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Michael Jasinski, CNS Research Associate Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the pace of Russian SSBN force modernization has slowed considerably. Whereas two classes of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) were introduced in the 1980s (Delfin and Akula), only a single new SSBN was laid down during the 1990s (the Borey-class Yuriy Dolgorukiy), and it is still years from being completed. In contrast to earlier Soviet practices in which all three legs of the triad underwent parallel modernization programs (one exception being a relatively slow SLBM modernization program of the early 1970s), in the 1990s the modernization of the sea-going leg of the Russian nuclear triad has taken second place to the modernization of land-based ICBMs.[1] As a result of this slowing of the pace of modernization, the total number of Russian SSBNs in service has decreased by more than half since 1991. While in 1991 Russia's SSBN fleet included 61 boats, the July 2000 START I Memorandum of Understanding data for Russia listed only five Akulas [Project 941, NATO designation 'Typhoon'], seven Delfins [Project 667BDRM, NATO designation 'Delta IV'], 11 Kalmars [Project 667BDR, NATO designation 'Delta III'], and four Murenas [Project 667B, NATO designation 'Delta I'], for a total of 27 SSBNs. Moreover, these numbers include ships that have been withdrawn from active service and put in reserve status or await decommissioning, or that are undergoing repairs. The cuts included nearly all submarines belonging to Navaga [Project 667A, NATO designation 'Yankee II'], Murena [Project 667B, NATO designation 'Delta I'] and Murena-M [Project 667BD, NATO designation 'Delta II'] classes, as well as several Kalmars and one Akula. Nevertheless, even though the withdrawal of the older ships ought to have allowed the Russian Navy to concentrate its resources on maintaining the newer SSBNs, in 2000 the navy's SSBN readiness and maintenance programs were reportedly funded at only 55-60% of required levels.[2] This inadequate level of funding inevitably had a negative effect on the numbers of SSBNs in service and their readiness. Although Russian SSBNs have a design service life of 25-30 years, the ships require regular maintenance to fully exploit that potential. Funding shortages had the predictable consequence of accelerating their aging process. The premature aging process has affected even the largest Russian SSBNs, the Akulas, which are currently facing an uncertain future. Although Russian Navy experts believe their operational life can be extended until 2005-2010, their remaining missiles will exhaust their service lives by 2003.[3] Out of six Akulas built, as of July 2000 five were still listed as being in service, including one undergoing repairs. The sixth one has been sent to a shipyard for scrapping in 1999.[4] However, of the Akulas still officially in service, only two are reputed to be still seaworthy, whereas the remainder are limited to serving as floating missile platforms, unable to go out to sea but still capable of launching their missiles, although even that limited capability may be lost unless additional funds are allocated for maintenance.[5] Wishing to preserve these ships in service, the Russian Navy wants to allocate more funds for the costly renovation of Akulas and their aging R-39 missiles.[4,6] According to Russian press reports, up to four Akulas could have their service lives extended until 2010.[5] The first ship of the class, TK-208, which entered service in 1981 and has been at the Sevmash shipyard since 1991 undergoing repairs, is to return to active service in 2001. During its stay at Sevmash the TK-208 was reportedly modified to carry the Bark SLBM that was cancelled in 1998.[3] If Akulas remain in service, it is not yet clear which missiles they will carry after service lives of their current weapons expire. In a July 2000 interview, Chief of the Operations Directorate and Deputy Chief of the Naval Main Staff Vice-Admiral Nikolay Konorev stated that a new missile system was being developed for use on Akulas.[7] There have been reports that an Akula submarine will be used to conduct tests of the new Bulava SLBM (see below) currently under development for the Yuriy Dolgorukiy SSBN. However, the reports did not clarify whether the new missile would arm Akulas as well. The tests are reportedly planned for 2005.[8] In spite of this announcement, the head of the Northern Fleet's missile test range at Nenoksa, Rear Admiral Vladimir Makeyev, told the Russian press that the Akulas will be used to test the new Bark SLBMs, even though this missile was cancelled in 1998 by the Security Council after a series of unsuccessful test launches.[9] Adding to the confusion surrounding the Akulas' future, there have also been reports of plans to convert up to three of the submarines into submersible freighters, which would carry nickel ore along Russia's northern coasts and of a possible sale of two such submarines to China. The latter were denied by the Russian government, however.[5,10] The newest Russian SSBNs, the Delfins, are expected to stay in service until at least 2015.[11] These ships are likely to form the backbone of Russia's naval nuclear deterrent during the next decade, during which all of the older SSBNs (such as the Kalmars) and possibly some or even all Akulas are likely to be withdrawn from service (particularly if additional funds for modernization fail to materialize), while only a small number of newly built Borey-class submarines will become operational. Plans exist to modernize Delfins over the next decade and to equip them with an improved SLBM variant, the Sineva.