICBM.
[For more information and a full analysis, please see: Nikolai Sokov, "Russia Tests New Strategic Weapons as Vice Premier Rejects Proposals for Increasing the Rate of Weapons Production," WMD Insights, February 2008, http://wmdinsights.com/I22/I22_RU1_RussiaTestsNew.htm.]
{Entered 10/14/08 AL}

12/26/2007 RUSSIA TESTS MODERNIZED TU-160
The Russian Air Force announced a successful test-flight of a modernized Tu-160 (Blackjack) strategic supersonic bomber -- the first such aircraft manufactured since the revival of serial production.[1] The modernized Tu-160 was originally expected to enter service in 2006.[2] After the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent economic crises, production of the Tu-160s ground to a halt. In 2007, Russian Air Force officials reportedly announced annual production targets at 1-2 aircraft with expectations to have a fleet of 30 bombers by 2025-2030.[1]

Sources:
[1] "Na KAPO im. Gorbunova ispytali novyy seriynyy TU-160," TatarInform, 6 January 2008;
[2] Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Russian nuclear forces, 2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2007, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/. {Entered 1/28/07 JQ}

12/25/2007 RUSSIA SUCCESSFULLY TESTS NEW RS-24 ICBM
On 25 December 2007, Russia successfully test-fired a new RS-24 ICBM, equipped with multiple indepenently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). All reentry vehicles were reported to have hit their designated targets on the Kura test range on the Kamchatka Peninsula, approximately 7,000 kilometers from their launch location.
[Interfax, "New RS-24 ICBM Lands on Target at Test Range in Kamchatka," Interfax, 25 December 2007.] {Entered 1/28/07 JQ}

12/17/2007 RUSSIA TESTS NEW SLBM
Russia reportedly test-fired a new SLBM from the Tula nuclear-powered submarine, located in the Barents Sea, and hit a designated area on the Kura testing ground on the Kamchatka Peninsula, according to a statement from the Russian Navy. The launch was conducted from below the sea's surface, however a spokesman declined to say which missile had been tested.
["Russia Test-fires New Intercontinental Missile," Reuters, 17 December 2007.] {Entered 1/28/07 JQ}

11/07/2007 MODIFIED "SINEVA" SLBM ENTERS SERVICE WITH RUSSIAN FLEET
Russian president Vladimir Putin has signed a decree officially accepting a heavily-modified version of the RSM-54 "Sineva" SLBM into service.
[Aleksandr Emelyanenkov, "Na vooruzheniye rossiyskogo VMF prinyat novyy raketnyy kompleks 'Sineva,'" Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 31 October 2007, in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.] {Entered 1/28/07 JQ}

7/3/2007 U.S. AND RUSSIA SET TO BEGIN TALKS TO REPLACE START I TREATY
On July 3, 2007, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov issued a joint statement that addressed the issue of replacing the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which is set to expire in December 2009. According to the statement, “The Ministers discussed development of a post-START arrangement to provide continuity and predictability regarding strategic offensive forces” and agreed to “continue these discussions with a view toward early results.” It remains to be seen whether the promise of the July 3 Joint Statement will be realized. Russian experts and some officials openly complain that the current U.S. administration seems unwilling to entertain a new treaty – a position that was reflected in Putin’s complaint last year about “stagnation” of Russia-American arms control efforts. [For more information and a full analysis, please see: Nikolai Sokov, "U.S. and Russia Set to Begin Talks to Replace START-1 Treaty," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I18/I18_R2_ReplaceSTARTI.htm.] {entered 9/6/07 JQ}

6/28/07 RUSSIA'S RECENT TEST OF NEW SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILE SUCCEEDS
The Russian Navy successfully tested its new Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile on June 28, 2007. The future of the program has been in doubt after three previous tests of the missile failed. Despite the declared success of Bulava, the most recent test is being questioned by outsiders who suspect that the test was only partially successful. {[For more information and a full analysis, please see: Nikolai Sokov, "Update: Russia's Recent Test of New Submarine-Launched Missile Succeeds," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I18/I18_R3_Update-BulavaTest.htm.] entered 9/6/07 JQ}

4/15/2007 RUSSIAN NAVY LAUNCHES FIRST BOREY-CLASS SUBMARINE, BUT BULAVA MISSILE STILL NOT READY
The Russian Navy celebrated the launching of its first strategic submarine in 17 years on April 15, 2007. The new Borey-class submarine, the Yuri Dolgoruki, is Russia's newest and most advanced strategic submarine. The vessel is set to carry the new Bulava multiple-warhead sea-launched ballistic missile. Due to delays in the missile's development, however, it is uncertain when the new ships may be armed and fully operational. [For more information and full analysis, please see: Jacob Quamme, "Russian Navy Launches First Borey-Class Submarine, but Bulava Missile Still Not Ready," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I16/I16_RU4_RussianNavy.htm.] {entered 9/6/07 JQ}

2/15/07 RUSSIA WARNS OF POSSIBLE INF TREATY WITHDRAWAL
Russian Chief of the General Staff, Yuri Baluyevski warned that Russia was considering withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. He justified such considerations based upon the development of other nations' intermediate missile capabilities and U.S. ballistic missile defense deployments in Eastern Europe. [For more information and a full analysis, please see: Nikolai Sokov, "Chief of Russia General Staff Warns of Possible Russian Withdrawal From The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty," WMD Insights,  http://www.wmdinsights.com/I13/I13_R1_ChiefofRussia.htm.] {entered 9/6/07 JQ}

1/20/2007 RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES DEBATES ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CONFERENCE
Russia's 2000 Military Doctrine, which placed emphasis on the role of Russia's nuclear weapons, needed to be updated, according to a statement by President Vladimir Putin in 2005. In January 2007, the Academy of Military Sciences held a conference to debate the role of nuclear weapons in Russia's current security environment. Based upon deliberations made at the Conference, the role of Russia's nuclear arsenal is likely to remain unchanged in the near future. [For more information and a full analysis, please see: Nikolai Sokov, "Russian Academy of Military Sciences Debates Role of Nuclear Weapons in Conference on New Military Doctrine," WMD Insights,  http://www.wmdinsights.com/I13/I13_R2_RussianAcademy.htm.] {entered 9/6/07 JQ}

12/25/2006 RUSSIAN STRATEGIC FORCES: SUCCESS AND SETBACKS AT YEAR'S END
Russia's efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces made an important advance in December 2006, with the deployment of the first road-mobile Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), but also suffered a significant disappointment when yet another test of the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) ended in failure. The slow pace of deployments of the former system and the difficulties Russia has experienced in developing the latter mean Moscow will be forced to rely on Soviet-era systems far more heavily than it had originally anticipated. [For more information and a full analysis, please see: Nikolai Sokov, "Russian Strategic Forces Meet Success and Setbacks at Year's End," WMD Insights,  http://www.wmdinsights.com/I12/I12_R3_
RussianStrategicForces.htm.] {entered 2/7/07 JQ}

9/10/2006 NEW RUSSIAN SLBMs TESTED WITH MIXED RESULTS; QUESTIONS ABOUT SEA-BASED  TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS RAISED
On 7-10 September 2006, the Russian navy conducted test firings of several submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). One such missile, the new Bulava, is widely regarded as Russia's newest and most advanced SLBM. The test ended after the missile failed, shortly after emerging from the surface. Approximately one month later, the Russian navy conducted yet another test in an apparent attempt to demonstrate that the earlier failure was not a flaw inherent in the system, but a simple glitch. The new test also ended unsuccessfully, although the missile did maintain a proper trajectory for a couple of minutes, before deviating off course and self destructing.

Also tested were an older R-29R [NATO designation SS-N-18 'Stingray'] missile and a modernized version of the R-29RM [NATO designation SS-N-23 'Skiff'] missile: the Sineva. These tests were successful. The tests included several interesting characteristics: they were conducted from the area near the North Pole, where launches of this type are considered to be particularly difficult due to the complex magnetic environment, and the missiles were not fired toward the standard missile range in Kamchatka, rather they were fired toward the Kizha range in Northwest Russia. There is some speculation that this choice was made thanks to U.S. plans to construct anti-ballistic missile defenses in Poland, but this has not been confirmed.

When Defense Minister Ivanov reported on the tests to President Putin, his statements raised questions about whether Russia is still abiding by the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI), under which the United States and Russia agreed to remove nuclear warheads from sea-launched missiles, with the exception of SLBMs on strategic submarines. In response to a question by Putin on how many nuclear submarines Russia currently has deployed, Ivanov replied "At this moment …we have eight nuclear submarines deployed. Of them, five are strategic submarines and three are multipurpose submarines, but all of them are deployed with nuclear weapons. The ships have different missions – intercontinental, that is, and multipurpose, but on board of each of them are nuclear weapons." It is unclear whether this signaled a quiet departure from the PNI agreements, or whether Ivanov, famous for inaccurate off-the-cuff remarks, had merely made an error. [For more information and a full analysis of this story, please see Nikolai Sokov and Jacob Quamme, "Russia's Newest Submarine-Launched Missile Fails in Tests, but Tests of Other Systems Succeed; Defense Minister Ivanov Raises Questions on Status of Russian Sea-Based Tactical Nuclear Weapons," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I10/I10_R1_RussiasNewestSub.htm.] {entered 2/7/07 JQ}

8/30/2006 RUSSIA CONTEMPLATES WITHDRAWAL FROM INF TREATY
Russian media reported that while meeting with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in Alaska in late August 2006, Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov mentioned the possibility of his country's withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty. The treaty bans the development, production, and deployment of missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500km.

Ivanov's comment was made in response to an attempt by Rumsfeld to convince Ivanov of the benefits of placing conventional warheads on long-range strategic missiles for use against terrorists. Ivanov responded that long-range missiles were not the only way of dealing with this threat, adding that long-range cruise missiles could be modified with conventional warheads, or even intermediate-range missiles, which "the United States and Russia cannot have ... unlike many other countries, which already have such missiles." Such sentiments are rumored to be long-held in certain Russian defense circles, and various examples of public statements by Russian defense officials confirm this. [For more information and a full analysis of this story, please see Nikolai Sokov, "Russia's military debates withdrawal from the INF treaty," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I9/I9_R1_RussianMilitary.htm.] {Entered 2/5/07 JQ}

7/1/2006 ALLEGED ILLICIT ARMS SALES VIA BELARUS TO IRAN
An article in the 14 April 2006 issue of Jane's Intelligence Digest alleges that Russia intended to sell advanced A-300P anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran via Belarus. The declared purpose of the missile transfer is to support the Joint Russia-Belarusian Air Defense Group, the purpose of which is to provide air defense from potential threats—presumably from NATO.

The report in Jane's alleged, however, that the transfer was intended covertly to supply missiles to Iran. While the Jane's report does not offer any specific evidence for the claims, rumors of such an intention have circulated for some time. Russia has also shown itself to be sensitive to international criticism of sales of similar systems to Iran, giving Russia an incentive to conduct such transactions covertly. These signals, combined with misleading statements by Iranian Commerce Minister Masud Mir-Kazemi, while in Minsk, that Iran does not rely on on foreign arms purchases (in December 2005, Russia and Iran signed an agreement under which Iran would purchase $1 billion in Russian arms, the latest in a series of agreements since the 1990s), raise questions about Russian/Belarusian A-300P transfers.

Concerns over Iranian missile activities were also underscored in a June, 4 2006 Austrian press report stating that in 2005, Austrian customs officials working in coordination with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation seized a "friction tester" bound for Iran. Such a device can be used to develop missile fuel, as it is designed to determine the amount of friction required for a solid or liquid to explode. Allegedly the friction tester was sold by a U.S. company to Germany (which could explain the reason for FBI involvement), and was then shipped to an Austrian company, which then attempted to ship it to Iran. [For more information and a full analysis, please see Sammy Salama and Gina Cabrera-Farraj, "Controversy over Alleged Belarusian Air Defense Systems and Seizure of Dual-Use Goods in Austria Turn Spotlight on Iran," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I7/I7_R1_ControversyOver.htm.]  
{Entered 2/5/07 JQ}

6/27/2006 PUTIN SEEKS TO "REPLACE" START I TREATY
At a 27 June 2006 conference of Russia's ambassadors, Putin expressed his desire to replace the START I treaty, due to expire in 2009, with one more cost-effective and efficient. In addition, Russia seeks to include in the new agreement an allowance to place multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) on the ground-based Topol-M ICBM, which is banned under the 1991 START I treaty. As two staples of the Russian nuclear strategic forces, the multi-warhead R-36M [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] and UR-100NUTTKh [SS-19 'Stiletto'], reach the end of their service lives in 2015, Moscow will find it increasingly difficult to maintain the number of strategic warheads allowed under the Moscow Treaty. For more information and a full analysis, please see Nikolai Sokov, "Putin seeks to replace START-I treaty," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I8/I8_R4_PutinSeeks.htm.]  {Entered 2/5/07 JQ}

5/10/2006: PUTIN COMMENTS ON U.S. PLANS TO DE-NUCLEARIZE SOME ICBMS
In his 10 May 2006 address to the Russian Federal Assembly, Russian President Putin gave what appeared to be the definitive Russian reaction to reported U.S. plans to place conventional explosive warheads on some Trident II (D-5) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The purpose of this initiative would be to allow U.S. military commanders the ability to strike worldwide targets within an hour of the decision to do so, without having to use nuclear weapons.

Putin's response was generally negative, largely echoing U.S. criticisms of the proposal: that a launch of a de-nuclearized SLBM could be easily misinterpreted by "one" of the nuclear powers and even responded to with a full strategic missile response. This criticism has been surprisingly muted in the Russian state press, however. Some analysts believe this could indicate that Russian officials are themselves weighing the possibility of arming their own SLBMs with conventional warheads, and are delaying full opposition to the U.S. plans until Russian analysts finish assessing the possibility of doing so. [For a complete analysis of this story, please see Nikolai Sokov, "Russia weighing US plans to put non-nuclear warheads on long-range missiles," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I6/I6_R3_RussiaWeighing.htm.]
{Entered 1/31/07 JQ}

5/1/2006: RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN OFFICIALS DENY ALLEGATIONS OF MISSING WARHEADS
Allegations that over 250 Ukrainian nuclear warheads with an estimated combined yield of 20 megatons were lost during a transfer to Russian authorities in the early 1990s have been emphatically denied by both Russian and Ukrainian officials. The allegations were part of a special report by a commission established by the Ukrainian parliament to investigate allegations of illicit arms trade.

Chief of the General Staff of Ukraine, Colonel-General Sergey Kirichenko, declared that Ukraine had delivered all nuclear warheads to Russia, and that all deliveries had been thoroughly documented and verified. Similarly, Russian Chief of the General Staff Yuriy Baluyevskiy stated that he refused to comment on the report because it "lacked any foundation whatsoever." [For more information, please see Nikolai Sokov, "Russian and Ukrainian Officials Deny New Allegations that Nuclear Warheads Were Lost in the 1990s," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I5/R4_RussiaandUkranian.htm.]
{Entered 1/24/07 JQ}

3/19/2006: DETAILS ON NEW CLASS OF RUSSIAN SUBMARINES EMERGE
On 19 March 2006, the keel was laid for the Russian navy's third Borey class submarine, suggesting that the naval leg of the strategic triad is emerging from the hiatus which it experienced during the 1990s. (At that time, the new Bark SLBM was cancelled and construction of the first Borey was placed on hold.) At the keel-laying ceremony, Admiral Vladimir Masorin provided details of the navy's intentions for the new boats. He indicated that they will be deployed in both the Northern and Pacific fleets, and that their number will be greater than four to six.

A few days prior to the keel-laying ceremony, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov was briefed on the status of Russia's newest SLBM, intended for deployment aboard Borey-class submarines. The new missile is set to carry ten nuclear warheads, and includes several design features new to Russia's SLBM arsenal, including a system that launches missiles at an angle, enabling launch without first requiring a complete stop in the water, as was the case with previous Russian/Soviet SSBNs. [For the full story on these developments, please see Nikolai Sokov,"New Details on Russian Strategic Subs Emerge, as Keel for Third Borey Class Boat is Laid," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I4/R_NewDetails.htm.]
{Entered 1/24/07 JQ}

12/16/2005: 2005 ARMS ACQUISITION PLANS NOT MET
According to independent military analyst Vladislav Shurygin, the arms acquisition plan for 2005 was not fulfilled. Specifically, he pointed out that instead of seven ICBMs the Ministry of Defense acquired only four and instead of one refurbished and one new Tu-160 heavy bombers it received none. Furthermore, the defense industry was not fully paid even for the work completed.
[Vladislav Shurygin, "Poslesloviye k rekviyemu," Zavtra, 8-14 December 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

12/5/2005: ROAD-MOBILE ICBM DEPLOYMENTS
Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Nikolay Solovtsov announced that three road-mobile Topol-M ICBMs will be deployed in 2006 at the Teykovo SRF division. By the end of 2007, six more ICBMs will be deployed at the same division, completing a full regiment of nine road-mobile ICBMs.
["V RVSN v 2006 godu na vooruzheniye postupyat tri mobilnykh kompleksa 'Topol-M'," Interfax-AVN, 5 December 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

12/1/2005: 2006 DEFENSE BUDGET
A meeting of the Military-Industrial Commission chaired by Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov finalized the distribution of funds within the defense budget for 2006. The budget includes, among other items, the purchase of six Topol-M ICBMs and one refurbished Tu-160 heavy bomber. According to Kommersant, the prospects for the 2006 acquisitions program appear questionable, since in 2005 only four Topol-M ICBMs were purchased instead of the six that were originally planned, while the refurbishment of one Tu-160 heavy bomber, originally planned for 2005 as well, was not completed. (CNS note: The 2005 acquisitions plan may have been considered fulfilled if missiles used for test launches were counted.)
[Ivan Safronov and Petr Netreba, "Mikhail Fradkov raspredelil oboronnyy zakaz," Kommersant, 1 December 2005.]{Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/29/2005: TOPOL ICBM TESTED
On 29 November 2005, the SRF conducted a test launch of a Topol [NATO designation SS-25 'Sickle'] ICBM from the Plesetsk test range; the impact area was the Kura test range in Kamchatka. The missile used in the launch was 20 years old and the declared purpose of the exercise was to verify that missiles of this age could still perform according to specifications (the original life of ten years has been extended several times).
Sources:
[1] "S kosmodroma Plesetsk zapustili 20-letnuyu raketu," Strana.Ru, 29 November 2005.
[2] "Raketa 'Topol' porazila tseli na Kamchatke," Strana.Ru, 29 November 2005. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/25/2005: SERVICE LIFE OF SS-18 ICBMS TO BE EXTENDED
According to deputy chief of the SRF Gen-Lt. Vitaliy Linnik, the service life of RS-20 'Voyevoda' [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] ICBMs will be extended for another 10-15 years. He noted that these missiles were introduced into service gradually over a long period of time, and consequently they will also be withdrawn from service gradually. Life extension of SS-18s, he remarked, was limited by certain technical problems, which could only be resolved by their producer--the Yuzhmash enterprises in Ukraine (currently called Pivdenmash). An intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in extending service lives of SS-18s is ready for signature, he said.
["Srok sluzhby raket RS-20 'Voyevoda' budet prodlen," Strana.Ru, 25 November 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/25/2005: DELTA IV SSBN TO GET LIFE EXTENSION SERVICE
The Ryazan SSBN, a 667BDRM Delfin [NATO name Delta IV] class ballistic missile submarine, is set to undergo a refit and repairs to extend its service life. The work will be performed at the Zvezdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk.
["Delta IV 'Ryazan' to get service lifetime extension," Bellona Foundation, http://www/bellona.no, 25 November 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/22/2005: ARMS MODERNIZATION DELAYS
Arms modernization goals planned for 2005 have not been met. For example, the Russian Air Force did not receive a modernized Tu-160 heavy bomber, which was supposed to be re-equipped to carry gravity bombs, among other new features (work will only be completed in 2006); the armed forces did not receive the new S-400 Triumph missile defense complex; funding for the new SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy is apparently also delayed. Rising weapons prices as well as the failure (by the Ministry of Finance) to transfer all funds allocated under the budget are reportedly to blame for this state of affairs.
[Nikita Petrov, "Ivanov nachnet s tankov," Strana.ru, 22 November 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/18/2005: RUSSIAN SATELLITE SYSTEM IN CRISIS
Speaking at a roundtable held at the Federation Council, Deputy Chief of the Space Forces General Oleg Gromov admitted that only one Russian surveillance satellite is able to monitor the United States while 12-13 U.S. satellites are focused on Russia. Existing naval communication satellites ('Molniya 1-T,' 'Molniya-3,' and 'Parus') need to be replaced with the 'Meridian,' new-generation satellite, but this would require a significant increase in funding. The early warning system can no longer be restored, he added, even if additional outdated 71X6 and 73D6 satellites are launched. Currently there are three early warning satellites in orbit while no fewer than eight are needed.

