Russia: General Nuclear Weapons Developments

To return to the main Nuclear Weapons entry, see the Nuclear Weapons Overview file.

This file includes information on developments that affect all three of the Russian strategic forces.  For information on specific developments in the ICBM/SRF, SSBN, and bomber forces please see the respective sections of the NIS Nuclear and Missile Database.  For coverage of debates concerning arms control treaties please see the Nuclear Disarmament Treaties and Agreements section.

12/26/2007 RUSSIA TESTS MODERNIZED TU-160
The Russian Air Force announced a successful test-flight of a modernized Tu-160 (Blackjack) strategic supersonic bomber -- the first such aircraft manufactured since the revival of serial production. [1] The modernized Tu-160 was originally expected to enter service in 2006. [2] After the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent economic crises, production of the Tu-160s ground to a halt. In 2007, Russian Air Force officials reportedly announced annual production targets at 1-2 aircraft with expectations to have a fleet of 30 bombers by 2025-2030.[1]
Sources:
[1] "Na KAPO im. Gorbunova ispytali novyy seriynyy TU-160," TatarInform, 6 January 2008;
[2] Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Russian nuclear forces, 2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2007, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/. {Entered 1/28/07 JQ}

12/25/2007 RUSSIA SUCCESSFULLY TESTS NEW RS-24 ICBM
On 25 December 2007, Russia successfully test-fired a new RS-24 ICBM, equipped with multiple indepenently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). All reentry vehicles were reported to have hit their designated targets on the Kura test range on the Kamchatka Peninsula, approximately 7,000 kilometers from their launch location. [Interfax, "New RS-24 ICBM Lands on Target at Test Range in Kamchatka," Interfax, 25 December 2007.] {Entered 1/28/07 JQ}

12/17/2007 RUSSIA TESTS NEW SLBM
Russia reportedly test-fired a new SLBM from the Tula nuclear-powered submarine, located in the Barents Sea, and hit a designated area on the Kura testing ground on the Kamchatka Peninsula, according to a statement from the Russian navy. The launch was conducted from below the sea's surface, however a spokesman declined to say which missile had been tested. ["Russia Test-fires New Intercontinental Missile," Reuters, 17 December 2007.] {Entered 1/28/07 JQ}

11/07/2007 MODIFIED "SINEVA" SLBM ENTERS SERVICE WITH RUSSIAN FLEET
Russian president Vladimir Putin has signed a decree officially accepting a heavily-modified version of the RSM-54 "Sineva" SLBM into service. [Aleksandr Emelyanenkov, "Na vooruzheniye rossiyskogo VMF prinyat novyy raketnyy kompleks 'Sineva,'" Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 31 October 2007, in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.] {Entered 1/28/07 JQ}

7/3/2007 U.S. AND RUSSIA SET TO BEGIN TALKS TO REPLACE START I TREATY
On July 3, 2007, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov issued a joint statement that addressed the issue of replacing the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which is set to expire in December 2009. According to the statement, “The Ministers discussed development of a post-START arrangement to provide continuity and predictability regarding strategic offensive forces” and agreed to “continue these discussions with a view toward early results.” It remains to be seen whether the promise of the July 3 Joint Statement will be realized. Russian experts and some officials openly complain that the current U.S. administration seems unwilling to entertain a new treaty – a position that was reflected in Putin’s complaint last year about “stagnation” of Russia-American arms control efforts. [For more information and a full analysis, please see: Nikolai Sokov, "U.S. and Russia Set to Begin Talks to Replace START-1 Treaty," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I18/I18_R2_ReplaceSTARTI.htm.] {entered 9/6/07 JQ}

6/28/07 RUSSIA'S RECENT TEST OF NEW SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILE SUCCEEDS
The Russian Navy successfully tested its new Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile on June 28, 2007. The future of the program has been in doubt after three previous tests of the missile failed. Despite the declared success of Bulava, the most recent test is being questioned by outsiders who suspect that the test was only partially successful. {[For more information and a full analysis, please see: Nikolai Sokov, "Update: Russia's Recent Test of New Submarine-Launched Missile Succeeds," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I18/I18_R3_Update-BulavaTest.htm.] entered 9/6/07 JQ}

4/15/2007 RUSSIAN NAVY LAUNCHES FIRST BOREY-CLASS SUBMARINE, BUT BULAVA MISSILE STILL NOT READY
The Russian Navy celebrated the launching of its first strategic submarine in 17 years on April 15, 2007. The new Borey-class submarine, the Yuri Dolgoruki, is Russia's newest and most advanced strategic submarine. The vessel is set to carry the new Bulava multiple-warhead sea-launched ballistic missile. Due to delays in the missile's development, however, it is uncertain when the new ships may be armed and fully operational. [For more information and full analysis, please see: Jacob Quamme, "Russian Navy Launches First Borey-Class Submarine, but Bulava Missile Still Not Ready," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I16/I16_RU4_RussianNavy.htm.] {entered 9/6/07 JQ}

2/15/07 RUSSIA WARNS OF POSSIBLE INF TREATY WITHDRAWAL
Russian Chief of the General Staff, Yuri Baluyevski warned that Russia was considering withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. He justified such considerations based upon the development of other nations' intermediate missile capabilities and U.S. ballistic missile defense deployments in Eastern Europe. [For more information and a full analysis, please see: Nikolai Sokov, "Chief of Russia General Staff Warns of Possible Russian Withdrawal From The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty," WMD Insights,  http://www.wmdinsights.com/I13/I13_R1_ChiefofRussia.htm.] {entered 9/6/07 JQ}

1/20/2007 RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES DEBATES ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CONFERENCE
Russia's 2000 Military Doctrine, which placed emphasis on the role of Russia's nuclear weapons, needed to be updated, according to a statement by President Vladimir Putin in 2005. In January 2007, the Academy of Military Sciences held a conference to debate the role of nuclear weapons in Russia's current security environment. Based upon deliberations made at the Conference, the role of Russia's nuclear arsenal is likely to remain unchanged in the near future. [For more information and a full analysis, please see: Nikolai Sokov, "Russian Academy of Military Sciences Debates Role of Nuclear Weapons in Conference on New Military Doctrine," WMD Insights,  http://www.wmdinsights.com/I13/I13_R2_RussianAcademy.htm.] {entered 9/6/07 JQ}

12/25/2006 RUSSIAN STRATEGIC FORCES: SUCCESS AND SETBACKS AT YEAR'S END
Russia's efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces made an important advance in December 2006, with the deployment of the first road-mobile Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), but also suffered a significant disappointment when yet another test of the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) ended in failure. The slow pace of deployments of the former system and the difficulties Russia has experienced in developing the latter mean Moscow will be forced to rely on Soviet-era systems far more heavily than it had originally anticipated. [For more information and a full analysis, please see: Nikolai Sokov, "Russian Strategic Forces Meet Success and Setbacks at Year's End," WMD Insights,  http://www.wmdinsights.com/I12/I12_R3_
RussianStrategicForces.htm.] {entered 2/7/07 JQ}

9/10/2006 NEW RUSSIAN SLBMs TESTED WITH MIXED RESULTS; QUESTIONS ABOUT SEA-BASED  TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS RAISED
On 7-10 September 2006, the Russian navy conducted test firings of several submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). One such missile, the new Bulava, is widely regarded as Russia's newest and most advanced SLBM. The test ended after the missile failed, shortly after emerging from the surface. Approximately one month later, the Russian navy conducted yet another test in an apparent attempt to demonstrate that the earlier failure was not a flaw inherent in the system, but a simple glitch. The new test also ended unsuccessfully, although the missile did maintain a proper trajectory for a couple of minutes, before deviating off course and self destructing.

Also tested were an older R-29R [NATO designation SS-N-18 'Stingray'] missile and a modernized version of the R-29RM [NATO designation SS-N-23 'Skiff'] missile: the Sineva. These tests were successful. The tests included several interesting characteristics: they were conducted from the area near the North Pole, where launches of this type are considered to be particularly difficult due to the complex magnetic environment, and the missiles were not fired toward the standard missile range in Kamchatka, rather they were fired toward the Kizha range in Northwest Russia. There is some speculation that this choice was made thanks to U.S. plans to construct anti-ballistic missile defenses in Poland, but this has not been confirmed.

When Defense Minister Ivanov reported on the tests to President Putin, his statements raised questions about whether Russia is still abiding by the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI), under which the United States and Russia agreed to remove nuclear warheads from sea-launched missiles, with the exception of SLBMs on strategic submarines. In response to a question by Putin on how many nuclear submarines Russia currently has deployed, Ivanov replied "At this moment …we have eight nuclear submarines deployed. Of them, five are strategic submarines and three are multipurpose submarines, but all of them are deployed with nuclear weapons. The ships have different missions – intercontinental, that is, and multipurpose, but on board of each of them are nuclear weapons." It is unclear whether this signaled a quiet departure from the PNI agreements, or whether Ivanov, famous for inaccurate off-the-cuff remarks, had merely made an error. [For more information and a full analysis of this story, please see Nikolai Sokov and Jacob Quamme, "Russia's Newest Submarine-Launched Missile Fails in Tests, but Tests of Other Systems Succeed; Defense Minister Ivanov Raises Questions on Status of Russian Sea-Based Tactical Nuclear Weapons," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I10/I10_R1_RussiasNewestSub.htm.] {entered 2/7/07 JQ}

8/30/2006 RUSSIA CONTEMPLATES WITHDRAWAL FROM INF TREATY
Russian media reported that while meeting with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in Alaska in late August 2006, Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov mentioned the possibility of his country's withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty. The treaty bans the development, production, and deployment of missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500km.

