Fact Sheet

Iran Nuclear Overview

Arak IR-40 Heavy Water Reactor, Iran. (Src. Wikimedia Commons)

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Iran Nuclear Overview

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Background

This page is part of the Iran Country Profile.

Iran’s interest in nuclear technology dates to the 1950s, when the Shah of Iran received technical assistance under the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. While this assistance ended with the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran remained interested in nuclear technology and developed an extensive nuclear fuel cycle, including sophisticated enrichment capabilities, which became the subject of intense international negotiations and sanctions between 2002 and 2015. Negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran yielded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015, a comprehensive 25-year nuclear agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear capacity in exchange for sanctions relief. On 16 January 2016, all nuclear-related sanctions on Iran were lifted in response to its progress meeting key metrics of the deal. 1 On May 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the United States would unilaterally cease implementing the JCPOA, and intended to re-impose nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. This decision was met with resistance by Iran and the other members of the P5+1, who stated their intent to maintain the deal without U.S. participation. Iran has since rolled back its compliance with the deal’s operational limits on Iran’s nuclear program.

History

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: 1950s to 1988

Iran’s nuclear program began in the 1950s but was slow to progress. The United States supplied the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) with a small 5MWt research reactor (TRR), fueled by highly enriched uranium (HEU), in 1967. In 1973, the Shah unveiled ambitious plans to install 23,000MWe of nuclear power in Iran by the end of the century, charging the newly founded Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) with oversight of this task. 2

In the five years that followed, Iran concluded several nuclear technology related contracts with foreign suppliers and invested in education and training for its personnel. In 1976, Iran paid one billion dollars for a ten percent stake in Eurodif’s Tricastin uranium enrichment plant in France and a fifteen percent stake in the RTZ uranium mine in Rossing, Namibia. 3 Tehran signed a $700 million contract to purchase uranium yellowcake from South Africa, and sent Iranian technicians abroad for nuclear training. 4 By the time of the 1979 revolution, Iran had developed an impressive baseline capability in nuclear technologies.

Much of Iran’s nuclear talent fled the country in the wake of the Revolution. 5 This loss, compounded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s opposition to nuclear technology, resulted in the near disintegration of Iran’s nuclear program post-1979. Work on nuclear projects that had been ongoing under the Shah, such as construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant was suspended. However, in 1984 Khomeini expressed a renewed Iranian interest in nuclear power, seeking the assistance of international partners to complete construction at Bushehr. 6

Accelerating Under the Radar of the International Community: 1989 to 2003

Freed from the burden of the costly war with Iraq, Iranian leaders began refocusing on nuclear technology acquisition in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Iran signed long-term nuclear cooperation agreements with Pakistan and China, in 1987 and 1990 respectively. 7 Accords with both countries involved the training of Iranian personnel, China also agreed to provide Iran with a 27KW miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR) and two 300MW Qinshan power reactors. 8 In January 1995, Russia announced that it would complete Bushehr’s construction and agreed to build three additional reactors. 9

U.S. intelligence agencies have long suspected Iran of using its civilian nuclear program as a cover for clandestine weapons development, and the U.S. government has actively pressured potential suppliers to limit nuclear cooperation with Iran. As a result, China did not ultimately supply Iran with the research reactor (which would have been suitable for plutonium production), the two Qinshan power reactors, or the uranium conversion plant it had previously offered Iran. The United States also blocked Iran’s agreement with Argentina for uranium enrichment and heavy water production facilities.

Russia and Iran signed a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in August 1992. 10 In a follow-up agreement in 1995, Russia agreed to complete construction of the Bushehr-1 nuclear power plant and also secretly offered to supply Iran with a large research reactor, a fuel fabrication facility, and a gas centrifuge plant. 11 Hearing of these covert negotiations, U.S. President Bill Clinton expressed concerns about the technology transfers to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who eventually agreed to scale back Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation at least until Bushehr’s construction had been completed. 12 Despite this top-level ban on nuclear cooperation with Iran, American officials believe that individual Russian scientists and institutes assisted Iranian engineers in sensitive areas of the nuclear fuel cycle, and with the construction of a 40MW heavy water research reactor at Arak. 13

