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Michael Jasinski, CNS Research Associate
Dr. Nikolai Sokov, CNS Senior Research Associate
April 2001

Status and Development Trends

Created on 17 December 1959 by a Soviet Council of Ministers resolution, the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) have historically represented the main component of the Soviet Union's strategic arsenal. Although the SRF's importance was somewhat diminished in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union and the START I and II treaties (which, in addition to significant numerical cuts, also force considerable changes in the structure of the Russian strategic nuclear forces), the SRF will likely remain the most effective component of Russia's strategic arsenal.[1]

Since its inception, the SRF enjoyed the status of a separate branch of forces, on a par with the Russian Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy and, until its 1997 merger with the Air Force, the Air Defense Forces. Following the fall of the Soviet Union and the rapid deterioration of Russia's conventional forces, which led to a greater reliance on nuclear forces, the SRF's status actually increased, particularly after SRF Commander General (later Marshal) Igor Sergeyev became the minister of defense in 1997.  On 1 November 1997 President Yeltsin ordered the Missile-Space Defense Troops, which controlled Russia's early warning, space tracking, and ABM systems, and the Military Space Forces, which controlled Russian military space launch assets, to merge with the SRF. In addition to optimizing Russia's military organizational structure, the stated goals of this merger were reducing the redundancies, and therefore costs, of the three branches of service. According to some reports, the merger reduced the three services' combined share of the defense budget from 19.3% to 15.5% and resulted in the disbanding of tens of military units with duplicate roles. At the same time, the reorganization had its share of critics who alleged that the SRF was siphoning funds away from Missile-Space Defense Troops and Military Space Forces projects to fund its own high-priority programs. Some Russian military observers also speculated that the reorganizations had more to do with the rising or falling fortunes of certain "clans" of generals, rather than a desire to save money or to optimize the Armed Forces' organizational structure. Regardless of the actual reasons, the merger meant a considerable expansion of the SRF's capabilities. In addition to controlling Russia's ICBM force, the SRF's responsibilities now expanded into the area of strategic early warning, ballistic missile defense, and even space launches. The last responsibility proved to be of particular benefit to the SRF, since it provided the service with expanded training opportunities for its missile crews, and a potential source of income, as the SRF began considering converting hundreds of ICBMs that have been slated for dismantlement into space launch vehicles.[2,3,4]

In late 1998 Marshal Sergeyev began promoting the idea of reorganizing the Armed Forces into three services, with the addition of a separate strategic nuclear forces command. Called the Strategic Deterrent Forces (SDF), the new service would have united the SRF's ICBM force, the Air Force's Long-Range Aviation, and the Navy's ballistic missile submarine force. In addition, the SDF would also acquire the 12th Main Directorate, the agency tasked with the safekeeping of nuclear warheads assigned to the Ministry of Defense. SDF proponents have argued that the unification of all legs of Russia's nuclear triad under a single headquarters would cut strategic modernization costs by 15-20% thanks to the elimination of organizational redundancies and research and development duplication, and would also ensure more centralized control of nuclear and missile nonproliferation enforcement functions.[5] The idea of developing a dual-purpose (land- and sea-based) ballistic missile, which later became known as the Bulava, was indirectly related to the SDF concept. The proposed unification of the strategic nuclear forces would have represented a further de facto increase of the SRF's status since, as the most important component of the nuclear triad, its leadership would play a leading role within the new unified command. In fact, for the post of the commander of the new service, Marshal Sergeyev recommended SRF Commander General Vladimir Yakovlev.[6,7] 

Sergeyev's proposal sparked opposition from the chiefs of other branches of services, who ultimately protested the plan to deprive their services of strategic nuclear components.[8] President Yeltsin did not support the SDF, and this defeat for Sergeyev turned out to be the beginning of the deterioration of the SRF's political fortunes. The main challenge to the favored status of the SRF came from the General Staff, whose generals desired more emphasis on Russia's conventional capabilities, which they viewed as more pertinent to Russia's national security problems, including the Chechen conflict and other potential "hot spots" along its periphery. In accordance with proposals advanced in the spring of 2000 by Russian General Staff Chief Anatoliy Kvashnin, reportedly within the framework of implementing the April 2000 Military Doctrine, the SRF would be sharply reduced and demoted from an independent branch of the armed forces to a separate command by 2003, with its assets subsequently either transferred to the Air Force or subordinated directly to the Commander-in-Chief. Its structure would be reduced from 19 missile divisions to only two controlling merely 150 ICBMs. Kvashnin's proposal called for an accelerated rate of withdrawal of old ICBMs from service, without expending efforts to extend their service lives. While acknowledging that Russia continues to need a nuclear deterrent, Kvashnin asserted that effective deterrence could be provided by a considerably smaller number of nuclear weapons and claimed that Russia's security in the West (vis-a-vis NATO) and East (vis-a-vis China) was guaranteed by political agreements. To some extent, Kvashnin's plan to reduce the SRF, which was presented while the second Chechen conflict was in full swing and after the pro-nuclear trend in the Russian defense doctrine caused by the Kosovo crisis had waned, appears to have been caused by the desire to reallocate some of the funds the service receives to the badly underfunded conventional forces, whose conditions has deteriorated to such an extent that they have difficulty even in localizing regional conflicts.[9,10,11,12]

