Ch'ŏngsu Chemical Complex

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Last Updated: March 1, 2003
Other Name: 청수화학연합기업소; Ch'ŏngsu Chemical Factory (청수화학공장)
Location: Ch'ŏngsu-nodongjagu (청수노동자구), Sakchu-kun (삭주군), North P'yǒng'an Province (평안북도), North Korea
Subordinate To: 5th Machine Industry Bureau (제5기계사업총국), Second Economic Committee (제2경제위원회) for chemical weapons production; Ministry of Chemical Industry (화학공업성) for civilian production
Size: Approximately 500,000 square meters
Facility Status: Unknown

Construction of the Ch'ongsu Chemical Factory was completed in the early 1950s. In 1954, Dr. Lee Sŭng Ki directed the early stages of a pilot process to produce vinalon, a synthetic fabric, with a daily output of 20kg. However, in 1958, the Korean Workers Party adopted Cabinet Decision No. 122, "On Promoting Construction of a Vinalon and Vinyl Chloride Plant," and large-scale production of vinalon, approaching 20,000 tons annually, was established at the February 8th Vinalon Complex in Hamhŭng, South Hamgyŏng Province.

[1] Various North Korean media reports in "DPRK's Ch'ongsu Chemical Factory, Suspect CW Site, Profiled," 22 November 2000, FBIS Document ID: KPP20001122000099;
[2] Osamu Eya, Kimu Jon Iru Daizukan (Tokyo: Shogakkan, 2000), pp. 64-65, in "Alleged Locations of DPRK Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Warfare Facilities Mapped," 6 June 2001, FBIS Document ID: KPP20010606000075;
[3] Inoue Tadao, Boei Gijutsu Janaru, December 1999, in "Ch'ongsu Chemical Factory Alleged CW Site," 11 January 2000, FBIS Document ID: FTS20000111000855;
[4] Yi Chae-sung, "Pukhan Kwahag'ŭi Isanggwa Hyŏnshil," Chapter Three in Pukhan'ŭl Umjiginŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, August 1998), pp. 123-174, in "Chemical Engineering, Experts Described," 23 December 1999, FBIS Document ID: FTS19991223001168.

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