Ivanov's comment was made in response to an attempt by Rumsfeld to convince Ivanov of the benefits of placing conventional warheads on long-range strategic missiles for use against terrorists. Ivanov responded that long-range missiles were not the only way of dealing with this threat, adding that long-range cruise missiles could be modified with conventional warheads, or even intermediate-range missiles, which "the United States and Russia cannot have ... unlike many other countries, which already have such missiles." Such sentiments are rumored to be long-held in certain Russian defense circles, and various examples of public statements by Russian defense officials confirm this. [For more information and a full analysis of this story, please see Nikolai Sokov, "Russia's military debates withdrawal from the INF treaty," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I9/I9_R1_RussianMilitary.htm.] {Entered 2/5/07 JQ}

7/1/2006 ALLEGED ILLICIT ARMS SALES VIA BELARUS TO IRAN
An article in the 14 April 2006 issue of Jane's Intelligence Digest alleges that Russia intended to sell advanced A-300P anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran via Belarus. The declared purpose of the missile transfer is to support the Joint Russia-Belarusian Air Defense Group, the purpose of which is to provide air defense from potential threats—presumably from NATO.

The report in Jane's alleged, however, that the transfer was intended covertly to supply missiles to Iran. While the Jane's report does not offer any specific evidence for the claims, rumors of such an intention have circulated for some time. Russia has also shown itself to be sensitive to international criticism of sales of similar systems to Iran, giving Russia an incentive to conduct such transactions covertly. These signals, combined with misleading statements by Iranian Commerce Minister Masud Mir-Kazemi, while in Minsk, that Iran does not rely on on foreign arms purchases (in December 2005, Russia and Iran signed an agreement under which Iran would purchase $1 billion in Russian arms, the latest in a series of agreements since the 1990s), raise questions about Russian/Belarusian A-300P transfers.

Concerns over Iranian missile activities were also underscored in a June, 4 2006 Austrian press report stating that in 2005, Austrian customs officials working in coordination with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation seized a "friction tester" bound for Iran. Such a device can be used to develop missile fuel, as it is designed to determine the amount of friction required for a solid or liquid to explode. Allegedly the friction tester was sold by a U.S. company to Germany (which could explain the reason for FBI involvement), and was then shipped to an Austrian company, which then attempted to ship it to Iran. [For more information and a full analysis, please see Sammy Salama and Gina Cabrera-Farraj, "Controversy over Alleged Belarusian Air Defense Systems and Seizure of Dual-Use Goods in Austria Turn Spotlight on Iran," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I7/I7_R1_ControversyOver.htm.]  
{Entered 2/5/07 JQ}

6/27/2006 PUTIN SEEKS TO "REPLACE" START I TREATY
At a 27 June 2006 conference of Russia's ambassadors, Putin expressed his desire to replace the START I treaty, due to expire in 2009, with one more cost-effective and efficient. In addition, Russia seeks to include in the new agreement an allowance to place multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) on the ground-based Topol-M ICBM, which is banned under the 1991 START I treaty. As two staples of the Russian nuclear strategic forces, the multi-warhead R-36M [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] and UR-100NUTTKh [SS-19 'Stiletto'], reach the end of their service lives in 2015, Moscow will find it increasingly difficult to maintain the number of strategic warheads allowed under the Moscow Treaty. For more information and a full analysis, please see Nikolai Sokov, "Putin seeks to replace START-I treaty," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I8/I8_R4_PutinSeeks.htm.]  {Entered 2/5/07 JQ}

5/10/2006: PUTIN COMMENTS ON U.S. PLANS TO DE-NUCLEARIZE SOME ICBMS
In his 10 May 2006 address to the Russian Federal Assembly, Russian President Putin gave what appeared to be the definitive Russian reaction to reported U.S. plans to place conventional explosive warheads on some Trident II (D-5) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The purpose of this initiative would be to allow U.S. military commanders the ability to strike worldwide targets within an hour of the decision to do so, without having to use nuclear weapons.

Putin's response was generally negative, largely echoing U.S. criticisms of the proposal: that a launch of a de-nuclearized SLBM could be easily misinterpreted by "one" of the nuclear powers and even responded to with a full strategic missile response. This criticism has been surprisingly muted in the Russian state press, however. Some analysts believe this could indicate that Russian officials are themselves weighing the possibility of arming their own SLBMs with conventional warheads, and are delaying full opposition to the U.S. plans until Russian analysts finish assessing the possibility of doing so. [For a complete analysis of this story, please see Nikolai Sokov, "Russia weighing US plans to put non-nuclear warheads on long-range missiles," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I6/I6_R3_RussiaWeighing.htm.]
{Entered 1/31/07 JQ}

5/1/2006: RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN OFFICIALS DENY ALLEGATIONS OF MISSING WARHEADS
Allegations that over 250 Ukrainian nuclear warheads with an estimated combined yield of 20 megatons were lost during a transfer to Russian authorities in the early 1990s have been emphatically denied by both Russian and Ukrainian officials. The allegations were part of a special report by a commission established by the Ukrainian parliament to investigate allegations of illicit arms trade.

Chief of the General Staff of Ukraine, Colonel-General Sergey Kirichenko, declared that Ukraine had delivered all nuclear warheads to Russia, and that all deliveries had been thoroughly documented and verified. Similarly, Russian Chief of the General Staff Yuriy Baluyevskiy stated that he refused to comment on the report because it "lacked any foundation whatsoever." [For more information, please see Nikolai Sokov, "Russian and Ukrainian Officials Deny New Allegations that Nuclear Warheads Were Lost in the 1990s," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I5/R4_RussiaandUkranian.htm.]
{Entered 1/24/07 JQ}

3/19/2006: DETAILS ON NEW CLASS OF RUSSIAN SUBMARINES EMERGE
On 19 March 2006, the keel was laid for the Russian navy's third Borey class submarine, suggesting that the naval leg of the strategic triad is emerging from the hiatus which it experienced during the 1990s. (At that time, the new Bark SLBM was cancelled and construction of the first Borey was placed on hold.) At the keel-laying ceremony, Admiral Vladimir Masorin provided details of the navy's intentions for the new boats. He indicated that they will be deployed in both the Northern and Pacific fleets, and that their number will be greater than four to six.

A few days prior to the keel-laying ceremony, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov was briefed on the status of Russia's newest SLBM, intended for deployment aboard Borey-class submarines. The new missile is set to carry ten nuclear warheads, and includes several design features new to Russia's SLBM arsenal, including a system that launches missiles at an angle, enabling launch without first requiring a complete stop in the water, as was the case with previous Russian/Soviet SSBNs. [For the full story on these developments, please see Nikolai Sokov,"New Details on Russian Strategic Subs Emerge, as Keel for Third Borey Class Boat is Laid," WMD Insights, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I4/R_NewDetails.htm.]
{Entered 1/24/07 JQ}

12/16/2005: 2005 ARMS ACQUISITION PLANS NOT MET
According to independent military analyst Vladislav Shurygin, the arms acquisition plan for 2005 was not fulfilled. Specifically, he pointed out that instead of seven ICBMs the Ministry of Defense acquired only four and instead of one refurbished and one new Tu-160 heavy bombers it received none. Furthermore, the defense industry was not fully paid even for the work completed.
[Vladislav Shurygin, "Poslesloviye k rekviyemu," Zavtra, 8-14 December 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

12/5/2005: ROAD-MOBILE ICBM DEPLOYMENTS
Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Nikolay Solovtsov announced that three road-mobile Topol-M ICBMs will be deployed in 2006 at the Teykovo SRF division. By the end of 2007, six more ICBMs will be deployed at the same division, completing a full regiment of nine road-mobile ICBMs.
["V RVSN v 2006 godu na vooruzheniye postupyat tri mobilnykh kompleksa 'Topol-M'," Interfax-AVN, 5 December 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

12/1/2005: 2006 DEFENSE BUDGET
A meeting of the Military-Industrial Commission chaired by Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov finalized the distribution of funds within the defense budget for 2006. The budget includes, among other items, the purchase of six Topol-M ICBMs and one refurbished Tu-160 heavy bomber. According to Kommersant, the prospects for the 2006 acquisitions program appear questionable, since in 2005 only four Topol-M ICBMs were purchased instead of the six that were originally planned, while the refurbishment of one Tu-160 heavy bomber, originally planned for 2005 as well, was not completed. (CNS note: The 2005 acquisitions plan may have been considered fulfilled if missiles used for test launches were counted.)
[Ivan Safronov and Petr Netreba, "Mikhail Fradkov raspredelil oboronnyy zakaz," Kommersant, 1 December 2005.]{Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/29/2005: TOPOL ICBM TESTED
On 29 November 2005, the SRF conducted a test launch of a Topol [NATO designation SS-25 'Sickle'] ICBM from the Plesetsk test range; the impact area was the Kura test range in Kamchatka. The missile used in the launch was 20 years old and the declared purpose of the exercise was to verify that missiles of this age could still perform according to specifications (the original life of ten years has been extended several times).
Sources:
[1] "S kosmodroma Plesetsk zapustili 20-letnuyu raketu," Strana.Ru, 29 November 2005.
[2] "Raketa 'Topol' porazila tseli na Kamchatke," Strana.Ru, 29 November 2005. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/25/2005: SERVICE LIFE OF SS-18 ICBMS TO BE EXTENDED
According to deputy chief of the SRF Gen-Lt. Vitaliy Linnik, the service life of RS-20 'Voyevoda' [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] ICBMs will be extended for another 10-15 years. He noted that these missiles were introduced into service gradually over a long period of time, and consequently they will also be withdrawn from service gradually. Life extension of SS-18s, he remarked, was limited by certain technical problems, which could only be resolved by their producer--the Yuzhmash enterprises in Ukraine (currently called Pivdenmash). An intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in extending service lives of SS-18s is ready for signature, he said.
["Srok sluzhby raket RS-20 'Voyevoda' budet prodlen," Strana.Ru, 25 November 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/25/2005: DELTA IV SSBN TO GET LIFE EXTENSION SERVICE
The Ryazan SSBN, a 667BDRM Delfin [NATO name Delta IV] class ballistic missile submarine, is set to undergo a refit and repairs to extend its service life. The work will be performed at the Zvezdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk.
["Delta IV 'Ryazan' to get service lifetime extension," Bellona Foundation, http://www/bellona.no, 25 November 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/22/2005: ARMS MODERNIZATION DELAYS
Arms modernization goals planned for 2005 have not been met. For example, the Russian Air Force did not receive a modernized Tu-160 heavy bomber, which was supposed to be re-equipped to carry gravity bombs, among other new features (work will only be completed in 2006); the armed forces did not receive the new S-400 Triumph missile defense complex; funding for the new SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy is apparently also delayed. Rising weapons prices as well as the failure (by the Ministry of Finance) to transfer all funds allocated under the budget are reportedly to blame for this state of affairs.
[Nikita Petrov, "Ivanov nachnet s tankov," Strana.ru, 22 November 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/18/2005: RUSSIAN SATELLITE SYSTEM IN CRISIS
Speaking at a roundtable held at the Federation Council, Deputy Chief of the Space Forces General Oleg Gromov admitted that only one Russian surveillance satellite is able to monitor the United States while 12-13 U.S. satellites are focused on Russia. Existing naval communication satellites ('Molniya 1-T,' 'Molniya-3,' and 'Parus') need to be replaced with the 'Meridian,' new-generation satellite, but this would require a significant increase in funding. The early warning system can no longer be restored, he added, even if additional outdated 71X6 and 73D6 satellites are launched. Currently there are three early warning satellites in orbit while no fewer than eight are needed.