Deputy Chief of the Air Force Colonel General Aleksandr Zelin disclosed that the Russian Air Force, including the Strategic Air Force, is forced to use the U.S. GPS system because the similar Russian GLONASS system includes only 14 satellites while 24 are needed. Overall, Russia maintains 96 satellites while the United States has 415 satellites in orbit. Of the 96 Russian satellites, 62 are already beyond warranty periods, including 33 military and 29 civilian or dual-purpose satellites, according to Federal Space Agency chief Anatoliy Perminov. Russia spends only $0.8 billion on these activities. The federal space program plans to spend 315 billion rubles through 2015, but according to Perminov this is not enough to address the deficiencies.

The former head of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency and current director of the defense-industrial department of the Ministry of Industry and  Energy (Minpromenergo) stated that in the next decade several enterprises critical for the production of strategic missiles will be unable to function. Plans that would ensure production of solid rocket fuel currently are being fulfilled at the level of 34% while defense enterprises altogether operate at about 30% capacity. The defense industrial complex, he declared, is only surviving thanks to its inheritance from the Soviet era and will not be able to support new technologies and needs when this inheritance has been exhausted.
[Viktor Myasnikov, "Orbitalnaya gruppirovka dyshit na ladan," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 18 November 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/17/2005: RUSSIA TO TRANSFER ALL MILITARY MISSILE LAUNCHES TO PLESETSK
The Russian government has decided that the Ministry of Defense can transfer all defense-related launches from Baikonur, a launch complex in Kazakhstan, to Plesetsk in northern Russia. The transfer will cost 27 billion rubles (nearly $935 million as of 17 november 2005) and 2,500 people are expected to lose their jobs. All elements at Baikonur that are currently controlled by the military will be transferred to civilian jurisdiction; the transfer will be completed in 2008. Plans call for the military use of Baikonur beyond 2008 to be limited to test launches of ballistic missiles. Similiarly, Russia plans to terminate the use of the new space launch center Svobodnyy, in the Russian Far East, which was formally established in 1993 but has not been used much. Svobodnyy will be closed after the currently planned launches from that site are completed; no new launches will be scheduled there.

Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov stated that in 2006-10 the military plans to establish infrastructure at Plesetsk to launch military satellites using 'Soyuz-2' space launch vehicles, and in 2011-2015, 'Angara' space launch vehicles. [Alina Chernoyvanova, "Voyennyye ukhodyat s Baikonura," Gazeta.Ru, 17 November 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/11/2005: PROBLEMS PRODUCING NEW ICBMS
According to Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, subcontractors that can be as much as four times removed from the final assembly of strategic missiles are creating production difficulties. According to the former chief of staff of the SRF Viktor Yesin, almost all of these subcontracting enterprises are unique:  their products cannot be acquired elsewhere. Their share in the Topol-M ICBM, for example, could be as low as 1-2%, but their contribution is indispensable. Low funding levels and the low production level of Topol-M means that these firms can at times remain idle for as much as ten months of the year. Consequently their costs are extremely high and state funding is not enough to cover these costs.
[Viktor Myasnikov, "Borba za dengi oboronzakaza obostryayetsya," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 11 November 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/9/2005: ARMS PURCHASE PLANS
According to Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov, in 2006 the Russian Armed Forces will purchase six strategic missiles, six space vehicles and 12 space launch vehicles.
["Minoborony za uvelicheniye finansirovaniya Gosoboronzakaza," Strana.ru, 9 November 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/9/2005: SERGEY IVANOV POLICY STATEMENT
Speaking at an annual meeting of the top leaders of the Russian Armed Forces, Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov made a number of important policy statements, although the overall tone was more down-to-earth and practical than earlier statements where he put strategy and doctrine at center stage. Ivanov said that a stable trend toward greater reliance on military force is evident in today's world, attributing it to a greater variety of threats to international and national security. Therefore, he declared that "the Ministry of Defense advocates the implementation of the principle of preventive action in the steps toward ensuring the defense and security of the country." By preventive action, he said, the military leadership means not only preventive strikes against terrorists and their bases, but "other actions of a preventive nature that seek to prevent the emergence of various threats before extreme measures become necessary to neutralize them." It seemed unlikely, however, that his statement implied reliance on nuclear weapons for these preventive operations. Rather, Ivanov probably meant enhancing the conventional capability of the Russian armed forces, including the much-touted introduction of conventional long-range high-precision air-launched cruise missiles. Nevertheless, in listing Armed Forces priorities he first named "the maintenance of the capability of nuclear deterrence forces and the enhancement of units of permanent high readiness." Although this statement does not necessarily indicate that Russia intends to rely on nuclear weapons in a broader range of scenarios than previously foreseen, Ivanov apparently sought to indicate that the threats and challenges to Russia's security that do require reliance on nuclear weapons had become more important.
Sources:
[1] Statement of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation S.B. Ivanov at a Conference of the Leadership of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 9 November 2005 (Ministry of Defense Website,  http://www.mil.ru/releases/2005/11/091300_11338.shtml).
[2] Vitaliy Shlykov, "O polze generalskikh somneniy," Izvestiya, 14 November 2005.
[3] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Gosoboronpokaz," Izvestiya, 9 November 2005.
[4] "Reabilitatsiya sapog," Gazeta.Ru, 9 November 2005.
[5] Nikita Petrov, "Armiya gotova demonstrirovat silu," Strana.Ru, 9 November 2005. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/1/2005: DEFENSE-PENETRATING MANEUVERABLE WARHEAD TESTED
On 1 November 2005, the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) conducted a flight-test of a road-mobile Topol-M ICBM with a maneuverable warhead known as Igla. Igla can travel at the speed of Mach 6 (six times the speed of sound), with service engines switching on and off randomly, making its flight unpredictable. Also, Igla reportedly utilizes "stealth" technology—a special coating that makes it "invisible" to thermal or electromagnetic detection. These features are intended to give it the capability to penetrate any existing or foreseeable missile defense system.[1-6] The first, partial test of the warhead was conducted in 1999 and another, unconfirmed, test in 2001. The first widely publicized test of Igla was held in February 2004 from an earlier version of that missile, 'Topol' (see the CNS Research Story "Military Exercises in Russia: Naval Deterrence Failures Compensated By Strategic Rocket Success").

Kommersant-Daily reported that the test used the new road-mobile version of the Topol-M ICBM[3], while other sources suggested that the missile used was Topol (SS-25), the earlier type of single-warhead road-mobile ICBM.[6] Unofficial investigations by journalists later led to questions as to whether this information was based on hard evidence.[8] It has remained unclear whether the test utilized Topol-M or Topol.  U.S. sources have mentioned the use of Topol-M.[8, 9] There has also been unconfirmed information that the missile used during that test carried more than one warhead.[8,10]

In a departure from standard procedure, the missile was launched from a test range at Kapustin Yar in Astrakhan region (instead of from Plesetsk in northern Russia) to the 10^th test range at lake Balkhash (a.k.a. Priozersk) in Kazakhstan (instead of Kura in Kamchatka). Reportedly, the unusual trajectory was designed to deny the United States an opportunity to observe the new warhead.[1-6]
Sources:
[1] "S poligona Kapustin Yar osushchestvlen pusk ballisticheskoy rakety," Strana.ru, http://www.strana.ru/263867.html, 1 November 2005.
[2] "Moskva ispytala assimetrichnyy otvet," Kommersant-Daily, 2 November 2005.
[3] "Minoborony: Topol-M smozhet preodolet protivoraketnuyu oboronu SShA," Grani.ru, http://www.grani.ru/Politics/World/US/RF/p.97576.html, 2 November 2005.
[4] Olga Bozhyeva, "Topolinyy pukh-pakh," Moskovskii komsomolets, 3 November 2005.
[5] "Tem vremenem v Rossii…" Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 November 2005.
[6] "Ballisticheskaya raketa 'Topol' porazila tsel," Vesti.ru, 11 November 2005.
[7] See exchange on RPF (Russian Submarine Fleet) forum at http://nvs.rpf.ru/nvs/forum/archive/66/66646.htm and subsequent postings.
[8] "U.S. Analyzes New Russian Warhead," Global Security Newswire, 22 November 2005.
[9] Bill Gertz, "Russian Warhead Alters Course Midflight in Test," Washington Times, 21 November 2005.
[10] Nikita Petrov, "Armiya gotova demonstrirovat silu," Strana.ru, 9 November 2005. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

10/28/2005: NEW TOPOL-M REGIMENT TO ENTER SERVICE IN 2005
According to Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov, the fifth regiment of silo-based Topol-M ICBMs will enter service by the end of 2005 at the Tatishchevo SRF division (four regiments of Topol-Ms already deployed are part of that division).
["Kto uslyshit veteranov?" Krasnaya zvezda, 28 October 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

10/28/2005: MIRVing OF RUSSIAN ICBMs ANNOUNCED
Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov disclosed plans to MIRV at least some of Russia's single-warhead Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27] ICBMs, as well as other important elements of the future Russian strategic posture. He said that deployment of road-mobile Topol-Ms will begin in 2006 with the transfer of the first wing ("divizion") of three launchers to the 54th division in Teykovo (Ivanov oblast). Beginning in 2007, up to nine Topol-Ms will be deployed each year. (Nine launchers is the standard size of a regiment of road-mobile Topol ICBMs.) If these plans succeed, the rate of replacement of old, Soviet-era ICBMs will increase substantially (the current deployment rate of silo-based Topol-Ms is four per year).

Solovtsov also stated that the Igla maneuverable warhead will be deployed both on Topol-Ms and on the future Bulava SLBM, whose first flight test was conducted in September 2005. Until this statement it remained unclear how widespread Igla would become. It now appears that Russia intends to make the ability to penetrate missile defenses a high priority.  He failed to specify, however, whether all ballistic missiles of new types will be equipped with the maneuverable warhead. Igla is bigger and heavier than an ordinary warhead and, consequently, Bulava, which is widely reported as intended to carry ten warheads, might be unable to carry the same number of Igla’s.

Solovtsov also disclosed for the first time that the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which designed both Topol-M and Bulava, was working on MIRVing Topol-M, putting an end to years of speculation about possible MIRVing of Topol-Ms. He did not specify, however, whether all Topol-M ICBMs will be MIRVed or only some of them. Previously there has been speculation that only silo-based missiles will carry more than one warhead.
Sources:
[1] "Topol-M vsekh silney," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 October 2005.
[2] James Hackett, "Dodgy Russian Warhead," Washington Times, 14 November 2005, p. 18. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

10/4/2005: TESTING OF CONVENTIONAL AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE COMPLETED
In late August 2005, the Russian military conducted the final test of the Kh-555 conventionally armed air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), which is supposed to usher in production and deployment of that precision-guided weapon for long-range bombers. The new ALCM is supposed to reinvigorate Tu-160 heavy bombers, whose role had been previously limited to nuclear-armed ALCMs, which have a relatively small role in today's world. Igor Seleznev, the chief designer of the Raduga design bureau, which created Kh-555, said that the new weapon was effectively designed from the scratch, although it used the existing nuclear-armed Kh-55 as a starting point. According to Seleznev, Kh-555 features a new engine, new guidance system (using both its own data as well as data obtained from the GLONASS satellite positioning system), new warhead, additional fuel tanks (which helped to increase its range to 3,500 km), and greater throwweight (350kg instead of Kh-55's 130kg). The August flight tests included four Kh-555 launched from a Tu-160 heavy bomber, which hit two windows and two doors of a house at a test range where, according to the exercise scenario, "terrorists" were hiding. Kh-555 is reportedly the second program that has been successfully completed by the Tactical Missile Armaments Corporation, of which Raduga is a part. The previous one was the Kh-35 land-based anti-ship missile for the Bal missile complex.
[Dmitriy Litovkin, "Strategicheskiye avianostsy perevooruzhilis," Izvestiya, 4 October 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

9/27/2005: FIRST FLIGHT TEST OF NEW BULAVA SLBM
On 27 September 2005 Russia conducted the first flight test of the new Bulava SLBM. The test was conducted from the Dmitriy Donskoy, a Project 941 Akula [NATO name 'Typhoon'] SSBN, from the White Sea. After a 30-minute flight the warhead landed on the Kura test range in Kamchatka. This launch has opened a program of flight tests that will continue until 2007. According to Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral Vladimir Masorin, SSBNs armed with Bulava missiles will enter service in 2007. The missile will be deployed on two submarines: Dmitriy Donskoy, which has been converted for the new missile, and the newly built Yuriy Dolgorukiy, a Project 955 Borey SSBN that will be commissioned in 2007. Bulava can carry no fewer than 10 warheads, and has a range of 8,000km. The next flight test of Bulava is scheduled for December 2005, according to Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology chief designer Yuriy Solomonov.
Sources:
[1] Ivan Safronov, "'Bulava' uletela na Kamchatku," Kommersant,28 September 2005.
[2] Yevgeniy Ustinov and Roman Fomishenko, "Novyye kalibry 'Astrakhani'," Krasnaya zvezda, 17 November 2005.
[3] "Rossiya v dekabre provedet vtoroy pusk ballisticheskoy rakety 'Bulava-M'," RIA-Novosti, 12 December 2005.{Entered 12/20/05 NS}

9/26/2005: LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES AT TEYKOVO SRF DIVISION
The Teykovo division of road-mobile Topol [NATO designation SS-25] ICBMs conducted large-scale exercises under the oversight of Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Nikolay Solovtsov. The scenario envisaged deployment of mobile ICBMs under conditions of a dual enemy attack involving strikes by enemy aircraft and a simulated attack by terrorists (special forces of the Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, GRU, played the latter role). Despite of the loss of some command, control and communications structures, the division was able to deploy at short notice following a warning of a nuclear attack and simulate the launch of its ICBMs. The Teykovo division is scheduled to receive the new road-mobile Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27] ICBMs in 2006.
Sources:
[1] Dmitriy Litovkin, "V Ivanovskoy oblasti proshli krupnomasshtabnyye komandno-shtabnyye ucheniya," Izvestiya, 27 September 2005.
[2] Aleksandr Tikhonov, "Vykhodili v polya 'Topolya'," Krasnaya zvezda, 7 October 2005. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

8/29/2005: TOPOL-M ICBM DEPLOYMENT PLANS
Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov announced that the first road-mobile Topol-M ICBMs will be deployed in 2006. According to Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, Russia will have two or three divisions of road-mobile Topol-Ms by 2012.
[Viktor Alekseyev, "'Topol' podsadili na kolesa," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 2 August 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

8/12/2005: SS-19 ICBM PROSPECTS DETAILED
According to Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Nikolay Solovtsov, the very high reliability of RS-18 [NATO designation SS-19] ICBMs, which was part of the missiles' original design, has already made it possible to retain them for 25 years, which is far beyond the original warranty period. In the future, currently deployed missiles will be replaced by similar ones taken out of so-called "dry storage" (that is, unfueled). Consequently, SS-19 ICBMs are likely to remain in service until the late 2020s-early 2030s.
[Vadim Koval, "Mishch derzhavy ne issyakla," Krasnaya zvezda, 12 August 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

7/13/2005: TATISHCHEVO SRF DIVISION PASSES INSPECTION
An unannounced inspection of the Tatishchevo division of the Strategic Rocket Forces assessed its combat readiness as "good," announced Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Nikolay Solovtsov. The division has silo-based Topol-M ICBMs.
["Sostoyaniye Tatishchevskogo raketnogo soyedineniya otseneno na 'khorosho'," RIA-Novosti, 11 July 2005. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

5/26/2005: RUSSIA TESTS PRECISION-GUIDED CONVENTIONAL ALCM
Deputy chief of the Armed Forces Armaments Department Lieutenant General Aleksandr Rakhmanov announced that Russia had recently tested a precision-guided conventional air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) Kh-555, which "hit a window" from the distance of 2,000km. He explained that Kh-555 was a "modernization of an old missile using all new technologies."
["V RF ispytana vysokotochnaya raketa bolshoy dalnosti," Strana.Ru, 26 May 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

5/11/2005: DETAILS ON NEW SLBM TESTING
Chief of the Central Naval Test Range Rear Admiral Vitaliy Fedorin disclosed that the program for testing the new Bulava SLBM has been considerably shortened compared to Soviet practice due to the introduction of more intense computer simulations, which made it possible to skip the traditional phase of testing the new missile from a land-based launcher. The second- and third-generation SLBMs, he said, were first tested 15-18 times from a land-based launcher, but Bulava skipped that phase and designers went straight to "throw launches" from a submarine (the throw launch involves a launch of a simulator, which duplicates the dimensions, weight, and balance of the missile). This made it possible to save about three years and considerable funds.
[Mikhail Truliyev, "V interesakh triady," Voyenno-promyshlennyi kuryer, 11-17 May 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

5/5/2005: REDUCTION OF RUSSIAN ICBMs DETAILED
Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov stated that Russia planned to eliminate one or two missile divisions each year for the next five years. Five destruction facilities have been established for the elimination of ICBMs and mobile ICBM launchers. He also mentioned that 18 silos have been mothballed instead of eliminated to be used in the future for deployment of new types of ICBMs. Some heavy RS-20 [NATO designation SS-18] ICBMs have been stored for use as space-launch vehicles. A special launch center in Orenburg oblast will be built for this purpose to replace Baikonur in Kazakhstan. Overall, SS-18s will remain in service until 2014-2016 or even longer. He also mentioned that, in principle, it would be possible to produce heavy ICBMs in Russia, but did not think it likely.
Sources:
"Yadernyy shchit usokhnet v tri raza," Gazeta.ru, 5 May 2005.
Aleksandr Babakin, "Sekvestr yadernykh arsenalov," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 13 May 2005.
Nikolay Poroskov, "V god budem sokrashchat po odnoy-dve divizii," Vremya novostey, 6 May 2005. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