Kvashnin's ideas also encountered considerable criticism. Their opponents charged that, if implemented in full, they would amount to a unilateral fulfillment of START II terms, and would reduce Russia's leverage on the United States to compel it to ratify the 1997 ABM Treaty demarcation agreements. Such reductions would also considerably reduce the likelihood of Russian "adequate response" in the event of a US National Missile Defense deployment. Finally, Kvashnin's critics charged that his proposals were motivated mainly by his desire to become minister of defense. In spite of these criticisms, there were early signs that Kvashnin's ideas also enjoyed considerable support. In June, he was appointed a permanent member of the Security Council (traditionally, the Ministry of Defense was represented only by the minister). SRF Chief Vladimir Yakovlev did not receive a promotion at the same time as other service chiefs (he was not promoted to Army General until June, months later than the others). Yakovlev seemed resigned to his defeat within the military’s own ranks: as early as a week before the Collegium he publicly pinned all his hopes on Putin’s wisdom and statesmanship; in the immediate aftermath of the meeting, Minister of Defense Igor Sergeev threatened to resign.[47]

Following an inconclusive meeting between Putin, Sergeyev, Kvashnin, and Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov at Sochi, Kvashnin's proposals were discussed at the 11 August 2000 Security Council session. Although the decisions made during the session were considerably less radical than ones advocated by Kvashnin, they can be viewed as a net defeat for the SRF. The Security Council decided to demote the SRF from an independent branch of the armed forces to a separate command in 2006, rather than 2003. The proposed rate of missile reductions was once again linked to the expiration of their service lives and made conditional on external developments, particularly the future of missile defense proposals in the United States. Furthermore, the Security Council reversed the 1998 decision to transfer the Space-Missile Defense Troops to the SRF, ordering their integration into the Air Force by 2002. Although the Security Council's decisions were qualified by a statement calling for reconsidering or reversing SRF reform plans in the event of unfavorable developments in the area of strategic arms reduction talks or ballistic missile defenses, Russian military observers have interpreted the Security Council's decisions as a sign that the service's fate has already been decided. It is expected that, as missile divisions are disbanded once their missiles are eliminated, the SRF will gradually lose its army-level command structures.[13,14,15,16] 

The decisions made during the August 2000 Security Council session were subsequently reinforced by the appointment of the Security Council Secretary at that time, Sergey Ivanov, to the position of minister of defense in April 2001, replacing Igor Sergeyev.[17] The retired Marshal Sergeyev, however, retained some official role in defense policy when he was designated the president's advisor on strategic stability. It is not clear what the extent of his influence will be, however.[18] 

The planned diminution in the SRF's institutional status will coincide with a sharp drop in the number of missiles and warheads under its control, and its relative contribution to the Russian strategic nuclear force. This process began in the early 1990s, with the START I-mandated reductions, under which the SRF lost half of its "heavy" R-36M-series ICBMs [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan,' START designation RS-20]. Between 1990 and 2000,  the total number of missiles under SRF control decreased by about 25% and the number of warheads by a slightly smaller percentage.  However, these figures do not reflect the decreasing readiness of the SRF force caused by the progressive obsolescence of its ICBMs and inadequate budget allocations for maintenance and training.  Overall, START I reductions reduced the SRF's share of strategic nuclear warheads from 64% to 53%.[19]

However, these reductions pale in comparison with the drawdown the SRF will undergo by the end of the decade, especially if START II cuts are implemented. START II requires the United States and Russia to reduce the total number of strategic warheads to 3,000-3,500, including the elimination of all heavy ICBMs, and the elimination of MIRVed missiles or their conversion to a single-warhead variant, within certain guidelines.  

