Submarine Proliferation

Iran Current Capabilities

Capabilities | Import | Export

Updated January 2010

Overview

Iran's submarine force currently consists of three Russian Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines (Tareq 901, Noor 902, Yunes 903), one 500-ton Nahang and four 120-ton Yono-class (also referred to as Qadir or Ghadir-class) midget submarines.[1] The Iranian Navy plays a crucial strategic role in Iran's national security architecture due to Tehran's dependence on the Persian Gulf for trade and security. However, its naval forces also operate in the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea and, possibly, the Indian Ocean.[2]

The Persian Gulf separates the Iranian landmass from the Arabian Peninsula and is connected to the Gulf of Oman through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most strategically located waterways in the world.[3] The Strait is about 120 miles long, 60 miles wide at the eastern, and 24 miles wide at the western end, with a complex system of narrow shipping lanes (about 2 miles) separated into outbound and inbound traffic. A considerable proportion of the world's oil exports pass through this narrow waterway and its critical role is amplified by the limited capacity of alternative energy routes. Currently, two main overland routes connect Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea: the East-West Pipeline (Petroline) and the Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas pipeline.[4]

The Iranian naval forces are divided into two branches: the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN, commanded by Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy (IRGCN, commanded by Rear Admiral Morteza Safari).[5] IRIN developed out of the Shah's Imperial Iranian Navy which existed prior to the Islamic revolution of 1979. The IRGCN emerged after the revolution (during the Iran-Iraq war) and was officially established in 1985.[6] During the 1984-88 Tanker War the IRCGN proved a capable force in disrupting Iraq's proxy oil exports using unconventional naval guerrilla tactics (amphibious offensives, speedboat hit-and-run attacks and frogmen commando raids on enemy port installations) after conventional methods like air- and ship launched missiles and naval gunfire had proved futile.[7] These asymmetric naval operations during the Iran-Iraq war form the basis for Iran's current maritime doctrine. The sinking of two Iranian surface vessels, a Vosper-class corvette and a Combattante-class guided missile patrol craft, by the U.S. Navy during Operation Praying Mantis in 1988 further convinced Tehran that in a classical naval engagement Iran would quickly be overwhelmed. Consequently, the Iranian leadership prioritized the foreign acquisition and indigenous development of submarines as a suitable means of supporting its new asymmetric doctrine.[8] The Kilo-class and midget submarines add substance to Iran's defense strategy by creating a balance between littoral defensive operations and offensive operations further out from the Persian Gulf. In a potential conflict, Iran is likely to use its submarines against seaborne enemy forces and commercial shipping traffic through the laying of mines and firing of torpedoes. They would also be used for reconnaissance missions and covert Special Forces insertion. In a 2007 discussion broadcast on Iranian television, Rear Admiral Sajjad Kuchaki, former Commander of IRIN, delineated the importance of the submarine force in Tehran's military strategy and mentioned various capabilities that Iran has successfully developed in the last few years. He claimed that more than 90 percent of the expertise needed for submarine construction is "home-grown." Although Admiral Kuchaki's announcements certainly contain the usual military rhetoric, the following excerpt provides a glimpse of Iranian naval strategy, especially the value of submarines as force multipliers vis-à-vis superior enemy surface forces.[9]

"Given that Iran has a strong dependency on sea, we believe we should move towards becoming stronger in waters. Iran's key strategy is the strategy of all-out defense. The main elements of this strategy are the submarines...we believe...that one submarine can engage and harm five equipped surface vessels.

"If we have 50 submarines, it will mean that the whole of the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman will be under our control...we are concentrating all our efforts on underwater vessels."

Since 2007 Tehran has been attempting to better integrate its two naval branches, leading to a clear division in operational territory. The IRGCN is now fully in charge of the Persian Gulf, while IRIN focuses its operations on the Gulf of Oman and the Caspian Sea.[10] IRIN controls the Kilo-class boats, in line with its operational responsibilities, while both branches operate the various midget submarines.