4/29/2005: SUBMARINES WITH BULAVA SLBMs TO BE DEPLOYED IN 2006
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov announced  that two SSBNs, Dmitriy Donskoy and Yuriy Dolgorukiy, armed with the new Bulava SLBM, will enter service by the end of 2006. In accordance with a three-year testing program, he said, the navy conducted the firsts tests of Bulava in 2004 and planned to hold the first flight tests in 2005; test launches will be continued in 2006. It has not been decided yet in which fleet the two new SSBNs will serve. Dmitriy Donskoy is a Project 941 Akula [NATO name 'Typhoon') submarine, which has been remodeled to carry the new SLBM. Yuriy Dolgorukiy belongs to the new Borey class designed to carry Bulava.
[Andrey Garavskiy, "Kogda udarit 'Bulava'?" Krasnaya zvezda, 29 April 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

4/15/2005: ICBM ELIMINATION PLANS FOR 2005
According to Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Lieutenant General Vitaliy Linnik, the withdrawal of RS-22 [NATO designation SS-24] rail-mobile ICBMs from combat duty will be completed in 2005. Elimination of the missile system began in 2002; by 2005 14 rail launchers had been dismantled at an SRF central maintenance facility in Bryansk. Elimination of launchers and missiles will be completed in 2006. Both the Kostroma division of rail-mobile ICBMs and the Kartaly base of heavy RS-20 [SS-18] ICBMs will be eliminated in 2005. Nevertheless, heavy ICBMs will remain in service for another 10-15 years. Work on technical solutions to the problem of extending their warranty periods began in 2004.
[Aleksandr Babakin, "'Topoli' sokhnut na kornyu," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 15 April 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

3/25/2005: TOPOL-M DEPLOYMENT PLANS
Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov announced that serial production of the road-mobile ICBM Topol-M would begin in 2005 and its full-scale deployment in 2006. He noted, however, that funding problems continued and could possibly cause difficulties for this process.
[Anatoliy Solntsev, "Net pregrady 'Topolyam'," Krasnaya zvezda, 22 March 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

3/20/2005: HEAVY BOMBERS LAUNCH ALCMs
During Long-Range Air Force exercises, two Tu-95MS and one Tu-160 heavy bombers conducted launches of air-to-surface missiles. The launches were conducted at the Pem-Bay test range in northern Russia.
["Rossiiskiye 'strategi' proveli uspeshnyye puski raket," Strana.ru, 29 March 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

3/19/2005: RUSSIAN NAVY LOOKING FORWARD TO A NEW SSBN IN 2006
In 2005, a new strategic submarine is scheduled to begin sea trials. The submarine, Yuriy Dolgorukiy, belongs to a new class, designated Borey, and was built at the Sevmash Shipyard in Severodvinsk. Another submarine of the same class, Aleksandr Nevskiy, is being built at the same shipyard; a third submarine is still in the planning stages. The urgent need for new SSBNs is dictated by the rapid  deterioration of the existing force: of 27 SSBNs, only 13 remain in service, according to official naval estimates--10 Project 667BDRM Delfin and 667BDR Kalmar [NATO names Delta IV and III] submarines and three Project 941 Akula [NATO name 'Typhoon'] vessels (according to unofficial assessments, only one Typhoon is actually in service with just ten SLBMs instead of the standard 20). The deterioration of the existing SSBN force was demonstrated during large-scale exercises in February 2004, when two consecutive missile launches from Delfin submarines failed. Although the keel of Yuriy Dolgorukiy was laid in the mid-1990s, construction did not begin in earnest until 2000: the SLBM that had been previously intended for the submarine was canceled following several unsuccessful flight tests. In 1998, the contract for a new SLBM was given to the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which came up with a solid-fuel SLBM known as Bulava  (funding for the new missile, however, began only in 2000). Yuriy Dolgorukiy was subsequently redesigned to carry a new missile that was twice as light as the previous one. In 2006, Bulava is expected to enter production. According to the chief of the shipbuilding department of the navy, Rear Admiral Vladimir Shlemov, in 2004 Sevmash fulfilled all planned work, 85% of which was paid for by the state. In 2005 the amount of work is expected to increase 1.3 times and funding 1.6 times.
Sources:
"V 2005 godu VMF poluchit dve noveyshiye strategicheskiye submariny," Lenta.ru, 29 January 2005.
Aleksandr Goltz, "Budet li 'Bulava' u 'Yuriya Dolgorukogo'," Novaya gazeta, 4 February 2005.
"Stroitsya atomnyy otvet SShA," Gazeta.ru, 19 March 2005.
"VMF Rossii poluchit unikalnyy podarok," Strana.ru, 19 March 2005. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

3/17/2005: DMITRIY DONSKOY SSBN TO RETURN TO SERVICE IN 2005
The Dmitriy Donskoy, lead boat in the Project 941 Akula [NATO name 'Typhoon'] class, will return into service in 2005 after a 10-year overhaul. Dmitriy Donskoy is intended to serve as a platform for testing the prospective submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) Bulava.
["APL 'Dmitriy Donskoy' vernetsya v stroy v 2005 godu," Strana.ru, 17 March 2005. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

2/11/2005: HEAVY ICBM TEST LAUNCH
According to media reports, in December 2004 the Strategic Rocket Forces conducted the first launch of the heavy RS-20 [NATO designation SS-18] ICBM since 1991. [CNS note:  in fact, this information is incorrect, as there was at least one preceding test, in 2002.] The purpose of the test was to confirm that the 16-year old missile can still perform its mission. Contrary to established practice, the launch was conducted from the deployment area instead of one of Russia's test ranges (SS-18s have usually been launched from Baikonur in Kazakhstan).
[Igor Plugatarev, "'Topol-M' vytesnyayet 'Molodtsa' i 'Voevodu'," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 28 January-3 February 2005; in VPK i Biznes, 11 February 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

2/5/2005: COMPARISON OF LIQUID- AND SOLID-FUEL MISSILES
According to Aleksandr Makeyev, co-chairman of the Makeyev social organization, writing in an opinion piece on the history of Russian and Soviet missiles, the decision to cancel the Bark (RSM-52) liquid-fuel SLBM project in the mid-1990s and terminate production of RSM-54 [NATO designation SS-N-23] missiles was a mistake because it effectively closed down a traditional and still promising avenue in the development of Soviet and Russian strategic forces. Makeyev argues, in particular, that the Soviet Union failed to develop truly efficient solid fuel that would come close to, much less exceed, the efficiency of liquid fuels. In addition, advances in the design of liquid-fuel SLBMs at the Makeyev Design Bureau effectively eliminated the traditional advantages of solid-fuel missiles, such as greater reliability and safety. Finally, he writes, an emphasis on the liquid-fuel missiles designed by Makeyev Design Bureau would have allowed Russia to avoid the significant expenses associated with contractors not located in Russia: unlike the ICBM production network, SLBM production has always been purely "Russian." 
[Aleksandr Makeyev, "Start v proshloye ili v budushcheye?" Krasnaya zvezda, 5 February 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

2/2/2005: ICBM DEPLOYMENT PLANS
First Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel General Aleksandr Belousov stated that the Ministry of Defense plans to acquire seven new ICBMs for the Strategic Rocket Forces in 2005, including three road-mobile Topol-M ICBMs. The road-mobile Topol-M was considered ready for deployment after a successful flight test in December 2004.
[Yuriy Gavrilov, "Tri 'Topolya-M' - armiya," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 2 February 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

1/12/2005: RELIABILITY OF OLD TYPES OF ICBMs ASSESSED
Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov stated that the level of "technical readiness" of ICBMs (i.e., the ability of ICBMs to launch and deliver their payload to a designated target) was about 97% even though most of them are already quite old. A high degree of reliability was imbedded into the missiles and launchers at the design stage, he said, which is why the SRF is able to extend their warranty periods two or more times.
[Oleg Falichev, "Yadernyy garant nashey nezavisimosti," Krasnaya zvezda, 12 January 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

12/24/2004: ROAD-MOBILE TOPOL-M DEPLOYMENT TO BEGIN
Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov announced that deployment of road-mobile Topol-M ICBMs would begin in 2005 instead of 2006 as had been originally planned. The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade agreed to support the inclusion of funds for three additional ICBMs in the 2005 budget.
["Dmitriy Litovkin, "Ministr oborony porazil raketoy Germana Grefa," Izvestiya, 24 December 2004.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

12/24/2004: RUSSIAN STRATEGIC FORCES FACE TECHNOLOGICAL AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS
Yuriy Solomonov, director and chief designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which designed two of Russia's most modern strategic missiles, Topol-M and Bulava, said that the strategic modernization program faces grave challenges, primarily due to chronic underfinancing, and could fail. In 2005 the defense industry was unable to fulfill the state contract on serial production of Topol-M ICBMs, he said, or on development and testing of the new SLBM, Bulava. He also claimed that about 200 technologies used in the production of strategic missiles have been lost in recent years; many components are no longer produced at all, especially those in the chemical industry. Further, former director of the 4th Research Institute of the SRF Vladimir Dvorkin opined that the present rate of Topol-M production, four missiles per year, cannot sustain production lines or the cooperation of contractors and subcontractors.
[Matvey Kulakov, "Potentsial yadernogo sderzhivaniya rezko snizhayetsya," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 12 December 2004.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

12/24/2004: RUSSIA CONDUCTS MOBILE TOPOL-M TEST
On 24 December 2004 Russia conducted the fourth test of a road-mobile Topol-M ICBM, reportedly the final test before the beginning of scheduled deployment of that missile.
[Reuters, 24 December 2004.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

12/22/2004: CONVENTIONAL ROLES FOR LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT CONSIDERED
According to Commander-in-Chief of the Long-Range Air Force Igor Khvorov, Russia's long-range aircraft (including strategic Tu-95MS and Tu-160 and medium-range Tu-22M3 bombers) will be used in the future against terrorists in a conventional capacity, although they were originally created to carry nuclear weapons. In 2004 the Long-Range Air Force acquired long-range conventional weapons and can now "act like the U.S. Air Force in Yugoslavia or Iraq." He also said that in 2005 the air force planned to receive a refurbished Tu-160, which will be re-equipped to carry gravity bombs (originally all Tu-160s had been designed to carry only cruise  missiles). Speaking about plans for the future, Khvorov noted that the air force was working on concepts for future long-range aircraft and has developed 10 possible approaches. Although no decision has been made, the air force is leaning toward creating future aircraft on the basis of Tu-160, whose capabilities are currently only being utilized at about 60%, he said.
["Strategicheskaya aviatsiya mozhet nanosit karauyshchiy udar po terroristam," Izvestiya, 22 December 2004.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

12/14/2005: CINC OF THE SRF ON THE FUTURE OF THE ICBM FORCE
According to Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov, 90% of Russia's missiles are beyond their original warranty periods, but are still reasonably reliable. As an example he cited the recent launch of a Topol [NATO designation SS-25] ICBM of the Teykovo division, which was 17 years old. The service lives of RS-18 [NATO designation SS-19] ICBMs have been extended three times beyond the original 10 years. RS-20 [NATO designation SS-18] ICBMs will serve another 10-15 years, he said, and will subsequently be used to launch satellites. Solovtsov declared that by the time heavy ICBMs will be completely beyond service, the SRF will have enough new Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27] ICBMs to support strategic deterrence functions. According to Izvestiya, in 2004 the SRF cut 1,600 personnel along with 11 units. 28 ICBMs were eliminated via launching along with 28 ICBM silos and 17 permanent structures for mobile ICBMs.
["Komanduyushchiy raketnymi voyskami strategicheskogo naznacheniya Nikolay Solovtsov: 'V blizhayshyye gody nam budet chto pokazat'" Izvestiya, 13 December 2004.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

12/1/2004: RUSSIA AND INDIA WILL JOINTLY BUILD "GLONASS" SATELLITE SYSTEM
Chief of the Federal Space Agency Anatoliy Perminov stated that Russia and India will cooperate in building up the GLONASS satellite global positioning system to 18 satellites from the current 11 by 2007. The accuracy of geographic coordinates is expected to increase to 1 meter. In addition to putting new satellites in orbit, the two countries also intend to replace some older satellites with new ones.
["Rossiya i Indiya uvelichat sistemu 'GLONASS' do 18 sputnikov," Strana.ru, 1 December 2004.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

10/7/2004: RUSSIAN MOD DOES NOT BELIEVE IN "ACCELERATED" REDUCTIONS OF U.s. STRATEGIC FORCES
An anonymous high-level representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense said that the recent statement by Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker about reductions of U.S. strategic forces under the 2002 Moscow Treaty were "misleading" because these reductions only entailed movement of warheads from delivery vehicles to storage facilities. "These are virtual reductions," the Defense Ministry representative said, they "could be easily implemented not just in several years, but even in several days and then just as easily return warheads to delivery vehicles." Real reductions should entail elimination of weapons, but the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (the Moscow Treaty) does not provide for this, continued the ministry's representative, noting that the lenient reduction provisions and the absence of verification reflected the preferences of the United States.
"Minoborony: Dosrochnoye sokrashcheniye SShA yadernogo oruzhiya - fiktsiya," Strana.ru, 7 October 2004.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

8/9/2004: RUSSIA PLANS TO DEVELOP ITS NUCLEAR TESTING GROUND UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY
At a recent Kremlin conference on the topic of nuclear energy Sergey Ivanov, Russian Minister of Defense, and Aleksandr Rumyantsev, head of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency, presented to President Vladimir Putin a draft statute on the Ministry of Atomic Energy.[1]  According to the draft, work in the nuclear sector will move in three main directions.  These include the development and implementation of state defense orders and nuclear armament programs; the development, production, modernization, operation, and disposition of nuclear weapons; and joint activity for the maintenance and expansion of the nuclear test site at Novaya Zemlya.[2]  According to Rumyantsev, Russia is not planning to conduct nuclear tests but does intend to perform conventional explosive tests at the site.  The development and use of Novaya Zemlya is intended to keep the facility in working order and to preserve Russia's nuclear potential.[3] 
Sources:
[1] "Vladimir Putin: "Atomnuyu energitiku yadernogo oboronnogo kompleksa, budet napryamuyu kurirovat Ministerstvo oboroni," RIA Oreanda, 9 August 2004; in Rambler Mass Media, http://www.rambler.ru.
[2] Viktoriya Sokolova, "Proyekt polozheniya o federalnom agentstve atomnoy energii RF predpologayet razvitiye yadernogo poligona na Novoy Zemle," ITAR-TASS, 9 August 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] "Rossiya namerena razvivat svoy yaderniy poligon na Novoy Zemle i provodit tam neyaderniye eksperimenti," ITAR-TASS, 17 September 2004; in Rosatom website, http://www.minatom.ru. {Entered 4/15/2005}

4/20/2004: TOPOL-M LAUNCHED AT TARGET NEAR HAWAII
A Topol-M flight test was conducted on 20 April from the Plesetsk test range in northern Russia. The impact area was in the Pacific Ocean not far from Hawaii. This was the first flight test of Topol-M at its maximum distance and the first ICBM test for that distance in 16 years.
[Mikhail Tuliyev, "Pusk na maksimalnuyu dalnost," Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer, 29 April-11 May 2004.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

2/18/2004: RUSSIA LAUNCHES MILITARY SATELLITES
ITAR-TASS, citing the Space Forces press service, reported on 18 February 2004 that Russia had successfully launched a military satellite, the Kosmos 2405, from the Plesetsk State Test Site using a Molniya-M space launch vehicle (SLV).[1] The satellite reportedly was a Molniya-1T produced by the Reshetnev Scientific Production Association of Applied Mechanics.[2] Some Russian and Western sources indicated, however, that the payload was in fact an Oko-class (US-KS) satellite, which is part of the high elliptical orbit component of the Russian Missile Attack Warning System.[3,4,5] Another military satellite, a Raduga-1 telecommunications satellite designated Kosmos 2406, was placed into orbit by a Proton-K SLV launched from the Baykonur Cosmodrome on 27 March 2004.[6] Deputy Space Forces Commander for Armaments Lieutenant General Oleg Gromov praised personnel involved in the launch, adding that its purpose was to strengthen Russian military space assets.[7]
Sources:
[1] Vladislav Kuznetsov, "Kosmicheskiy apparat voyennogo naznacheniya vyveden na tselevuyu orbitu," ITAR-TASS, 18 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Alina Chernoivanova, "Rossiya vmesto oka zapustila ukho," Gazeta.Ru, 18 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Alina Chernoivanova, "U Rossii v nebe novyy glaz," Gazeta.Ru, 18 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[4] David C. Isby, "SLBM malfunction overshadows Russian strategic exercise," Jane's Missiles and Rockets online edition, http://www4.janes.com, 1 April 2004.
[5] Aleksandr Zheleznyakov, "Zapushchen 'Kosmos-2405'," Central Research and Development Institute of Robotics and Technical Cybernetics of the State Research Center of Russia Web Site, http://spacer.rtc.ru, 18 February 2004.
[6] Ivan Safronov, "Kosmicheskiye voyska zapustili na orbitu novyy 'Globus'," Kommersant, 29 March 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[7] Aleksandr Kovalev, "Raketa-nositel 'Proton-K' uspeshno vyvela na orbitu sputnik voyennogo naznacheniya serii 'Kosmos'," RIA Novosti, 27 March 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com. {Entered 3/30/2004 TS}

2/18/2004: COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING EXERCISE CONCLUDES WITH TEST OF NEW WARHEAD
A nearly month-long command and staff training exercise (komandno-shtabnaya trenirovka) that involved each component of the Russian strategic nuclear triad and all six military districts came to a close on 18 February 2004.[1,2] The successful test launch of a Topol [NATO designation SS-25 'Sickle'] intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) armed with an experimental defense-penetrating warhead capped the exercises, billed as the one of the largest training activities undertaken in the past 20-25 years.[3,4] The scenario for the Security 2004 exercise outlined an attack by terrorists simultaneously on four fronts, including from space, and as such appeared to simulate those threats to Russian national security elaborated in the October 2003 Ministry of Defense report entitled "Immediate Tasks of Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" that expanded upon the 2000 Military Doctrine.[2,5] The "active phase" of the exercise, which began on 10 February, foresaw the launch of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) by Tu-95MS [NATO name 'Bear H'] strategic bombers.[6] It also envisioned the launch of sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) by two Project 667BDRM [NATO name 'Delta IV'] ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in the Barents Sea, but at least two and possibly three of the SLBM launches failed.[7,8,9] The plan for the exercise also called for two ICBM launches conducted jointly by the Space Forces and the Strategic Rocket Forces.[10,11] (For more information on the exercise and analysis of its strategic importance, please see the CNS report "Military Exercises In Russia: Naval Deterrence Failures Compensated By Strategic Rocket Success.")
Sources:
[1] "V Vooruzhennykh silakh RF zavershilas aktivnaya faza strategicheskoy komandno-shtabnoy trenirovki 'Bezopasnost-2004'," ITAR-TASS, 18 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Vladislav Kulikov, Sergey Ptichkin, Boris Talov, "Ucheniya yadernogo chemodanchika," Rossiyskaya gazeta, No. 25 (3402), 11 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Ivan Safronov, "Rossiya razygrayet yadernuyu voynu," Kommersant, 30 January 2004, p.4; in WPS Oborona i bezopasnost, 2 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[4] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Giperzvukovaya 'koala'," Izvestiya, No. 032 (26589), 20 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[5] "V Vooruzhennykh Silakh Rossii nachalas strategicheskaya komandno-shtabnaya trenirovka," ITAR-TASS, 10 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[6] "Strategicheskiye bombardirovshchika [sic] Tu-95MS uspeshno porazili krylatymi raketami tseli i vernulis na bazu," ITAR-TASS, 17 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[7] "Pusk dvukh ballisticheskikh raket s atomnoy podlodki 'Novomoskovsk' ne sostoyalsya," ITAR-TASS, 17 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[8] "Morskaya ballisticheskaya raketa 'Sineva' unichtozhena sistemoy samolikvidatsii iz-za otkloneniya ot zadannoy trayektorii," ITAR-TASS, 18 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[9] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Ballisticheskiye rakety Putina ne porazili," Izvestiya, No. 030 (26587), 19 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[10] Konstantin Lantratov, "Chto i kuda zapuskali kosmicheskiye voyska," Kommersant, No. 030, 19 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[11] "Ispytannyy v sredu eksperimentalnyy letatelnyy apparat sposoben preodolevat perspektivnyye sistemy protivoraketnoy oborony," ITAR-TASS, 19 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com. {Entered 3/1/2004 EMC}