Deputy Chief of the Air Force Colonel General Aleksandr Zelin disclosed that the Russian Air Force, including the Strategic Air Force, is forced to use the U.S. GPS system because the similar Russian GLONASS system includes only 14 satellites while 24 are needed. Overall, Russia maintains 96 satellites while the United States has 415 satellites in orbit. Of the 96 Russian satellites, 62 are already beyond warranty periods, including 33 military and 29 civilian or dual-purpose satellites, according to Federal Space Agency chief Anatoliy Perminov. Russia spends only $0.8 billion on these activities. The federal space program plans to spend 315 billion rubles through 2015, but according to Perminov this is not enough to address the deficiencies.

The former head of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency and current director of the defense-industrial department of the Ministry of Industry and  Energy (Minpromenergo) stated that in the next decade several enterprises critical for the production of strategic missiles will be unable to function. Plans that would ensure production of solid rocket fuel currently are being fulfilled at the level of 34% while defense enterprises altogether operate at about 30% capacity. The defense industrial complex, he declared, is only surviving thanks to its inheritance from the Soviet era and will not be able to support new technologies and needs when this inheritance has been exhausted.
[Viktor Myasnikov, "Orbitalnaya gruppirovka dyshit na ladan," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 18 November 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/17/2005: RUSSIA TO TRANSFER ALL MILITARY MISSILE LAUNCHES TO PLESETSK
The Russian government has decided that the Ministry of Defense can transfer all defense-related launches from Baikonur, a launch complex in Kazakhstan, to Plesetsk in northern Russia. The transfer will cost 27 billion rubles (nearly $935 million as of 17 november 2005) and 2,500 people are expected to lose their jobs. All elements at Baikonur that are currently controlled by the military will be transferred to civilian jurisdiction; the transfer will be completed in 2008. Plans call for the military use of Baikonur beyond 2008 to be limited to test launches of ballistic missiles. Similiarly, Russia plans to terminate the use of the new space launch center Svobodnyy, in the Russian Far East, which was formally established in 1993 but has not been used much. Svobodnyy will be closed after the currently planned launches from that site are completed; no new launches will be scheduled there.

Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov stated that in 2006-10 the military plans to establish infrastructure at Plesetsk to launch military satellites using 'Soyuz-2' space launch vehicles, and in 2011-2015, 'Angara' space launch vehicles. [Alina Chernoyvanova, "Voyennyye ukhodyat s Baikonura," Gazeta.Ru, 17 November 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/11/2005: PROBLEMS PRODUCING NEW ICBMS
According to Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, subcontractors that can be as much as four times removed from the final assembly of strategic missiles are creating production difficulties. According to the former chief of staff of the SRF Viktor Yesin, almost all of these subcontracting enterprises are unique:  their products cannot be acquired elsewhere. Their share in the Topol-M ICBM, for example, could be as low as 1-2%, but their contribution is indispensable. Low funding levels and the low production level of Topol-M means that these firms can at times remain idle for as much as ten months of the year. Consequently their costs are extremely high and state funding is not enough to cover these costs.
[Viktor Myasnikov, "Borba za dengi oboronzakaza obostryayetsya," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 11 November 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/9/2005: ARMS PURCHASE PLANS
According to Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov, in 2006 the Russian Armed Forces will purchase six strategic missiles, six space vehicles and 12 space launch vehicles.
["Minoborony za uvelicheniye finansirovaniya Gosoboronzakaza," Strana.ru, 9 November 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/9/2005: SERGEY IVANOV POLICY STATEMENT
Speaking at an annual meeting of the top leaders of the Russian Armed Forces, Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov made a number of important policy statements, although the overall tone was more down-to-earth and practical than earlier statements where he put strategy and doctrine at center stage. Ivanov said that a stable trend toward greater reliance on military force is evident in today's world, attributing it to a greater variety of threats to international and national security. Therefore, he declared that "the Ministry of Defense advocates the implementation of the principle of preventive action in the steps toward ensuring the defense and security of the country." By preventive action, he said, the military leadership means not only preventive strikes against terrorists and their bases, but "other actions of a preventive nature that seek to prevent the emergence of various threats before extreme measures become necessary to neutralize them." It seemed unlikely, however, that his statement implied reliance on nuclear weapons for these preventive operations. Rather, Ivanov probably meant enhancing the conventional capability of the Russian armed forces, including the much-touted introduction of conventional long-range high-precision air-launched cruise missiles. Nevertheless, in listing Armed Forces priorities he first named "the maintenance of the capability of nuclear deterrence forces and the enhancement of units of permanent high readiness." Although this statement does not necessarily indicate that Russia intends to rely on nuclear weapons in a broader range of scenarios than previously foreseen, Ivanov apparently sought to indicate that the threats and challenges to Russia's security that do require reliance on nuclear weapons had become more important.
Sources:
[1] Statement of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation S.B. Ivanov at a Conference of the Leadership of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 9 November 2005 (Ministry of Defense Website,  http://www.mil.ru/releases/2005/11/091300_11338.shtml).
[2] Vitaliy Shlykov, "O polze generalskikh somneniy," Izvestiya, 14 November 2005.
[3] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Gosoboronpokaz," Izvestiya, 9 November 2005.
[4] "Reabilitatsiya sapog," Gazeta.Ru, 9 November 2005.
[5] Nikita Petrov, "Armiya gotova demonstrirovat silu," Strana.Ru, 9 November 2005. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

11/1/2005: DEFENSE-PENETRATING MANEUVERABLE WARHEAD TESTED
On 1 November 2005, the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) conducted a flight-test of a road-mobile Topol-M ICBM with a maneuverable warhead known as Igla. Igla can travel at the speed of Mach 6 (six times the speed of sound), with service engines switching on and off randomly, making its flight unpredictable. Also, Igla reportedly utilizes "stealth" technology—a special coating that makes it "invisible" to thermal or electromagnetic detection. These features are intended to give it the capability to penetrate any existing or foreseeable missile defense system.[1-6] The first, partial test of the warhead was conducted in 1999 and another, unconfirmed, test in 2001. The first widely publicized test of Igla was held in February 2004 from an earlier version of that missile, 'Topol' (see the CNS Research Story "Military Exercises in Russia: Naval Deterrence Failures Compensated By Strategic Rocket Success").

Kommersant-Daily reported that the test used the new road-mobile version of the Topol-M ICBM[3], while other sources suggested that the missile used was Topol (SS-25), the earlier type of single-warhead road-mobile ICBM.[6] Unofficial investigations by journalists later led to questions as to whether this information was based on hard evidence.[8] It has remained unclear whether the test utilized Topol-M or Topol.  U.S. sources have mentioned the use of Topol-M.[8, 9] There has also been unconfirmed information that the missile used during that test carried more than one warhead.[8,10]

In a departure from standard procedure, the missile was launched from a test range at Kapustin Yar in Astrakhan region (instead of from Plesetsk in northern Russia) to the 10^th test range at lake Balkhash (a.k.a. Priozersk) in Kazakhstan (instead of Kura in Kamchatka). Reportedly, the unusual trajectory was designed to deny the United States an opportunity to observe the new warhead.[1-6]
Sources:
[1] "S poligona Kapustin Yar osushchestvlen pusk ballisticheskoy rakety," Strana.ru, http://www.strana.ru/263867.html, 1 November 2005.
[2] "Moskva ispytala assimetrichnyy otvet," Kommersant-Daily, 2 November 2005.
[3] "Minoborony: Topol-M smozhet preodolet protivoraketnuyu oboronu SShA," Grani.ru, http://www.grani.ru/Politics/World/US/RF/p.97576.html, 2 November 2005.
[4] Olga Bozhyeva, "Topolinyy pukh-pakh," Moskovskii komsomolets, 3 November 2005.
[5] "Tem vremenem v Rossii…" Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 November 2005.
[6] "Ballisticheskaya raketa 'Topol' porazila tsel," Vesti.ru, 11 November 2005.
[7] See exchange on RPF (Russian Submarine Fleet) forum at http://nvs.rpf.ru/nvs/forum/archive/66/66646.htm and subsequent postings.
[8] "U.S. Analyzes New Russian Warhead," Global Security Newswire, 22 November 2005.
[9] Bill Gertz, "Russian Warhead Alters Course Midflight in Test," Washington Times, 21 November 2005.
[10] Nikita Petrov, "Armiya gotova demonstrirovat silu," Strana.ru, 9 November 2005. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

10/28/2005: NEW TOPOL-M REGIMENT TO ENTER SERVICE IN 2005
According to Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov, the fifth regiment of silo-based Topol-M ICBMs will enter service by the end of 2005 at the Tatishchevo SRF division (four regiments of Topol-Ms already deployed are part of that division).
["Kto uslyshit veteranov?" Krasnaya zvezda, 28 October 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

10/28/2005: MIRVing OF RUSSIAN ICBMs ANNOUNCED
Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov disclosed plans to MIRV at least some of Russia's single-warhead Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27] ICBMs, as well as other important elements of the future Russian strategic posture. He said that deployment of road-mobile Topol-Ms will begin in 2006 with the transfer of the first wing ("divizion") of three launchers to the 54th division in Teykovo (Ivanov oblast). Beginning in 2007, up to nine Topol-Ms will be deployed each year. (Nine launchers is the standard size of a regiment of road-mobile Topol ICBMs.) If these plans succeed, the rate of replacement of old, Soviet-era ICBMs will increase substantially (the current deployment rate of silo-based Topol-Ms is four per year).