On 14 August 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) revealed the existence of undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran, including Natanz Enrichment Complex, the address of the Kalaye Electric Company, a heavy water production plant under construction at Arak, and the names of various individuals and front companies involved with the nuclear program. 14 Between September and October 2003, the IAEA carried out a number of facilities inspections and met with Iranian officials to determine the history of Iran’s nuclear program. In November, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution welcoming Iran’s decision to sign the Additional Protocol and suspend enrichment. However, the Board noted with concern Iran’s previous concealment efforts and pointed out that Iran’s new declarations contradicted the Agency’s previous information about its nuclear program. The Board requested that the Director General take all of the necessary steps to confirm Iran’s past and present nuclear activities. 15

At a Diplomatic Impasse with the International Community: 2003 to 2009

To avoid referral to the UN Security Council, Iran entered into negotiations with the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), and agreed in October 2003 to cooperate with the IAEA, sign the Additional Protocol, and temporarily suspend conversion and enrichment activities. 16 However, Iran exploited ambiguities in the definition of “suspension” to continue to produce centrifuge components and carry out small-scale conversion experiments. 17 Faced with renewed sanctions threats, Iran concluded the Paris Agreement with the EU-3 on 15 November 2004. 18 Tehran agreed to continue the temporary suspension of enrichment and conversion activities, including the manufacture, installation, testing, and operation of centrifuges, and committed to working with the EU-3 to find a mutually beneficial long-term diplomatic solution. 19

In early November 2004, the CIA received thousands of pages of information from a “walk-in” source indicating that Iran was modifying the nose cone of its Shahab-3 missile to carry a nuclear warhead. Furthermore, in early 2004, the IAEA discovered that Iran had hidden blueprints for a more advanced P-2 centrifuge and a document detailing uranium hemisphere casting from its inspectors. 20 Iranian officials dismissed these documents as forgeries. 21 The IAEA called on Iran to be more cooperative and to answer all of the Agency’s questions about the origins of its centrifuge technology. 22 Iran amended its previous declaration and admitted that it had clandestinely imported P-1 centrifuges through a foreign intermediary in 1987. Iran also acknowledged for the first time that it had imported P-2 centrifuge drawings in 1994. 23 The Agency determined that the traces of highly enriched uranium (HEU) on Iranian centrifuge equipment most likely originated from the foreign intermediary, as they did not match any samples from Iran’s declared inventory. 24

Diplomatic progress broke down on 1 August 2005, when Iran notified the IAEA that it would resume uranium conversion activities at Esfahan. 25 On 5 August, Iran rejected the EU-3’s Long Term Agreement, because Tehran felt that the proposal was heavy on demands, light on incentives, did not incorporate Iran’s proposals, and violated the Paris Agreement. 26 The Board of Governors responded by adopting a resolution that found Iran in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement. On 28 June 2005, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13382, blocking the financial assets of individuals and entities supporting WMD proliferation. Four Iranian entities were designated as agents of proliferation concern, including the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the Aerospace Industries Organization. 27

In February 2006, Tehran ended its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol and resumed enrichment at Natanz. The IAEA Board of Governors subsequently voted to report Iran’s case to the UN Security Council (UNSC). On 15 March, the UNSC released a Presidential Statement, calling on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA. 28 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad responded by delivering a speech in April in which he discussed Iran’s possession of a second uranium enrichment facility with P-2 centrifuges. 29 In June, the EU-3 together with the United States, China and Russia (P5+1) offered to provide Tehran with advanced civilian nuclear technology if Iran suspended enrichment activities and resumed implementation of the Additional Protocol. 30 Iran responded to this proposal in a letter addressed to President George W. Bush, which made only brief reference to the nuclear issue and did not address the demands of the international community. 31 In response to Iranian defiance, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1696 in July, which demanded that Iran suspend enrichment activities, banned the international transfer of nuclear and missile technologies to Iran, and froze the foreign assets of twelve individuals and ten organizations involved with the Iranian nuclear program. 32 President Ahmadinejad vowed to ignore the UNSC resolution and continue enrichment. 33 That same month, Iran inaugurated a heavy water production plant at Arak, prompting yet another UNSC resolution. 34 As it had with Resolution 1696, Iran also ignored Resolution 1737 and continued to operate and expand its Natanz enrichment facility. 35

In November 2007, Iran admitted that the foreign intermediary from its previous declarations was the illicit global nuclear trafficking network of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. Iran also admitted to purchasing a complete set of P-2 centrifuge blueprints from the Khan network in 1996, which it used when it began constructing and testing P-2 centrifuges in 2002. However, Iran refused to answer the Agency’s outstanding questions about its UF4 conversion activities (“The Green Salt Project”), high explosives testing, and re-entry vehicle design. 36