12/25/2003: STATE MILITARY PROCUREMENT PLAN FOR 2004 ADOPTED
The Russian government approved the 2004 state military procurement plan at a closed session on 25 December 2003.[1] This marks the first time in the past decade that the government adopted the plan before the beginning of the calendar year, and should allow defense enterprises to enter into contracts without the delays of several months that previously slowed the process.[2,3] The plan for 2004 provides for funding in the amount of 341.2 billion rubles ($11.7 billion as of 25 December 2003), an increase of 19.8% over 2003, totaling approximately 14% of all federal budget expenditures.[3] According to Deputy Minister for Economic Development and Trade Colonel General Vladislav Putilin, this sum nevertheless represents 20% less than the funding outlined in the State Armaments Program. He noted, however, that funding dedicated to the production of military hardware and armaments will increase by 30%.[1] As a result, amongst other equipment, the 2004 state military procurement plan calls for acquisition of six Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'] intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), one Tu-160 [NATO name 'Blackjack'] strategic bomber, six military space satellites and four booster-rockets, and a number of Iskander-M [NATO designation SS-26 'Stone'] tactical short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). It also foresees modernization of Tu-160 and Tu-95MS [NATO name 'Bear H'] strategic bombers as well as Tu-22M3 [NATO name 'Backfire'] long-range bombers.[2] In terms of the naval leg of the strategic triad, the state procurement plan provides funding in 2004 for the first tests of the new Bulava sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and for continued construction of the first Project 955 Borey-class strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the Yuriy Dolgorukiy, which is scheduled to be launched in 2005 as part of plans to introduce three Borey-class SSBNs into the Russian Navy by 2010.[3,4,5] The procurement plan, which is considered an integral part of efforts to modernize the armed forces, also incorporates several measures that seek to streamline the procurement process and reduce costs.[3] For example, it allows companies to enter into contracts of up to three years (instead of the standard one-year agreement), thereby locking in prices for the future, and mandates that open tenders be held for a wide variety of military equipment, a step that could cut the cost of spending on military goods by up to 15%.[1,2,3] A new agency created in 2003, the State Committee for State Military Procurement, is tasked with oversight of conventional weapons purchases, while the Ministry of Defense will remain the sole procurer of equipment that pertains to logistics and support.[2]
Sources:
[1] Vladimir Mukhin, "Gosoboronzakaz budet prinyat do kontsa etogo goda," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, No.45 (369), 26 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Ivan Safronov, Konstantin Lantratov, "Pravitelstvo modernizirovalo oboronnyy zakaz," Kommersant, No. 236, 26 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] SeverInform, "V 2004 godu gosudartsvennyy oboronnyy zakaz stanet sostavnoy chastyu modernizatsii Vooruzhennykh sil RF," 27 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[4] Andrey Mikhaylov, "V 2004 godu v Severodvinske budet prodolzheno stroitelstvo APL proyekta 'Borey'," Pravda.Ru, 3 January 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[5] Andrey Mikhaylov, "Pravitelstvo utverdilo zakaz dlya oboronki," Pravda.Ru, 26 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com. {Entered 2/16/2004 EMC}

10/2/2003:  RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR POSTURE
On 2 October 2003, Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov presented a report entitled "Immediate Tasks of Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" at a top-level meeting at the Ministry of Defense . The document, inter alia, outlines two major tasks for nuclear weapons: deterrence of an attack and de-escalation of a conflict if deterrence fails. Deterrence is viewed as a means to prevent the use of force against Russia for political purposes. De-escalation of a conflict is based on the notion of "pre-determined damage," which explicitly refers to the possible limited use of nuclear weapons to inflict a sufficient amount of damage to a hostile party to ensure that aggression is not worthwhile. Although the main threats to Russian security remain international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, according to the report Russia will consider the limited use of nuclear weapons to fight any potential enemy. The report also addresses Russia's possible reaction to possible developments in US nuclear policy. According to the document, development of low-yield nuclear weapons by the United States might trigger Russia to revise its approach to deter threats of various levels. The report also outlines planned changes in the nuclear triad, including a substantial reduction of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). By 2007-2008, the SRF will consist of 10 missile divisions (there are currently 19), primarily employing old types of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) whose service lives will be extended until these systems gradually are phased out in favor of new missile systems. The air-based component of the strategic forces will stress modernization of the Tu-160 heavy bomber [NATO designation 'Blackjack'], which should be able to carry high-precision cruise missiles with both nuclear and conventional warheads, as well as gravity bombs. The naval leg of the nuclear triad will focus upon development of a new sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) [CNS believes it is the Bulava] and a new submarine [CNS believes this refers to the Borey class] to carry this new missile. [For more information on the "Immediate Tasks of Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" report, see Nikolai Sokov, "Russian Ministry of Defense's New Policy Paper:  The Nuclear Angle," CNS Report, 10 October 2003, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/sok1003.htm.]
["Aktualnyye zadachi razvitiya Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii," Krasnaya zvezda online edition,  http://www.redstar.ru/2003/10/11_10/3_01.html, 11 October 2003.]  {Entered 11/7/2003 TS}

8/5/2003: RUSSIA TO HALVE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN 2004
Strana.ru reported on 5 August 2003 that Deputy Defense Minister and Armed Forces Chief of Armaments Colonel General Aleksey Moskovskiy stated that defense expenditures for the purchase of new arms and equipment will cut in half in 2004. The deputy minister added that the reduction is not due to economic considerations, but rather other government concerns. At this point, the most significant drawdown in the arms program for 2001-2005 is associated with modernization of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and the development of new anti-aircraft missile systems and aviation. However, Moskovskiy believes that problems modernizing the SRF naval component could be largely compensated for by extending the length of the operation of strategic land-based missile systems, which is less expensive. Reductions in the purchase of space technology are also likely—expenditures for Space Forces modernization had increased by 3.5 times since they became a separate service of the Russian Armed Forces. A new approach to the modernization of conventional weapons is also being considered, in order to further reduce defense expenditures: military units may be allowed to transfer arms and military equipment whose warranty is about to expire, but which could still be sold for export, to industrial enterprises. The reduction of defense expenditures for 2004 is also likely to affect the drafting of a new State Armament Program for 2010–2015, to be completed this year.
[Nikita Petrov, "Expenditures For Defense Will Be Cut in Half," Strana.ru Web Site, http://www.strana.ru/, 5 August 2003; in "Russian Defense Expenditures For Purchase of New Arms, Equipment, To Be Halved in 2004," FBIS Document CEP20030806000184]. {Entered 11/21/2003 TS}

3/26/2003-6/27/2003: GREATER RELIANCE ON CONTRACT SOLDIERS PLANNED
Nezavisimaya gazeta reported on 26 March 2003 that Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov had announced that the Russian government would consider adopting a volunteer manning program for the Russian military. The Ministry of Defense has assembled a list of 92 units that would undergo conversion. The first units to undergo the conversion would be the Ground Forces, Airborne Forces, and Naval Infantry. Strategic Rocket Forces and the Air Force would undergo conversion to the new system in the second wave. The initiative was announced even though the professionalization program, under development by an interagency commission created by the Russian government on 21 November 2002, is still incomplete.  This led one commission member to express the concern that Ivanov's initiative amounted to an experiment. The commission, which studied the transformation of the French military to an all-professional force, was surprised that such force components as infantry would be professionalized earlier than "intellectual" ones (SRF, Air Force). Moreover, the commission has encountered difficulties in obtaining necessary planning information from the Ministry of Defense.[1]

On 6 May 2003 the Ministry of Defense held a press conference on the contract manning program and revealed additional details of the program. During the conference, Deputy General Staff Chief Lieutenant General Smirnov said that the Russian military has experienced great difficulties acquiring enlisted personnel via conscription, due to the growing numbers of exemptions and health problems among conscripts. According to Smirnov, only 10.3% of the annual draft cohort was not exempt to conscription, and about half of conscripts suffer from medical problems limiting their usefulness. According to the federal program, in 2004-2005 units belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops, Federal Border Service, and Ministry of Defense units stationed in the North Caucasus would switch to contract manning. The second phase of the program would begin in 2008, when the number of contract personnel would increase and units belonging to the SRF, Air Force, Navy, and the Space Forces would also undergo the transition. The reform would also include training units, reduced manning units, and equipment storage facilities. Conscription would eventually be shortened to 1-1.5 years. Upon completing their initial training, conscripts would have the option of contract service, or an assignment to a reduced-manning unit. According to preliminary estimates, $138 billion rubles will be needed through 2007 to implement the reform. Overall, nearly 200 units are to transition to contract manning by 2007.[2] Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Vladimir Kravchenko, however, indicated that the Navy would shift to contract manning by 2007, sooner than Smirnov indicated, adding that 60% of submarine crews already were serving under contract.[3]

It remains to be seen whether these ambitious plans will be successfully implemented. The effort to transform the Pskov division of the Airborne Forces has experienced only limited success due to inadequate funding, lack of housing and other infrastructure, and other problems that reduce the attractiveness of contract service. The program's provision to offer contract service to conscripts may be an insurance policy against the failure to attract genuine volunteers into the military and increase the quality of the enlisted personnel, including in nuclear components.
Sources:
[1] Anatoliy Kostyukov, "Pervoy na kontrakt poydet pekhota," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 March 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com/.
[2] Otari Sarkisyan, "Tolko 10,3 protsenta sostoyashchikh na uchete rossiyskikh prizyvnikov nadenut pogony," Regions.ru, 6 May 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com/.
[3] Yuliya Andreyeva, "ITAR-TASS, 27 June 2003; in "Russia: Chief of Staff Says Navy To Shift to Contract Manning by 2007," FBIS Document CEP20030627000104. {Entered 8/8/2003 MJ}

1/10/2003: ARMED FORCES PAY RAISE, MILITARY REFORM QUESTIONED
Izvestiya reported on 10 January 2003 that members of the armed forces had received a 10% increase in rank-related pay as of 1 January 2003.[1] The pay raise, which also applies to the pensions received by retired servicemen, resulted from a decision to link rank-related pay in the military to existing civil service pay grades. The new salary scale will translate into an additional 350-550 rubles ($11-17 as of 10 January 2003) per month, depending upon rank, and also will result in an increase of other payments to which soldiers and retirees are entitled.[1,2] These payments, such as bonuses for length of service, are indexed to rank- and duty-related pay and together with the pay raise could lead to an increase in total wages by as much as 70%.[1] In addition, according to Russian Deputy Defense Minister Lyubov Kudelina, the government plans to undertake a further indexation of military wages later in 2003, in line with the rate of inflation and depending on available resources.[2]

Critics have argued that the January pay increase does not even offset the official rate of inflation for 2002 of 15.1%. Its effects therefore resemble previous attempts to reform the military pay system such as the decision to double rank-related pay as of 1 July 2002, while simultaneously eliminating a series of important social benefits enjoyed by the military.[1,2] As a result, these efforts have not improved the difficult living conditions in which soldiers and their families exist, as evidenced by monitoring conducted by the government on the socio-economic status of military families. The results of this research indicated that average real wages for the military dropped by 2.8% in 2002, while other citizens enjoyed an increase of 34.7%. In addition, the average monthly salary received by hired labor exceeded the compensation received by contract soldiers for the first time. As a result, according to the Ministry of Defense, 46.2% of Russian military families currently live below the poverty line as opposed to 32.6% of the general population.[2] It also is not clear whether the financial resources foreseen in the current budget will be sufficient to implement the pay raise, especially given plans announced by Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov to expand gradually throughout the course of 2003 the number of military units composed of contract, rather than conscripted, soldiers. The military also intends by the summer of 2003 to present President Putin with its program for converting the armed forces to a primarily contract soldier-based service beginning in 2004.[1]

In the meantime, one component of military reform already under consideration concerns the medical commissions that determine the fitness of draftees for duty. A new Statute on Military-Medical Examination, approved by government decree, outlines the operating procedures that these commissions should follow to determine the fitness of individuals for service. The statute specifies that the commissions will consist of doctors approved by the local government head on the recommendation of a military commissioner. It also dictates that decisions on the individual fitness of draftees for combat will be taken by a majority of the doctors present at a commission meeting instead of requiring a quorum or a qualified majority. In the opinion of critics of the changes, these new medical rules may result in an increased likelihood that medically unsuitable individuals will be drafted. These individuals therefore charge that the new rules are tailored to ensure that the army meets draft quotas rather than the declared goal of making military service a more respected and prestigious profession. Opponents also believe that the changes will not impact the widespread use of bribery to evade military service and in fact actually may create the impression that the government sanctions a system in which avoidance of military service increasingly is seen as a business.[3]
Sources:
[1] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Na khleb khvatit," Izvestiya, No. 2, 10 January 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Sergey Ishchenko, "Pogonnyy rubl," Trud-7, No. 1, 4 January 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] "Seksualnuyu oriyentatsiyu prizyvnikov opredelyat golosovaniyem," Izvestiya.Ru Web Site, http://www.izvestiya.ru/community/article31149, 13 March 2003. {Entered 4/8/2003 EMC}

10/12/2002: COMBAT READINESS OF RUSSIAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES TESTED
A five-day command and training exercise involving several branches of the Russian armed forces concluded on 12 October 2002 with coordinated test launches of a Topol [NATO designation SS-25 'Sickle'] intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from the Plesetsk Test Site, sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) from Pacific and Northern Fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea, and cruise missiles fired by Tu-95MS [NATO name 'Bear-H'] and Tu-160 [NATO name 'Blackjack'] strategic bombers.[1,2] The exercise also tasked the Russian anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, which utilized early-warning radars and command posts in Belarus for the first time, with simulating the destruction of the missiles during the final stage of flight. It appears that the ABM system played the role of U.S. national missile defense (NMD). Therefore, the results of the exercise, in which all of the missiles reportedly overcame the ABM system and successfully "struck" the programmed targets, could be interpreted as proof of the continued effectiveness of the ICBMs. According to military officials, the exercise sought to demonstrate the ability of the strategic nuclear forces, assigned the preeminent role in maintaining Russia's security, to defend the country against military aggression, including through the use of nuclear weapons. The new Russian military doctrine, taking into account weakened conventional arms capabilities, foresees the use of nuclear weapons in order to preserve Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The exercise may also have sought to demonstrate an ability to overcome ABM systems.[1] Some Russian commentators, however, pointed to the closed nature of the exercise, its full-scale simulation of a conflict, and proximity to a US NMD test as possibly indicating a renewal of strategic arms competition between Russia and the United States.  Sergey Sokut, of Nezavisimaya gazeta, characterized similar exercises conducted at the end of the 1990s as more transparent and contrasted the emphasis of earlier exercises on de-escalation with the full nuclear strike and coordinated ICBM and SLBM launches in this latest exercise. Sokut also attributed the US decision to postpone its NMD test from 24 August 2002 to mid-October 2002 to Washington's desire to make a political statement rather than to the officially stated technical reasons.[3]
Sources:
[1] Vladimir Levin, "Yadernyye rakety proleteli nad Moskvoy," Press-tsentr.Ru, 15 October 2002; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] "V Rossii v odin den osushchestvleny puski ballisticheskikh raket nazemnogo, morskogo i vozdushnogo bazirovaniya," Interfax, 12 October 2002.
[3] Sergey Sokut, "Raketnaya duel vozobnovilas," Nezavisimaya gazeta, No. 220 (2774), 15 October 2002. {Entered 11/26/2002 EMC}
 
9/27/2002: RUSSIAN STRATEGIC FORCES TO BE REDUCED TO MINIMUM SUFFICIENCY
On 29 September 2002, Chief of the General Staff, Army General Anatoliy Kvashnin announced that in the course of reform Russian strategic forces will be brought to a level of minimum sufficiency.[1] Kvashnin did not specify how individual components of the Russian triad will be affected by the reform. This decision was reported as part of an effort to optimize the Russian armed forces and make them correspond to both the threats Russia faces and Russia's economic capabilities.[2]
Sources:
[1] "V khode voyennoy reformy strategicheskiye yadernyye sily Rossii budut privedeny k minimalno dostatochnomu urovnyu," UNIAN, No. 038 (230), 23-29 September 2002.
[2]  Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 27 September 2002; in "Russian chief of staff: Defense Ministry to be streamlined," FBIS Document CEP20020927000226. {Entered 10/2/2002 MJ}

8/16/2002: NO PLANS TO RESTORE SRF STATUS
SRF Commander Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov announced on 16 August 2002 that there were no plans to restore the SRF's status as a separate branch of service. Solovtsov added that all three components of the Russian strategic triad will be developed without favoring any single component.
["U rossiyskogo voyennogo rukovodstva net planov po vosstanovleniyu RVSN kak otdelnogo vida Vooruzhennykh sil strany," RIA Novosti, 16 August 2002.] {Entered 11/27/2002 MJ}

6/19/2002: RUSSIAN OFFICIALS ON CONSEQUENCES OF ABM, START II TREATY DEMISE
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov said on 19 June 2002 that the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and subsequent Russian declaration that it considered itself no longer bound by START II provisions gave Russia more flexibility in decisionmaking on the structure of its nuclear forces. Ivanov said that the Moscow Treaty is advantageous to the Russian military, and that Russia will not make any rash moves in response to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Ivanov's remarks were echoed by General Staff Chief General Anatoliy Kvashnin, who added that Russia will now be able to retain its MIRVed ICBMs, which START II banned.[1] As a result of the demise of START II, Russia now plans to retain the remaining 154 R-36M-series [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] ICBMs permitted by START I, until at least 2010.[2] Strategic Rocket Forces Commander Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov told journalists that a decision to extend the service lives of MIRVed ICBMs was in the final stages of preparation.[3] The Ministry of Defense reportedly plans to increase the strategic nuclear forces' budget share from 18% in 2002 to 23-25% in 2003.[4]
Sources:
[1] "US missile defence plans give Russia nuclear 'flexibility': minister," Agence France Presse, 19 June 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[2] "Ballisticheskiye rakety 'Satana' mogut nakhoditsya na boyevom dezhurstve do 2010 goda-Baluyevskiy," Interfax, 20 June 2002.
[3] "Rossiya imeyet otvet na resheniye SShA vyyti iz Dogovora po PRO-komanduyushchiy RVSN," Interfax, 22 June 2002.
[4] Vladimir Georgiyev, "Armiya-pravitelstvo: 1:0 v polzu raket," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 June 2002, p. 2; in Universal Database of Central Russian Newspapers, http://online.eastview.com/. {Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}

5/18/2002: RUSSIA TO MAINTAIN NUCLEAR TRIAD
On 18 May 2002, Colonel General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, the first deputy chief of the General Staff, told reporters that reductions in Russia's strategic arms do not imply the elimination of any of the three components of its nuclear triad.
[Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 18 May 2002; in "Russia to keep 'nuclear triad' despite strategic offensive weapons cuts," FBIS Document CEP20020518000059.] {Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}