Solovtsov also stated that the Igla maneuverable warhead will be deployed both on Topol-Ms and on the future Bulava SLBM, whose first flight test was conducted in September 2005. Until this statement it remained unclear how widespread Igla would become. It now appears that Russia intends to make the ability to penetrate missile defenses a high priority.  He failed to specify, however, whether all ballistic missiles of new types will be equipped with the maneuverable warhead. Igla is bigger and heavier than an ordinary warhead and, consequently, Bulava, which is widely reported as intended to carry ten warheads, might be unable to carry the same number of Igla’s.

Solovtsov also disclosed for the first time that the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which designed both Topol-M and Bulava, was working on MIRVing Topol-M, putting an end to years of speculation about possible MIRVing of Topol-Ms. He did not specify, however, whether all Topol-M ICBMs will be MIRVed or only some of them. Previously there has been speculation that only silo-based missiles will carry more than one warhead.
Sources:
[1] "Topol-M vsekh silney," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 October 2005.
[2] James Hackett, "Dodgy Russian Warhead," Washington Times, 14 November 2005, p. 18. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

10/4/2005: TESTING OF CONVENTIONAL AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE COMPLETED
In late August 2005, the Russian military conducted the final test of the Kh-555 conventionally armed air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), which is supposed to usher in production and deployment of that precision-guided weapon for long-range bombers. The new ALCM is supposed to reinvigorate Tu-160 heavy bombers, whose role had been previously limited to nuclear-armed ALCMs, which have a relatively small role in today's world. Igor Seleznev, the chief designer of the Raduga design bureau, which created Kh-555, said that the new weapon was effectively designed from the scratch, although it used the existing nuclear-armed Kh-55 as a starting point. According to Seleznev, Kh-555 features a new engine, new guidance system (using both its own data as well as data obtained from the GLONASS satellite positioning system), new warhead, additional fuel tanks (which helped to increase its range to 3,500 km), and greater throwweight (350kg instead of Kh-55's 130kg). The August flight tests included four Kh-555 launched from a Tu-160 heavy bomber, which hit two windows and two doors of a house at a test range where, according to the exercise scenario, "terrorists" were hiding. Kh-555 is reportedly the second program that has been successfully completed by the Tactical Missile Armaments Corporation, of which Raduga is a part. The previous one was the Kh-35 land-based anti-ship missile for the Bal missile complex.
[Dmitriy Litovkin, "Strategicheskiye avianostsy perevooruzhilis," Izvestiya, 4 October 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

9/27/2005: FIRST FLIGHT TEST OF NEW BULAVA SLBM
On 27 September 2005 Russia conducted the first flight test of the new Bulava SLBM. The test was conducted from the Dmitriy Donskoy, a Project 941 Akula [NATO name 'Typhoon'] SSBN, from the White Sea. After a 30-minute flight the warhead landed on the Kura test range in Kamchatka. This launch has opened a program of flight tests that will continue until 2007. According to Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral Vladimir Masorin, SSBNs armed with Bulava missiles will enter service in 2007. The missile will be deployed on two submarines: Dmitriy Donskoy, which has been converted for the new missile, and the newly built Yuriy Dolgorukiy, a Project 955 Borey SSBN that will be commissioned in 2007. Bulava can carry no fewer than 10 warheads, and has a range of 8,000km. The next flight test of Bulava is scheduled for December 2005, according to Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology chief designer Yuriy Solomonov.
Sources:
[1] Ivan Safronov, "'Bulava' uletela na Kamchatku," Kommersant,28 September 2005.
[2] Yevgeniy Ustinov and Roman Fomishenko, "Novyye kalibry 'Astrakhani'," Krasnaya zvezda, 17 November 2005.
[3] "Rossiya v dekabre provedet vtoroy pusk ballisticheskoy rakety 'Bulava-M'," RIA-Novosti, 12 December 2005.{Entered 12/20/05 NS}

9/26/2005: LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES AT TEYKOVO SRF DIVISION
The Teykovo division of road-mobile Topol [NATO designation SS-25] ICBMs conducted large-scale exercises under the oversight of Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Nikolay Solovtsov. The scenario envisaged deployment of mobile ICBMs under conditions of a dual enemy attack involving strikes by enemy aircraft and a simulated attack by terrorists (special forces of the Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, GRU, played the latter role). Despite of the loss of some command, control and communications structures, the division was able to deploy at short notice following a warning of a nuclear attack and simulate the launch of its ICBMs. The Teykovo division is scheduled to receive the new road-mobile Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27] ICBMs in 2006.
Sources:
[1] Dmitriy Litovkin, "V Ivanovskoy oblasti proshli krupnomasshtabnyye komandno-shtabnyye ucheniya," Izvestiya, 27 September 2005.
[2] Aleksandr Tikhonov, "Vykhodili v polya 'Topolya'," Krasnaya zvezda, 7 October 2005. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

8/29/2005: TOPOL-M ICBM DEPLOYMENT PLANS
Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov announced that the first road-mobile Topol-M ICBMs will be deployed in 2006. According to Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, Russia will have two or three divisions of road-mobile Topol-Ms by 2012.
[Viktor Alekseyev, "'Topol' podsadili na kolesa," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 2 August 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

8/12/2005: SS-19 ICBM PROSPECTS DETAILED
According to Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Nikolay Solovtsov, the very high reliability of RS-18 [NATO designation SS-19] ICBMs, which was part of the missiles' original design, has already made it possible to retain them for 25 years, which is far beyond the original warranty period. In the future, currently deployed missiles will be replaced by similar ones taken out of so-called "dry storage" (that is, unfueled). Consequently, SS-19 ICBMs are likely to remain in service until the late 2020s-early 2030s.
[Vadim Koval, "Mishch derzhavy ne issyakla," Krasnaya zvezda, 12 August 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

7/13/2005: TATISHCHEVO SRF DIVISION PASSES INSPECTION
An unannounced inspection of the Tatishchevo division of the Strategic Rocket Forces assessed its combat readiness as "good," announced Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Nikolay Solovtsov. The division has silo-based Topol-M ICBMs.
["Sostoyaniye Tatishchevskogo raketnogo soyedineniya otseneno na 'khorosho'," RIA-Novosti, 11 July 2005. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

5/26/2005: RUSSIA TESTS PRECISION-GUIDED CONVENTIONAL ALCM
Deputy chief of the Armed Forces Armaments Department Lieutenant General Aleksandr Rakhmanov announced that Russia had recently tested a precision-guided conventional air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) Kh-555, which "hit a window" from the distance of 2,000km. He explained that Kh-555 was a "modernization of an old missile using all new technologies."
["V RF ispytana vysokotochnaya raketa bolshoy dalnosti," Strana.Ru, 26 May 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

5/11/2005: DETAILS ON NEW SLBM TESTING
Chief of the Central Naval Test Range Rear Admiral Vitaliy Fedorin disclosed that the program for testing the new Bulava SLBM has been considerably shortened compared to Soviet practice due to the introduction of more intense computer simulations, which made it possible to skip the traditional phase of testing the new missile from a land-based launcher. The second- and third-generation SLBMs, he said, were first tested 15-18 times from a land-based launcher, but Bulava skipped that phase and designers went straight to "throw launches" from a submarine (the throw launch involves a launch of a simulator, which duplicates the dimensions, weight, and balance of the missile). This made it possible to save about three years and considerable funds.
[Mikhail Truliyev, "V interesakh triady," Voyenno-promyshlennyi kuryer, 11-17 May 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

5/5/2005: REDUCTION OF RUSSIAN ICBMs DETAILED
Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov stated that Russia planned to eliminate one or two missile divisions each year for the next five years. Five destruction facilities have been established for the elimination of ICBMs and mobile ICBM launchers. He also mentioned that 18 silos have been mothballed instead of eliminated to be used in the future for deployment of new types of ICBMs. Some heavy RS-20 [NATO designation SS-18] ICBMs have been stored for use as space-launch vehicles. A special launch center in Orenburg oblast will be built for this purpose to replace Baikonur in Kazakhstan. Overall, SS-18s will remain in service until 2014-2016 or even longer. He also mentioned that, in principle, it would be possible to produce heavy ICBMs in Russia, but did not think it likely.
Sources:
"Yadernyy shchit usokhnet v tri raza," Gazeta.ru, 5 May 2005.
Aleksandr Babakin, "Sekvestr yadernykh arsenalov," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 13 May 2005.
Nikolay Poroskov, "V god budem sokrashchat po odnoy-dve divizii," Vremya novostey, 6 May 2005. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

4/29/2005: SUBMARINES WITH BULAVA SLBMs TO BE DEPLOYED IN 2006
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov announced  that two SSBNs, Dmitriy Donskoy and Yuriy Dolgorukiy, armed with the new Bulava SLBM, will enter service by the end of 2006. In accordance with a three-year testing program, he said, the navy conducted the firsts tests of Bulava in 2004 and planned to hold the first flight tests in 2005; test launches will be continued in 2006. It has not been decided yet in which fleet the two new SSBNs will serve. Dmitriy Donskoy is a Project 941 Akula [NATO name 'Typhoon') submarine, which has been remodeled to carry the new SLBM. Yuriy Dolgorukiy belongs to the new Borey class designed to carry Bulava.
[Andrey Garavskiy, "Kogda udarit 'Bulava'?" Krasnaya zvezda, 29 April 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