Once--and if--all the START II-mandated deactivations are complete by the end of 2003, the SRF will have only about 360 mobile RT-2PM Topol [NATO designation SS-25 'Sickle,' START designation RS-12M] and 105 silo-based UR-100N ICBMs [NATO designation SS-19 'Stiletto,' START designation RS-18] reduced to one warhead, supplemented by a growing force of RT-2PM2 Topol-Ms [NATO designation SS-27, START designation RS-12M2], in both mobile and silo-based configurations. However, the Topol-M production rate has remained low, and according to one estimate, by January 2008 the SRF might have as few as 260 single-warhead missiles.[20] In addition to reductions in absolute numbers, START II considerably changes the balance within the Russian triad, reducing the SRF's share of warheads from 60% to 30%, with up to 50% of warheads being carried on SLBMs and 20% on strategic bombers. 

However, although START II potentially reduces the SRF's share in Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal, Russia's economic difficulties mean that other legs of Russia's nuclear triad may not be able to take advantage of the situation.  While the SRF modernization program, including the procurement of the Topol-M ICBM, has been progressing at a slow pace, Russia's air and naval strategic deterrents have experienced problems of even greater severity. Only one SSBN (the Borey class lead ship Yuriy Dolgorukiy) has been laid down since 1991, and its construction has suffered delays due to intermittent financing and problems in the development of the next-generation SLBM. Long Range Aviation, which controls Russia's strategic bomber force, faces a similar predicament of progressive obsolescence. Although it is to receive new types of cruise missiles, the development of a new type of strategic bomber has been suspended indefinitely due to lack of funding. Under these conditions the SRF could prove to be the most cost-effective component of the Russian nuclear triad and retain its dominant role. 

Russia's apparent inability to maintain a force of 3,000-3,500 strategic warheads (the maximum levels permitted by START II), particularly given the ICBM MIRV ban, have led to START III proposals which, among other things, include relaxing the ICBM MIRV ban by allowing ICBMs to be fitted with up to three warheads, level of MIRVing of which the new Topol-M ICBM is apparently capable. One proposed variant of START III foresees the Russian triad as being composed of 400-500 warheads on ICBMs, 600-800 on SLBMs, and 200-300 on strategic bombers.[20] 

In keeping with the upcoming reduction in stature, and as part of the ongoing Russian military reform plans, which include considerable personnel cuts in all branches of Russia's armed forces, SRF personnel strength will be reduced as well. SRF Commander Yakovlev stated in November 2000 that SRF personnel would be cut by 10,000 servicemen in 2001, and by 60,000 by 2006.[21]

Although it faces a significant decrease in the number of its deployed missiles and warheads, the SRF is planning for the future. One of the main concerns being addressed by SRF leadership is the increasing numbers of conventional air- and sea-launched precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and their growing effectiveness in destroying targets hitherto invulnerable to all but nuclear weapons, including missile silos, hardened command centers, and other vital components of Russian strategic forces. To meet this challenge, the SRF appears to be dedicating some efforts toward improving its survivability against such weapons. Measures discussed in open sources include the development of electronic warfare systems designed to reduce the effectiveness of PGMs guidance systems, improving the stealth characteristics of Russian mobile ICBM systems, and increasing the mobile ICBMs' mobility and ability to launch their missiles from virtually any spot within the divisional area. Some thought has also been given to improving the survivability of SRF missile base support systems.[22,23] 

SRF Unit Organization

At the time the START I Memorandum of Understanding was signed, the SRF had 26 missile divisions, organized in six missile armies located on the territory of the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Kazakhstani republics.[24] Following the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent force reductions, by 1997 SRF had only 19 missile divisions on Russian territory, grouped in four missile armies. Seven additional divisions were left outside of Russia and were eventually disbanded. The same fate was shared by  two missile army headquarters, the 43rd (located in Ukraine) and the 50th (located in Smolensk and controlling missile divisions in Belarus).[25]

As of 1991 SRF units in Kazakhstan included two heavy ICBM divisions, each with eight regiments and 52 R-36M-series [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] ICBMs. By the end of 1996 all of the nuclear warheads arming the missiles have been transferred to Russia, and missiles and silos were eliminated shortly thereafter with US financial and technical assistance.[26]  

The Ukraine-based SRF comprised an entire Missile Army, the 43rd, headquartered in Vynnytsa. The army controlled two missile divisions, one wholly equipped with UR-100N ICBMs and the second with a mix of UR-100N and the silo-based variant of the RT-23UTTKh [NATO designation SS-24 'Scalpel'] ICBM. All of the missiles' strategic warheads were transferred to Russia under the terms of the Trilateral Statement, and the government of Ukraine began the process of eliminating the missiles and their launch silos with US assistance. By 2000 all of the UR-100N ICBMs and their silos had been eliminated, and most of the RT-23UTTKh ICBMs have been withdrawn from their silos and stored in a disassembled state, pending the construction of a solid-rocket fuel conversion plant. 