4/7/2002: PUTIN WORRIED ABOUT LOWERING OF NUCLEAR THRESHOLD
On 7 April 2002, during a discussion with German journalists prior to his visit to Germany, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed concern about reports on the US Nuclear Posture Review. Putin's main concerns were the possibility of a resumption of nuclear tests by the United States and the lowering of the nuclear threshold through adoption of ultra-low yield nuclear munitions, which would transform nuclear weapons from a means of deterrence to militarily usable weapons. At the same time, Putin downplayed his concerns by pointing out that there had been no authoritative statements by US officials on a new US doctrine.
["V Moskve obespokoyeny zayavleniyami SShA o razrabotke Vashingtonom novoy yadernoy strategii," Interfax, 7 April 2002.] {Entered 10/4/2002 MJ}

1/19/2002: NAVAL FORCES GIVEN PRIORITY IN NUCLEAR TRIAD
Colonel General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, acknowledged on 19 January 2002 that naval forces have been given priority in Russia's future plans for its nuclear triad.[1]  The strongest evidence of this priority shift came in March 2001 when the Russian government ordered the production of 40 sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).[2]  Previously the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) received priority in procurement and funding, but recent cutbacks in Topol-M production and ICBM modernization suggested that priorities were changing.[1,3]  The removal of former SRF commander Marshal Igor Sergeyev from his post as Defense Minister in March 2001 was another indicator.  The new change will shift priority to saving Russia's deteriorating ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force. Only one new SSBN is under construction (the Borey-class Yuriy Dolgorukiy), and Murena M-class [NATO name 'Delta II'] and Kalmar-class ['Delta III'] SSBNs are reaching the end of their service lives.  By 2010 only the seven Delfin-class ['Delta-IV'] SSBNs are expected to remain in service. It remains to be seen whether the Russian government will be able to allocate sufficient funds to the naval strategic deterrent to arrest or reverse its decline.
Sources:
[1]  Sergey Sokut, "Russia is Changing Its Concept of Constructing Nuclear Forces," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 19 January 2002; in "Report on Radical Change in Priority in Triad of Strategic Nuclear Forces in Favor of Navy," FBIS Document CEP20020118000353.
[2] German Galkin & Dmitriy Zobkov, "Vice Premier Klebanov Saving Missile Makers. Minister Adamov Escaping From 'Greens'," Kommersant, 17 March 2001; in "Kommersant Views Klebanov Chelyabinsk Tour, Order for 40 ICBMs Likely 'Soon'," FBIS Document CEP20010319000186.
[3] Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 6 February 2002; in "Russian military prioritizes Navy's nuclear capabilities," FBIS Document CEP20020206000126. {Entered 5/8/2002 RG}
 
5-8/2001: IVANOV COMMENTS ON REFORM GOALS, PROGRESS
Since his appointment as Minister of Defense, Sergey Ivanov has made a number of comments outlining the main priorities of the ongoing military reform process, including the role and composition of Russia's strategic forces. During an interview in May 2001, Ivanov declared that all three components of Russia's strategic nuclear forces (land-, air-, and sea-based) ought to be preserved, adding that this point of view is also shared by Vladimir Putin.[1] In an August 2001 Krasnaya zvezda interview, Ivanov also said that while the present three-component structure would be preserved, Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal would nevertheless be "optimized," a formulation that likely means reductions in size and changes in the relative importance of individual components of the Russian strategic triad.[2] It also appears that the strategic forces will not enjoy the same degree of support as they did under Igor Sergeyev. According to Ivanov's deputy minister for armaments, Colonel General Aleksey Moskovskiy, in the past the strategic forces have been modernized at the expense of conventional forces; the current reform process, however, will seek to balance the needs of strategic and conventional components. When asked whether the SRF would receive a fourth Topol-M regiment this year, Moskovskiy replied that all procurement plans for this year would be fulfilled, without providing additional details.[3] Ivanov also showed no signs of deviating from the official Russian position that radical cuts in strategic weapons would not be possible in the event of US deployment of strategic ballistic missile defenses.[4] Ivanov cautioned against expecting immediate results from the reform process, stating that it would not bear fruit before 2004. However, some progress has already been made, according to Ivanov.[5] Russian armed forces now comprise three branches of service (the Ground Forces, Air Force, and Navy) and three separate commands (the Strategic Rocket Forces, which lost their status as a branch of service, Airborne Forces, and Space Forces, which came into existence on 1 June 2001).[6]
Sources:
[1] "Ministr oborony Rossii vyskazyvayetsya za garmonichnoye razvitiye vsekh komponentov yadernykh sil," Interfax, 22 May 2001.
[2] "Sergey Ivanov: Vazhnoy zadachey reformy armii i flota yavlyayetsya optimizatsiya udarnoy gruppirovki Strategicheskikh yadernykh sil," ITAR-TASS, 10 August 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[3] "Minoborony RF namereno optimizirovat razvitiye strategicheskikh yadernykh sil i sil obshchego naznacheniya," Interfax, 28 May 2001.
[4] "Ministr oborony RF schitayet, chto radikalnyye sokrashcheniya yadernykh vooruzheniy vozmozhny pri sokhranenii strategicheskoy stabilnosti," UNIAN, No. 032 (172), 6-12 August 2001.
[5] "Sergey Ivanov schitayet, chto pervyye otchetlivyye plody voyennoy reformy poyavyatsya v 2004-2005 godu," ITAR-TASS, 25 June 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[6] Valeriy Batuyev, "Ministr oborony khochet skazku sdelat bylyu," Vremya-MN, 29 May 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/. {Entered 8/30/2001 MJ}
 
3/28/2001: SERGEY IVANOV APPOINTED DEFENSE MINISTER
Sergey Ivanov, who previously served as the Security Council Secretary, was appointed Defense Minister on 28 March 2001 by President Putin.  A graduate of the Leningrad State University Translation Department and the Yu. V. Andropov Red Star Institute of the USSR KGB, Ivanov worked in foreign intelligence, specializing in the Anglo-Scandinavian area and obtaining the rank of lieutenant general.  From 1981 to 1998 he worked both in the central apparatus of the KGB and abroad.  From August 1998 until his Security Council appointment, Ivanov served as a deputy director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and head of the Forecasting, Analysis, and Strategic Planning Department.  He was appointed Secretary of the Security Council on 15 November 1999 and served in that post until being appointed Defense Minister.[1]  Although Putin emphasized that Ivanov's appointment heralded a new phase of demilitarization of Russia's society, reporters were quick to note that while Ivanov is the first defense minister without military background, he does hold the rank of lieutenant general in the FSB.[2]  Media sources predict that under Ivanov the status and decision-making influence of the Defense Ministry will increase significantly.[3] Ivanov replaced Marshal Igor Sergeyev, who had held this position since May 1997 and commanded the SRF between 1992 and May 1997.[4] Following his replacement, Sergeyev was appointed Strategic Stability Issues Advisor to the President, a newly created position.[1]
Sources: 
[1] "Look Who's Here," Kommersant, 29 March 2001; in "Kommersant Profiles Russian Government Reshuffle Appointees," FBIS Document CEP20010329000245. 
[2] Vladimir Temnyy, "Money Is Behind Reshuffle," Grani.ru Web Site,  http://Grani.ru, 29 March 2001; in "Russia:  Defense Ministry Cadre Reshuffle Eyed," FBIS Document CEP20010329000365.
[3] Lidiya Andrusenko et al., "Putin's First Revolution.  President Prefers Personal Loyalty," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 March 2001, p. 1,3; in "Nezavisimaya Gazeta Eyes Implications of Putin's Reshuffle," FBIS Document CEP20010329000165.
[4] Interfax, 19 May 2000; in "New Russian Cabinet: Continuity Maintained But Accent Changed," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,  http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe. {Entered 6/11/2001 MJ}
 
2/13-16/2001: RUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF HOLDS LARGE-SCALE STRATEGIC COMMAND AND STAFF EXERCISES
From 13-16 February 2001 the Russian General Staff held large-scale command and staff exercises with the participation of all three components of Russia's strategic nuclear "triad." In contrast to earlier strategic command and staff exercises, the Russian Ministry of Defense released few details on the exercise's scenario and course of events. Led by the General Staff Chief, General Anatoliy Kvashnin, the three-day exercise apparently simulated a large-scale nuclear conflict ending with a mass nuclear exchange, and featured training ICBM and SLBM launches, as well as heavy bomber flights with ALCM launches.[1] Commenting on the exercise and the accompanying ballistic missile launches, General Staff First Deputy Chief General Valeriy Manilov stated that it demonstrated Russia's answer to the US NMD initiatives, adding that Russian missiles are capable of penetrating any missile defense system.[2] 
Sources:
[1] Sergey Sokut, "Russia Won the War," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 February 2001, p. 1; in "Strategic Exercise Said To Show Resolve To 'Maintain Nuclear Parity'," FBIS Document CEP20010226000075.
[2] "Valeriy Manilov: rossiyskiye rakety sposobny preodolet lyubuyu sistemu zashchity," Strana.ru Web Site, http://www.strana.ru/, 19 February 2001. {Entered 3/20/2001 MJ}
 
11/10/2000:  IVANOV CONFIRMS SRF REFORM PLANS
Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Ivanov confirmed that the status of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) as an independent branch of the armed forces will remain unchanged until 2006 (see the 8/11/2000 entry below).  Ivanov also confirmed that control of the Space-Missile Forces will be transferred from the SRF to the Air Force in the next two years.
["RVSN poka nichego ne grozit,"  Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 10-16 November 2000, p. 1.] {Entered 1/2/01 RG}
 
8/11/2000: SECURITY COUNCIL PRESERVES SRF UNTIL 2006, CHANGES SPENDING PRIORITIES
On 11 August 2000, the Russian Security Council decided to preserve the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) as an independent branch of the armed forces until 2006. This decision means a partial defeat for the Chief of General Staff, General Anatoliy Kvashnin, who wanted to abolish the SRF as an independent branch and dramatically reduce their size by 2003 (for additional information on Kvashnin's proposals, please see the 7/11/2000 entry in the Russia: ICBM Force/SRF General Developments section). In addition, no ICBM will be withdrawn from service before completely exhausting its service life, which will be extended through modernization programs.[1] Nevertheless, on balance the session was a defeat for the SRF and Marshal Sergeyev.  Although the SRF are to remain an independent branch until 2006, Russian military experts are interpreting this decision as a sign that their fate has already been decided. By 2007 Russia will have implemented START II-mandated reductions, leaving the SRF in a much-reduced state, which can only encourage the proponents of eliminating them as an independent branch of forces. According to one report, the SRF will most likely be gradually reduced in status after 2006. Initially the SRF will lose their army-level command structures, then they will be reduced to an independent command, and finally they will be integrated into the Air Force. The Security Council added a statement that in the event of unwelcome developments in strategic arms reduction talks or ballistic missile defenses, SRF reform plans may be altered, giving some hope to the SRF leadership that these decisions could be reversed.[2,3] The SRF also suffered additional blows at the Security Council session. The Space-Missile Defense Troops, transferred to the SRF in 1998, are to be retransferred to the Air Force over the next two years. The Security Council decided to end priority financing of the SRF in favor of improving the condition of Russia's general purpose forces, with particular emphasis on creating a larger number of high-readiness units in all three services. Finally, at the close of the Security Council's session, President Vladimir Putin promised to allocate the military additional 2 billion rubles (approximately $70 million) by the end of 2000.[3,4]
Sources:
[1] "RVSN kak vid vooruzhennykh sil sokhranitsya do 2006 goda--istochniki," Interfax, No.1, 12 August 2000.
[2] Nikolay Petrov, "Putin ne uvolil ne Sergeyeva, ni Kvashnina," Kommersant online edition, http://www.online.ru/rproducts/commersant-daily-month/, 12 August 2000.
[3] Igor Danilov, "Itogi zasedaniya Soveta bezopasnosti RF: boyevaya nichya v polzu voyennoy reformy," Interfax, No.4, 14 August 2000.
[4] Svetlana Sukhova, "Rossii krylya nikto ne slomayet," Segodnya online edition, http://news.mosinfo.ru/news/2000/SGD/, 14 August 2000. {Entered 8/16/2000 MJ}
 
6/23/2000: MINATOM OFFICIAL DISCUSSES STATE ORDERS AND FINANCING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS
For additional information, please see the 6/23/2000 entry in the Russia: Closed Cities and General Weapons Facilities Developments section. {Entered 8/14/2000 MJ}
 
1/27/00: RUSSIAN DEFENSE PROCUREMENT TO INCREASE BY FIFTY PERCENT
On 27 January 2000 Russian Prime Minister and acting President Vladimir Putin announced that funding for defense procurement (the state defense order) will be increased by fifty percent for the year 2000.[1] The Russian government approved the state defense order at a session held the same day, and Putin observed that this decision had been made much earlier than in previous years.[2] Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov, who is responsible for coordinating military-industrial complex issues in the government, said that financing for research and development work will increase by 80 percent. According to Klebanov, defense procurement will be mainly oriented towards the purchase and production of conventional weapons, especially precision guided munitions.  Klebanov also emphasized that special attention will be paid to the military use of space, with the goal of maintaining the number of military satellites at the minimum acceptable level.[2,3] Putin said that the war in Chechnya is not the main reason for the increased defense budget; rather, it has been necessitated by many years of underfinancing, which has significantly undermined the Russian army's effectiveness.[1]  The former chairman of the Duma budgetary-finance committee, Aleksandr Zhukov, said that in 2000 defense procurement will reach a new high for the post-Soviet period, comprising almost 40 percent of the military budget. The defense budget is also being kept more secret, with fewer details being released to the press than in past years.[3] Klebanov noted that the government has paid the defense industry for 50-60 percent of the 1999 state defense order, and if not for the war in Chechnya, the entire order would have been paid for. By April 2000 the state's debt to defense industry for 1997-1998 is to be paid in full and in the next two to three years all past debts to are to be paid off.[2]
Sources:
[1] "Oboronnyy goszakaz v 2000 godu uvelichitsya v poltora raza-Putin," Interfax, 27 January 2000.
[2] "Uvelicheniye oboronnogo zakaza ne svyazano s chechenskoy kampaniyey," Interfax, 27 January 2000.
[3] Andrey Korbut, "Voyennyye raskhody vnov zasekretili," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 14-20 January 2000, p.5.{Entered 2/9/00 EV}
 
1/14/2000: NEW NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT PUBLISHED
The new Russian national security concept lowers the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict. For details on the concept please see the NIS Nuclear Profiles Overview Russia's New National Security Concept: The Nuclear Angle, by Dr. Nikolai Sokov.
 
12/6/99: CONSULTATIONS ON NUCLEAR FORCES HELD
According to an official of the Russian Ministry of Defense, a routine meeting of specialists on nuclear issues from Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the United States is to take place between 6 and 9 December 1999 at the Russian National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in Moscow. Russian and US experts meet once a year in accordance with the Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987. This meeting was expanded to include all the parties to the START I Treaty and Lisbon Protocol and will deal with issues such as notification of ballistic missile launches, disarmament-treaty compliance, and the functioning of data and signal transmission systems.
[Vladislav Kuznetsov, ITAR-TASS, 6 December 1999; in "Experts to Discuss ICBM Launch Notifications," FBIS Document FTS19991206000145.] {entered 3/31/2000 lgm}
 
10/20/99: MILITARY OFFICIALS SAY RUSSIA PREPARED FOR US ABROGATION OF ABM TREATY
Colonel General Vladimir Yakovlev, commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces (RSVN), told Interfax on 20 October 1999 that Russia is prepared to take "countermeasures" if the United States decides to unilaterally abrogate the ABM Treaty and deploy a limited national missile defense system (NMD). Although the United States argues that its limited NMD would not be directed against Russia, Yakovlev said that the Russian military was considering about 20 possible countermeasures "that could be put into effect without significantly increasing expenditures." Among these he mentioned reinstituting patrols by rail-mobile SS-24 ICBMs, which have been suspended since 1991, and increasing the patrol areas used by road-mobile SS-25 missiles, which are currently limited by the START I treaty. The removal of these restrictions would greatly improve the ability of these systems to overcome any US missile defense system, Yakovlev added. Yakovlev concluded that "the history of arms development provides reason to conclude that "the shield is always weaker than the sword." Anonymous Russian military sources told Interfax that they expect the United States will decide to deploy NMD, whether or not Russia agrees to amend the ABM Treaty to permit it.  They contended that "it is only a matter of time" until such a decision is made publicly. [Officially, the Clinton administration has said it will not decide whether to deploy a limited NMD until June 2000.] Nevertheless, Interfax reported that many Russian military leaders do not believe that the deployment of limited NMD by the United States will decrease the effectiveness of Russia's nuclear deterrent. The believe that the same measures that were devised a decade ago to counter the Reagan administration's "Star Wars" initiative will prove equally effective against the planned limited NMD system. Many Russian military planners also do not believe that the United States will be able to develop and deploy an NMD that could protect against a large-scale nuclear attack, such as Russia is capable of launching. The main impact of US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russian military sources told Interfax, will be on the entire system of limitations on strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Yakovlev pointedly noted that any US violation of the ABM Treaty would threaten START I, START II, and the proposed START III agreements. Yakovlev cautioned that if these agreements were to collapse, it would cause a major decrease in military transparency between the United States and Russia, as inspections of nuclear weapons facilities would cease. Instead of amending the ABM Treaty, Russian military officials suggest intensified collaborative efforts with the United States to improve monitoring of missile developments and launches in third countries, such as the establishment of joint monitoring centers.[1] The same day, Colonel General Valeriy Manilov, first deputy chief of the Russian General Staff, said that Moscow "will not compromise" on the provisions of the ABM Treaty. Ivashov reiterated the official Russian view that the ABM Treaty, START I, START II and START III are part of a single package, and "can only be implemented together." He concluded that Moscow views "as a threat" efforts to "destroy the existing system of arms control treaties," making a slightly veiled reference to US efforts to amend the ABM Treaty.[2]  These reports suggest that some Russian officials may be exaggerating the threat presented by the possible US deployment of NMD for domestic political purposes or to secure additional concessions from the United States. (For more information on this topic please see the ABM Treaty Overview.
Sources:
[1]"Moskva gotova k 'assimetrichnomu otvetu' na vykhod SShA iz dogovora po PRO," Interfax, 20 October 1999.
[2] "Rossiya ne poydet na kompromiss s SShA po voprosu peresmotra dogovora po PRO--general Manilov," Interfax, 20 October 1999. {entered 10/22/99 sdp}
 
9/28/99: STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES MUST BE REPLACED SOON
Colonel General Anatoly Sitnov, the head of procurement for Russia's armed forces, told reporters at a press conference that the land- and sea-based components of the nuclear triad needed to be totally replaced by 2007, while the air component was viable until 2015. He emphasized that only by replacing the entire complement of outdated silo-based missiles with the new RS-12M2 'Topol-M' [NATO designation 'SS-27'] can continuity in the strategic nuclear forces be maintained and the proposed limits under START III be attained.
["Resursnye vozmozhnosti strategicheskikh yadernykh sil Rossii rasschitany do 2007 goda," Interfax, 28 September 1999.] {entered 4/19/2000 lgm}
 