On 14 June 2008, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, met in Tehran with Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, and Iran’s top nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili to deliver a new P5+1 incentives package. The proposal offered economic incentives, access to LWR technology, and a guaranteed nuclear fuel supply in exchange for the freezing of Iran’s enrichment efforts. 37 Speaking just days before the deadline set by world powers for Iran’s reply, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said Iran would “continue with its path” of nuclear development. 38 The UN Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1835 on 27 September 2008, reaffirming previous resolutions demanding a halt to Iran’s nuclear activities. 39

On 21 September 2009, ahead of the public revelation by the leaders of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, Iran disclosed to the IAEA that it was building a second pilot enrichment facility. 40 According to IAEA Spokesperson Marc Vidricaire, Iran’s letter “stated that the enrichment level would be up to 5%,” and the Agency was assured that additional information would be provided in due time. The facility was located in an underground tunnel complex on the grounds of an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) base near the city of Qom. Managed by Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) was slated to hold 2,784 centrifuges, and began operations using 696 centrifuges in late 2011. 41 Moreover, Iran contradicted its declaration to the IAEA concerning planned enrichment levels by moving 19.75% enrichment activities from Natanz to Fordow. 42 A May 2012 report from the IAEA raised concerns over the activity at Fordow, citing uranium enriched past the stated target of 19.75%, and the “difference between the original stated purpose of the facility, and the purpose for which it is now used.” 43 The plant’s size, secrecy, and location on an IRGC military base led some analysts in the U.S. government to argue that Iran constructed it in order to produce HEU for nuclear weapons. 44

In fall 2009, Iran and the P5+1 resumed talks-first on October 1 in Geneva, and then on 19 October in Vienna. During the October negotiations with the P5+1, Iran agreed to IAEA inspections at the FFEP and, in principle, to send 1,200kg of LEU to Russia for further enrichment and to France for fuel plate fabrication. 45 The Tehran Research Reactor was expected to run out of 19.7% enriched LEU fuel soon after 2009. This prompted Iran to seek a replacement for the fuel and, reportedly, to signal readiness to ship its domestically produced LEU to a third country for further enrichment. Representatives from the P5+1 and Iran tentatively agreed to this fuel swap arrangement at the meeting in Geneva on 1 October 2009. 46 Iran, however, subsequently rejected the deal and proposed instead to conduct the exchange in phases, with the first phase involving the swap of 400kg of LEU for fuel on the Gulf island of Kish. The proposal, announced by Iran’s Foreign Minister Mottaki, was dismissed by the IAEA and the United States as inconsistent with earlier negotiations. 47

Following the breakdown in negotiations, Iran informed the IAEA that it would begin enriching some of its LEU to up to 20% U-235. 48 Four days later, President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had produced 20% enriched uranium and had the ability to enrich it further if it chose to do so. 49 Following President Ahmadinejad’s announcement, France, Russia, and the United States sent a letter to the IAEA expressing their commitment to the fuel swap agreement and their resolve to ensure that the deal would be implemented in full. 50

Tensions with the international community further increased after President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran intended to construct 10 additional uranium enrichment facilities. Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the AEOI, announced that Iran had identified close to twenty sites for these future plants and that construction work on two of the plants would begin “within the year.” 51 On 15 December 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill stipulating the imposition of sanctions on “foreign companies that help supply gasoline to Iran.” 52

Agency inspectors visited the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), and carried out the first design information verification inspection from 26-27 October 2009. The Agency verified that the facility was being built to house 3,000 IR-1 centrifuges. In November 2009, the IAEA Board of Governors voted to rebuke Iran for building the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in secret. The resolution urged Iran to clarify the original purpose of the Fordow enrichment site, stop its construction, confirm that there were no more undeclared facilities, and comply with the UN Security Council Resolutions adopted earlier. 53

Increased Sanctions and Stalled P5+1 Talks: 2010 to early-2013

In June 2010, the UN Security Council approved another set of sanctions under UNSCR 1929, primarily aimed at Iran’s nuclear-related investments; three affiliates of the state-owned shipping company the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which had already been targeted by unilateral U.S. and EU sanctions; and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. 54 In 2011, the United States increased pressure on the IRISL, and several companies and individuals were indicted on charges of aiding the IRISL in conducting fraudulent transactions through nine major banks located in New York. 55 In October 2011, the United States sanctioned a ring of six front companies in Panama which allegedly took over control of some IRISL vessels after the June 2011 indictment. 56