Belarus also found itself with two missile divisions on its territory, each with three regiments of nine mobile Topol ICBMs. Unlike the other newly independent states, whose missiles were dismantled in place, Belarus returned the mobile ICBMs along with their warheads. These ICBMs were then assigned to SRF units stationed at Vypolzovo and Yoshkar-Ola.

As of July 2000 the SRF included the following divisions:

Missile Division at Dombarovskiy (Orenburg Oblast) with 52 R-36M ICBMs. Twelve silos were eliminated earlier as part of START I eliminations.

Missile Division at Kartaly (Chelyabinsk Oblast) with seven regiments and 46 R-36M ICBMs.

Missile Division at Aleysk (Altay Kray) with five regiments and 30 R-36M ICBMs. By the end of 2000, one of the division's regiments with six silos had been deactivated, and the silos demolished. The rest of the division will be deactivated in 2001.

Missile Division at Uzhur (Krasnoyarsk Kray) with with 52 R-36M ICBMs. Twelve silos were eliminated during the 1990s.

Guards Missile Division at Kozelsk (Kaluga Oblast) with six regiments and 60 UR-100N ICBMs.

60th Taman Missile Division near Tatischchevo (Saratov Oblast), with a mix of silo-based UR-100N, RT-23UTTKh (one regiment) and Topol-M ICBMs. The Tatishchevo division is the first, and as of December 2000 the only, line SRF unit to receive the newest Topol-M ICBMs, deploying two regiments in 1998 and 1999 with a total of 20 missiles, and one incomplete regiment of four missiles in 2000. The new Topol-Ms have been replacing UR-100N and RT-23UTTKh ICBMs on a one-to-one basis, and the process of rearming the division is likely to continue.  

Ternopol-Berlin Missile Division near Bershet (Perm Oblast) with four regiments and 12 rail-mobile RT-23UTTKh ICBM launchers. 

Vienna Guards Missile Division near Krasnoyarsk (Krasnoyarsk Kray) with four regiments and 12 rail-mobile RT-23UTTKh ICBM launchers.

Guards Missile Division near Kostroma with four regiments and 12 rail-mobile RT-23UTTKh ICBM launchers.

Missile Division near Teykovo (Ivanovo Oblast) with four regiments and 36 mobile Topol ICBM launchers.

Kharbin Missile Division near Drovyanaya (Chita Oblast) with two regiments and 18 road-mobile Topol ICBM launchers.

Kiev-Zhitomir Missile Division near Yoshkar-Ola with four regiments and 36 mobile Topol ICBM launchers.

Guards Rechitsa Missile Division near Vypolzovo (Tver Oblast) with two regiments and 18 mobile Topol ICBM launchers.

Melitopol Missile Division near Yurya (Kirov Oblast) with five regiments and 45 mobile Topol ICBM launchers.

Missile Division near Nizhniy Tagil (Sverdlovsk Oblast) with five regiments and 45 mobile Topol ICBM launchers.

Guards Glukhov Missile Division near Novosibirsk with five regiments and 45 mobile Topol ICBM launchers.

Missile Division near Kansk (Krasnoyarsk Kray) with five regiments and 45 mobile Topol ICBM launchers.

Missile Division near Irkutsk with four regiments and 36 mobile Topol ICBM launchers.

Missile Division near Barnaul with four regiments and 36 mobile Topol ICBM launchers.[28]

The number of SRF divisions will likely decrease in the next 10 years; the units most likely to be deactivated are missile divisions using the R-36M heavy ICBM, the rail-mobile RT-23UTTKh ICBM, and some UR-100N divisions. If START II-mandated cuts are implemented, the SRF will have only three ICBM types in service: the Topol, the UR-100N/NUTTKh (of which 105 may be retained in single-warhead mode but eventually will be decommissioned due to obsolescence), and the new Topol-M. Alternatively, the number of divisions may be reduced at a slower pace if the number of regiments subordinated to each division is reduced. While more costly, this option would increase the ICBM force's survivability.