9/1/99:  INTERVIEW WITH THE SRF DEPUTY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
In an interview with a reporter from Krasnaya Zvezda, Colonel General Vladimir Muravev discussed the significance of the law On Funding the State Defense Order for the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation, signed by President Boris Yeltsin on 17 July 1999. Muravev said that "the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation are the main factor deterring aggression against our state." Given the serious economic difficulties that the country is experiencing and the fact that only 45-50 percent of the Defense Ministry's budget was financed in 1998, it became necessary to pass a law that would ensure targeted and stable financing for the strategic forces. This law establishes norms for determining the minimum funding necessary for defense orders, states the particulars of how the government will put together the budget for the nuclear forces, and creates the economic basis for maintaining the strategic forces at the level required to ensure the country's security from now through 2010. Muravev stated, "Stable financing will allow planning the optimal balanced development of the nuclear triad based on further integration of attack, information, and control systems. In turn, the integration of attack and information systems with a unified system of combat troop and weapon management, together with the introduction of a unified system for using arms and military equipment, will ensure the maximum effectiveness of the strategic nuclear forces." Muravev maintains that the law also has political significance inasmuch as it demonstrates to the world that Russia, in spite of economic hardship, will preserve its nuclear forces to guarantee its security.
[Alexander Dolinin, "Goszakaz yadernym silam garantirovan zakonom," Krasnaya zvezda, No. 182, 21 August 1999, p. 4.] {Entered 10/1/99 LGM}
 
8/30/99:  RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX VITAL TO NATIONAL SECURITY
On 30 August 1999 at the 50th anniversary celebration of the first Soviet nuclear test, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told journalists that the existence of Russia's nuclear weapons complex "remains the guarantor of national security and global peace in the current geopolitical setting."  Putin believes that developing and upgrading the nuclear weapons complex is one of the main tasks facing Russia.  "If we do not preserve our nuclear weapons capability in the next five to seven years, the situation will cardinally change in our country," according to Putin.[1]  At the same ceremony, Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev said that Russia's nuclear weapons are the most modern and "the best in the world."  While acknowledging that Russia is reducing its nuclear arsenal, Sergeyev noted that it would be a long process, due to "US double standards" in the nonproliferation of nuclear technologies.[2]
Sources:
[1]  "V sovremennykh geopoliticheskikh usloviyakh yadernoye oruzhiye Rossii garantiruyet sokhraneniye mira - Putin," Interfax, No. 4, 30 August 1999.
[2]  "Marshal Sergeyev schitayet rossiyskoye yadernoye oruzhiye luchshim v mire," Interfax, No. 4, 30 August 1999. {Entered 9/9/99 CEM}
 
8/26/99:  MODERNIZATION OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTINUES
On 26 August 1999 at a meeting with journalists at VNIIEF in connection with the 50th anniversary of the first Soviet nuclear test, Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev said that Russia's weapons are currently undergoing modernization in four different areas.  The first area is safety, specifically the prevention of accidental detonations or launches.  He noted that nuclear weapons have safety features that prevent their use if stolen by terrorists.  The second area is extending the service life of Russia's current nuclear arsenal.  The third is continuing research and development to maintain the nuclear arsenal in the event of a test ban (through laboratory modeling.)  The fourth is improvement of nuclear weapons in view of the development of anti-missile defense systems.  Ryabev also called for the formation of a smaller nuclear weapons complex, noting that Russia has already reduced its production of nuclear weapons more than ten-fold.  Weapons assembly facilities will be cut from four to two, and industry staff from 75,000 to 35,000 by the year 2005.  Ryabev commented that Russia has received $215 million from the United States, Japan, and the European Union to assist in conversion efforts.  The cities of Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Zheleznogorsk are scheduled to receive an additional $20 million in 2000 from the United States for defense conversion.  With regard to nuclear waste, Ryabev said "no nuclear wastes will be brought to Russia from abroad--only spent fuel from nuclear power stations, specifically uranium 235 and plutonium.  Plutonium will be extracted from the spent nuclear fuel for energy purposes.  The wastes will then be vitrified and returned to the sender country."
["Rossiya prodolzhayet sovershenstvovat yadernoye oruzhiye," Interfax, No. 2, 26 August 1999.]  {Entered 9/10/99 CEM}
 
7/23/99: LAW ON FUNDING THE STATE DEFENSE ORDER FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
The bill On funding the state defense order for the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation was signed into law by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 17 July 1999, having been adopted by the State Duma on 23 June 1999 and approved by the Federation Council on 2 July 1999. Speaking to reporters after the bill's adoption by the Duma, Roman Popkovich, chairman of the Duma's Defense Committee, noted that for the first five months of 1999, only 20 percent of the funds allocated in the budget for the purchase of arms and military equipment had been disbursed.[1] Hence, the need for this law, according to which a minimum of 15 percent of funds allocated for defense will be spent to develop and maintain the strategic nuclear forces. The law restricts the ability of the Defense Ministry to give a disproportionate amount of funds to favorite projects by setting a strict division of 15 percent for strategic forces and 85 percent for general-purpose forces. Popkovich said that unless prompt action is taken, the nuclear arsenal faces "wholesale degradation" in the next 10 years. While NATO countries have continued to update their nuclear forces, Russia's nuclear force is still based on the Soviet arsenal, which is now old and no longer considered safe.[2] But even this funding might not be sufficient. According to a high-ranking official who requested anonymity, "Because of the lack of funds, we are three years behind schedule on the Topol-M and instead of 24-hour early-warning satellite coverage, we have no more than six hours." The military likewise warns that wear and tear on the nuclear umbrella will lead to loss of the ability to withstand a nuclear strike by 2003.[3]
 
Article 1 of the law defines the composition of Russia's strategic nuclear forces. Article 2 establishes the nature of the defense orders that shall receive minimum funding. Article 3, which is secret, states what the minimum funding amounts shall be. Article 4 explains in detail the procedures to be used in funding the strategic forces during consideration of the draft budget for the following fiscal year, to include the following provisions:
1) expenditures on defense orders cannot be funded in amounts less than those specified in Article 3, with inflation to be factored in at the rate established by the Russian government for the corresponding period;
2) said expenditures must be indicated separately, with priority items stated as separate lines in the defense budget. Preliminary approval of the list and the funding amounts shall be obtained prior to consideration of the draft budget law in the State Duma;
3) the government must give its consent to any proposed cuts or redistrubution of funds for the strategic forces during consideration by the Duma of the draft budget for the next fiscal year or when proposed amendments and supplements to the current budget are being considered;
4) the resources specified in the budget cannot be used for any other purposes, nor may they be used to settle debts from preceding years;
5) any resources not used in the current fiscal year will be carried over to the following fiscal year; and
6) if the budget law does not come into force at the beginning of the fiscal year, funding will continue at the rate in effect for the corresponding time period of the preceding year, taking into account the inflation index, and within two weeks of the budget law coming into effect, the Russian Finance Ministry will establish the difference between what has been disbursed and what should have been disbursed under the new budget law and will disburse the appropriate amount to settle the difference within a week.
 
Article 5 provides for amendments and supplements to the law in the following circumstances:
in the year 2005, once plans for the period 2006-2010 have been updated; or earlier than 2005, if the program has been updated prior to 2005, if the composition of the strategic forces changes, if the Russian Federation enters into international agreements, if international agreements are terminated or suspended, or if funding volumes, as established in Article 3, are adjusted for inflation.
 
Article 6 provides for control over defense funding and states that the Russian government shall report the status of funding to the Federation Council on a quarterly basis. In accordance with Article 7, the law comes into force on its official release date.[4]
To read the full text (in Russian) of  On Funding the State Defense Order for the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation click here.
Sources:
[1] "Gosduma prinimayet zakon o finansirovanii gosudarstvennogo oboronnogo zakaza dlya strategicheskikh yadernykh sil Rossii," Interfax, No. 4, 23 June 1999.
[2] Oleg Odnokolenko, "Byudzhetnyy klyuchik k yadernomu chemodanchiku: Rossiyskuyu yadernuyu triadu 'postavili na protsenty,'" Segodnya, 25 June 1999, p. 1-2; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, No. 74, 28 June 1999.
[3] Aleksey Karelov, "Yadernym silam ne khvatayet deneg," Vremya, 16 June 1999, p. 2; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, No. 70, 18 June 1999.
[4] "Federal Law: On Funding the State Defense Order for the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation," Rossiysskaya gazeta, 23 July 1999, p. 13; in "Strategic Nuclear Forces Funding Law," FBIS Document FTS19990723001553. {Entered 9/27/99 LGM}
 
7/22/99:  SECOND SRF REGIMENT TO BE EQUIPPED WITH TOPOL-Ms AND MORE TOPOL-Ms TO BE PRODUCED
On 22 July 1999, Colonel General Anatoliy Sitnov, Chief of Arms Supplies of the Russian Armed Forces, announced that another Topol-M regiment of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) would be made combat ready.[1]  This announcement was reiterated on 2 August 1999 by SRF Commander Colonel General Vladimir Yakovlev, when he announced that "another rocket regiment equipped with [10] Topol-M missile systems will "undoubtedly" be added to the Russian armed forces before the end of 1999."  As part of the Tatishchevo division, the regiment will be based in the Saratov region.  In 1998 a regiment in the Tatishchevo division received 10 Topol-M ICBMs.  According to Yakovlev, the mass production of these missiles means that the armed forces will receive an additional 20 Topol-M ICBMs next year.  That number could rise to 30, but is dependent on the federal budget and the implementation of the law On funding the state defense order for the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.[2]  In order to improve the capabilities of the anti-missile defense system and satellite surveillance, the Ministry of Defense plans to purchase 10 new satellites.  And in addition to those, equipment for the rest of the nuclear triad of Russia will be purchased:  the air force will receive a new strategic bomber, the Tu-160, which has been in production at the Kazan Airplane Factory for five years, and the Russian Navy will receive a new nuclear submarine, a large anti-submarine ship, a missile ship, and a landing craft.  However, actual delivery of the orders will be dependent on funding for defense contracts.  In the first half of 1999 the Ministry of Defense only received 20 percent of the funds for the defense order.  Of that, 48 percent will be spent on the purchase of new weapons and the modernization of existing military technology.  An additional 60 percent of requested funds for the state defense order should be distributed by the Ministry of Finance in the fourth quarter of 1999.  It is unclear, however, if that money will be available.[1,3]  If the necessary funds are not made available, then many systems currently in service will begin to become ineffective in 2003.  Sitnov noted that the lifetime of tanks and artillery equipment can be extended again, but that is not the case with the space satellites or other more advanced systems.[3]  In a related Vremya MN article from 20 July 1999, it was reported that no one knows exactly how much money Russia needs yearly for military reform.  There is a suspicion that current defense budgets are spent on feeding the army, not on its development.  In connection with the budget, Sitnov admitted that in fact, the military really needs 22 satellites, not the 10 that are expected to be ordered under the current budget.[4]
Sources:
[1]  Vladimir Georgiyev, "VS Rossii priobretut 10 novykh "Topoley-M," Nezavisimaya gazeta online edition, http://home.mosinfo.ru/news/ng/99/07/data/n132-23.htm, No. 132, 22 July 1999.
[2]  "Another Missile Regiment to be Added to Russian Armed Forces - Commander," Interfax, No. 2, 2 August 1999.
[3]  "Rossiiskiye sily yadernogo sderzhivaniya v etom godu popolnyatsya obraztsami vooruzhenii," Interfax, 17 July 1999, http://www.interfax.ru.
[4]  "Armiya zagovorila," Vremya MN, No. 128, 20 July 1999.  {Entered 9/29/99 CEM}
 
7/20/99:  FORCES IN RUSSIAN FAR EAST LOSE POWER DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF UTILITY BILL
According to Interfax, air defense forces of the 11th Army division in Russia's Far East lost power on 20 July 1999 after the Khabarovskenergo company cut off electrical service because of outstanding debts.  Units of the strategic rocket forces in charge of Russia's "nuclear shield" and many Russian military cities were also left without electricity.  During the outage, civilian airliners disappeared from military radar before back-up systems came on.  Sources noted that "the air and air defense forces have repaid 27 percent of their debt for electricity.  However, they still owe electricity suppliers 27 million rubles, plus about 110 million rubles for heat."  Funds to pay for the remaining utility debt have still not arrived from Moscow.  However, according to a government resolution adopted in July 1999, "heat electricity, and water cannot be cut off from facilities that are of strategic importance for the country's security."[1]  In a related article in the Washington Post it was noted that this is "at least the third time in a year that sensitive military installations have found themselves without power because of unpaid bills."[2]
Sources:
[1] "Chasti PVO na Dalnem Vostoke vremenno ostavili bez kontrolya vozdushnuu granitsu rossii," Interfax, 20 July 1999.
[2] Sharon Lafraniere, "Power to Russian Nuclear Forces is Shut Off; Units on Border With China Go Dark Temporarily for Failure to Pay Bill," Washington Post, 20 July 1999, p. A15; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,  http://web.lexis-nexis.com.  {Entered 9/16/99 CEM}
 
6/24/99:  YELTSIN RETURNS BILL ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DUMA
Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent letters to Yegor Stroyev, chairman of the Federation Council, and Gennady Seleznev, speaker of the State Duma, informing them that he was returning without review the bill On the creation, use, dismantlement, and safety of nuclear weapons, which was adopted by the State Duma on 20 May 1999 and approved by the Federation Council on 9 June 1999. The bill was returned because of a failure to follow constitutional requirements in the process of submitting draft legislation to the State Duma. According to Article 104, Section 3 of the Russian Constitution, a conclusion of the government must be included in any legislation which provides for expenditures from the federal budget. As this procedure was not followed in this case, Yeltsin stated that the bill had been unlawfully adopted and could not be signed into law.
["Prezident Rossiyskoy Federatsii B.N. Yeltsin ne podpisal Federalnyy zakon," Rossiyskaya gazeta online edition, http://www.rg.ru, 24 June 1999.] {Entered 10/1/99 LGM}
6/21-26/99: ZAPAD-99 EXERCISE INCLUDES SIMULATED NUCLEAR STRIKES
From 21 to 26 June the Russian armed forces conducted what was described as the largest military command-staff exercise of the past 10 years, with the final stage of the exercise featuring simulated nuclear strikes by air-launched cruise missiles against Europe and the United States.[1]  Code-named Zapad-99 (West-99) the exercise involved extensive cooperation between Russian and Belarusian forces, while Kazakhstani military officers attended as observers.[2,3]  The Russian forces involved included all of the armed services, with up to 50,000 troops taking part.[4]  According to Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, the purpose of the exercises was to "work out one of the provisions of the Russian military docrine--the use of nuclear weapons in the case when all other methods of organizing defense have been exhausted."[5]  While Russian Ministry of Defense officials denied any direct link between the exercise and NATO's air campaign against Serbia, claiming that the exercise had been planned in December 1998, several aspects of Zapad-99 were designed to test possible countermeasures to the tactics used by NATO against Serbia.[2,6,7]  Sergeyev noted that the exercise had been crafted to take into account a "powerful information offensive that preceded armed aggression, the localization of the conflict and non-contact warfare."[5]  By "non-contact warfare" Sergeyev was apparently referring to a campaign in which air forces conduct all the fighting, at least initially, with no direct engagement of opposing ground forces.  This was reflected in reports of the exercise and the maneuvers conducted, with a heavy emphasis on aviation, air defense, and naval forces.  The scenario for the exercises started with a massive air attack from the "west" involving 450 tactical and strategic aircraft, plus 120 cruise missiles, against Belarusian territory.  In addition, the scenario postulated a 110-aircraft and 40-cruise missile attack against Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast.[2]  According to Colonel General Anatoliy Kornukov, Commander of the Russian Air Force and Air Defense Forces, these simulated air attacks were met and repulsed with 21 intercept sorties and 28 SAM launches against target drones.  Russian air forces then screened Russian and Belarusian ground forces that prepared a counterattack in Belarus and worked to "deblockade" Kaliningrad.  Long-range aviation forces carried out simulated strikes against attacking ground forces on 24 June, with a simulated 50-aircraft strike against armored targets at an exercise range near Tver.[2]  In the north, the Northern Fleet deployed 30 ships, including the nuclear-powered cruiser Petr Velikiy, and four submarines, and engaged in extensive live-fire exercises. Even these large-scale exercises ran into budget constraints, however, as the Fleet's fuel allocation for the maneuvers was reduced by half just before the exercise started, necessitating a reduction in the number of ships participating and a cut in the flying time for tactical and helicopter aviation.[1]  Despite the reported success of all the individual components of the exercise, the overall scenario called for limited nuclear strikes against "western" targets in order to bring the conflict to a close. Indeed, Sergeyev's comments imply that nuclear strikes were used as a last resort after conventional defenses had begun to collapse.[8]  The simulated nuclear strikes started on the morning of 26 June, when two Tu-95 MS Bear-H bombers from the 22nd Guards Heavy Bomber Division flew near Iceland on a simulated cruise missile launch mission, reportedly with the mainland United States as the target.[9]  The same day two Tu-160 BlackJack bombers flew down the coast of Norway, reportedly in a simulated nuclear strike against continental Europe.[9,6,8,10]  These strikes apparently ended the exercise [indicating that Defense Ministry planners believe that escalation to limited nuclear strikes might successfully terminate a conflict].  No cost figures for the exercise have been released, but the Russian press has speculated that the cost could run into the billions of rubles, and may have exhausted the training budget for the year.[11]  Indeed, the Northern Fleet reportedly consumed its entire fuel allocation for the 1999 training year during the exercise.[2]  According to Defense Minister Sergeyev, similar exercises may be held every two years in the future.[8]
Sources:
[1] Dmitriy Litovkin, Roman Fomishenko, "Zapolyarnyy gals 'Zapada-99,'" Krasnaya zvezda, 13 July 1999, p. 2.
[2] Aleksandr Babakin, "Nash 'Zapad-99' ne protiv Zapada," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 26 June 1999, p. 2.
[3] Interfax, 22 June 1999; in "Russian Military Exercises Consider Balkans Conflict," FBIS Document FTS19990622000754.
[4] Michael R. Gordon, "Manuevers Show Russian Reliance on Nuclear Arms," New York Times, 10 July 1999, p. A1.
[5] "Na ucheniyakh 'Zapad-99' otrabatyvalos uslovnoye primeneniye yadernogo oruzhiya," Interfax, 9 July 1999.
[6] Yuriy Golotyuk, "Defense Ministry Premiere in 'Western Theater,'" Izvestiya, 29 June 1999, p. 2; in "Zapad-99 Said to Have Rehearsed Nuclear Strike," FBIS Document FTS19990629000823.
[7] Vladimir Georgiyev, "Russia Used Nuclear Weapons Two Weeks Ago," Nezavisimaya gazeta, p. 2; in "Sergeyev: Security 'Only by Using Nuclear Weapons,'" FBIS Document FTS19990712001052.
[8] Ivan Safronov, "Russia Plans to Give West a Scare.  Every Two Years," Kommersant, 10 July 1999, p. 2; in "Sergeyev's 'Pleasure' Seen at Review of Zapad Exercise," FBIS Document FTS19990712000827.
[9] Aleksandr Koretskiy, "Rossiya nanesla yadernyy udar po SShA," Segodnya online edition,  http://home.eastview.com, 2 July 1999.
[10] Anatoliy Yurkin, ITAR-TASS, 28 June 1999; in "Russian Planes Fire Missiles in 'West-99' Exercises," FBIS Document FTS1999062800186.
[11] Nikolay Karpov, "Skolko stoit postrelyat," Delovoy vtornik, No. 24, 13 July 1999, p. 2; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost,  No. 82, 15 July 1999.  {Entered 7/29/99 JL}
 