In a letter dated 19 February 2010, Iran informed the IAEA that it was still seeking to purchase LEU for the Tehran Research Reactor on the international market and would be willing to exchange LEU for fuel assemblies “simultaneously or in one package inside the territory of Iran.” Iran requested that the IAEA convey this message to the P5+1 but the sides were not able to restart negotiations. 57 The breakdown of talks was followed by a new nuclear fuel swap proposal brokered by Brazil and Turkey. On 17 May 2010, Brazil, Turkey and Iran issued a joint statement in which Iran agreed to export half of its LEU stock (1,200kg) to Turkey as a confidence-building measure, in return for 120kg of 20% enriched uranium for use in its medical research reactor. 58 The deal, however, was not accepted by Western countries, who saw Iran’s agreement to the removal of only 1,200kg of LEU from its territory as too little, too late.

In October 2010, the P5+1 extended another invitation to Iran to discuss its nuclear program, but did not accept Iran’s request for Turkey or Brazil to attend. 59 Talks resumed on 6 December 2010 in Geneva, during which the P5+1 requested assurances that the Iranian nuclear program remained peaceful and Iran requested that international sanctions be lifted. 60 Diplomats convened for the next round of talks in Istanbul, Turkey in late January 2011. The talks broke down due to Iran’s insistence on the lifting of all economic sanctions as a precondition for substantive discussions on its nuclear program. 61

On 13 July 2011, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov proposed a phased approach to addressing the nuclear dispute with Iran. Under the Russian proposal, Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA would be met with reciprocal steps from the P5+1. 62 According to Iranian former chief nuclear negotiator Hossein Mousavian, the proposal envisioned five stages, with Iran limiting its enrichment activities to one site; capping enrichment levels at 5% U-235; implementing modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements that provides for early provision of design information; ratifying the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement; and finally, suspending enrichment for three months. In response, at each stage the P5+1 would gradually lift sanctions imposed unilaterally and through the UN Security Council. 63 Iran initially welcomed the Russian plan, but the United States, the United Kingdom and France did not accept the idea of lifting sanctions at an early stage. 64 Formal discussions on the basis of the proposal never took place.

On 8 November 2011, the IAEA released a safeguards report that more fully detailed Iran’s secret nuclear weapons program for the first time. According to the report, the IAEA estimated that the program, named “Project Amad,” was established in the late 1990s or early 2000s, though the bulk of the activity occurred between 2002 and 2003. 65 The Agency presented a lengthy, detailed account of “possible military dimensions” to Iran’s nuclear program. Most of the information in the annex had been known previously, but the November 2011 report was the first time that the IAEA assembled available evidence into one overview document. According to the report, Iran engaged in a range of activities “relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.” 66 These included efforts to “procure nuclear related and dual-use equipment and materials by military-related individuals and entities;” to develop “undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material;” to acquire “nuclear weapons development information and documentation,” presumably from the A.Q. Khan network; and to “work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components.” The report further stated that prior to the end of 2003 those activities took place under a “structured program,” and that there are indications that “some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.” 67 The IAEA report led to the adoption of a new resolution by the Board of Governors that expressed “deep and increasing concern” about the unresolved issues and urged Iran to fully comply with its obligations. 68

After the November 2011 IAEA report, and given that Russia and China both opposed a new UN Security Council resolution and new sanctions, the United States and the European Union launched a series of unprecedented unilateral measures. For the first time, the United States designated the Government of Iran and all financial institutions in the country as entities of money laundering concern, warning financial institutions around the world that doing business with Iranian banks entailed significant risks. 69 In December 2011, the U.S. Congress enacted the Menendez-Kirk amendment, requiring the President to sanction the Central Bank of Iran, as well as foreign financial institutions, including central banks, for processing transactions related to oil and petroleum products on behalf of Iranian companies and the Iranian government. 70 The measures entered into force in the summer of 2012. The Obama administration granted waivers to 20 countries, exempting them from financial sanctions because they significantly reduced their purchases of Iranian oil. These countries included China, Turkey, South Korea, Japan, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Taiwan, India, and Malaysia. The administration also granted waivers to 10 European Union members after the bloc agreed on 23 January 2012 to freeze all assets of the Central Bank of Iran and phase-out Iranian oil imports by 1 July 2012. 71 On 5 February, the United States ordered the freezing of all property of the Government of Iran, including its Central Bank, and all other Iranian financial institutions. 72