Silo-Based ICBM Unit Organization

An ICBM base (division) is usually 60-80km by 40-50km; the whole territory is owned by the military. It includes a cantonment area (ploshchadka), which is located at the edge of the base and includes staff buildings, living quarters, and other elements of infrastructure, including those needed for weapons maintenance and storage of non-deployed missiles. The cantonment area also includes, within a special guarded perimeter, an underground command bunker. An alternate command bunker is located at the opposite side of the base.

The ICBM base includes several regimental position units (pozitsionnyy rayon polka), each with a radius of approximately 10-15km. The maximum number of regiments ever achieved was 12.

The regimental position consists of a regimental command bunker in the center of that area, which is, on the surface, indistinguishable from an ICBM silo, and several silos located 10-15km from the regimental command bunker. Missiles are fully controlled from the regimental center. Combat duty is performed by teams, each of which spends three to four days at the center and consists of two subteams that alternate every 12 hours. Each regiment has three to four such teams (meaning that after three to four days of combat duty each team has nine to 12 days for recuperation).

Each silo position (otdelnyy start -- OS) is about 100m by 100m. Missiles are controlled and launched from the regimental command center; the missile can be accessed only with permission from that center. Each silo position is guarded by a special team headed by a sergeant or a warrant officer. Both the regimental command center and the silo positions can function autonomously for about 30 days if external power lines are broken.[28]

Road-Mobile ICBM Unit Organization

The deployment area for a road-mobile ICBM division is 150-200km by 150-200km (START I limits the deployment area to 125,000km²); the area is not wholly owned by the military. The central unit (called the "maintenance facility" in the START I Treaty) is the same as at silo ICBM bases.

Each division includes up to five regimental position areas. Each regimental position area includes an area where the ICBM launchers are permanently located (the START I Treaty uses the term "restricted area" and limits its size to 5km²) and combat patrol and training routes of mobile launchers. Each regiment has up to nine ICBM launchers (the START I limit is 10 for each restricted area). Within the permanent location area, mobile launchers are normally located within special structures (krona). ICBMs can be launched from a combat patrol route or from inside the special structures, the roofs of which can be opened. The division and each regiment have both fixed and mobile command centers.[28]

Rail-Mobile ICBM unit Organization

The bases of rail-mobile ICBMs (rail garrisons, according to START I terms) are essentially railroad stations. Each party to START I may have no more than seven rail garrisons. Each rail garrison can have no more than two entrances/exits and the length of each track inside the garrison is limited to 20km. Each rail garrison can have no more than five trains of standard configuration. Each train has up to three launchers, and railcars containing a command center and living quarters. Pursuant to the unilateral initiatives announced by Mikhail Gorbachev on 5 October 1991, trains with rail-mobile ICBM launchers are permanently restricted to their rail garrisons; rail-mobile ICBMs (SS-24) are slated for elimination under the START II Treaty.[28]

Personnel, Training, and Social Issues

Despite its privileged status, in recent years the SRF has not received full funding for its training and social needs. As a result, it has experienced problems in these areas. 

The SRF has been suffering from a decreased number of training opportunities. Due to lack of funding, missile crews often have to train on simulators rather than on actual systems, although the SRF leadership considers such training to be adequate.[31] Mobile ICBM units appear to suffer more severely from inadequate training budgets, since their effectiveness depends to a great extent on the combat readiness of the complex and expensive to maintain transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicles, which also require considerable amounts of fuel for training their drivers. During a 1997 exercise with the Teykovo missile division, some officers were reduced to having to pay out of their own pocket for spare parts and other supplies needed to maintain readiness. Fuel and lubricants were also reported in short supply.[32] Similar problems were experienced by a Topol regiment belonging to a mobile ICBM division based at Yoshkar-Ola during its routine semi-annual exercise used to train TEL vehicle driver-mechanics and launch crews. Fuel shortages have forced the regiment to curtail other operations for several months in order to have enough fuel for the exercise.[33] Some SRF divisions also suffer from a shortage of junior officers, with regiments conducting exercises sometimes needing to be augmented by officers assigned to other regiments. There have also been cases of late salary payments.[32] 

To some extent, the SRF has been able to increase the training opportunities by having its missile crews participate in space launches from the Baykonur and Plesetsk space launch sites, in cooperation with Rosaviakosmos, the civilian space agency. In 2000 alone, the SRF conducted over 20 space launches.[34] 

The SRF's problems have also extended to personnel matters as well. Due to its nature, the SRF, like other Russian military organizations dealing with nuclear weapons, has relied heavily on officers and warrant officers. SRF officers are trained at five (nine before 1998) military academies. Institutes that train SRF officers include the Peter the Great Academy in Moscow, Mozhayskiy Military University in St. Petersburg, and institutes in Rostov, Serpukhov, and Perm. In addition, there are academy and institute branches in Stavropol, Pushkino and Kubinka, as well as a cadet corps in St. Petersburg, which functions as a preparatory school for military academies.[29] 