6/9/99:  BILL ON NUCLEAR ARMS APPROVED BY RUSSIAN FEDERATION COUNCIL
On 6 June 1999, Russia's Federation Council unanimously approved the bill On the creation, use, dismantlement, and safety of nuclear weapons, which the State Duma adopted on 20 May 1999.
[Nikolai Venediktov, RIA-Novosti, 9 June 1999; in "Federation Council Approves Bill on Nuclear Arms," FBIS Document FTS19990610001421.] {entered 10/1/99 LGM}
 
5/20/99:  DUMA ADOPTS BILL ON THE CREATION, USE, DISMANTLEMENT, AND SAFETY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The bill On the creation, use, dismantlement, and safety of nuclear weapons establishes the legal basis for state regulation of activities connected with nuclear weapons. It also provides for punitive measures for violations of Russian laws covering this area.[1] The bill states that nuclear weapons and installations, as well as facilities for research and development, maintenance, and destruction of nuclear weapons materials, are exclusively the responsibility of the federal authorities. In accordance with this bill, the Russian president makes all nuclear disarmament decisions, which must be approved by the Federation Council.[2]
[1] "Poryadok v yadernykh voyskakh," Rossiyskaya gazeta, No. 97, 21 May 1999, p. 2.
[2] "Gosudarstvennaya Duma prinyala federalnyy zakon "O sozdanii, ekspluatatsii, likvidatsii i obespechenii bezopasnosti yadernogo oruzhiya," Krasnaya zvezda, 21 May 1999, p.1; in WPS Oborona i bezopasnost, No. 59, 24 May 1999. {entered 10/1/99 LGM}
 
4/29/99: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The Security Council of the Russian Federation conducted a closed meeting to discuss the status and the prospects of the nuclear deterrence forces. Reports were made by the Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev and the Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov. At a subsequent briefing the secretary of the Security Council, Vladimir Putin, reported that the meeting adopted three documents. One of them covers the development and the security of the nuclear weapons complex (i.e. development, production, and testing of nuclear warheads), another is a concept for the use of nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons; the third document, said Putin, was so secret that even its title could not be disclosed. He stressed that Russia would continue "to abide by all obligations it had undertaken" in the area of arms control and international security.[1] Press reports suggested that in the view of the breakdown of the START II ratification process, the Security Council decided to extend service life of SS-18 Satan (RS-20) heavy ICBMs, retain eight Delta III SSBNs which had been previously slated for decommissioning, and buy eight Tu-160 Blackjack and three Tu-95 Bear heavy bombers from Ukraine.[2] The Security Council also reportedly decided to develop a new, low-yield nuclear warhead and to develop a capability to ensure the reliability of Russian nuclear weapons within the framework of the CTBT. Considerable attention was devoted to the safety and security of Russian nuclear weapons design, production, and storage facilities.[3,4,5] For more information please see the overview, "The Russian Federation Security Council Meeting on Nuclear Weapons."
Sources:
[1] "Na zasedanii Soveta bezopasnosti prinyaty dokumenty kasauyshchiyesya razvitiya yadernykh sil," Interfax, 29 April 1999.
[2] Ilya Bulavinov and Ivan Safronov, "Rossiya budet derzhat 'yadernyy porokh' sukhim," Kommersant-Daily, 30 April 1999.
[3] Igor Korotchenko, "Otechestvennyy yadernyy kompleks razvalivayetsya," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 April 1999, p. 2.
[4] "Yadernyy shchit bez izyana," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 30 April 1999, p. 2.
[5] Pavel Felgengauer, "Ogranichennaya yadernaya voyna? A pochemu by i net!" Segodnya, 6 May 1999, pp. 1, 2. {Entered 6/14/99 NS}
 
4/9/99: REMARK ABOUT RETARGETING OF MISSILES CREATES FUROR
In an interview with Interfax, State Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev said that President Boris Yeltsin had told him in their morning meeting that he had given an order for Russian missiles to be targeted "against those countries that are carrying out military operations against Yugoslavia."[1,2] The remark created a furor in Moscow and in the capitals of the countries concerned. Contacted by Interfax for comment, a NATO spokesman in Brussels said that NATO refrained from any comment since "We didn't hear this information from President Yeltsin himself."[3] Seleznev's press secretary later said that it was all a misunderstanding, that the words "the order has been given" were never said, and that "the president was speaking only of a possibility of retargeting the missiles under certain circumstances." Strategic Rocket Forces Chief of Staff Anatoliy Perminov said later the same day that "the forces had not so far received an order from Yeltsin to retarget their missiles on any NATO countries." Presidential aide Sergey Prikhodko, who is in charge of foreign policy in the presidential administration, said, "It cannot be ruled out that NATO's large-scale action in Yugoslavia will demand introducing correctives to the Russian defense doctrine."[4]
Sources:
[1]"Yeltsin otdal prikaz o natselivanii rossiyskikh raket v storonu tekh stran, kotoryye voyuyut protiv Yugoslavii - Seleznev," Interfax, 9 April 1999.
[2] Russian Public Television First Channel Network, 9 April 1999; in "Seleznev: Yeltsin Wants Missiles Aimed at NATO States," FBIS Document FTS19990409000733
[3] "V NATO ne rassmatrivayut kak ofitsialno soobshcheniye Selezneva o natselivanii rossiyskikh raket v storonu stran, voyuyushchikh protiv SRYu, i potomu vozderzhivayutsya ot kommentariya," Interfax, 9 April 1999
[4] ITAR-TASS, 9 April 1999; in "Russia's Missiles Not Retargeted 'So Far,'" FBIS Document FTS19990409001335 {entered 11/3/99 LGM}
 
4/1/99: DUMA COMMITTEE CHAIR CALLS FOR DEFENSE BUDGET INCREASE
Speaking before reporters on 1 April 1999, Roman Popkovich, Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, said that Russia's defense budget should be at least 5.5 percent of GDP.  According to Popkovich "the deputies have once again realized the need to pay more attention to the armed forces and their financing.  I think the defense budget will be increased this year."  Popkovich noted that the minimum defense budget on which the army can survive is 3.5 percent of GDP, as had been approved by the president. With regard to the START II Treaty, Popkovich said that the Duma will ratify it because "Russia needs it in the first place and it has nothing to do with our relations with the United States."
[Boris Kipkeyev, "Lawmaker Hopeful for Russia Defense Budget Increase," ITAR-TASS, 1 April 1999.] {Entered 5/25/99 CEM}
 
3/25/99: RYBAKOV: REDEPLOYMENT OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN BELARUS A 'HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO'
On 25 March 1999, Izvestiya reported that the Chief of the Foreign Ministry Directorate for International Security and Arms Control, Valentin Rybakov, called the redeployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus a "hypothetical scenario" and noted that the Belarusian leadership was not calling for the return of nuclear weapons to Belarus. According to Izvestiya, the Russian military may consider the possibility of beginning talks with Belarus about the return of Russian nuclear weapons to the republic. After Russia withdrew its nuclear forces from Belarus, the two ICBM bases at Lida and Mozyr and the two storage facilities at Kolosova and Lesnaya were supposed to be destroyed. The destruction of these sites was to be completed by 5 December 2001, but only three launch pads have been destroyed because of lack of funds. Those launch pads that have not been destroyed have fallen into disrepair and ICBMs could not be deployed to them without substantial and expensive rebuilding.
(For Belarusian commentary on this issue please see the section on Belarusian Position on Nuclear Related Issues.)
[Svetlana Karpekova, "Belarus Cannot Afford Nuclear Weapons," Izvestiya, 25 March 1999, p. 3; in "N-Weapons' Return to Belarus 'Unlikely' on Cost Grounds," FBIS Document FTS19990324001130.] {Entered 5/10/99 SS}
 
3/17/99: DUMA ADOPTS BILL ON THE FINANCING OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
On 17 March 1999, the Duma adopted a bill on financing the Russian Federation's strategic nuclear forces until 2010. Deputies passed the bill after its first reading by a large majority. Duma Defense Committee Chairman Roman Popkovich (Our Home is Russia) stated that Russia's strategic nuclear forces (SNF) have already "entered the zone of progressive degradation."  Without guaranteed financing,  Popkovich argued, decline of the SNF would continue and this could force Russia to leave the ranks of leading nuclear states by the year 2005.  According to Popkovich, the bill allocates the yearly "minimal necessary amount of financing" from investment programs to the SNF and the bill plans the development of the SNF in financial terms.  Popkovich reported that the general fiancial expenditures stipulated by law are compatible with the State Purchasing Order Until 2010 and do not exceed 3.5 percent of GDP, as requested.  Deputies did not link financing for the SNF to the START II Treaty, which the Duma has yet to ratify. Popkovich also quoted Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov's letter to the Duma in which Primakov said that he "considers it possible to support the bill" after introducing some clarifications into the bill. According to Aleksey Arbatov (Yabloko), the bill "creates the basis for a more simple position for further Russian treaties." The bill adjusts SNF financing in relation to the level of inflation and stipulates that financing for the SNF may not be used to pay other debts or for other purposes. The bill also mandates that if funds earmarked for the SNF are not completely used, then they will be be included in the next year's budget as supplemental funding for the SNF.
["Gosduma prinyala v pervom chtenii zakon o finansirovanii strategicheskikh yadernykh sil RF do 2010 goda," Interfax, 17 March 1999.] {Entered 4/19/99 SS}
 
3/15/99: MIKHAYLOV: ROLE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY
Speaking before reporters on 15 March 1999, Russian Security Council First Deputy Secretary Vyacheslav Mikhaylov said that Russia regards nuclear forces as "a guarantee of national security and a means to deter aggression against the Russian state and its allies."[1]  Referring to President Boris Yeltsin's approval of the document "Fundamental Tenets for the Russian Federation's Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence," Mikhaylov contended that the policy's main goals are the "guaranteed defense of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Russia and its allies, and the creation of favorable conditions for the country's peaceful development." The same document asserted that Russia supports continued "systematic and consequential efforts by all nuclear states to reduce nuclear weapons at a global level" and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Mikhaylov asserted that "the policy is not directed towards any one state or union of states" and stated that other measures to remove threats to national sovereignty and territorial integrity are ineffective as long as other states maintain nuclear weapons in their arsenals. Yeltsin's approval of the Russian nuclear deterrence policy came after NATO inducted Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into the alliance.  According to Nezavisimaya gazeta, the doctrine could "become the basis upon which concrete decisions regarding the structure of Russian nuclear forces are based."[2]
Sources:
[1] "Obespecheniye yadernogo sderzhivaniya yavlyayetsya odnim iz vazhneyshikh prioritetov Rossii-pervyy Zamsekretarya Sovbeza RF Mikhaylov," Interfax, 15 March 1999.
[2] Sergey Sokut, "Yeltsin utverdil yadernuyu politiku," Nezavisimaya gazeta, online edition, http://www.ipres.ru/news/ng/98/index.html, 16 March 1999. {Entered 4/13/99 SS}
 
3/4/99: STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES MUST FORM BASE OF RUSSIA'S DEFENSE
On 4 March 1999 Roman Popkovich, Duma Defense Committee Chairman and member of the Our Home is Russia faction announced that on 17 March 1999 the Russian Duma will debate the draft law On Financing Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces through 2010. At parliamentary hearings concerning war and other threats to the security of Russia as a result of NATO expansion, Popkovich noted that "war is possible and thus we must provide for the defense of our state." In Popkovich's opinion the foundation of Russia's security must be its strategic forces. Popkovich added that Russia "has the opportunity to destroy NATO from the inside, and we must use this opportunity."
["Osnovoy oborony Rossii dolzhny byt strategicheskiye yadernyye sily, voyska PVO i VVS - glava komiteta Gosdumy po oborone," Interfax, No. 2, 4 March 1999.] {Entered 4/28/99 CEM}
 
3/3/99: DUMA RESOLUTION TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY AT NUCLEAR ARSENALS APPROVED
The Russian Duma passed a resolution on 3 March 1999 calling on President Yeltsin to develop a federal program to strengthen nuclear weapons security by the year 2005. The resolution, which was approved by 302 deputies, calls for the creation of a professional security unit for Ministry of Defense nuclear sites, and for using funds from the federal budget for equipment to protect nuclear munition storage sites. According to the deputies, lack of funding for those military divisions that use nuclear munitions and are responsible for the security of these munitions should not be permitted. The Duma estimates that government owes these military divisions 645.2 million rubles ($27,810,344 at the 3 March 1999 exchange rate).
["Gosduma RF vystupaet za razrabotku federalnoy programmy usileniya bezopasnosti yadernogo oruzhiya," Interfax, 3 March 1999.] {entered 4/1/99 SS}
 
2/17/99: JOINT RUSSIAN-US CONSULTATIVE GROUP DISCUSSES Y2K ISSUE
During its Moscow conference held 17-21 February 1999 at the Russian Defense Ministry, the Russian-US Consultative Group on Defense Issues discussed current projects "connected with the further development of bilateral relations in the military field."[1] The agenda included discussion of US and Russian defense ministries' efforts to resolve the Y2K computer problem. While Russian nuclear forces rely more heavily on computers than Russia's other military branches, older mainframe computers are used for the strategic work and most of the Russian officer corps do not use computers. Russian specialists agree that there will be no serious problems such as accidental nuclear launches, but rather "months of fits and starts," to get the systems back into working order. Vladimir Orlov of the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center) noted that problems will most likely occur with tracking the location and alert status of nuclear weapons, as opposed to problems with the targeting systems.[2] Other issues discussed at the consultative group meeting included "possible threats to security of Russia and the United States, bringing trust and security measures into the military field, prospects of bilateral military cooperation and progress with the START I Treaty."[3]
Sources:
[1] "In the Interests of Developing Mutually Advantageous Cooperation," Krasnaya zvezda,23 February 1999, p.1; in "Russia, US Group Discusses START I, Y2K Bug," FBIS Document FTS19990222001204.
[2] Petr Yudin, "Technology Lag Provides Protection for Russia," Defense News, 2-8 February 1999, p.10.
[3] Anatoliy Yurkin, "Russo-US Consultative Group Meeting in Moscow 17-21 Feb," ITAR-TASS, 12 February 1999; in "Russo-US Consultative Group Meeting in Moscow 17-21 Feb," FBIS Document FTS19990212000861. {entered 3/25/99 SS}
 
2/10/99: SERGEYEV: PROPOSAL TO UNIFY RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES COMPLETE BY MAY
After meeting with President Boris Yeltsin on 10 February 1999, Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev stated that the proposal to place all Russian strategic nuclear deterrence forces under one command will be concluded in May.[1] Yeltsin created a special commission to study the creation of a unified strategic forces command and appointed Sergeyev to head the commission.  Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin was appointed deputy chairman of the commission, which includes all commanders of the military services.[2] According to Sergeyev, the special commission will study the "mechanism and indicators in the political, economic military and technical spheres" and will brief Yeltsin on the conclusions in May. In 1998, Sergeyev proposed the creation of the Unified Main Command of Strategic Deterrence Forces, which would assume command of all military structures possessing strategic nuclear weapons, including the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Navy, and the Air Force.[1] Sergeyev further recommended that Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Vladimir Yakovlev should head the unified strategic command. Critics state that the proposed unification of nuclear deterrent forces is an attempt by Sergeyev to save the Strategic Rocket Forces, which were to be merged with the Air Force in 2001.[2] According to these critics, Sergeyev's proposal lacks support from the troops and the accelerated creation of a unified command will turn a significant number of the top generals against Sergeyev.[2]
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 10 February 1999; in "Sergeyev on Uniting Command of Nuclear Forces," FBIS Document FTS19990210000605.
[2] Nikolay Gulko, "President Hands Over Nuclear Forces to Sergeyev," Kommersant, 11 February 1999, p.3; in "Sergeyev Wins on N-Forces, But Victory May Be 'Pyrrhic'," FBIS Document FTS19990211000733. {entered 3/25/99 SS}
 
2/9/99: MINATOM: TWO CLOSED CITIES WILL NO LONGER MAKE NUCLEAR WARHEADS
Speaking before reporters on 9 February 1999,  Russian First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev stated that two plants in the closed cities of Sarov (Arzamas-16) and Zarechnyy (Penza-19) will no longer assemble nuclear armaments.
[ITAR-TASS, 9 February 1999; in "Nuclear Weapons Plants To Be Wound Down," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe.]  {Entered 4/12/99 SS}
 
1/15/99: EXPERT CALLS CREATION OF UNIFIED STRATEGIC COMMAND PREMATURE
On 15 January 1999, Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye published an article by Army General Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareyev, who warned that the proposed integration of Russian strategic nuclear forces "is premature and is capable of giving rise to more negative than positive consequences." According to Gareyev, the proposed Unified Main Command of the Strategic Deterrence Forces would lead to "the disintegration and destruction of the unified character of strategic planning and of the command and control of the armed forces" because the proposed Unified Main Command would diminish the role of the General Staff in strategic planning.  Gareyev further noted that the document for the creation of the Unified Main Command fails to clearly define the functions of the proposed Command. The draft proposed transferring the main commands from the Navy and the Air Force as well as some functions from the General Staff to the Unified Main Command.  Gareyev argued that the proposed Unified Main Command would "complicate the command and control system of the strategic nuclear forces (SNF)" because an intermediary command and control system would exist within the SNF's own system. Gareyev noted the need for military intelligence in the planning and targeting policies of the SNF and questioned whether the proposed Unified Main Command would receive such intelligence at the expense of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and other branches of the armed forces. According to Gareyev, those who support the creation of the Unified Main Command "envision taking a portion of the specialists from the General Staff, from the main staffs of the Navy and Air Force and from the 12th Main Directorate."  Gareyev asserted, however, that there are "no specialists to spare in these command and control agencies" and any transfer of specialists would disrupt the functioning of these groups. Gareyev doubted statements that the proposed command will yield savings of 10-15 percent because the recruitment and training of new specialists as well as integration of automated command, control and communications (C3) systems would reduce such savings. Gareyev also expressed concern that "no single organ will remain which would have the right to supervise nuclear weapons and ensure nuclear safety."
[Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareyev, "Integration--No Goal in and of Itself: The Command and Control and the Strategic Forces Must Become More Effective and Economical," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, p. 4; in "Improvements in Control of Strategic Forces Urged," FBIS Document FTS19990122001305.] {Entered 4/22/99 SS}
 
1/13/99: RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTER SERGEYEV REITERATES SUPPORT FOR CREATING UNIFIED STRATEGIC COMMAND
Speaking to reporters on 13 January 1999, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev called the creation of the Unified Main Command of the Strategic Deterrence Forces "one of the main reforms of Russian armed forces for 1999."[1]  According to Sergeyev, the "military command must react quickly to changing operational circumstances and be capable of working under any conditions."[1]  Sergeyev further warned that without such unified control, Russian missiles would become mere "decorations." Russian strategic rocket forces, nuclear submarines, and nuclear bombers would fall under the new command's jurisdiction.  All of Russia's nuclear forces would be under the Unified Main Command, and as a result, the decision whether to use nuclear forces would rest with the new command.[2] However, according to the Ministry of Defense, "there has been no talk of administrative restructuring: submarine launch squadrons will remain part of the Navy and bombers will remain part of the Air Force."[2] Critics argue that Sergeyev strayed from plans approved by President Boris Yeltsin in November and eliminated departments and headquarters "one after the other."[2]  Russian General Headquarters and the Navy protested the large-scale reorganization and mounted a press campaign against Sergeyev, which alleged that his reforms would break up the last combat-ready Russian army.[2]
Sources:
[1] "Marshal Sergeyev nazyvayet sozdaniye obyedinennogo komandovaniya strategicheskich sil sderzhivaniya odnim iz glavnykh napravlenyy reformirovaniya vooruzhennykh sil Rossii v 1999 godu," Interfax, 13 January 1999.
[2] Aleksandr Golts, "Komandovaniye razdora," Itogi, 22 December 1998,  pp.16-17.{entered 1/21/99 SS}
 