In late January 2012, an IAEA team headed by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards Herman Nackaerts visited Iran to discuss ways to resolve outstanding issues. A follow-up visit took place in late February 2012, but the two sides were unable to agree on a plan, and the IAEA expressed its disappointment in the meeting due to Iran’s refusal to grant access to the Parchin military complex―a site where Iran has allegedly conducted high explosive and hydrodynamic experiments relevant to the development of nuclear weapons. 73 On 6 March 2012, Iran announced that it would allow IAEA inspectors to visit Parchin. However, subsequent IAEA-Iran talks throughout 2012 did not produce an agreement on a “structured approach” that would include a visit to the site. 74 Furthermore, at a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in September 2012, the U.S. envoy accused Iran of “systematically demolishing” the very facility IAEA inspectors wanted to visit. 75 The Institute for Science and International Security has published satellite images of the site that show items that “could be associated with the removal of equipment or with cleansing it.” 76 A May 2013 report by the IAEA Director General noted that Iran has “[spread, leveled and compacted] material over most of the site, a significant portion of which it has also asphalted.” 77

In March 2012, the EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, speaking for the Western powers, announced that she had “offered to resume talks with Iran on the nuclear issue.” 78 On 14 April 2012, Iran and the P5+1 countries met in Istanbul to re-open discussions about Iran’s nuclear program. The talks lasted two days and were described as constructive, with the two sides reportedly refraining from confrontational rhetoric, and agreeing to hold another round of talks in May 2012 in Baghdad. 79 On 23 May 2012, the second round of new P5+1 talks with Iran was held in the “Green Zone” of Baghdad, Iraq. In an attempt to build on the momentum from the Istanbul talks, both sides went to Baghdad with specific proposals on key issues. The P5+1 requested that Iran stop uranium enrichment up to 20% U-235, ship out all of the 20% enriched uranium already produced, and close the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. 80 In return, the P5+1 were reportedly prepared to discuss the provision of medical isotopes, cooperation in nuclear safety, and the supply of parts for Iran’s civil aviation. 81 They also “offered to refrain from imposing further United Nations sanctions against Iran.” 82 Iran signaled a willingness to halt the 20% enrichment if the move were met with lifting of some of the current sanctions, such as those imposed against its oil industry and central bank. The P5+1 position, however, was that an end to 20% uranium enrichment and greater transparency needed to precede the lifting of any sanctions, rather than happening simultaneously. Iran has insisted that its “inalienable right” to enrich uranium be recognized by the P5+1. Media reported that Iran’s five-point proposal included non-nuclear issues, such as regional security, but no further details were publicly available. The parties were once again unable to agree on substantive actions. 83

At June 2012 negotiations in Moscow, the parties did not change their positions, but more details on Iran’s proposal were reported. The five-point proposal included the following: recognition of Iran’s right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes; sanctions relief in return for Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA; cooperation in nuclear energy and safety; a possible cap on 20% enrichment; and several non-nuclear issues. 84 With no agreement achieved, the high-level talks were suspended. On 3 July 2012, the P5+1 and Iran held a technical meeting in Istanbul among lower-level officials. 85 At the gathering, “the experts explored positions on a number of technical subjects.” On 24 July, Iran’s deputy nuclear negotiator Ali Bagheri and EU deputy foreign policy chief Helga Schmid met in Istanbul to find “common ground and coordination” between the parties. 86 Although the talks were described as constructive, no agreement was achieved and details of the discussions were withheld. 87

On 10 August 2012, President Barack Obama signed into law the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, expanding sanctions against Iran. 88 The law included a ban on the provision of insurance, reinsurance, and other shipping services to vessels of entities involved in proliferation. 89 The European Union also tightened its restrictions on trade with Iran, prohibiting the import, financing, insurance, and brokering of Iranian natural gas, and banning the supply of vessels to transport or store Iranian oil. The EU banned the provision of ship-building, flagging, and classification services to Iran’s ships, as well as the sale of graphite, aluminum, and steel. 90 The shipping sanctions affected not only U.S.- and EU-sanctioned IRISL, but also the vessels of the National Iranian Tanker Company, which transport oil.