However, in spite of the fact that the SRF has long had the highest proportion of commissioned and warrant officers of all military services, the SRF cannot do without conscript soldiers and, like the rest of the Russian military, it does not have a long-term professional non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps. In recent years the SRF has been making efforts to "professionalize" its enlisted force by attracting contract servicemen, and here too it received top priority. In April 1999, SRF Deputy Chief Lieutenant General Vladimir Uvakin said that contract servicemen accounted for about 25% of NCOs and junior enlisted personnel in the SRF. They were assigned to positions of particular responsibility, including communication centers, radio technical centers, missile regiments themselves, nuclear weapon storage facilities, etc. In spite of this, Uvakin also noted that not all contract servicemen performed to standards, which compelled SRF to develop its own personnel selection system stressing psychological evaluations and other methods of assessing a potential contract serviceman's suitability.[30]  

Personnel quality problems also afflict the SRF conscript force. Shortages in the number of recruits due to considerable draft evasion have led to a general lowering of standards in the Russian armed forces, forcing the military to accept recruits who would have otherwise been rejected as unsuitable. There have also been isolated incidents of SRF soldiers being dismissed for psychological reasons.[35]  Efforts to ensure the reliability of SRF conscripts have included barring "unreliable" ethnic minorities from this branch of service.[44]

Although no statistics appear to be available on the incidence of hazing and other types of abuse of servicemembers serving in the SRF, such incidents have been reported. In 1999 charges were brought against an SRF officer charged with beating nine servicemembers of his unit and attempted bribery.[36] SRF units have also experienced growing problems with drug use. According to statistics compiled by a collegium of the SRF Prosecutors General, 33 drug-related crimes were noted in 1998, more than twice the previous year's total. In addition, drug use is also contributing to the spread of HIV/AIDS in the Russian military.[37,38] 

SRF units also have their share of social problems, although the situation may not be as serious as in less prestigious branches of the military. Housing remains a problem for some garrisons. The Kostroma missile division, for example, was short about 400 apartments in 1996.[31] SRF leaders have attempted to solicit US assistance to alleviate these problems, but without success.[45] 

The Russian Ministry of Defense's inability to pay its energy bills has affected the SRF as well. In September 2000, the SRF missile division located near Teykovo suffered a brief power outage as a result of unpaid energy debts accumulated by the SRF. The power outage affected only the missile base's garrison area, and not its missile silos or warhead storage areas. Power was restored after the unit's soldiers seized the local utility's facilities.  A similar incident nearly took place at the Aleysk missile division, which was warned that its power would be cut off if energy debts continued to mount. The SRF energy crisis was temporarily solved after the Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov condemned the outages as unacceptable, given that SRF units are considered essential facilities, and by a Unified Energy Systems of Russia (YeES Rossii) order canceling power shut-offs to any SRF bases, regardless of their financial situation.[39,40,41,42] 

Inadequate food allocations have forced SRF units to grow their own food. Speaking with Krasnaya zvezda reporters in 1999, SRF Food Service Chief Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Uglov stated that the SRF units have resorted to military-owned agricultural enterprises and subsidiary farms to improve their food self-sufficiency. These farms have been able to satisfy about 40% of the SRF's needs, and the SRF hoped to increase its self-sufficiency to 60%. Planned projects in this area included opening dairies, sausage shops, bakeries, and other establishments at SRF agricultural enterprises.[43] 

Like other branches of the Russian military, some SRF units have been receiving various levels of financial or material support from the regional governments. For example, SRF units located in Orenburg Oblast have become so dependent on local assistance for food, housing, and even training funds, that the local SRF army commander proposed adding to its name the honorific "Orenburg." A similar relationship appears to exist between the missile division based in Tatishchevo (Saratov Oblast) and the oblast government.[46]