12/30/98: RUSSIAN OFFICIAL RULES OUT DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN BELARUS
Russian Deputy Minister for CIS Affairs Igor Savolskiy told a press conference on 29 December that Russia has no plans to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus in the event that the two countries reunite.[1]  Savolskiy was answering a question about the possible deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus following the release by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Belarusian counterpart Alyaksandr Lukashenka on 25 December 1998 of a declaration calling for the accelerated drafting of a "treaty of unification" between Russia and Belarus.[2]  Savolskiy said that although Russia and Belarus would continue joint military cooperation, "the decision that Russia will be the sole CIS nuclear power will not be questioned by anyone."[1] Belarus has signed and ratified the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state, and in accordance with the Lisbon protocol to START I, agreed to the removal of all former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons from its territory.  Despite Savolskiy's political declaration, the international treaty obligations of Russia and Belarus do not appear to preclude the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory if both countries should decide to make such a deployment.  The NPT does not prohibit the deployment by a nuclear weapon state of nuclear weapons under its control on the territory of a non-nuclear weapon state, a point insisted on by the United States during the negotiation of the treaty in the 1960s.[3]  As a result, the United States is permitted to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear signatories of the NPT, such as Germany and the Netherlands. A small number of US nuclear weapons are still based in these countries.[4]  By extension, Russia could argue that it is permitted to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus under the NPT, if the two countries were to jointly reverse their current policy stance and agree on such a deployment.
Sources:
[1]"Russia Rules Out Deploying Nuclear Weapons in Belarus," AFP, 30 December 1998; in Johnson's Russia List #2537, 30 December 1998.
[2] Pavel Kuznetzov, "Russia-Belarus Unification Treaty to be Ready by Mid,"  ITAR-TASS, 25 December 1998; at http://www.lexis-nexis.com
[3]"Narrative: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," available at http://www.acda.gov/treaties/npt1.htm#1.
[4] William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris and Joshua Handler, Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998 (Washington DC: National Resources Defense Council, 1998); available at: http://www.nrdc.org. {entered 1/20/99 SDP}
 
11/6/98: SERGEYEV PROPOSES COMMAND CONSOLIDATION FOR RUSSIAN STRATEGIC FORCES
Interfax reported on 6 November 1998 that Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev proposed reorganizing the armed forces into a three-service structure and forming a Unified Main Command of the Strategic Deterrence Forces.  Sergeyev met with President Boris Yeltsin on 3 November 1998 in Sochi to discuss military reform,[1] and Yeltsin agreed to Sergeyev's proposals. Moskovskiy Komsomolets published an excerpt from Sergeyev's letter to Yeltsin in which the defense minister argued for "the transition to a three branch structure for the Armed Forces along with the simultaneous creation" of a Unified Main Command of the Strategic Deterrence Forces.[2] Proponents of Sergeyev's proposal argue that a unified command structure would reduce personnel by seven to 12 percent, and "allow army training to be more efficient." According to Sergeyev's supporters, the Unified Main Command would cut duplication in research and development, thereby reducing the cost of upgrading strategic nuclear forces by 15-20 percent. Advocates further insist that the Unified Main Command would ensure that "control over the nonproliferation of missile and nuclear technologies [is] more centralized." Formation of the new command would occur in two phases:  the first stage would create a management body, and the second stage would place responsibility for Russia's nuclear forces as a whole on the Unified Main Command.[1] In particular, the Ministry of Defense's 12th Main Directorate, which is responsible for nuclear security in the armed forces, will fall under the Command's jurisdiction. First Deputy Defense Minister Nikolay Mikhaylov convened a meeting of the Defense Ministry's Collegium on 6 November 1998 to protest Sergeyev's proposals, which "struck a blow against the self-esteem of the commanders-in-chief who today have their own nuclear forces." The Air Force and Navy leadership also expressed skepticism that "some sort of unified command [would] be effective, at a moment when the army and navy are crumbling away before their very eyes."  Opponents further note that the law On Defense and Yeltsin's edict On the First Measures to Reform the Russian Federation Armed Forces make no reference to the creation of a unified command.[2]
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 6 November 1998; in "Combined Command Considered for Armed Force," FBIS Document FTS19981106001318.
[2] Sergey Larionov, "Revolt in Uniform: In the Defense Ministry, They Cannot Share Nuclear Weapons," Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 10 November 1998, p.1; in "MoD Officials vs. Nuclear Force Changes," FBIS Document FTS19981110001080. {entered 2/1/99 SS}
 
11/5/98: YAKOVLEV: STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES UNIFICATION REDUCES DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
On 5 November 1998, Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye published an interview with Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) Vladimir Yakovlev.  According to Yakovlev, the decision to place the SRF, the Space Forces, and the Missile Space Defense Forces under a single command has reduced defense expenditures. Yakovlev stated that "before the unification, these three components took 19.3 percent of our defense budget," compared to 15 percent after unification.  Yakovlev said that the decreased budget was "achieved by introducing uniform technical principles and a uniform command and control system."  According to Yakovlev, the uniform technical principle resulted from an audit of "the scientific research and experimental design operations," which uncovered "parallel research" that could be combined.  The combination of research and development projects resulted in "a savings of 290-300 million rubles."  The unified command also reduced the "administrative apparatus [of the three armed forces] by 32 percent in 1997 and by 10 percent in 1998. Yakovlev stated that reductions in combat units and logistical formations saved 284 million rubles per year. The creation of the Special Purpose Separate Missile Warning Army from the Missile Defense Corps and Space Monitoring Division reduced defense spending by 100 million rubles a year. In northern Russia, tracking ranges of the Air Forces, Air Defense, Military Space Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, and Navy were consolidated into a "uniform northern zone." The new tracking network, which is headquartered at Plesetsk, saves Russia 40 million rubles. Yakovlev stated that "military economic policy is becoming the basis of our [the SRF's] activities."  According to Yakovlev, further reforms should concentrate on the development of a uniform command and control system, and he added that the development of a standardized missile "is the future of economical and effective Strategic Nuclear Forces and the Armed Forces as a whole."
[Sergey Sokut, "Effektivnost, stoimost, realizuyemost," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 5 November 1998, p.1.] {entered 3/23/99 SS}
 
11/98: LAW ON FINANCING THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE RF UNTIL 2010
In the 6-12 November 1998 issue of Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye it was reported that the Russian Duma Defense Committee, in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Atomic Energy, agreed on the final version of a proposed new federal law On Financing the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation until 2010.  Yuriy Maslyukov noted that acceptance of this law is one of the necessary conditions for Russia to consider taking practical measures within the framework of START II.  The proposed law includes measures for determining the size of the SRF and a number of other programs, including methods to support combat readiness of striking systems; defense and support systems; development and purchase of weapons and weapons systems, including nuclear munitions; provisions for nuclear safety; and capital construction and reconstruction of SRF facilities.
[ Igor Korotchenko, "Finansirovaniye strategicheskikh yadernykh sil budet garantirovat zakon," Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye, No. 42, 6-12 November 1998, p. 1.] {Entered 4/25/99 CEM}
 
10/21/98: MILITARY REFORMS MAY INCLUDE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
On 21 October 1998 Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev said that a joint command for strategic nuclear forces could be created as part of on going military reforms.[1]  Russian armed forces are currently made up of four services--the strategic rocket forces, naval, air, and ground forces.  A three-service structure composed of the navy, air force, and army will be created, and the new structure will "reflect the spheres in which the armed forces are used."[2] Sergeyev proposed placing control of strategic nuclear forces under a unified command structure. According to Nezavisimaya gazeta, Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Colonel General Vladimir Yakovlev "has been the chief advocate" of the new structure and may be "the most realistic candidate" to lead it.[1]
[1] Sergey Sokut, "Defense Minister has Stated Possibility of Creating Joint Command of All Russia's Strategic Forces," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 October 1998, p.1; in "Nuclear Forces Confront 'Radical Change' in Structure," FBIS Document FTS19981021000247.
[2] Interfax, 20 October 1998; in "Russia's Sergeyev Visits Hanoi; Discusses Nuclear Forces," FBIS Document FTS19981020000267. {entered 1/28/99 SS}
 
10/6/98:  MASLYUKOV LINKS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION WITH START II
First Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Maslyukov told a 6 October 1998 press conference that "the government of Russia and the Federal Assembly should jointly agree on a program of re-arming the Strategic Nuclear Forces, by guaranteeing its financing."  Maslyukov noted that modernization was imperative, because the "existing strategic nuclear forces are aging and suffer physical wear and tear and in seven to eight years time, the country will have not a single missile, not a single submarine, not a single bomber left that was built in Soviet times."  To compensate for this mass obsolescence of the existing nuclear forces, Maslyukov said that it is neccessary to ensure, starting with 2000, the annual commissioning of 35-40 Topol-M missiles and, toward the end of the next decade, to guarantee the building of at least several Yuriy Dolgorukiy-type [Borey-class] submarines.[1]  Maslyukov said, "along with rearmament of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, it is necessary to seek in a diplomatic way a limitation and reduction of the nuclear potential of the United States."  According to him, START II ratification is an important part of such a diplomatic approach.  He added, however, that rapid opening of START III negotiations and continued US adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty would also be necessary to guarantee the preservation of  "mutual nuclear deterrence."  Maslyukov warned that "the world will not understand" if Russia now rejects START II, and said that doing so would hamper efforts to prevent further nuclear proliferation in the wake of the May 1998 nuclear tests in India and Pakistan.[2] (For more information, please see the section on START II Ratification Developments.)
Sources:
[1] Dmitriy Znamenskiy, RIA-Novosti, 7 October 1998; in "Russia's Maslyukov on Financing Nuclear Arms, START II," FBIS-TAC-98-280.
[2] Yelena Kornysheva, ITAR-TASS, 6 October 1998; in "Further on Russia's Nuclear Rearmament," FBIS-SOV-98-279. {entered 11/30/98 SS}
 
7/3/98:  SECURITY COUNCIL DECIDES TO RETAIN STRATEGIC TRIAD
The Russian Security Council, in a session reportedly chaired by President Boris Yeltsin, decided to retain Russia's strategic triad of land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear weapons until 2010.  The Topol-M (RS-12M2, SS-X-27) ICBM, in silo-based (RS-12M2) and mobile (RS-12M1) modifications, will replace all other types of ICBMs and is expected to remain operational at least until 2020.[1]  The "nuclear potential" of the Air Force will be reduced, but Tu-95M (Bear) and Tu-160 (Blackjack) bombers will remain in service until at least 2015 and, according to Security Council Secretary Andrey Kokoshin, will be "modernized and equipped with updated versions of long-range cruise missiles."[2] Naval nuclear potential will be increased, the operational readiness of Delfin (Delta IV) SSBNs will be maintained, and development of "Bark" (which may refer to R-29RMU or SS-N-X-28) missiles for the nuclear submarine Yuriy Dolgorukiy will go forward.[1,3] The Security Council's press service reported that funds (amount unspecified) will be earmarked for scientific and industrial organizations involved in space, nuclear, and missile programs, and that other decisions on "economic, scientific, and industrial measures to ensure nuclear deterrence" were adopted.[1]
 
Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko and Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev also attended the meeting. Presidential spokesman Sergey Yastrzhembskiy stated that "major decisions were made on developing strategic nuclear forces, on developing nuclear and space technology, on financing the strategic nuclear forces, cutting arms and developing the nuclear non-proliferation regime," but gave no details;  according to Yastrzhembskiy, President Yeltsin  said that "nuclear forces are under full control, reliable, and meet national security needs in their current form" and "Russia sees the START II treaty as a priority issue.  Its ratification will indeed serve the interests both of national security and international stability." [4]
Sources:
[1] "Sovet Bezopasnosti RF reshil sokhranit trekhkomponentniy sostav strategichesikh yadernykh sil," Interfax daily news bulletin no. 4, 3 July 1998.
[2] "Russia to be major nuclear power in 3rd millenium-official," ITAR-TASS 3 July 1998.
[3] Ivan Safronov and Ilya Bulavinov, "Boris Yeltsin podnyal yadernyy shchit," Kommersant-daily, 4 July 1998.
[4] Reuters; in "Yelstin Says Nuclear Force Not Weaker" Russia Today, online edition, http://www.russiatoday.com/rtoday/news/10.html, 7 July 1998. {Entered 7/15/98 FLW}
 
2/11/97: SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY ENDORSES NUCLEAR FIRST-USE POLICY
In an interview with the official government newspaper Rossiyskaya gazeta, Russian Security Council Secretary Ivan Rybkin said that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to an attack with conventional weapons. "Everyone should know that if there is a direct challenge, our response will follow a full program, so to say, and we reserve the right to chose what weapons in our arsenal to use, including nuclear weapons," said Rybkin. The Security Council Secretary added that "needless to say, I am not talking about launching a pre-emptive strike," but emphasized that "if some aggressor were to unleash a conflict against us using conventional weapons, we might use nuclear weapons to inflict a decisive retaliatory strike." He concluded that it was particularly important to reinforce this nuclear option under current conditions, when the Russian armed forces "undergoing reform, lack the power they had in the past."[1] Rybkin's statement, although unusual for its public candor, did not mark a major change in official Russian policy, since the 1993 draft principles of a new Russian military doctrine approved by Yeltsin in 1993 had provided for the first use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances (see database entry below).[2]
Sources:
[1] Boris Yamashov, "Interview with Ivan Rybkin, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 11 February 1997.
[2] "Some Confusion Over Russia's Nuclear Weapons Doctrine," Jamestown Monitor, 12 February 1997. {Entered 8/22/97 SDP}
 
1996/97: DEFENSE BUDGET FOR '97 LESS THAN HALF OF AMOUNT REQUESTED
Russia's 1997 defense budget allows for defense spending of 101 trillion rubles ($20 billion), which is less that half of the amount requested by the defense ministry (260 trillion rubles). Defense spending for 1996 is estimated at 80 trillion rubles ($17 billion).
[Peter Rutland, "...While Rodionov Protests Defense Budget," OMRI DAILY DIGEST, No. 162, Part I, 8/26/96.] {Entered 9/03/96 KD}
 
8/20/96: RODIONOV CALLS NUCLEAR FORCES PRIMARY DETERRENT
The new Russian Minister of Defense, Igor Rodionov, declared that Russia would prioritize maintenance of its strategic nuclear forces as the nation's primary military deterrent, while significantly reducing conventional forces.
["Rodionov on the Army's Future," JAMESTOWN MONITOR, 8/20/96.] {Entered 9/23/96 KD}
 
8/7/96: KOKOSHIN OUTLINES ROLE OF RUSSIAN MILITARY
First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin outlined the role and the objectives of the Russian armed forces in an article in Segodnya. Kokoshin stated that Russia's central goals are to ensure national security and to attain the highest possible place in the hierarchy of the world's most developed states. Kokoshin sees military power as a crucial instrument in achieving these goals. The main role of the Russian armed forces is to deter any military aggression by a credible demonstration of military capability and readiness to use it, and to defeat the aggressor in case of attack. The objectives of the Russian armed forces are to promote various regional balances of power, consistent with Russia's national security interests and advancing international stability. Among the potential threats to Russia's national security Kokoshin names the eastward expansion of NATO; the changing system of international relations in the Asia-Pacific region and along Russia's southern borders; and the threat of proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Kokoshin suggests that the main objective for Russia's Armed Forces reform to the year 2005 is creating a military with strong and technically advanced conventional forces, and integrated nuclear deterrence forces, that ensure retaliation in case of large-scale aggression against Russia. Development of an effective missile attack warning system, and reliable and survivable nuclear weapons command and control, is essential for Russian nuclear forces. Although Kokoshin assigns a crucial role in preventing aggression against Russia to the nuclear forces, he does not imply the need for quantitative increase in nuclear weapons. Within Russia's military expenditures in 1996-2002, the Defense Ministry plans to devote more funds to research and modernization of the existing armaments and military technology as well as combat and operational training.
[Andrey Kokoshin, "Kakaya armiya nam nuzhna," SEGODNYA, No. 140, 8/07/96, p. 5.] {Entered 9/03/96 KD}
 
6/14/96: YELTSIN SIGNS NATIONAL SECURITY DOCUMENT
Yeltsin signed the Russian Federation President's Message to the Federal Assembly on National Security. According to this document, the main objective of Russia's national security policy is the formation of an external environment favorable to the country's internal development. Russia condemns military confrontation and does not seek to maintain quantitative parity in armaments and armed forces with other leading states, but it upholds the principle of realistic deterrence based on determination to use its armed forces in order to counter aggression. Russia consistently pursues a policy of nuclear deterrence, maintaining strategic, operational-tactical and tactical nuclear weapons at a sufficient level for deterrence. The Russian Federation retains its status as a nuclear power in order to prevent nuclear attack or major conventional armed-aggression against it, or its allies, and also to provide nuclear guarantees for allied states within the CIS.
["Russian Federation President's Message to the Federal Assembly on National Security," NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 06/14/96, pp. 7-8; in FBIS-SOV-96-116, 6/14/96.]
 
11/3/93: NEW DOCTRINE REVERSES RUSSIAN POSITION ON FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
President Yeltsin approved a new military doctrine which abandons the former Soviet Union's "no first use policy." The new doctrine guarantees that Russia will not use nuclear weapons against NPT signatory countries and non-nuclear nations except in two instances; first, if a non-nuclear state which has an alliance with a nuclear state attacks Russia, Russia's armed forces, or Russia's allies and second, if a non-nuclear state and a nuclear state both attack Russia. The new doctrine does not rule out first use of nuclear weapons against a nuclear state.
Sources:
[1] Anne McElvoy and Michael Evens, "Moscow Ends Pledge Not To Use Nuclear Arms First," THE TIMES (London), 11/4/93, p. 12.
[2] John Lloyd, "Russia Scraps `No First Use' Doctrine On Nuclear Weapons," FINANCIAL TIMES, 11/11/93.
 
11/3/93: RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE ENUMERATES POTENTIAL THREATS
The doctrine maintains Russia's commitment to protect all vital interests, including sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity from outside aggression by any means necessary. Russia pledges not to use military force, except in cases of individual and collective self-defense. Russia is in favor of nuclear disarmament, but only on a multilateral basis. The doctrine places great emphasis on Russia's nuclear self-defense capability. The doctrine lists possible external threats to Russia, which include attacks on Russian military installations on foreign territory, local wars, ethnic conflicts, territorial claims, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to transport and manufacture these weapons.
Sources:
[1] Stephen Foye, "Text Of Russian Military Doctrine Published," RFE/RL NEWS BRIEFS, Vol. 2, No. 47, 11/15/93, p. 5.
[2] "Nuclear Defense Policy Key To New Military Policy," WE/MY, 11/15/93, Vol. II, No. 23, pp. 1-2.
 

Comments or questions? E-mail Nikolai Sokov:  nsokovATmiis.edu.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.

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