4/15/2005: ICBM ELIMINATION PLANS FOR 2005
According to Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Lieutenant General Vitaliy Linnik, the withdrawal of RS-22 [NATO designation SS-24] rail-mobile ICBMs from combat duty will be completed in 2005. Elimination of the missile system began in 2002; by 2005 14 rail launchers had been dismantled at an SRF central maintenance facility in Bryansk. Elimination of launchers and missiles will be completed in 2006. Both the Kostroma division of rail-mobile ICBMs and the Kartaly base of heavy RS-20 [SS-18] ICBMs will be eliminated in 2005. Nevertheless, heavy ICBMs will remain in service for another 10-15 years. Work on technical solutions to the problem of extending their warranty periods began in 2004.
[Aleksandr Babakin, "'Topoli' sokhnut na kornyu," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 15 April 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

3/25/2005: TOPOL-M DEPLOYMENT PLANS
Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov announced that serial production of the road-mobile ICBM Topol-M would begin in 2005 and its full-scale deployment in 2006. He noted, however, that funding problems continued and could possibly cause difficulties for this process.
[Anatoliy Solntsev, "Net pregrady 'Topolyam'," Krasnaya zvezda, 22 March 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

3/20/2005: HEAVY BOMBERS LAUNCH ALCMs
During Long-Range Air Force exercises, two Tu-95MS and one Tu-160 heavy bombers conducted launches of air-to-surface missiles. The launches were conducted at the Pem-Bay test range in northern Russia.
["Rossiiskiye 'strategi' proveli uspeshnyye puski raket," Strana.ru, 29 March 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

3/19/2005: RUSSIAN NAVY LOOKING FORWARD TO A NEW SSBN IN 2006
In 2005, a new strategic submarine is scheduled to begin sea trials. The submarine, Yuriy Dolgorukiy, belongs to a new class, designated Borey, and was built at the Sevmash Shipyard in Severodvinsk. Another submarine of the same class, Aleksandr Nevskiy, is being built at the same shipyard; a third submarine is still in the planning stages. The urgent need for new SSBNs is dictated by the rapid  deterioration of the existing force: of 27 SSBNs, only 13 remain in service, according to official naval estimates--10 Project 667BDRM Delfin and 667BDR Kalmar [NATO names Delta IV and III] submarines and three Project 941 Akula [NATO name 'Typhoon'] vessels (according to unofficial assessments, only one Typhoon is actually in service with just ten SLBMs instead of the standard 20). The deterioration of the existing SSBN force was demonstrated during large-scale exercises in February 2004, when two consecutive missile launches from Delfin submarines failed. Although the keel of Yuriy Dolgorukiy was laid in the mid-1990s, construction did not begin in earnest until 2000: the SLBM that had been previously intended for the submarine was canceled following several unsuccessful flight tests. In 1998, the contract for a new SLBM was given to the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which came up with a solid-fuel SLBM known as Bulava  (funding for the new missile, however, began only in 2000). Yuriy Dolgorukiy was subsequently redesigned to carry a new missile that was twice as light as the previous one. In 2006, Bulava is expected to enter production. According to the chief of the shipbuilding department of the navy, Rear Admiral Vladimir Shlemov, in 2004 Sevmash fulfilled all planned work, 85% of which was paid for by the state. In 2005 the amount of work is expected to increase 1.3 times and funding 1.6 times.
Sources:
"V 2005 godu VMF poluchit dve noveyshiye strategicheskiye submariny," Lenta.ru, 29 January 2005.
Aleksandr Goltz, "Budet li 'Bulava' u 'Yuriya Dolgorukogo'," Novaya gazeta, 4 February 2005.
"Stroitsya atomnyy otvet SShA," Gazeta.ru, 19 March 2005.
"VMF Rossii poluchit unikalnyy podarok," Strana.ru, 19 March 2005. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

3/17/2005: DMITRIY DONSKOY SSBN TO RETURN TO SERVICE IN 2005
The Dmitriy Donskoy, lead boat in the Project 941 Akula [NATO name 'Typhoon'] class, will return into service in 2005 after a 10-year overhaul. Dmitriy Donskoy is intended to serve as a platform for testing the prospective submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) Bulava.
["APL 'Dmitriy Donskoy' vernetsya v stroy v 2005 godu," Strana.ru, 17 March 2005. {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

2/11/2005: HEAVY ICBM TEST LAUNCH
According to media reports, in December 2004 the Strategic Rocket Forces conducted the first launch of the heavy RS-20 [NATO designation SS-18] ICBM since 1991. [CNS note:  in fact, this information is incorrect, as there was at least one preceding test, in 2002.] The purpose of the test was to confirm that the 16-year old missile can still perform its mission. Contrary to established practice, the launch was conducted from the deployment area instead of one of Russia's test ranges (SS-18s have usually been launched from Baikonur in Kazakhstan).
[Igor Plugatarev, "'Topol-M' vytesnyayet 'Molodtsa' i 'Voevodu'," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 28 January-3 February 2005; in VPK i Biznes, 11 February 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

2/5/2005: COMPARISON OF LIQUID- AND SOLID-FUEL MISSILES
According to Aleksandr Makeyev, co-chairman of the Makeyev social organization, writing in an opinion piece on the history of Russian and Soviet missiles, the decision to cancel the Bark (RSM-52) liquid-fuel SLBM project in the mid-1990s and terminate production of RSM-54 [NATO designation SS-N-23] missiles was a mistake because it effectively closed down a traditional and still promising avenue in the development of Soviet and Russian strategic forces. Makeyev argues, in particular, that the Soviet Union failed to develop truly efficient solid fuel that would come close to, much less exceed, the efficiency of liquid fuels. In addition, advances in the design of liquid-fuel SLBMs at the Makeyev Design Bureau effectively eliminated the traditional advantages of solid-fuel missiles, such as greater reliability and safety. Finally, he writes, an emphasis on the liquid-fuel missiles designed by Makeyev Design Bureau would have allowed Russia to avoid the significant expenses associated with contractors not located in Russia: unlike the ICBM production network, SLBM production has always been purely "Russian." 
[Aleksandr Makeyev, "Start v proshloye ili v budushcheye?" Krasnaya zvezda, 5 February 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

2/2/2005: ICBM DEPLOYMENT PLANS
First Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel General Aleksandr Belousov stated that the Ministry of Defense plans to acquire seven new ICBMs for the Strategic Rocket Forces in 2005, including three road-mobile Topol-M ICBMs. The road-mobile Topol-M was considered ready for deployment after a successful flight test in December 2004.
[Yuriy Gavrilov, "Tri 'Topolya-M' - armiya," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 2 February 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

1/12/2005: RELIABILITY OF OLD TYPES OF ICBMs ASSESSED
Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov stated that the level of "technical readiness" of ICBMs (i.e., the ability of ICBMs to launch and deliver their payload to a designated target) was about 97% even though most of them are already quite old. A high degree of reliability was imbedded into the missiles and launchers at the design stage, he said, which is why the SRF is able to extend their warranty periods two or more times.
[Oleg Falichev, "Yadernyy garant nashey nezavisimosti," Krasnaya zvezda, 12 January 2005.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

12/24/2004: ROAD-MOBILE TOPOL-M DEPLOYMENT TO BEGIN
Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov announced that deployment of road-mobile Topol-M ICBMs would begin in 2005 instead of 2006 as had been originally planned. The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade agreed to support the inclusion of funds for three additional ICBMs in the 2005 budget.
["Dmitriy Litovkin, "Ministr oborony porazil raketoy Germana Grefa," Izvestiya, 24 December 2004.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

12/24/2004: RUSSIAN STRATEGIC FORCES FACE TECHNOLOGICAL AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS
Yuriy Solomonov, director and chief designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which designed two of Russia's most modern strategic missiles, Topol-M and Bulava, said that the strategic modernization program faces grave challenges, primarily due to chronic underfinancing, and could fail. In 2005 the defense industry was unable to fulfill the state contract on serial production of Topol-M ICBMs, he said, or on development and testing of the new SLBM, Bulava. He also claimed that about 200 technologies used in the production of strategic missiles have been lost in recent years; many components are no longer produced at all, especially those in the chemical industry. Further, former director of the 4th Research Institute of the SRF Vladimir Dvorkin opined that the present rate of Topol-M production, four missiles per year, cannot sustain production lines or the cooperation of contractors and subcontractors.
[Matvey Kulakov, "Potentsial yadernogo sderzhivaniya rezko snizhayetsya," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 12 December 2004.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

12/24/2004: RUSSIA CONDUCTS MOBILE TOPOL-M TEST
On 24 December 2004 Russia conducted the fourth test of a road-mobile Topol-M ICBM, reportedly the final test before the beginning of scheduled deployment of that missile.
[Reuters, 24 December 2004.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

12/22/2004: CONVENTIONAL ROLES FOR LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT CONSIDERED
According to Commander-in-Chief of the Long-Range Air Force Igor Khvorov, Russia's long-range aircraft (including strategic Tu-95MS and Tu-160 and medium-range Tu-22M3 bombers) will be used in the future against terrorists in a conventional capacity, although they were originally created to carry nuclear weapons. In 2004 the Long-Range Air Force acquired long-range conventional weapons and can now "act like the U.S. Air Force in Yugoslavia or Iraq." He also said that in 2005 the air force planned to receive a refurbished Tu-160, which will be re-equipped to carry gravity bombs (originally all Tu-160s had been designed to carry only cruise  missiles). Speaking about plans for the future, Khvorov noted that the air force was working on concepts for future long-range aircraft and has developed 10 possible approaches. Although no decision has been made, the air force is leaning toward creating future aircraft on the basis of Tu-160, whose capabilities are currently only being utilized at about 60%, he said.
["Strategicheskaya aviatsiya mozhet nanosit karauyshchiy udar po terroristam," Izvestiya, 22 December 2004.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

