Kusong Uranium Milling Facility

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Last Updated: June 1, 2005
Other Name: 구성우라늄제련시설; Kusŏng Uranium Processing Factory (구성우라늄가골골장)
Location: Kusŏng (구성시), North P'yŏng'an Province (평안북도), North Korea
Subordinate To: Ministry of Extractive Industries (채취공업성), Cabinet (내각)
Size: Unknown
Facility Status: Unknown

Construction of the uranium milling facility in Kusŏng was completed in 1989. Some sources consider this to be a uranium "conversion" facility. However, this facility processes uranium ore into yellow cake, or UO2. Therefore, the proper description of this facility's function is "milling." In August 1991, the Kusŏng Uranium Milling Facility was reported to have a processing capacity of 300kg of ore per day.

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[2] So Yong-ha, "Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development," Hoguk, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in "North's Nuclear Capability Assessed," FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 25.
[3] Alexandre Y. Mansourov, "The Origins, Evolution, and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1995, p. 27.
[4] Osamu Eya, Kimu Jon Iru Daizukan (Tokyo: Shogakkan, 2000), pp. 64-65.
[5] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 February 1994, pp. 74-79.
[6] Yu Min, "Pukhan Kip'okchekaebal Chipch'ak 70 Ch'arye P'okp'alshirhŏm/Russia Chŏngbu'ŭi Pukhaekp'yŏngganaeyong," Taehan Maeil, 5 January 1996, p. 6, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.
[7] Shin Hyo Sŏp, "Pukhan, 94 Nyŏn'kke Haekmugi Yangsan'ganŭng/'Haek Kaebal' Ŏdikkaji Wanna," Hankook Ilbo, 9 November 1991, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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