Sources:
[1] Pavel Podvig, ed., Strategicheskoye yadernoye vooruzheniye Rossii, (Moscow: IzdAT, 1998), pp. 126-127.
[2] "Integratsiya RVSN, Voyenno-kosmicheskikh sil, i voysk Raketno-kosmicheskoy oborony v yedinyy vid Vooruzhennykh Sil povysila potentsial yadernogo sderzhivaniya, schitayet glavkom RVSN," TASS, 18 November 1997; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[3] Yuriy Strigelskiy, "Gantsevichi. Zapadnyy shchit Rossii," Belorusskaya delovaya gazeta, 28 January 2000; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 14 February 2000; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/. 
[4] Sergey Sokut, "Effektivnost, stoimost, realizuyemost," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 5 November 1998, p.1.
[5] Interfax, 6 November 1998; in "Combined Command Considered for Armed Force," FBIS Document FTS19981106001318.
[6] Interfax, 10 February 1999; in "Sergeyev on Uniting Command of Nuclear Forces," FBIS Document FTS19990210000605.
[7] Nikolay Gulko, "President Hands Over Nuclear Forces to Sergeyev," Kommersant, 11 February 1999, p.3; in "Sergeyev Wins on N-Forces, But Victory May Be 'Pyrrhic'," FBIS Document FTS19990211000733.
[8] Sergey Larionov, "Revolt in Uniform: In the Defense Ministry, They Cannot Share Nuclear Weapons," Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 10 November 1998, p.1; in "MoD Officials vs. Nuclear Force Changes," FBIS Document FTS19981110001080.
[9] "Rukovodstvo Genshtaba vystupilo s initsiativoy reorganizatsii Raketnykh voysk strategicheskogo naznacheniya," Interfax, No. 4, 11 July 2000.
[10] Vadim Solovev, "Ottyagivaniye resheniy o naznachenii politika ministrom oborony lish usugublyayet situatsiyu. Podkovernaya borba generalov vyryvayetsa naruzhu," Nezavisimaya gazeta online edition, http://news.mosinfo.ru/news/2000/NGA, 14 July 2000, p.1
[11] "Nachalnik Genshtaba RF predlagayet k 2003 godu preobrazovat RVSN v rod voysk vooruzhennykh sil tsentralnogo podchineniya," Interfax, No. 2, 12 July 2000.
[12] Aleksey Melnikov, "Putinu predstoit reshit spor mezhdu Sergeyevym i Kvashninym o budushchem Raketnykh voysk strategicheskogo naznacheniya," Interfax, No. 4, 12 July 2000.
[13] "RVSN kak vid vooruzhennykh sil sokhranitsya do 2006 goda--istochniki," Interfax, No.1, 12 August 2000.
[14] Nikolay Petrov, "Putin ne uvolil ni Sergeyeva, ni Kvashnina," Kommersant online edition, http://www.online.ru/rproducts/commersant-daily-month/, 12 August 2000.
[15] Igor Danilov, "Itogi zasedaniya Soveta bezopasnosti RF: boyevaya nichya v polzu voyennoy reformy," Interfax, No.4, 14 August 2000.
[16] Svetlana Sukhova, "Rossii krylya nikto ne slomayet," Segodnya online edition, http://news.mosinfo.ru/news/2000/SGD/, 14 August 2000. 
[17] "RVSN poka nichego ne grozit,"  Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 10-16 November 2000, p. 1.
[18]  "Look Who's Here," Kommersant, 29 March 2001; in "Kommersant Profiles Russian Government Reshuffle Appointees," FBIS Document CEP20010329000245.
[19] V. Kravchenko, A. Ovcharenko, "Russia's Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces Under a START II Treaty in Force," Morskoy sbornik, August 2000, pp. 2-9; in "Russsia's Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces Under START II," FBIS Document CEP20000915000213.
[20] Pavel Podvig, The Russian Strategic Forces: Uncertain Future, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies Web Site, http://www.armscontrol.ru/.
[21]  "V budushchem godu v raketnykh voyskakh strategicheskogo naznacheniya Rossii planiruyetsya sokratit okolo 10 tysyach voyennosluzhashchikh," Interfax, No. 1, 15 November 2000. 
[22] "Seychas rassmatrivayutsya neskolko variantov oblika i primeneniya strategicheskikh sil budushchego - glavkom RVSN RF," Interfax, No. 2, 4 November 2000.  
[23] Sergey Sokut, "Topol-M's Instead of Scalpels.  Russia Has Said Goodbye to Ukrainian Missiles and Armed Itself With Its Own Ones," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 December 2000, p. 1; in "'Incomplete' Third Topol-M Missile Regiment Commissioned in Russia," FBIS Document CEP20001228000156.