12/14/2005: CINC OF THE SRF ON THE FUTURE OF THE ICBM FORCE
According to Commander-in-Chief of the SRF Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov, 90% of Russia's missiles are beyond their original warranty periods, but are still reasonably reliable. As an example he cited the recent launch of a Topol [NATO designation SS-25] ICBM of the Teykovo division, which was 17 years old. The service lives of RS-18 [NATO designation SS-19] ICBMs have been extended three times beyond the original 10 years. RS-20 [NATO designation SS-18] ICBMs will serve another 10-15 years, he said, and will subsequently be used to launch satellites. Solovtsov declared that by the time heavy ICBMs will be completely beyond service, the SRF will have enough new Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27] ICBMs to support strategic deterrence functions. According to Izvestiya, in 2004 the SRF cut 1,600 personnel along with 11 units. 28 ICBMs were eliminated via launching along with 28 ICBM silos and 17 permanent structures for mobile ICBMs.
["Komanduyushchiy raketnymi voyskami strategicheskogo naznacheniya Nikolay Solovtsov: 'V blizhayshyye gody nam budet chto pokazat'" Izvestiya, 13 December 2004.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

12/1/2004: RUSSIA AND INDIA WILL JOINTLY BUILD "GLONASS" SATELLITE SYSTEM
Chief of the Federal Space Agency Anatoliy Perminov stated that Russia and India will cooperate in building up the GLONASS satellite global positioning system to 18 satellites from the current 11 by 2007. The accuracy of geographic coordinates is expected to increase to 1 meter. In addition to putting new satellites in orbit, the two countries also intend to replace some older satellites with new ones.
["Rossiya i Indiya uvelichat sistemu 'GLONASS' do 18 sputnikov," Strana.ru, 1 December 2004.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

10/7/2004: RUSSIAN MOD DOES NOT BELIEVE IN "ACCELERATED" REDUCTIONS OF U.s. STRATEGIC FORCES
An anonymous high-level representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense said that the recent statement by Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker about reductions of U.S. strategic forces under the 2002 Moscow Treaty were "misleading" because these reductions only entailed movement of warheads from delivery vehicles to storage facilities. "These are virtual reductions," the Defense Ministry representative said, they "could be easily implemented not just in several years, but even in several days and then just as easily return warheads to delivery vehicles." Real reductions should entail elimination of weapons, but the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (the Moscow Treaty) does not provide for this, continued the ministry's representative, noting that the lenient reduction provisions and the absence of verification reflected the preferences of the United States.
"Minoborony: Dosrochnoye sokrashcheniye SShA yadernogo oruzhiya - fiktsiya," Strana.ru, 7 October 2004.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

8/9/2004: RUSSIA PLANS TO DEVELOP ITS NUCLEAR TESTING GROUND UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY
At a recent Kremlin conference on the topic of nuclear energy Sergey Ivanov, Russian Minister of Defense, and Aleksandr Rumyantsev, head of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency, presented to President Vladimir Putin a draft statute on the Ministry of Atomic Energy.[1]  According to the draft, work in the nuclear sector will move in three main directions.  These include the development and implementation of state defense orders and nuclear armament programs; the development, production, modernization, operation, and disposition of nuclear weapons; and joint activity for the maintenance and expansion of the nuclear test site at Novaya Zemlya.[2]  According to Rumyantsev, Russia is not planning to conduct nuclear tests but does intend to perform conventional explosive tests at the site.  The development and use of Novaya Zemlya is intended to keep the facility in working order and to preserve Russia's nuclear potential.[3] 
Sources:
[1] "Vladimir Putin: "Atomnuyu energitiku yadernogo oboronnogo kompleksa, budet napryamuyu kurirovat Ministerstvo oboroni," RIA Oreanda, 9 August 2004; in Rambler Mass Media, http://www.rambler.ru.
[2] Viktoriya Sokolova, "Proyekt polozheniya o federalnom agentstve atomnoy energii RF predpologayet razvitiye yadernogo poligona na Novoy Zemle," ITAR-TASS, 9 August 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] "Rossiya namerena razvivat svoy yaderniy poligon na Novoy Zemle i provodit tam neyaderniye eksperimenti," ITAR-TASS, 17 September 2004; in Rosatom website, http://www.minatom.ru. {Entered 4/15/2005}

4/20/2004: TOPOL-M LAUNCHED AT TARGET NEAR HAWAII
A Topol-M flight test was conducted on 20 April from the Plesetsk test range in northern Russia. The impact area was in the Pacific Ocean not far from Hawaii. This was the first flight test of Topol-M at its maximum distance and the first ICBM test for that distance in 16 years.
[Mikhail Tuliyev, "Pusk na maksimalnuyu dalnost," Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer, 29 April-11 May 2004.] {Entered 12/20/05 NS}

2/18/2004: RUSSIA LAUNCHES MILITARY SATELLITES
ITAR-TASS, citing the Space Forces press service, reported on 18 February 2004 that Russia had successfully launched a military satellite, the Kosmos 2405, from the Plesetsk State Test Site using a Molniya-M space launch vehicle (SLV).[1] The satellite reportedly was a Molniya-1T produced by the Reshetnev Scientific Production Association of Applied Mechanics.[2] Some Russian and Western sources indicated, however, that the payload was in fact an Oko-class (US-KS) satellite, which is part of the high elliptical orbit component of the Russian Missile Attack Warning System.[3,4,5] Another military satellite, a Raduga-1 telecommunications satellite designated Kosmos 2406, was placed into orbit by a Proton-K SLV launched from the Baykonur Cosmodrome on 27 March 2004.[6] Deputy Space Forces Commander for Armaments Lieutenant General Oleg Gromov praised personnel involved in the launch, adding that its purpose was to strengthen Russian military space assets.[7]
Sources:
[1] Vladislav Kuznetsov, "Kosmicheskiy apparat voyennogo naznacheniya vyveden na tselevuyu orbitu," ITAR-TASS, 18 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Alina Chernoivanova, "Rossiya vmesto oka zapustila ukho," Gazeta.Ru, 18 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Alina Chernoivanova, "U Rossii v nebe novyy glaz," Gazeta.Ru, 18 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[4] David C. Isby, "SLBM malfunction overshadows Russian strategic exercise," Jane's Missiles and Rockets online edition, http://www4.janes.com, 1 April 2004.
[5] Aleksandr Zheleznyakov, "Zapushchen 'Kosmos-2405'," Central Research and Development Institute of Robotics and Technical Cybernetics of the State Research Center of Russia Web Site, http://spacer.rtc.ru, 18 February 2004.
[6] Ivan Safronov, "Kosmicheskiye voyska zapustili na orbitu novyy 'Globus'," Kommersant, 29 March 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[7] Aleksandr Kovalev, "Raketa-nositel 'Proton-K' uspeshno vyvela na orbitu sputnik voyennogo naznacheniya serii 'Kosmos'," RIA Novosti, 27 March 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com. {Entered 3/30/2004 TS}

2/18/2004: COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING EXERCISE CONCLUDES WITH TEST OF NEW WARHEAD
A nearly month-long command and staff training exercise (komandno-shtabnaya trenirovka) that involved each component of the Russian strategic nuclear triad and all six military districts came to a close on 18 February 2004.[1,2] The successful test launch of a Topol [NATO designation SS-25 'Sickle'] intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) armed with an experimental defense-penetrating warhead capped the exercises, billed as the one of the largest training activities undertaken in the past 20-25 years.[3,4] The scenario for the Security 2004 exercise outlined an attack by terrorists simultaneously on four fronts, including from space, and as such appeared to simulate those threats to Russian national security elaborated in the October 2003 Ministry of Defense report entitled "Immediate Tasks of Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" that expanded upon the 2000 Military Doctrine.[2,5] The "active phase" of the exercise, which began on 10 February, foresaw the launch of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) by Tu-95MS [NATO name 'Bear H'] strategic bombers.[6] It also envisioned the launch of sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) by two Project 667BDRM [NATO name 'Delta IV'] ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in the Barents Sea, but at least two and possibly three of the SLBM launches failed.[7,8,9] The plan for the exercise also called for two ICBM launches conducted jointly by the Space Forces and the Strategic Rocket Forces.[10,11] (For more information on the exercise and analysis of its strategic importance, please see the CNS report "Military Exercises In Russia: Naval Deterrence Failures Compensated By Strategic Rocket Success.")
Sources:
[1] "V Vooruzhennykh silakh RF zavershilas aktivnaya faza strategicheskoy komandno-shtabnoy trenirovki 'Bezopasnost-2004'," ITAR-TASS, 18 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Vladislav Kulikov, Sergey Ptichkin, Boris Talov, "Ucheniya yadernogo chemodanchika," Rossiyskaya gazeta, No. 25 (3402), 11 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] Ivan Safronov, "Rossiya razygrayet yadernuyu voynu," Kommersant, 30 January 2004, p.4; in WPS Oborona i bezopasnost, 2 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[4] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Giperzvukovaya 'koala'," Izvestiya, No. 032 (26589), 20 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[5] "V Vooruzhennykh Silakh Rossii nachalas strategicheskaya komandno-shtabnaya trenirovka," ITAR-TASS, 10 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[6] "Strategicheskiye bombardirovshchika [sic] Tu-95MS uspeshno porazili krylatymi raketami tseli i vernulis na bazu," ITAR-TASS, 17 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[7] "Pusk dvukh ballisticheskikh raket s atomnoy podlodki 'Novomoskovsk' ne sostoyalsya," ITAR-TASS, 17 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[8] "Morskaya ballisticheskaya raketa 'Sineva' unichtozhena sistemoy samolikvidatsii iz-za otkloneniya ot zadannoy trayektorii," ITAR-TASS, 18 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[9] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Ballisticheskiye rakety Putina ne porazili," Izvestiya, No. 030 (26587), 19 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[10] Konstantin Lantratov, "Chto i kuda zapuskali kosmicheskiye voyska," Kommersant, No. 030, 19 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[11] "Ispytannyy v sredu eksperimentalnyy letatelnyy apparat sposoben preodolevat perspektivnyye sistemy protivoraketnoy oborony," ITAR-TASS, 19 February 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com. {Entered 3/1/2004 EMC}