The three Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines were commissioned from 1992 to 1996. Iran allegedly paid USD600 million for each boat and they are all based at Bandar Abbas in the Straits of Hormuz (Tehran is reportedly contemplating the relocation of its submarines from the shallow waters of Bandar Abbas to naval facilities in deeper waters at Chah Bahar[11] in the Gulf of Oman). Two of the Kilo-class submarines are operational at any one time and they are occasionally deployed in the eastern mouth of the Straits, the Gulf of Oman or the Arabian Sea. The vessels are already halfway through their approximately 30-year lifespan and have not been overhauled, but they can still be considered to be at fair to good readiness levels.[12] Their utility in the Persian Gulf is, however, somewhat limited as Kilo-class boats require a depth of at least 164 ft and can therefore only access about one third of the Gulf.[13] Unique water conditions (water salinity and strong currents) in the Gulf further limit the boats' operational use unless the submarines are deployed to deeper waters in the Gulf of Oman or the Arabian Sea.[14]

One of Iran's Russian-built Kilo-class submarines
Source: www.dodmedia.osd.mil

In 2004 Iran began deploying small midget submarines for use in shallow coastal waters. Four of the Yono-class boats (see Figure 1) and one Nahang-class are currently in service.[15] In a June 2009 ceremony at Bandar Abbas another three Yono-class coastal submarines were unveiled but it is unclear whether they are yet operational.[16] Iran claims that both the Yono and Nahang class midget submarines were built indigenously. However, they may have received assistance from the People's Republic of China and/or North Korea.[17] The midget submarines are operated by both the IRIN an IRCGN. Their operational capabilities include firing torpedoes (both the Yono and the Nahang class have two 533mm tubes), laying mines for anti-shipping operations, as well as Special Forces insertion into enemy territory.[18] Iran is also experimenting with wet submersibles, the Sabehat-15 GPS-equipped two-seat submersible swimmer delivery vehicle (SDV) - designed by the Esfahan Underwater Research Center- has undergone testing with both the IRIN and the IRCGN. Due to their limited endurance and payload, SDVs are primarily used for mining, reconnaissance and special operations. They are also restricted to operating in coastal waters.[19] In September 2008 IRCGN commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari claimed that Iran will soon be adding a new semi-heavy domestically built vessel to its naval forces.[20] The Qaa'em class boat production line was inaugurated on August 25, 2008. During the ceremony, Iranian defense minister Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar claimed the boat would be capable of firing torpedoes and subsurface missiles.[21]

None of Iran's current submarine classes are capable of firing missiles. Since the 1990s, however, Iran has acquired or domestically produced a large number of mines and torpedoes that can be employed on most of its subsurface boats.[22] In 2005 it reportedly launched two local production lines of 533mm and 324mm wake-homing torpedoes with ranges of up to 20km.[23] Speculation surrounds Iran's claims that it has developed a supercavitating high-speed torpedo called 'Hoot' with speeds of 100m/s (223m/h or 360km/h), which is allegedly based on the Russian VA-111 Shkval.[24] Iran might have sourced the technology from China, which imported 40 Shkval torpedoes in 1998 from Kazakhstan and was successful in reverse-engineering them. The Shkval is a shallow-water, rocket-propelled, super-cavitating torpedo with a range between 7 to 11 kilometers.[25] Iran's arsenal of sea mines is estimated to number around 2,000, and includes the domestically produced Sadaf-01/02 bottom-moored contact mine, as well as the Chinese MC52 sea-rising mine.[26] The deal with the Russian Federation is believed to have included a large number of Russian MDM-UDM series mines that can be laid from 533mm tubes with a 1,100 kg charge that detonates in response to acoustic, magnetic, or pressure influences within a 50-60 meter radius.[27]