In November 2012, the P5+1 agreed to pursue new talks with Iran. 91 Bringing updated proposals, the parties met in late February 2013 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Initial political consultations were followed by a technical meeting in Istanbul, but the subsequent round in Almaty failed to end the stalemate, and no further talks were scheduled. 92 Media later reported that the P5+1 proposal envisioned that Iran would suspend enrichment to 20% U-235; ship its 20%-enriched stockpile out of Iran (except material used for production of medical isotopes); agree to enhanced IAEA verification measures; and “suspend operations at, but not dismantle the cascades,” at Fordow for six months, while the parties negotiated a long-term settlement. In return, the P5+1 offered some relief from “sanctions on trade in gold and precious metals and petrochemical sales,” as well as licensing U.S. repairs of Iran’s civilian aircraft. Iran’s counterproposal, presented at the second Almaty meeting, suggested that Iran suspend 20% enrichment and continues to convert existing stock to oxide in return for recognition of its right to enrichment and “lifting of some banking sanctions.” 93

In May 2013, a U.S. Congressional committee approved legislation to further limit Iran’s oil exports and access to foreign currency reserves. 94 On 3 June 2013, President Obama signed an executive order that authorized, effective 1 July 2013, sanctions against “any foreign financial institution that conducts ‘significant transactions’ in the Iranian rial…or maintains rial accounts outside Iran.” 95

Hassan Rouhani’s victory in the June 2013 Iranian presidential elections signaled a shift in Iran’s position on nuclear negotiations. 96 In his inaugural address, President Rouhani, who served as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005, put priority on “elevating Iran’s position based on national interest and lifting of the oppressive sanctions,” signaling his intent to resume negotiations with the P5+1. 97 Secret bilateral talks between U.S. and Iranian officials in Oman, which reportedly started in March 2013, received new impetus following Rouhani’s election and began to focus on the outline of an eventual deal. 98

The first round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 was held in Geneva from 15-16 October 2013. After two additional rounds of intensive negotiations, Iran and the P5+1 announced on November 24th that they had reached an agreement on a Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), including interim steps over the next six months and elements of a longer-term, comprehensive solution. In addition, the IAEA and Iran agreed on a Framework for Cooperation (FFC) binding both parties to cooperate further “with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the IAEA to resolve all present and past issues.” 99 Both sides were unable to negotiate a comprehensive agreement and numerous deadlines were imposed, and allowed to expire, before the final negotiation process began with a 30 June 2015 deadline. Negotiations extended beyond the 30 June deadline with both side’s negotiating teams remaining in the Palais Coberg hotel in Vienna, Austria until an agreement could be reached. 100

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

On 14 July 2015 the P5+1 States and Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Although there was strong opposition in both the Iranian and the U.S. governments, legislation was passed in the U.S. Congress and the Iranian Parliament approving the deal. 101 102 On 20 July 2015, the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 2231 endorsing the plan. 103 The JCPOA is designed to limit Iran’s “breakout time” to a nuclear weapon from an estimated few months to one year or more. 104 This is being accomplished by the implementation of several measures to limit Iran’s ability to enrich uranium. First, the JCPOA requires Iran to reduce operational centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment facility from 19,000 to 5,060 until 2025. 105 The Fordow enrichment facility will be converted to research and development, and will not enrich uranium for a period of 15 years, while also having its centrifuges reduced to two cascades totaling 1044 machines. Iran agreed to ratify the Additional Protocol, in addition to its comprehensive safeguards agreement, and enact inspection measures that will enable IAEA inspectors unprecedented access to its nuclear facilities. In addition, Iran signed a “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues” agreement with the IAEA to resolve any questions the Agency still has concerning the possible military dimensions (PMD) of its nuclear program. This issue was reported as resolved by the IAEA Director General in his report to the Board of Governors on 15 December 2015. 106

In order to address concerns Iran could feasibly construct and operate a clandestine enrichment facility similar to Natanz or Fordow, the agreement allows for inspections of the entire fuel cycle; for up to 25 years at some facilities. This allows IAEA inspectors to inspect Iran’s uranium supplies from the mining stage through waste disposal, and monitor all centrifuge production facilities. 107

Finally, the JCPOA establishes a procurement channel monitored by a joint commission that will allow Iran to obtain the materials it needs to operate its nuclear facilities under the guidelines of international nuclear supply regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). 108

On 16 January 2016, the Director General of the IAEA issued a statement declaring Iran to be in compliance with all of its obligations under the JCPOA necessary to declare Implementation Day. This cleared the way for comprehensive sanctions relief for Iran while allowing IAEA inspectors continued, access to Iranian nuclear facilities. 109