12/25/2003: STATE MILITARY PROCUREMENT PLAN FOR 2004 ADOPTED
The Russian government approved the 2004 state military procurement plan at a closed session on 25 December 2003.[1] This marks the first time in the past decade that the government adopted the plan before the beginning of the calendar year, and should allow defense enterprises to enter into contracts without the delays of several months that previously slowed the process.[2,3] The plan for 2004 provides for funding in the amount of 341.2 billion rubles ($11.7 billion as of 25 December 2003), an increase of 19.8% over 2003, totaling approximately 14% of all federal budget expenditures.[3] According to Deputy Minister for Economic Development and Trade Colonel General Vladislav Putilin, this sum nevertheless represents 20% less than the funding outlined in the State Armaments Program. He noted, however, that funding dedicated to the production of military hardware and armaments will increase by 30%.[1] As a result, amongst other equipment, the 2004 state military procurement plan calls for acquisition of six Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'] intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), one Tu-160 [NATO name 'Blackjack'] strategic bomber, six military space satellites and four booster-rockets, and a number of Iskander-M [NATO designation SS-26 'Stone'] tactical short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). It also foresees modernization of Tu-160 and Tu-95MS [NATO name 'Bear H'] strategic bombers as well as Tu-22M3 [NATO name 'Backfire'] long-range bombers.[2] In terms of the naval leg of the strategic triad, the state procurement plan provides funding in 2004 for the first tests of the new Bulava sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and for continued construction of the first Project 955 Borey-class strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the Yuriy Dolgorukiy, which is scheduled to be launched in 2005 as part of plans to introduce three Borey-class SSBNs into the Russian Navy by 2010.[3,4,5] The procurement plan, which is considered an integral part of efforts to modernize the armed forces, also incorporates several measures that seek to streamline the procurement process and reduce costs.[3] For example, it allows companies to enter into contracts of up to three years (instead of the standard one-year agreement), thereby locking in prices for the future, and mandates that open tenders be held for a wide variety of military equipment, a step that could cut the cost of spending on military goods by up to 15%.[1,2,3] A new agency created in 2003, the State Committee for State Military Procurement, is tasked with oversight of conventional weapons purchases, while the Ministry of Defense will remain the sole procurer of equipment that pertains to logistics and support.[2]
Sources:
[1] Vladimir Mukhin, "Gosoboronzakaz budet prinyat do kontsa etogo goda," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, No.45 (369), 26 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Ivan Safronov, Konstantin Lantratov, "Pravitelstvo modernizirovalo oboronnyy zakaz," Kommersant, No. 236, 26 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] SeverInform, "V 2004 godu gosudartsvennyy oboronnyy zakaz stanet sostavnoy chastyu modernizatsii Vooruzhennykh sil RF," 27 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[4] Andrey Mikhaylov, "V 2004 godu v Severodvinske budet prodolzheno stroitelstvo APL proyekta 'Borey'," Pravda.Ru, 3 January 2004; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[5] Andrey Mikhaylov, "Pravitelstvo utverdilo zakaz dlya oboronki," Pravda.Ru, 26 December 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com. {Entered 2/16/2004 EMC}

10/2/2003:  RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR POSTURE
On 2 October 2003, Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov presented a report entitled "Immediate Tasks of Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" at a top-level meeting at the Ministry of Defense . The document, inter alia, outlines two major tasks for nuclear weapons: deterrence of an attack and de-escalation of a conflict if deterrence fails. Deterrence is viewed as a means to prevent the use of force against Russia for political purposes. De-escalation of a conflict is based on the notion of "pre-determined damage," which explicitly refers to the possible limited use of nuclear weapons to inflict a sufficient amount of damage to a hostile party to ensure that aggression is not worthwhile. Although the main threats to Russian security remain international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, according to the report Russia will consider the limited use of nuclear weapons to fight any potential enemy. The report also addresses Russia's possible reaction to possible developments in US nuclear policy. According to the document, development of low-yield nuclear weapons by the United States might trigger Russia to revise its approach to deter threats of various levels. The report also outlines planned changes in the nuclear triad, including a substantial reduction of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). By 2007-2008, the SRF will consist of 10 missile divisions (there are currently 19), primarily employing old types of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) whose service lives will be extended until these systems gradually are phased out in favor of new missile systems. The air-based component of the strategic forces will stress modernization of the Tu-160 heavy bomber [NATO designation 'Blackjack'], which should be able to carry high-precision cruise missiles with both nuclear and conventional warheads, as well as gravity bombs. The naval leg of the nuclear triad will focus upon development of a new sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) [CNS believes it is the Bulava] and a new submarine [CNS believes this refers to the Borey class] to carry this new missile. [For more information on the "Immediate Tasks of Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" report, see Nikolai Sokov, "Russian Ministry of Defense's New Policy Paper:  The Nuclear Angle," CNS Report, 10 October 2003, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/sok1003.htm.]
["Aktualnyye zadachi razvitiya Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii," Krasnaya zvezda online edition,  http://www.redstar.ru/2003/10/11_10/3_01.html, 11 October 2003.]  {Entered 11/7/2003 TS}

8/5/2003: RUSSIA TO HALVE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN 2004
Strana.ru reported on 5 August 2003 that Deputy Defense Minister and Armed Forces Chief of Armaments Colonel General Aleksey Moskovskiy stated that defense expenditures for the purchase of new arms and equipment will cut in half in 2004. The deputy minister added that the reduction is not due to economic considerations, but rather other government concerns. At this point, the most significant drawdown in the arms program for 2001-2005 is associated with modernization of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and the development of new anti-aircraft missile systems and aviation. However, Moskovskiy believes that problems modernizing the SRF naval component could be largely compensated for by extending the length of the operation of strategic land-based missile systems, which is less expensive. Reductions in the purchase of space technology are also likely—expenditures for Space Forces modernization had increased by 3.5 times since they became a separate service of the Russian Armed Forces. A new approach to the modernization of conventional weapons is also being considered, in order to further reduce defense expenditures: military units may be allowed to transfer arms and military equipment whose warranty is about to expire, but which could still be sold for export, to industrial enterprises. The reduction of defense expenditures for 2004 is also likely to affect the drafting of a new State Armament Program for 2010–2015, to be completed this year.
[Nikita Petrov, "Expenditures For Defense Will Be Cut in Half," Strana.ru Web Site, http://www.strana.ru/, 5 August 2003; in "Russian Defense Expenditures For Purchase of New Arms, Equipment, To Be Halved in 2004," FBIS Document CEP20030806000184]. {Entered 11/21/2003 TS}

3/26/2003-6/27/2003: GREATER RELIANCE ON CONTRACT SOLDIERS PLANNED
Nezavisimaya gazeta reported on 26 March 2003 that Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov had announced that the Russian government would consider adopting a volunteer manning program for the Russian military. The Ministry of Defense has assembled a list of 92 units that would undergo conversion. The first units to undergo the conversion would be the Ground Forces, Airborne Forces, and Naval Infantry. Strategic Rocket Forces and the Air Force would undergo conversion to the new system in the second wave. The initiative was announced even though the professionalization program, under development by an interagency commission created by the Russian government on 21 November 2002, is still incomplete.  This led one commission member to express the concern that Ivanov's initiative amounted to an experiment. The commission, which studied the transformation of the French military to an all-professional force, was surprised that such force components as infantry would be professionalized earlier than "intellectual" ones (SRF, Air Force). Moreover, the commission has encountered difficulties in obtaining necessary planning information from the Ministry of Defense.[1]

On 6 May 2003 the Ministry of Defense held a press conference on the contract manning program and revealed additional details of the program. During the conference, Deputy General Staff Chief Lieutenant General Smirnov said that the Russian military has experienced great difficulties acquiring enlisted personnel via conscription, due to the growing numbers of exemptions and health problems among conscripts. According to Smirnov, only 10.3% of the annual draft cohort was not exempt to conscription, and about half of conscripts suffer from medical problems limiting their usefulness. According to the federal program, in 2004-2005 units belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops, Federal Border Service, and Ministry of Defense units stationed in the North Caucasus would switch to contract manning. The second phase of the program would begin in 2008, when the number of contract personnel would increase and units belonging to the SRF, Air Force, Navy, and the Space Forces would also undergo the transition. The reform would also include training units, reduced manning units, and equipment storage facilities. Conscription would eventually be shortened to 1-1.5 years. Upon completing their initial training, conscripts would have the option of contract service, or an assignment to a reduced-manning unit. According to preliminary estimates, $138 billion rubles will be needed through 2007 to implement the reform. Overall, nearly 200 units are to transition to contract manning by 2007.[2] Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Vladimir Kravchenko, however, indicated that the Navy would shift to contract manning by 2007, sooner than Smirnov indicated, adding that 60% of submarine crews already were serving under contract.[3]

It remains to be seen whether these ambitious plans will be successfully implemented. The effort to transform the Pskov division of the Airborne Forces has experienced only limited success due to inadequate funding, lack of housing and other infrastructure, and other problems that reduce the attractiveness of contract service. The program's provision to offer contract service to conscripts may be an insurance policy against the failure to attract genuine volunteers into the military and increase the quality of the enlisted personnel, including in nuclear components.
Sources:
[1] Anatoliy Kostyukov, "Pervoy na kontrakt poydet pekhota," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 March 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com/.
[2] Otari Sarkisyan, "Tolko 10,3 protsenta sostoyashchikh na uchete rossiyskikh prizyvnikov nadenut pogony," Regions.ru, 6 May 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com/.
[3] Yuliya Andreyeva, "ITAR-TASS, 27 June 2003; in "Russia: Chief of Staff Says Navy To Shift to Contract Manning by 2007," FBIS Document CEP20030627000104. {Entered 8/8/2003 MJ}