Sources
[1] Iran's Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Strategy, (Office of Naval Intelligence, Fall 2009), p. 15; "Submarine Forces, Iran," Janes Underwater Warfare Systems, July 2, 2009.; Anthony Cordesman and Adam Seitz, Gulf Threats, Risks and Vulnerabilities: Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, (Working Draft) August 26 2009), p. 19.
[2] "Submarine Forces, Iran," Janes Underwater Warfare Systems, July 2, 2009. www.janes.com
[3] Abdulaziz H. Abuzinada, Hans-Jorg Barth, et al. (eds.), Protecting the Gulf 's Marine Ecosystems from Pollution (Basel, Switzerland: Birkhauser Basel, 2008); and W. Abdel-Monim Mubarak and A. I. Kubryakov, "Hydrological Structure of Waters of the Persian Gulf According to the Data of Observations in 1992," Physical Oceanography 11, no. 5 (September 2001), pp. 459—471.
[4] Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, Iran's Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The threat in the Northern Gulf, Praeger Security International, 2007, p. 23 and Energy Information Administration, Persian Gulf Region, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 2007, www.eia.doe.gov.
[5] Iran's Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Strategy, (Office of Naval Intelligence, Fall 2009), p. 12.
[6] Fariborz Haghshenass, Iran's Asymmetric Naval Warfare, (Policy Focus #87, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2008), p. 17.
[7] "Iran's Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Strategy, (Office of Naval Intelligence, Fall 2009), p. 7; Fariborz Haghshenass, Iran's Asymmetric Naval Warfare, (Policy Focus #87, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2008), p. 5; Jahangir Arasli, Obsolete Weapons, Unconventional Tactics, and Martyrdom Zeal: How Iran would apply its Asymmetric Naval Warfare Doctrine in a Future Conflict, (George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 10, April 2007), p. 31.
[8] Anthony Cordesman and Adam Seitz, Gulf Threats, Risks and Vulnerabilities: Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, (Working Draft) August 26 2009), p. 20.
[9] "Iranian navy to test upgraded missiles-Commander," BBC Monitoring Middle East, April 20, 2007; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, web.lexis-nexis.com.
[10] Iran's Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Strategy, (Office of Naval Intelligence, Fall 2009), p. 16.
[11] Cordesman and Kleiber, Iran's Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The threat in the Northern Gulf, p. 115.
[12] Fariborz Haghshenass, Iran's Asymmetric Naval Warfare, (Policy Focus #87, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2008), p. 13.
[13] Philip G. Laquinta, "The Emergence of Iranian Sea Power," Naval War College, 13 February 1998, p. 6.
[14] Caitlin Talmadge, "Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz," International Security, Vol 33, No1. (Summer 2008) p. 90.
[15] Fariborz Haghshenass, Iran's Asymmetric Naval Warfare, (Policy Focus #87, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2008), p. 13; Iran's Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Strategy, (Office of Naval Intelligence, Fall 2009), p. 15.
[16] "Submarine Forces, Iran," Janes Underwater Warfare Systems, July 2, 2009. www.janes.com; "Iran domestic submarines join naval fleet," Press TV, June 1 2009,www.presstv.ir
[17] Jahangir Arasli, Obsolete Weapons, Unconventional Tactics, and Martyrdom Zeal: How Iran would apply its Asymmetric Naval Warfare Doctrine in a Future Conflict, (George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 10, April 2007), pp. 21, 23; Iran's Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Strategy, (Office of Naval Intelligence, Fall 2009), p. 7.; "Submarines, Iran," Jane's Underwater Warfare Systems, March 17, 2008, www.janes.com; "Iran Hails New Domestically Manufactured Submarine," Al-Manar TV, 28 November 2007, www.almanar.com.lb
[18] Jahangir Arasli, Obsolete Weapons, Unconventional Tactics, and Martyrdom Zeal: How Iran would apply its Asymmetric Naval Warfare Doctrine in a Future Conflict, (George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 10, April 2007), p. 22;
[19] Fariborz Haghshenass, Iran's Asymmetric Naval Warfare, (Policy Focus #87, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2008), p. 14.
[20] Semi-heavy submarines to protect Iran waters, Press TV, September 6 2008. www.presstv.com.
[21] Iran: Production On New Submarine Begins, STRATFOR, August 25 2008. www.stratfor.com
[22] Jahangir Arasli, Obsolete Weapons, Unconventional Tactics, and Martyrdom Zeal: How Iran would apply its Asymmetric Naval Warfare Doctrine in a Future Conflict, (George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 10, April 2007).
[23] "Iran's Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Strategy", (Office of Naval Intelligence, Fall 2009), p. 17; "Submarine Forces, Iran," Janes Underwater Warfare Systems, July 2, 2009, www.janes.com; Fariborz Haghshenass, Iran's Asymmetric Naval Warfare, (Policy Focus #87, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2008), p. 14.
[24] Fariborz Haghshenass, Iran's Asymmetric Naval Warfare, (Policy Focus #87, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2008), p. 14.
[25] "Analysis: Transfer of Torpedo Technology Linked to Official agencies," FBIS Document FEA20071108401906 and "Iran, China Developing High-Speed Torpedo," Kanwa Defense Review online edition, June 1, 2006; in "Kanwa: Iran, China Developing High-Speed Torpedo," FBIS Document CPP20060525515036
[26] Jahangir Arasli, Obsolete Weapons, Unconventional Tactics, and Martyrdom Zeal: How Iran would apply its Asymmetric Naval Warfare Doctrine in a Future Conflict, (George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 10, April 2007), p. 32; Caitlin Talmadge, "Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz," International Security, Vol 33, No1. (Summer 2008), pp. 90-93, Philip G. Laquinta, "The Emergence of Iranian Sea Power," Naval War College, 13 February 1998, pp. 7-8.
[27] Caitlin Talmadge, "Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz," International Security, Vol 33, No1. (Summer 2008), p. 92.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.