Recent Developments and Current Status


Since 2016, the IAEA has released quarterly verification and monitoring reports on Iran’s implementation of the JCPOA in accordance with UNSCR 2231. These reports have been generally consistent with Iranian compliance in implementing the JCPOA. 110 However, some experts are concerned that JCPOA compliance monitoring has been incomplete. Analysts at the Institute for Science and International Security have criticized the IAEA reports as being too sparse to dispel controversies about Iran’s compliance. 111 These analysts also claim that Iran has exploited a loophole in the JCPOA to exceed its allotment of heavy water on two occasions. 112

Even before the JCPOA was signed and implemented, the U.S. Congress sought to hold the Obama administration accountable for the deal by passing the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, which required the president to certify Iran’s compliance with the deal to Congress every 90 days. 113 With the election of President Donald Trump, these periodic reviews became an opportunity for President Trump to follow through on his campaign promise to “dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.” 114 In April and July 2017, the Trump administration certified Iranian compliance, but voiced strong reservations and reluctance. 115 On 13 October 2017, President Trump announced that his administration would no longer certify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA. He alleged that Iran had not complied with the “spirit” of the deal, although he cited only minor and swiftly rectified Iranian technical violations of the deal involving surpassing the allowed limit of heavy water. 116 President Trump left it to the U.S. Congress to re-impose nuclear sanctions against Iran in December 2017. Congress let the deadline pass without action, allowing the deal to remain intact. In January 2018, President Trump again expressed his criticisms of the deal. While he agreed to renew the sanctions waivers, he challenged European allies to “join with the United States in fixing significant flaws in the deal” or face U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. 117

On 30 April 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered a presentation in which he revealed the seizure of over 100,000 documents by Israeli intelligence from what he called “Iran’s secret atomic archives.” Netanyahu claimed that the documents showed that Iran did in fact pursue a nuclear weapons program which comprised five 10-kiloton warheads and ended in 2003. 118 These figures suggested that Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions envisioned a rudimentary program compared to other nuclear weapon states. 119 Netanyahu contended that Iranian opacity about its prior nuclear efforts meant that the JCPOA had been negotiated under false pretenses, while others, such as UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, maintained that the revelations of Iran’s nuclear activities supported the necessity of the JCPOA and its inspections regime. 120

International and expert community reactions to Netanyahu’s presentation were largely dismissive of its informational value, and suspicious that the timing and theatrics of the event were intended to persuade President Trump to withdraw from the JCPOA. 121 Iran pushed back immediately: Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Amir Hatami responded to the Israeli allegations as a “baseless and unfounded … propaganda show,” while Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif referred to Netanyahu as “the boy who can’t stop crying wolf.” 122 The IAEA also released a statement reiterating that “the Agency had no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.” 123 White House spokeswoman Sarah Huckabee Sanders stated on May 1, 2018 that the United States had discussed the rollout of the presentation with Israel, suggesting some coordination between the two governments. 124

On 8 May 2018 President Trump announced that the United States would cease implementing the JCPOA and begin to reimpose nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. 125 He declared that the deal was “defective at its core,” and cited Iranian support for terrorism and pursuit of ballistic missiles, as well as the Israeli intelligence revelations on Iran’s earlier nuclear pursuits, as justifying the U.S. withdrawal. He did not cite any specific Iranian violations of the JCPOA. 126 As a result of the administration’s decision, U.S. companies with business relationships with Iran must sever contracts within 180 days, and the U.S. Treasury will re-impose secondary sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran. 127 Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated that Iran plans to discuss options for preserving the deal with the P5+1 nations. However, he expressed his displeasure with the United States’ lack of commitment to the agreement and also announced that he has “asked [Iran’s] Atomic Energy Organization to prepare the necessary orders to start unlimited enrichment.” 128 The leaders of France, the United Kingdom, and Germany issued a joint statement on behalf of their countries that reemphasized their support for the deal and its importance to the nonproliferation regime. 129 United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said that he was “deeply concerned” by Trump’s decision and released a statement in support of the continued implementation of the JCPOA. 130 Russia’s Foreign Ministry also reiterated its support for the JCPOA, and further stated that U.S. actions compromise international trust in the IAEA. 131