1/10/2003: ARMED FORCES PAY RAISE, MILITARY REFORM QUESTIONED
Izvestiya reported on 10 January 2003 that members of the armed forces had received a 10% increase in rank-related pay as of 1 January 2003.[1] The pay raise, which also applies to the pensions received by retired servicemen, resulted from a decision to link rank-related pay in the military to existing civil service pay grades. The new salary scale will translate into an additional 350-550 rubles ($11-17 as of 10 January 2003) per month, depending upon rank, and also will result in an increase of other payments to which soldiers and retirees are entitled.[1,2] These payments, such as bonuses for length of service, are indexed to rank- and duty-related pay and together with the pay raise could lead to an increase in total wages by as much as 70%.[1] In addition, according to Russian Deputy Defense Minister Lyubov Kudelina, the government plans to undertake a further indexation of military wages later in 2003, in line with the rate of inflation and depending on available resources.[2]

Critics have argued that the January pay increase does not even offset the official rate of inflation for 2002 of 15.1%. Its effects therefore resemble previous attempts to reform the military pay system such as the decision to double rank-related pay as of 1 July 2002, while simultaneously eliminating a series of important social benefits enjoyed by the military.[1,2] As a result, these efforts have not improved the difficult living conditions in which soldiers and their families exist, as evidenced by monitoring conducted by the government on the socio-economic status of military families. The results of this research indicated that average real wages for the military dropped by 2.8% in 2002, while other citizens enjoyed an increase of 34.7%. In addition, the average monthly salary received by hired labor exceeded the compensation received by contract soldiers for the first time. As a result, according to the Ministry of Defense, 46.2% of Russian military families currently live below the poverty line as opposed to 32.6% of the general population.[2] It also is not clear whether the financial resources foreseen in the current budget will be sufficient to implement the pay raise, especially given plans announced by Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov to expand gradually throughout the course of 2003 the number of military units composed of contract, rather than conscripted, soldiers. The military also intends by the summer of 2003 to present President Putin with its program for converting the armed forces to a primarily contract soldier-based service beginning in 2004.[1]

In the meantime, one component of military reform already under consideration concerns the medical commissions that determine the fitness of draftees for duty. A new Statute on Military-Medical Examination, approved by government decree, outlines the operating procedures that these commissions should follow to determine the fitness of individuals for service. The statute specifies that the commissions will consist of doctors approved by the local government head on the recommendation of a military commissioner. It also dictates that decisions on the individual fitness of draftees for combat will be taken by a majority of the doctors present at a commission meeting instead of requiring a quorum or a qualified majority. In the opinion of critics of the changes, these new medical rules may result in an increased likelihood that medically unsuitable individuals will be drafted. These individuals therefore charge that the new rules are tailored to ensure that the army meets draft quotas rather than the declared goal of making military service a more respected and prestigious profession. Opponents also believe that the changes will not impact the widespread use of bribery to evade military service and in fact actually may create the impression that the government sanctions a system in which avoidance of military service increasingly is seen as a business.[3]
Sources:
[1] Dmitriy Litovkin, "Na khleb khvatit," Izvestiya, No. 2, 10 January 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] Sergey Ishchenko, "Pogonnyy rubl," Trud-7, No. 1, 4 January 2003; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[3] "Seksualnuyu oriyentatsiyu prizyvnikov opredelyat golosovaniyem," Izvestiya.Ru Web Site, http://www.izvestiya.ru/community/article31149, 13 March 2003. {Entered 4/8/2003 EMC}

10/12/2002: COMBAT READINESS OF RUSSIAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES TESTED
A five-day command and training exercise involving several branches of the Russian armed forces concluded on 12 October 2002 with coordinated test launches of a Topol [NATO designation SS-25 'Sickle'] intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from the Plesetsk Test Site, sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) from Pacific and Northern Fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea, and cruise missiles fired by Tu-95MS [NATO name 'Bear-H'] and Tu-160 [NATO name 'Blackjack'] strategic bombers.[1,2] The exercise also tasked the Russian anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, which utilized early-warning radars and command posts in Belarus for the first time, with simulating the destruction of the missiles during the final stage of flight. It appears that the ABM system played the role of U.S. national missile defense (NMD). Therefore, the results of the exercise, in which all of the missiles reportedly overcame the ABM system and successfully "struck" the programmed targets, could be interpreted as proof of the continued effectiveness of the ICBMs. According to military officials, the exercise sought to demonstrate the ability of the strategic nuclear forces, assigned the preeminent role in maintaining Russia's security, to defend the country against military aggression, including through the use of nuclear weapons. The new Russian military doctrine, taking into account weakened conventional arms capabilities, foresees the use of nuclear weapons in order to preserve Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The exercise may also have sought to demonstrate an ability to overcome ABM systems.[1] Some Russian commentators, however, pointed to the closed nature of the exercise, its full-scale simulation of a conflict, and proximity to a US NMD test as possibly indicating a renewal of strategic arms competition between Russia and the United States.  Sergey Sokut, of Nezavisimaya gazeta, characterized similar exercises conducted at the end of the 1990s as more transparent and contrasted the emphasis of earlier exercises on de-escalation with the full nuclear strike and coordinated ICBM and SLBM launches in this latest exercise. Sokut also attributed the US decision to postpone its NMD test from 24 August 2002 to mid-October 2002 to Washington's desire to make a political statement rather than to the officially stated technical reasons.[3]
Sources:
[1] Vladimir Levin, "Yadernyye rakety proleteli nad Moskvoy," Press-tsentr.Ru, 15 October 2002; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] "V Rossii v odin den osushchestvleny puski ballisticheskikh raket nazemnogo, morskogo i vozdushnogo bazirovaniya," Interfax, 12 October 2002.
[3] Sergey Sokut, "Raketnaya duel vozobnovilas," Nezavisimaya gazeta, No. 220 (2774), 15 October 2002. {Entered 11/26/2002 EMC}
 
9/27/2002: RUSSIAN STRATEGIC FORCES TO BE REDUCED TO MINIMUM SUFFICIENCY
On 29 September 2002, Chief of the General Staff, Army General Anatoliy Kvashnin announced that in the course of reform Russian strategic forces will be brought to a level of minimum sufficiency.[1] Kvashnin did not specify how individual components of the Russian triad will be affected by the reform. This decision was reported as part of an effort to optimize the Russian armed forces and make them correspond to both the threats Russia faces and Russia's economic capabilities.[2]
Sources:
[1] "V khode voyennoy reformy strategicheskiye yadernyye sily Rossii budut privedeny k minimalno dostatochnomu urovnyu," UNIAN, No. 038 (230), 23-29 September 2002.
[2]  Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 27 September 2002; in "Russian chief of staff: Defense Ministry to be streamlined," FBIS Document CEP20020927000226. {Entered 10/2/2002 MJ}

8/16/2002: NO PLANS TO RESTORE SRF STATUS
SRF Commander Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov announced on 16 August 2002 that there were no plans to restore the SRF's status as a separate branch of service. Solovtsov added that all three components of the Russian strategic triad will be developed without favoring any single component.
["U rossiyskogo voyennogo rukovodstva net planov po vosstanovleniyu RVSN kak otdelnogo vida Vooruzhennykh sil strany," RIA Novosti, 16 August 2002.] {Entered 11/27/2002 MJ}

6/19/2002: RUSSIAN OFFICIALS ON CONSEQUENCES OF ABM, START II TREATY DEMISE
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov said on 19 June 2002 that the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and subsequent Russian declaration that it considered itself no longer bound by START II provisions gave Russia more flexibility in decisionmaking on the structure of its nuclear forces. Ivanov said that the Moscow Treaty is advantageous to the Russian military, and that Russia will not make any rash moves in response to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Ivanov's remarks were echoed by General Staff Chief General Anatoliy Kvashnin, who added that Russia will now be able to retain its MIRVed ICBMs, which START II banned.[1] As a result of the demise of START II, Russia now plans to retain the remaining 154 R-36M-series [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] ICBMs permitted by START I, until at least 2010.[2] Strategic Rocket Forces Commander Colonel General Nikolay Solovtsov told journalists that a decision to extend the service lives of MIRVed ICBMs was in the final stages of preparation.[3] The Ministry of Defense reportedly plans to increase the strategic nuclear forces' budget share from 18% in 2002 to 23-25% in 2003.[4]
Sources:
[1] "US missile defence plans give Russia nuclear 'flexibility': minister," Agence France Presse, 19 June 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[2] "Ballisticheskiye rakety 'Satana' mogut nakhoditsya na boyevom dezhurstve do 2010 goda-Baluyevskiy," Interfax, 20 June 2002.
[3] "Rossiya imeyet otvet na resheniye SShA vyyti iz Dogovora po PRO-komanduyushchiy RVSN," Interfax, 22 June 2002.
[4] Vladimir Georgiyev, "Armiya-pravitelstvo: 1:0 v polzu raket," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 June 2002, p. 2; in Universal Database of Central Russian Newspapers, http://online.eastview.com/. {Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}

5/18/2002: RUSSIA TO MAINTAIN NUCLEAR TRIAD
On 18 May 2002, Colonel General Yuriy Baluyevskiy, the first deputy chief of the General Staff, told reporters that reductions in Russia's strategic arms do not imply the elimination of any of the three components of its nuclear triad.
[Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 18 May 2002; in "Russia to keep 'nuclear triad' despite strategic offensive weapons cuts," FBIS Document CEP20020518000059.] {Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}

4/7/2002: PUTIN WORRIED ABOUT LOWERING OF NUCLEAR THRESHOLD
On 7 April 2002, during a discussion with German journalists prior to his visit to Germany, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed concern about reports on the US Nuclear Posture Revi