[12] The older Kalmars are nearing obsolescence, with the last submarine of the class having been completed in 1981.[13] Despite their age, in April 1999 the Russian Navy decided to modernize eight of these submarines to allow them to remain in service until 2005.[14] Nevertheless, their service lives are not likely to be extended very far past that point, and by the end of the next decade all of them are likely to be phased out. However, extending the service lives of existing submarines does not obviate the need to fund the construction of new ones. Given the long design and construction times for SSBNs, any modernization program of the sea-based nuclear deterrent requires a long lead-in time. As noted earlier, the pace of SSBN construction in the 1990s has been wholly inadequate to the Russian Navy's needs. Only one new SSBN was laid down over the course of the past decade, the prototype 4th-generation Project 955 Borey-class Yuriy Dolgorukiy, whose construction officially began on 2 November 1996 in Severodvinsk, after nearly a decade-long break in SSBN construction. Although the Russian Navy had hoped the construction would take no more than four years, constant shortages of funding and problems with the development of a new SLBM intended for the submarine meant the expected 2002 entry into service has been postponed.[15] Construction cost of a single Borey-class submarine has been estimated at $1.5 billion.[16] Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov has provided some funds for its construction out of the city's budget.[17] The ship was reportedly only 47% complete in May 2000, some four years after the start of construction. Russian Navy Chief of Main Staff Admiral Viktor Kravchenko blames the slow pace of construction on inadequate funding, stating that the navy received only 12% of what it needs for its SSBN construction program. Admiral Kravchenko also stated that proper financing of Russia's naval deterrent would require 25-27% of Russia's military budget.[11] Speaking in 1998, then-Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Maslyukov estimated that the Russian Navy would have no more than one or two Borey-class submarines in service by 2010.[15] The situation was further complicated by the need to redesign the Borey-class after its SLBM, the Bark, was cancelled in 1997. Some US experts have initially interpreted the Yuriy Dolgorukiy to be a development of the Typhoon class or even a derivative of the new Severodvinsk class of attack submarines. However, the majority of Russian experts consider the Yuriy Dolgorukiy to be in effect a 'Delta V', or a development of the Project 667 series of SSBNs. It is a 170m-long ship with a surface displacement variously estimated to be between 17,000 and 20,000 metric tons and submerged displacement of 33,800 metric tons, making it larger than the Delfin-class, but smaller than the Akula-class. It was originally to carry 12 missile tubes located behind the sail, but that number may change as a result of the cancellation of the originally planned SLBM and redesign work to accommodate a different missile.[18] It is not known how many Borey-class submarines will be built. According to the Russian Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev, the total Borey fleet would comprise 10-15 vessels.[2] According to other sources, the Russian Navy reportedly intends to procure a total of seven such submarines.[15] The combined result of insufficient funding for the maintenance of existing submarines and new construction programs is that the Russian SSBN fleet will continue to shrink in the next decade. According to its 1998 estimates, the Russian navy expected to have 27 SSBNs in service in 2003, belonging to the Kalmar, Delfin, and Akula classes. According to the same estimates, the number would decrease to only 16 after 2006, only slightly above the minimum level of 15 SSBNs considered acceptable by the Russian Navy.[19] However, even these estimates may yet prove to be overly optimistic. According to a study by Anatoliy Dyakov and Pavel Podvig of the Center for Study of Disarmament Problems, by the end of 2007 Russia's naval strategic deterrent will consist only of seven Delfin submarines. If the total number of SSBNs were to drop to such a low level, the Russian naval deterrent would fall considerably below its START II-allowed ceiling. If Podvig's and Dyakov's estimate proves correct, the seven Delfins will provide Russia with a seagoing naval deterrent of only 448 warheads, unless these ships receive new missiles carrying more warheads. If the total number of submarines were to be increased to nine or 10, as a result of commissioning Yuriy Dolgorukiy-class submarines, the number of SLBM-carried warheads might increase to 800-900.