The IAEA released compliance reports between 22 February and 31 May 2019 declaring that Iran was in good standing pursuant to its IAEA agreements pertaining to verification and monitoring, heavy water processing, activities related to enrichment and fuel, centrifuge research and development, manufacturing and inventory, and transparency measures. 132  Afterward, in response to U.S. re-imposition of nuclear-related sanctions, Iran reduced its compliance with the JCPOA in five phases: on 1 July 2019, Iran exceeded 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride; on 8 July 2019, Iran enriched uranium past 3.67% up to 4.5%; and on 8 September, Iran announced that its commitments for research and development under the JCPOA would be completely removed. Iran proceeded to invest in research and development of centrifuge technology that is not compliant with IAEA monitoring and safeguards, and on 16 November, Iran notified the Agency that its stock of heavy water had exceeded 130 metric tons. 133 On 5 January, Iran proceeded with the planned fifth and final rollback to its commitments, forgoing all agreed-to limits on centrifuges. Iran did not declare any intent to pursue a nuclear weapon and pledged to continue cooperation with the IAEA. 134

Throughout 2020, Iran has exceeded limits on uranium enrichment agreed to in the JCPOA, however it has not enriched beyond 5% U-235. Iran continues to cooperate with IAEA inspectors in verification and monitoring of sites related to the JCPOA. 135 Iran has refused IAEA access to sites associated with revelations from the “atomic archive” released by Israel in 2018. In June 2020, the UK, France, and Germany joined the United States in submitting a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors calling on Iran to allow IAEA inspection teams to all requested sites. The IAEA Board of Governors approved the resolution on 19 June 2020. 136

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Glossary

Sanctions
Punitive measures, for example economic in nature, implemented in response to a state's violation of its international obligations.
Uranium
Uranium is a metal with the atomic number 92. See entries for enriched uranium, low enriched uranium, and highly enriched uranium.
Research reactor
Research reactor: Small fission reactors designed to produce neutrons for a variety of purposes, including scientific research, training, and medical isotope production. Unlike commercial power reactors, they are not designed to generate power.
Centrifuge
Centrifuge: A machine used to enrich uranium by rapidly spinning a cylinder (known as a rotor and containing uranium hexafluoride gas) inside another cylinder (called the casing).
Fuel Cycle
Fuel Cycle: A term for the full spectrum of processes associated with utilizing nuclear fission reactions for peaceful or military purposes. The “front-end” of the uranium-plutonium nuclear fuel cycle includes uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. The fuel is used in a nuclear reactor to produce neutrons that can, for example, produce thermal reactions to generate electricity or propulsion, or produce fissile materials for weapons. The “back-end” of the nuclear fuel cycle refers to spent fuel being stored in spent fuel pools, possible reprocessing of the spent fuel, and ultimately long-term storage in a geological or other repository.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
IAEA: Founded in 1957 and based in Vienna, Austria, the IAEA is an autonomous international organization in the United Nations system. The Agency’s mandate is the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, technical assistance in this area, and verification that nuclear materials and technology stay in peaceful use. Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to accept safeguards administered by the IAEA. The IAEA consists of three principal organs: the General Conference (of member states); the Board of Governors; and the Secretariat. For additional information, see the IAEA.
United Nations Security Council
United Nations Security Council: Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The Council consists of fifteen members, five of which—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are permanent members. The other ten members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. The five permanent members possess veto powers. For additional information, see the UNSC.
United Nations Security Council
United Nations Security Council: Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The Council consists of fifteen members, five of which—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are permanent members. The other ten members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. The five permanent members possess veto powers. For additional information, see the UNSC.
P-5
P-5: The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Enriched uranium
Enriched uranium: Uranium with an increased concentration of the isotope U-235, relative to natural uranium. Natural uranium contains 0.7 percent U-235, whereas nuclear weapons typically require uranium enriched to very high levels (see the definitions for “highly enriched uranium” and “weapons-grade”). Nuclear power plant fuel typically uses uranium enriched to 3 to 5 percent U-235, material that is not sufficiently enriched to be used for nuclear weapons.
Ratification
Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.
Proliferation (of weapons of mass destruction)
The spread of biological, chemical, and/or nuclear weapons, and their delivery systems. Horizontal proliferation refers to the spread of WMD to states that have not previously possessed them. Vertical proliferation refers to an increase in the quantity or capabilities of existing WMD arsenals within a state.
Bilateral
Bilateral: Negotiations, arrangements, agreements, or treaties that affect or are between two parties—and generally two countries.
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The NSG was established in 1975, and its members commit themselves to exporting sensitive nuclear technologies only to countries that adhere to strict non-proliferation standards. For additional information, see the NSG.
Ballistic missile
A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.  The flight of a ballistic missile includes three phases: 1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; 2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and 3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target.  Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters - range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision.  Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets.
Nonproliferation
Nonproliferation: Measures to prevent the spread of biological, chemical, and/or nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. See entry for Proliferation.

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