Kalaye Electric Company

View All Iran Facilities

Last Updated: January 1, 2011
Other Name: Kola Electric Company
Location: Tehran
Subordinate To: Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
Size: Two large workshops and several office buildings
Facility Status: Dismantled

The Kalaye Electric Company was a small workshop on the outskirts of Tehran that served as Iran's primary centrifuge R&D and pilot enrichment facility between 1995 and 2002. [1] After media reports revealed its existence, the IAEA asked to visit the facility in February 2003. Tehran initially denied the IAEA request and engaged in substantial concealment efforts, such as renovating the entire facility and removing equipment. [2] When Iran eventually granted the IAEA access to the site in March 2003, Tehran prohibited the Agency from taking environmental samples. [3] However, Iran allowed the IAEA to take environmental samples during a subsequent inspection in August 2003. These samples revealed the existence of undeclared nuclear material, including natural, depleted, low, and highly enriched uranium. [4] Iran later admitted that it had used the facility for the production of centrifuge components and had conducted some testing with uranium hexafluoride (UF6), including the introduction of UF6 into a 19-machine cascade in 2002. [5]

At the end of 2002, Tehran had moved all enrichment equipment to the new Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz and began using the Kalaye Electric Company for centrifuge component production. [6] In 2006, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 placed sanctions on the Kalaye Electric Company for supporting Iranian proliferation activities. The resolution blocked the company from importing or exporting sensitive nuclear material and equipment and froze its financial assets. [7]

[1] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran's Developing Military Capabilities," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, p. 110, www.csis.org.
[2] Yonah Alexander and Milton M. Hoenig, The New Iranian Leadership (London: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. 120.
[3] Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rhodan, Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction:The Real and Potential Threat (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), p.186.
[4] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 10 September 2003, www.iaea.org.
[5] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 10 September 2003, www.iaea.org; Institute for Science and International Security, "Nuclear Sites, Kalaye Electric Company," www.isisnucleariran.org.
[6] Vitaly Fedchenko, "Weapons of Mass Analysis - Advances in Nuclear Forensics," Jane's Intelligence Review, 18 October 2007, www.janes.com.
[7] United Nations Security Council, "Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for Failure to Halt Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1737 (2006)," UN Department of Public Information, 23 December 2006, www.un.org.

Country Profile
Flag of Iran

This article provides an overview of Iran's historical and current policies relating to nuclear, chemical, biological and missile proliferation.

Learn More →

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright 2019.