[24] Pavel Podvig, ed., Strategicheskoye yadernoye vooruzheniye Rossii, (Moscow: IzdAT, 1998), p. 131.
[25] Pavel Podvig, ed., Strategicheskoye yadernoye vooruzheniye Rossii, (Moscow: IzdAT, 1998), p. 134.
[26] Pavel Podvig, ed., Strategicheskoye yadernoye vooruzheniye Rossii, (Moscow: IzdAT, 1998), p. 133.
[27] Pavel Podvig, ed., Strategicheskoye yadernoye vooruzheniye Rossii, (Moscow: IzdAT, 1998), p. 135.
[28] Adapted from Article VI of the START I Treaty and Alexander Pikayev, ed., Raketnaya Moshch Rossii: Proshloye i Nastoyashcheye, (Moscow: Committee on Critical Technologies and Nonproliferation; Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1996.)
[29] "Goszakaz na professionalov," Krasnaya zvezda, 13 February 1999, p. 2.
[30] Ilshat Baychurin, "Nabor na sluzhbu po kontraktu ne prekrashchen," Krasnaya zvezda, 2 April 1999, p. 2; also available as "Lt-Gen Uvakin on RSVN Contract Service," FBIS Document FTS19990408001876.
[31] Anatoliy Belousov, "V obkhod 'zolotogo koltsa.' Tvoi garnizoni, Rossiya," Krasnaya zvezda, 7 June 1996, p. 2.
[32] Aleksandr Dolinin, "Sredi berez i...'Topoley'," Krasnaya zvezda, 22 February 1997.
[33] Aleksandr Dolinin, "Sredi pervykh 'Topoley,'" Krasnaya zvezda, No. 166, 30 July 1999, p.1. 
[34] "RVSN do kontsa goda planiruyet 14 zapuskov kosmicheskikh apparatov," Interfax, No.2, 24 July 2000.
[35] "20 voyennosluzhashchikh s otkloneniyami v psikhike i imevshikh dostup k yadernomu oruzhiyu byli uvoleny iz RVSN za posledniye dva goda," Interfax, 11 October 1998.
[36] Pavel Kuybyshev, "Nachshtaba rezhimnoy chasti izbil devyaterykh raketchikov," Kommersant,  http://win.www.online.ru/products/.../13627415.doc.rhtml, 29 July 1999.
[37] Igor Obernikhin, "Na strazhe zakona: voyennaya prokuratura RVSN podvodit itogi," Krasnaya zvezda, No. 166, 30 July 1999, p.3.
[38] Aleksandr Alf, "Armiya v durmane: voyennye prokurory v odinochku ne mogut protivostoyat rasprostraneniyu narkotikov v voyskakh," Nezavisimaya gazeta, No. 90, 21 May 1999, http://home.mosinfo.ru/news/ng/99/05/data/090-21.htm.
[39] "Rossiyskiy premer nazyvayet nedopustimymi deystviya RAO EES, otkluchivshego podachu elektroenergii divizii RVSN," Interfax, No. 3, 12 September 2000.
[40] "Chubays zapretil regionalnym energosistemam otklyuchat ot elektroenergii chasti RVSN," Interfax, No. 3, 13 September 2000.
[41] "Energetiki Altayskogo kraya predupredili diviziyu RVSN o prekrashchenii energosnabzheniya za dolgi," Interfax, No. 1, 13 September 2000.
[42] Konstantin Katanyan, "Otklyucheniye ot energosnabzheniya voinskikh chastey mozhet vyzvat politicheskiy krizis," Vremya MN, 14 September 2000; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, No. 109, 18 September 2000.
[43] Vyacheslav Davidenko and Aleksandr Dolinin,"'Nuclear Missile' Cows, or How to be Food Self-Sufficient for Half a Year," Krasnaya zvezda, 16 July 1999; in "RVSN Food Service Chief Interviewed," FBIS Document FTS19990719001010. 
[44] Yuriy Golotyuk, "Obratnoy dorogi nyet," Izvestiya online edition, http://win.www.online.ru.
[45] "Russian commander:  Nunn-Lugar programme needs adjustment," ITAR-TASS, No. 3, 18 December 2000; in Johnson's Russia List, No. 4698, 19 December 2000. 
[46] Nikolai Sokov, "The Reality and Myths of Nuclear Regionalism in Russia," PONARS Memo No. 133, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/.../Sokov133.html. 
[47] Nikolai Sokov, "Denuclearization" of Russia’s Defense Policy?," Center for Nonproliferation Studies Web Site, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/denuke.htm, 17 July 2000. {Entered 4/16/2001 MJ}

Page last updated 6 July 2001
For major recent developments, see the General Nuclear Weapons Developments file.

Comments or questions? E-mail Nikolai Sokov:  nsokovATmiis.edu.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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