[20] The number by which the introduction of Borey-class submarines will increase the total number of naval strategic warheads will depend on the number and type of missiles it will carry. As originally designed, each Yuriy Dolgorukiy was to carry 120 warheads on 12 missiles. Due to the cancellation of the Bark it may be redesigned to carry a similar or larger number of lighter missiles carrying anywhere between three and 10 warheads each, most likely leading to a total number of warheads per submarine in the vicinity of 100, more than 64 carried by Delfins, but considerably less than 200 warheads carried by each Akula. Missile Developments Along with several classes of SSBNs, Russia entered the 1990s with several types of SLBMs. In 1991 Russia's SLBM arsenal included R-27 missiles [NATO designation SS-N-6 'Serb', START designation RSM-25] on Navagas, R-29 missiles [NATO designation SS-N-8 'Sawfly', START designation RSM-40] on Murenas and Murena-Ms, R-29R [NATO designation SS-N-18 'Stingray', START designation RSM-50] on Kalmars, R-29RM [NATO designation SS-N-23 'Skiff', START designation RSM-54] on Delfins, and R-39 [NATO designation SS-N-20 'Sturgeon', START designation RSM-52] on Akulas. This arsenal has decreased, both in terms of number of missiles and number of types, over the past decade as older types of submarines have been withdrawn. By 2000 only three type of missiles (R-29R, R-29RM, R-39) were still in service, and two of them (R-29R, R-39) were rapidly approaching the end of their service lives. Just as the Russian Navy did not receive a single new SSBN during the last decade, it did not place a single new type of SLBM in service. This has affected the prospects for extending the service lives of existing submarines (for example, the remaining R-39 missiles used by Akulas are expected to exhaust their service lives by 2003) and delayed the construction of the Yuriy Dolgorukiy. Although some US analysts have speculated that the Yuriy Dolgorukiy would carry the R-39U [NATO designation SS-NX-28] SLBM, a derivative of the 10-warhead solid-fuel R-39 missile carried by Akulas, this missile's development began in 1985 and the decision to accept it into service was made in 1989, long before the new SSBN class was conceived. According to some Russian experts, the R-39U was intended to equip the Akulas after the service lives of their older missiles have expired.[21] The missile originally intended for the Yuriy Dolgorukiy was the Bark, or Project 3M91. A derivative of the R-39, it was nevertheless a different missile than the R-39U. A solid-fuel missile weighing 87.6 metric tons (slightly less than the 90 metric ton R-39), Bark had a throw-weight of 3.05 metric tons (as opposed to 2.55 metric tons for the R-39) and could carry up to 10 warheads. According to Director General of the Makeyev Design Bureau Vladimir Degtyar, the Bark incorporated a number of ABM system penetration-enhancing features, and could be launched on a flattened trajectory, which reduced its flight time by nearly half.[3] It was under development until 1997, when it was cancelled following three unsuccessful tests.[22] Following the cancellation of the Bark, the already slowly progressing construction of Yuriy Dolgorukiy was suspended pending the development of a new suitable SLBM, and the redesign of the submarine's missile compartment to accomodate it. During its special session on 3 July 1998, the Russian Security Council adopted a strategic forces development program which, among other things, ordered the development of a new SLBM. This "compact-sized" missile, tentatively called Bulava (Bulava-30, according to some sources) is to be jointly developed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), which designed the Topol-M ICBM, and the Makeyev Design Bureau, the traditional developer of Russian SLBMs. According to some reports, the new SLBM is supposed to have 70% commonality with the Topol-M.[22] According to a September 1999 interview with the chief designer of the Topol-M, Yuriy Solomonov, the new SLBM was in the early stages of design at the time. Solomonov also stated that work on the new missile is proceeding in parallel with work on redesigning the Yuriy Dolgorukiy to accept the new missile, and that the new SLBM will be equipped with a different type of warhead than the Topol-M, although he declined to say how many warheads it is designed to carry. Once accepted into service, the Bulava would be produced by the same production association that produces the Topol-M. Makeyev design bureau's participation will apparently be limited to adapting the missile to naval use.[23] However, the new missile is not expected to enter service before 2010.[24] The Security Council made the decision to start developing of Bulava with MITT participation only after heavy MITT lobbying and over objections by the Makeyev Design Bureau which claimed that work on the Bark was 73% complete and that the missile's problems were not insurmountable.[3] Although collaborating with MITT on the solid-fuelled Bulava, the Makeyev Design Bureau also hopes to capitalize on its long experience of building liquid-fuelled SLBMs, which include the R-29RM which arms Delfins, and has been working on an upgraded variant of the R-29RM armed with 10 warheads. Called the Sineva, the newest R-29 derivative has been described as incorporating many of the technologies originally planned for the Bark, including new space navigation and computer systems, as well as ABM penetration features.[3] Its production was ordered in September 1999 by the Military-Industrial Commission chaired by then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. The order called for the production of an unspecified number of Sinevas over a five-year period.[26] In the meantime, the only SLBM expected to be in production in Russia in the foreseeable future is the Sineva, As with other Russian strategic forces modernization programs, the implementation of this initiative is also heavily dependent on the availability of funding. During a May 2000 interview Makeyev Design Bureau Director General Vladimir Degtyar complained that inadequate funding caused delays in resuming missile production.[3] Sources: 
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